The Dark Side

By Katz, Peter

The dangers of flying at night

If a pilot tries to convince you that flying at night is as safe as flying during the day (reasoning that the airplane can’t tell whether it’s night or day), you’d be wise to be “busy” the next time the said pilot offers to take you for a ride. While it may be true that the airplane can’t sense light conditions, you can’t say the same thing for the pilot. Unless the pilot has had sufficient night training, understands the hazards that need to be overcome and is proficient on instruments, he or she is rolling the dice on every night flight, especially those taking place in what the NTSB calls “dark night” conditions.

At night, what you’ll be able to see outside depends on five major factors: 1) your night vision’s degree of dark adaptation; 2) the cleanliness and light transmission ability of the windshield; 3) the intensity and concentration of lights on the ground; 4) the phase of the moon; 5) atmospheric conditions.

In its Airplane Flying Handbook, the FAA notes, “[at night] flight instruments should be used to a greater degree in controlling the airplane. This is particularly true on takeoffs and climbs.” Many experienced pilots treat every night flight as IFR. They know that night flying calls for more precision in aircraft control and navigation. If you think an inadvertent stall or other loss of control is hazardous during the day, you’d better believe that they’re deadly at night.

GPS receivers with moving maps and terrain avoidance represent a huge leap forward in navigational capability, and relieve a pilot’s workload, especially at night. Even if you’re confident your GPS alone will help you deal with poor night visibility, remember the FAA’s admonition that “Under no circumstances should a VFR night- flight be made during poor or marginal weather conditions unless both the pilot and the aircraft are certificated and equipped for flight under instrument flight rules.”

The NTSB recently completed its investigations of two night accidents involving light general aviation airplanes.

Piper Seneca PA-34-200T

At 10:20 p.m. on March 12, 2006, a twin-engine Piper PA-34-200T was destroyed when it hit trees near Old Bridge Airport in Old Bridge, NJ. The certificated private pilot and one passenger were killed; the other two passengers were seriously injured. Night instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed. The Part 91 personal flight had departed from Grand Strand Airport in North Myrtle Beach, S.C, at 7:34 p.m.

According to radar data obtained from the FAA, a target identified as the accident airplane approached Old Bridge Airport from the southwest. The target maneuvered consistent with entering the airport traffic pattern on a left downwind leg to land on runway 24. Continuing in the traffic pattern, the target descended to 400 feet MSL on the final leg of the approach. Radar contact was lost about a half-mile from the runway threshold.

A witness a half-mile south of the airport heard the Piper fly over her house at a “very low” altitude, heading in an easterly direction. The airplane then turned toward runway 24 and “dipped down” at a point halfway down the runway. She initially thought the airplane would land, but then saw the airplane pitch upward and enter a climbing turn to the right.

Another witness, who was a mile beyond the departure end of runway 24, saw the airplane as it came toward him from the runway. He heard the airplane’s engines “revving” and saw the lights approaching him. The airplane then turned right and disappeared from view. This was followed by the sounds of impact. The witness told investigators that the weather at the time of the accident was “foggy.”

A review of air traffic control and flight service station communication data revealed that the pilot hadn’t contacted any facilities prior to the flight or after departing the Myrtle Beach area.

The pilot held a private-pilot certificate with single-engine and multi-engine land ratings, but he didn’t have an instrument rating. His most recent FAA thirdclass medical certificate was issued on August 10, 2005, when he reported 1,657 hours of flight experience.

The airplane’s most recent annual inspection was completed on January 10, 2006; at that time, the airplane had accumulated 4,027 hours of flight time. Since that date, the Piper had accumulated an additional 18 hours of (light time.

At 10:15 p.m., the weather at Belmar-Farmingdale Airport in Belmar, NJ. (14 nm southeast of Old Bridge Airport) was reported as winds from 280 degrees at four knots, an overcast ceiling at 100 feet, less than a quarter-mile visibility, temperature at 48 degrees F, dew point at 46 degrees F and an altimeter setting of 30.04.

The airplane came to rest in a wooded area, about a half mile northwest of the airport. The initial impact point was a 50-foot- tall tree. The wreckage path was 350 feet long, and oriented in a direction of 040 degrees magnetic. Examination of the engines failed to reveal problems that would have prevented normal operation. Examination of the propellers revealed damage consistent with operation under power at impact.

The NTSB determined that the probable cause of the accident was the pilot’s improper decision to conduct a visual approach and landing in instrument meteorological conditions, and his failure to maintain adequate clearance from trees and terrain during a go- around. Factors in the accident were the low cloud ceiling and fog conditions.

SocataTB-20

At 7:27 p.m. on November 4,2004, aSocata TB-20 crashed into the Straits of Florida approximately five miles from the Key West International Airport in Key West, Fla. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and an IFR flight plan was filed for the Part 91 personal flight from Key West to Sarasota/Bradenton International Airport in Sarasota, FIa. The airplane was destroyed by impact, and the private pilot and his passenger were killed. The airplane had taken off four minutes prior to the accident.

The pilot called the Key West International control tower at 7:15:29 and advised the controller that the aircraft was IFR, had ATIS information Delta and was ready to taxi. The controller cleared the flight to the destination airport and to maintain 6,000 feet, provided the departure frequency and a transponder code, and instructed the pilot to taxi to runway 09. The pilot correctly repeated the IFR clearance then asked, “Will I be able to get a right turn out so that 1 can do a climbing circle over Key West?” The controller advised the pilot that he was going to coordinate with approach control. At 7:22:27, the pilot contacted the tower and advised the controller that the flight was ready to depart. At 7:22:49, the controller cleared the flight for take off. The controller advised Naval Air Station Key West approach control that the aircraft was, “rolling [and] he’s going southbound one eighty.” At 7:24:17, the tower controller advised the pilot to fly a heading of 180 degrees and to contact departure control. The pilot acknowledged and a few seconds later radioed the departure controller at the Naval Air Station. The airplane was identified on radar, and the pilot was advised to continue heading 180 degrees. At 7:26:36, the controller advised the pilot to turn right heading 360 degrees and to proceed direct to Lee County VORTAC when able. The pilot correctly read back the clearance. At 7:28:47, the controller radioed that he wasn’t receiving the transponder beacon return and to reset the transponder code to 0040. There was no response from the pilot. The controller made repeated transmissions, but there was no reply.

Recorded radar data revealed that discrete transponder returns were noted from 7:24:01, when the airplane was at 100 feet MSL, to 7:27:01, when the airplane was at 1,900 feet MSL. The radar data showed that after departing Key West International Airport to the east, the airplane banked to the right and flew in a southwesterly direction, then in a southerly direction.

The pilot held a private-pilot certificate with single-engine land and instrument ratings. His third-class medical certificate required that he “must wear corrective lenses.” A review of the application for his last medical certificate revealed his a total flight time as 813 hours.

The weather observation at Key West taken 13 minutes after the accident indicated visibility 10 miles, clear sky and wind from 090 degrees at five knots. Sunset took place at 5:45 p.m., and the end of civil twilight was 6:09 p.m.

Investigators examined the aircraft wreckage after recovery by the U.S. Coast Guard. No mechanical problems were detected, and there was no evidence of fire or heat damage. The airspeed indicator showed 206 knots (the never-exceed speed for the airplane was 186 knots). The back-up attitude indicator on the right side of the panel was indicating a right bank of approximately 65 degrees with a nose-down attitude of approximately 20 degrees. In addition to the engine-driven vacuum pump, the aircraft had an electrically operated stand-by vacuum pump.

The NTSB determined that the probable cause of this accident was the pilot’s failure to maintain aircraft control as a result of spatial disorientation. A factor in the accident was the dark night condition.

SPATIAL DISORIENTATION. Flying in thedark can be confusing and risky.

Peter Katz is editor and publisher of NTSB Reporter, an independent monthly update on aircraft accident investigations and other news concerning the National Transportation Safety Board. To subscribe, write to; NTSB Reporter, Subsf ripfion Dept., P.O. Box 831, White Plains, NY 10602-0831.

Copyright Werner Publishing Corporation Mar 2007

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