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Last updated on May 25, 2012 at 16:52 EDT

Bechtel and Parsons Brinckerhoff Reach Settlement on Big Dig

January 23, 2008
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Bechtel Infrastructure Corporation and Parsons Brinckerhoff today reached an agreement that settles claims by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the U.S. Attorney for the District of Massachusetts regarding our work as management consultant for the Boston Central Artery/Tunnel project, also known as the Big Dig.

John MacDonald, chairman of the Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff (B/PB) joint venture, issued the following statement:

We have reached a full and final settlement of claims by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the U.S. Attorney for the District of Massachusetts. Protracted legal proceedings would have served no one well, and we believe that this resolution is in the interests of all concerned.

We have always said that we take responsibility for our work. We understand and acknowledge with this resolution that our performance did not meet our commitment to the public or our own expectations. Above all, we deeply regret the tragic death of Milena Del Valle in the I-90 tunnel.

Our companies have a long history of delivering safe, high-quality engineering and construction services. Our willingness to scrutinize our own performance and learn from experience has been a major factor in our success. Going forward, we will implement a number of specific measures to apply lessons learned to our future work, such as improving quality management systems, more-extensive and mandatory training for field engineers, and additional standardized specifications for design and construction.

The Boston Central Artery/Tunnel project remains one of this country’s most remarkable infrastructure achievements. It will serve the people of Massachusetts well into the next century.

Under the terms of the agreement, Bechtel Infrastructure Corporation (BINFRA) will contribute $352 million toward the settlement, with Parsons Brinckerhoff (PB) contributing $47,230,500, which includes funds intended for future repairs and nonroutine maintenance of the Central Artery/Tunnel. Both BINFRA and PB will take specific actions to enhance their existing training, compliance, and quality assurance programs in order to improve long-term performance and ensure that future work benefits from lessons learned during the Central Artery/Tunnel project. The agreement also provides remedies in the unlikely event of a future major incident for which B/PB is liable.

Notes to Editors:

Roles and Responsibilities

 —  To build the Central Artery/Tunnel, the Massachusetts Highway     Department (MHD) and later Massachusetts Turnpike Authority (MTA) engaged     38 different section design consultants and 142 construction contracts.     MHD/MTA selected and awarded all of the design and construction contracts. —  Section design consultants prepared, stamped, and were responsible for     the final designs. Construction contractors were responsible for building     the facilities and meeting all of the requirements of their respective     contracts with MHD/MTA. B/PB was responsible for monitoring the     contractors’ compliance with terms and conditions of their respective     construction contracts. —  In 1999, just as construction activity was peaking, the MTA converted     from a traditional program management model to an integrated project     organization, which led to the management shifting to MTA. Although adopted     for the stated purpose of streamlining the management structure and     trimming costs, it also had the effect of blurring accountability and     responsibilities, and discouraging proactive project management. —  Describing the functional effect of the IPO, a National Academy of     Engineers report stated: “…during the transition to the IPO structure in     1997-1999, the best-qualified person available for a particular managerial     position was selected regardless of organizational affiliation (the     position of project director, who reports to the chairman of the MTA was     reserved for an MTA employee). In effect, B/PB is no longer in the role of     a project Management Consultant but supplies highly qualified people to     augment the staff of the MTA.”

I-90 Connector Tunnel Ceiling Panels

 —  The most comprehensive expert review of the tunnel ceiling-panel     collapse was conducted by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB),     which released its findings on July 10, 2007. In addition to noting B/PB     actions that contributed to the ceiling-panel collapse, the NTSB singled     out Powers Fasteners, the company that packaged, marketed, and distributed     the epoxy; the MTA; Gannett Fleming, the section design consultant; and     Modern Continental, the construction contractor. Power Fasteners has since     been indicted by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts for involuntary     manslaughter. —  The NTSB faulted Powers Fasteners for failing to provide the Central     Artery/Tunnel project with sufficiently complete, accurate, and detailed     information about the suitability of the company’s Power-Fast Fast Set     epoxy for sustaining long-term tensile loads and for failing to determine     that the anchor displacement was due to the use of this epoxy, which was     known by the company to have poor long-term load characteristics. —  The NTSB faulted MTA for failing to implement a timely tunnel     inspection program that would likely have revealed the ongoing anchor creep     in time to correct the deficiencies before an accident occurred. —  The NTSB faulted B/PB, along with the section designer, for failing to     identify potential long-term creep in the anchor adhesive and to account     for possible anchor creep in the design, specifications, and approval     process for the epoxy anchors used in that portion of the tunnel. It also     faulted B/PB, along with the construction contractor, for failing to     continue to monitor anchor performance in light of earlier anchor     displacement. —  The NTSB also noted a general lack of understanding and knowledge in     the construction community about creep in adhesive anchoring systems. —  Bruce A. Magladry, director of the National Transportation Safety     Board’s Office of Highway Safety, said of his investigation of the ceiling     collapse, “There’s no malice we find in the efforts of any of the people     involved in this construction project. These are conscientious people,     trying to do a job.”

Slurry Wall Construction

 —  Most of the tunnel walls on the I-93 mainline tunnel contracts were     slurry walls. (Slurry, a viscous liquid containing bentonite clay, holds     excavations open prior to the placement of concrete and is not part of the     final concrete wall.) Approximately 230 concrete slurry wall panels were     constructed on C17A1, one of the Central Artery/Tunnel’s mainline tunnel     contracts.      —  While the slurry was found to be out of specification in a number of     instances, the deviations from the specified tolerances were slight, and in     many cases the “out-of-spec” slurry on C17A1 would have met the slurry     tolerances for other sections of the Central Artery/Tunnel.      

Slurry Wall Breach

 —  In September 2004, a breach occurred in I-93 northbound tunnel wall,     in one of the deepest areas of the tunnel. The breach was unrelated to the     “out-of-spec” slurry. —  This wall breach resulted from a series of construction contractor     errors, compounded by inadequate oversight. B/PB missed an opportunity to     direct the contractor to correct the specific wall problem ahead of time. —  B/PB publicly acknowledged its responsibility at the time, and the     tunnel wall was repaired at no cost to the state. —  To minimize the possibility that similar problems might arise     elsewhere, project teams conducted physical inspections of approximately     1,600 tunnel wall panels. Of these, only one additional panel required     major repair. These inspections and repairs were carried out at the expense     of the contractor and B/PB.      

Oversight of Time and Materials Billing

 —  Part of B/PB’s contractual obligations after October 1, 2001 included     providing qualified personnel to staff the project’s Claims and Changes     Department. These personnel worked under the management, supervision, and     direction of MTA. The Claims and Changes Department was responsible for     reviewing contractors’ claims for payment for time and materials (T&M)     expenses and approving the claims for payment. —  Contractors submitted T&M slips to the department, as well as     spreadsheets summarizing the information contained on the T&M slips, to     support their claims for payment. —  A small number of contractors, seeking to increase their payments,     submitted T&M slips that recorded apprentice workers as journeymen workers,     which B/PB failed to catch. —  Three employees of one Central Artery/Tunnel contractor have pleaded     guilty to federal criminal charges for falsely categorizing apprentice     workers as journeymen.      

Concrete Program

 —  B/PB’s concrete testing program was reviewed and approved by MTA, MHD,     and the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA). The concrete quality     assurance program on the Central Artery/Tunnel met the applicable standards     required for highway construction, and MHD conducted regular independent     assessments of the testing program. —  In July 2007, concrete supplier Aggregate Industries agreed to pay $50     million for conspiracy to defraud the federal and state government in the     delivery of non-specification concrete to the project. In addition,     Aggregate Industries will provide up to $75 million in insurance coverage     for potential future structural maintenance costs related to its conduct. —  Aggregate Industries concealed this fraud by falsifying concrete batch     slips delivered to Central Artery/Tunnel inspectors and/or general     contractors’ representatives.      

Programmatic Upgrades

For BINFRA, these actions include:

 —  adopting a quality management system certified to ISO 9001:2000 for     all work for FHWA and/or the Commonwealth of Massachusetts; —  prohibiting the use of adhesive anchors in overhead applications where     public safety might be at risk, pending revision of current industry     standards; —  adopting and implementing design and construction specifications for     slurry walls, and waterproofing and leak mitigation in tunnels and     underground structures; and —  making mandatory for all BINFRA field engineers an update of its     existing course, “Ethics for Engineers,” and a new course, “Quality     Management for Engineers.”

For PB, these actions include:

 —  maintaining its ISO 9001 quality management system certification; —  prohibiting the use of adhesive anchors in overhead applications where     public safety might be at risk, pending revision of current industry     standards; —  adopting and implementing design and construction specifications for     slurry walls, and waterproofing and leak mitigation in tunnels and     underground structures; and —  enhancing and expanding PB’s current ethics training, quality     assurance training and technical certification programs.      

About Bechtel

Based in San Francisco, Bechtel is one of the world’s premier engineering, construction, and project management companies. Since its founding in 1898, Bechtel has worked on more than 22,000 projects in 140 countries. Today our 40,000 employees are teamed with customers, partners, and suppliers on hundreds of projects in nearly 50 countries. For more information about Bechtel, visit www.bechtel.com.

About Parsons Brinckerhoff

Founded in 1885 and headquartered in New York City, PB is a leader in the development and operation of infrastructure to meet the needs of communities around the world. The firm provides strategic consulting, planning, engineering, and program and construction management services to both public and private sector clients. For more information about PB, visit www.pbworld.com.

For additional details, please see background information.

 For more information, contact: Andy Paven Francis Canavan 617.439.2600  

SOURCE: Bechtel