Expert Says Russia Takes Tashkent Side in Uzbek-Tajik Disputes

Tajik expert Mirzo Amin suggests that Moscow is now taking the Uzbek side on the issue of building hydroelectric power stations in the region. He says that the recent talks between Uzbek President Islom Karimov and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, is evidence of that. Thus, after China that supported the stance of Uzbekistan at the latest SCO summit and annulled an earlier reached agreement with Tajikistan on the construction of a hydroelectric power station on the River Zarafshon, Russia has also announced its support for Tashkent, he says. “Then what should Tajikistan do? Should it attach itself to the USA as an ally? Or should it call on Mahmud Ahmadinezhad to enter the SCO as a fully-fledged member?” he asks. The following is an excerpt from Mirzo Amin’s report “Tashkent is with Moscow, and what about Dushanbe…?”, published by the Tajik newspaper Asia Plus website on 14 February; a subheading as published:

Uzbek president Islom Karimov’s visit to Russia ended on 5-6 February last week. The Uzbek leader visited Moscow on the personal invitation of [Russian President] Vladimir Putin. Experts believe Tashkent has made its final geopolitical choice in favour of the Kremlin.

Of course it would be difficult to predict something else after the Andijon events [disturbances in eastern Uzbekistan on 13 May 2005]. However, Karimov’s persistent policy has perplexed Europe and the USA. Uzbekistan has made Europe and the USA ask the question: are they not making a mistake in choosing the key country of the region?

It is noteworthy that ahead of his visit to Moscow Karimov held two important talks in Tashkent: on 18 January he received the EU special representative for Central Asia, Pierre Morel, and on 24 January he held talks with the commander of the US Central Command, Admiral William Fallon.

Pierre Morel after his talks with Karimov said that the European Union “views Uzbekistan as a reliable partner and supports strengthening and expanding cooperation.” In turn, the US admiral in particular said that the aim of his visit to Tashkent was “renewing the dialogue with an important regional player”.

One can draw the conclusion from reports and commentaries that Europe and the USA are not hiding their wish to improve Uzbek relations that were damaged after the Andijon events. At the same time, the Kremlin has also intensified its talks with Tashkent. Just several days after Fallon’s visit to Tashkent, on 30 January Putin phoned to allegedly congratulate Karimov on his 70th birthday. However, shortly after that the website of the Russian president carried a report about Karimov’s forthcoming visit to Moscow.

It is astonishing that the visit was Islom Karimov’s first visit after his recent re-election as the president of Uzbekistan!

Experts say that it is very difficult to get prepared for such a visit during a short period of time taking into account diplomatic procedures. However, be that as it may, the visit took place. Some experts hurriedly said that it was successful for Uzbekistan, others assessed its results as a victory for Moscow, and some others refrained from giving assessments: Tashkent will not give itself in so easily!

No sooner had experts assessed the event then new news came from the region for analysis. Official Dushanbe left for Teheran. Moreover it was Emomali Rahmon’s third visit to Iran in the past two and a half years! Is there any food for thought? Especially if one takes into account the fact that the Kremlin supported Tashkent’s position on transborder rivers in Central Asia.

Another question is whether the above mentioned visit of Rahmon to Teheran was planned beforehand or the idea was a sudden one. On the other hand, according to official reports, the visit was carried out on the personal invitation of [Iranian President] Mahmud Ahmadinezhad.

The last outpost of Russia?

The [Russian] newspaper Kommersant writes that the Uzbek side tried very hard to make the Kremlin give Karimov’s visit the status of state visit.

[Passage omitted: the author quotes the newspaper that Tashkent managed to persuade the Kremlin to do this]

The one-to-one talks between the presidents of Russia and Uzbekistan continued for three hours. The sides did not even mention the problem of the price for Uzbek gas and that of the transit of natural gas via the region. Earlier Russian experts suggested that this issue will be the main issue during the talks. The head of Gazprom Aleksey Miller even expressed his bewilderment after the talks, saying to the effect why so much time was spent then.

Instead of discussing the above issue, the sides discussed bilateral issues, the international situation and the problem of security in the region. The details of the talks, as this often happens, are not being made public. However, one can suggest that the sides also discussed Tajikistan.

Evidence of this is the [publicized] results of the talks between Putin and Karimov, which were reflected in an agreement between Russia and Uzbekistan.

The agreement consists of 17 points. Point No 11 is of special interest for our country.

[The author quotes the point] “11. The sides agreed on the need to take into account the interests of all states situated on the transborder rivers of the Central Asian region when implementing projects for construction of hydroelectric facilities on the rivers, in keeping with universally recognized norms of international law.”

Thus, after China that supported the stance of Uzbekistan at the latest SCO summit and annulled an earlier reached agreement with Tajikistan on the construction of a hydroelectric power station on the River Zarafshon, Russia has also announced its support for Tashkent.

Nevertheless, Uzbekistan – which has significant levers of influencing Moscow (price for gas, its transit, return to the USA [as published]) agreed to hand over the majority stake in the Tashkent aviation plant to Russia for ownership. Experts say that Tashkent has even more serious intentions in terms of expanding cooperation with the northern neighbour. They are in the long-term future. Then what should Tajikistan do? Should it attach itself to the USA as an ally? Or should it call on Mahmud Ahmadinezhad to enter the SCO as a fully-fledged member? Are there still no answers to all these questions yet?

[Passage omitted: documents signed during the Uzbek-Russian talks]

Originally published by Asia-Plus, Dushanbe, in Russian 14 Feb 08.

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