• E-mail
• Print
• Comment
• Font Size
• Digg
• del.icio.us
• Discuss article

Veblen and Sweezy on Monopoly Capital, Crises, Conflict, and the State

Posted on: Saturday, 18 December 2004, 03:00 CST

In the 1960s and 1970s there was a revival of non-neoclassical political economy, or heterodox economics, in many nations which has continued to this day. Original institutionalists started their own organization, the Association for Evolutionary Economics (AFEE) in 1965, followed by the Journal of Economic Issues in 1967. Other radicals and Marxists organized the Union for Radical Political Economics (URPE) in 1968 and the Review of Radical Political Economics the following year. In many nations similar organizations and journals were instituted in the 1970s. Post Keynesians started to publish the Cambridge journal of Economics in England and the journal of Post Keynesian Economics, inaugurated by Sidney Weintraub and Paul Davidson from the USA. The Association for Social Economics started to become more inclusive and participatory by including many heterodox themes in its Review of Social Economy. It wasn't until the late 1980s that the European Association for Evolutionary Political Economy was formed and the early 1990s when feminists became active in organizing their own International Association for Feminist Economics along with their journal, Feminist Economics.

After thirty to forty years of growth, heterodox political economy has really come of age, since now there are more journals and publishers disseminating heterodox themes than one could have imagined in the 1960s.1 Then in the 1990s a whole series of encyclopedias and companions were published, documenting the advances made since the 1960s, along with the seminal ideas of earlier writers.2

Furthermore, there is an organization committed to promoting the collective interests of some fifty heterodox or pluralistic associations: the international Confederation of Associations for Pluralism in Economics (ICAPE). In 2003 ICAPE sponsored a conference at the University of Missouri to document the history and promote the future of heterodox economics. Also, a Conference on the History of Heterodox Economics in the Twentieth Century was held at the University of Missouri-Kansas City in October 2002. It is commonplace now for political economists to share perspectives from the different schools of thought, be they original institutionalists, Marxists, Post Keynesians, feminists, or social economists. Indeed, for a growing number of scholars the themes of political economy are becoming sufficiently well developed for them to eschew rigid schools in favor of an eclectic fusion of ideas.

This fusion of ideas among and between schools is becoming so common that journals are increasingly recognizing such links. The JE! has been publishing articles promoting linkages for a number of decades now, and some AFEE presidents have been radical institutionalists with an affinity to Marxist political economy. Indeed, under the presidencies of William M. Dugger and James Ronald Stanfield, Paul M. Sweezy received the Veblen-Commons Award in 1999. This was the first time that a scholar of such Marxist credentials had ever won the award. The purpose of this paper is to provide a detailed analysis of the relationship between Thorstein Veblen and Sweezy and how their concerns fare in the current environment. An understanding of this intellectual heritage is essential for the historical and contemporary concerns of the Veblen-Commons Award as well as for the continuing analysis of the relationship between Marxism, institutionalism, and other trends in heterodox economics.5

Veblen's "Critique" of Marxism

Thorstein Bunde Veblen (1857-1929) is thcfather of institutional economics and a critical influence in the formation and development of AFEE. He established an indigenous branch of radical economics in the United States-institutionalism-and many argue he adapted certain Marxian themes to U.S. conditions (Hill 1998). He recognized the importance of contradictory processes, collective wealth, and interdisciplinary methods in a manner similar in many ways to the method of Karl Marx (Harris 1998). A major theme of Veblen which has Marxian overtones is that capitalism operates in a contradictory environment where business is in conflict with industry, while the concerns of the common people are in contradistinction to those of the leisure and business classes. He developed an evolutionary and materialistic understanding and critique of capitalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries while developing certain socialistic policies and perspectives for improving human welfare (O'Hara 2002).

Nevertheless, many institutionalists and others distance themselves from Marx, partly because of the arguments involved in Veblen's supposed "critique" of Marxism (e.g., Gordon and Adams 1989; Tool 2001). In two articles published in 1906 (1989) and 1907 (1989), Veblen explored the nature of Marxism in some detail. It is clear that Veblen was trying to assess the usefulness of the Marxian framework for developing a materialistic and evolutionary approach to institutions and political economy. He recognized the importance of the materialistic conception of history but wanted to modernize it to make it more evolutionary, less dogmatic, and more in keeping with contemporary developments in science and philosophy. In doing so, Veblen seemed to be working along lines similar to certain critical European Marxists such as Antonio Gramsci, Antonio Labriola, and George Lukacs (see O'Hara 1997). In particular, he wanted to modify Marxism by situating structure and agency in a system of interdependency. He recognized the need for an open-ended analysis of change where there is no final term and no specific direction. And he wanted to link the view of human nature based on instincts into a wider view of habits and institutions.

Veblen was attacking the type of interpretation of Marx made by the German Social Democratic Party (SDP) around the turn of the twentieth century.7 Although the SDP had many internal debates and sophisticated theorists, their most widespread interpretation of Marx was a crude economic determinism. Using a simplistic, crude, and unproven version of the labor theory of value, they held that society was split into two main classes, the capitalists and the workers. (Contemporary, critical Marxists still recognize the importance of these two classes, but they also recognize other classes and the vital differences between strata within these classes, such as engineers and unskilled workers).

The SDP promoted an economic, or materialist, conception of history in which economics determines everything else. Although political and social ideas and institutions had some reciprocal effect on the economy, the economy was seen to dominate "in the last instance." As technology progresses from primitive tools to modern industry, so too must institutions progress from the primitive to the slave, feudal, capitalist, and finally socialist systems. Technology meets an obstacle in the interests of the ruling class, but this obstacle will always be overcome by reform or, if necessary, by revolution. Many SDP theorists saw this historical evolution of economic systems as inevitable and predetermined by the dialectic of history. Progress from the primitive society to the eventual socialist society is inevitable. A similar view of political economy was espoused by "official Marxists" in the Soviet Union from the 1930s to the 1980s.

Veblen made a devastating attack on the SDP perspective. He argued that there is no proof of the simplistic labor theory of value and exploitation. Economics is not the determinant of ideas and everything else. Rather, a holistic approach is required in which there are interrelations, not one-way causation. Technology does not automatically progress but is produced by a particular pattern of institutions, a particular historical society. The Hegelian predeterminism and mystical inevitability of progress must be replaced by a causal investigation of evolution as a process, in which "progress" is not predetermined by any outside force and is not inevitable. Instead of rigid structural determinism, Veblen wanted to develop a balanced view of structure and agency, evolution, and blind drift as well as instincts, habits, and institutions. Nevertheless, he realized that Marx asked the right questions, and Veblen himself took a "softened" materialistic conception of history as a point of departure in his own work.

There had always been minority voices within Marxism, but from the late 1950s to the 1990s there was a tidal wave of criticism of Soviet Marxism, followed by renovation and renaissance.7 One of the leaders of the renaissance in the United States was Paul Sweezy. Sweezy's criticisms of Soviet Marxism were very similar to Veblen's criticisms of German social democratic Marxism. Moreover, Sweezy's own critical reconstruction of Marxism was similar in many ways to Veblen's basic approach. For many reasons, including Sweezy's influence, most contemporary U.S. radicals arrive at the same criticisms of dogmatic Marxism as Veblen (see, e.g., Sherman 1995). Thus there is much compatibility between modern critical and independent Marxian economics and the views of Veblen in his critique of "Marx and His Followers."

In particular, while the old deterministic Marxist tradition (as well as Ayresian institutionalism) took a purely structural view of causality and change, mo\dern Veblenians and radical political economists have been trying to connect structure and agency in a process of interaction and coevolution. This is perhaps the area where Veblen was ahead of Sweezy but where contemporary institutionalists and radical political economists have been wittingly or unwittingly following the lead provided by Veblen. Rigid economic determinism and reductionism of any sort must give way to multifarious interaction'between structure and agency. In this view, history and institutions do not dominate individuals, but individuals make history only under given institutional conditions not of their choosing (to paraphrase Marx; Sherman 1987, 24). In many ways, these political economists, including radical institutionalists, are continuing the spirit and problematic of Veblen much more so than some institutionalists who take more from John R. Commons or Clarence Ayres in their analysis.

Veblen and Sweezy: General Linkages

Arguably Paul Marlor Sweezy (1910-2004) was the father of the new critical and independent Marxian economics in the USA. He tried to show the continuing vibrancy of Marxism in the years after Veblen. He was the most influential U.S. Marxist of the twentieth century, as well as being a great stimulus to the New Left and the revival of radical political economy. He contributed to the ongoing development and application of the new, critical Marxist economics to contemporary conditions. His Theory of Capitalist Development ([1942] 1970) informed a whole generation of scholars in the fundamentals of political economy. His coauthored Monopoly Capital (with Paul Baran, 1966) illustrated how to critically evaluate American capitalism on the basis of an institutionally oriented methodology. His writing, editing, and publishing within Monthly Review Press invigorated socialist thought by analyzing contemporary problems of capitalism, socialism, and democracy. In short, Sweezy succeeded in applying political economy to the changing institutional conditions of the real world.

Sweezy was nondogmatic, flexible, and highly original. His flexibility was clear in his willingness to examine new ideas. It is common knowledge that he incorporated some basic points of Keynes in his framework, but it is not so commonly known that he incorporated many insights of Veblen in an integrated, original, and critical Marxian fashion. It is not surprising, therefore, that Sweezy's Marxism is not compatible with the old dogmas of Soviet Marxism or the German SDP but is compatible with the newer independent and critical approach of most contemporary Marxist scholars and "radical institutionalists."8

Sweezy's book The Theory of Capitalist Development ([1942] 1970) set the standard for books introducing the reader to Marx and Marxism-and it is still arguably the best single introduction to Marxist political economy. In this book he explained Marx's methodology, the theory of value, economic crises, monopoly, imperialism, and more. It is clear and straightforward and seldom uses Marx's own words but is very close in letter and spirit to the original. Sweezy is a lot easier to read for modern readers than Marx and covers all of the most important topics in one place.

Sweezy's work followed the spirit of Marx, but it was also fresh and original. Numerous articles by dogmatic Soviet writers and by dogmatists of every stripe frequently denounced Sweezy for straying from the gospel on value theory, crisis theory, monopoly theory, and imperialism. Sweezy's view of the Soviet Union was that it was not capitalist and it had many accomplishments but that it was not a good model of democratic socialism9 and should be called something other than socialism. This view was denounced from both sides. McCarthyites somehow saw him following the Soviet line and persecuted him for it. Communist Party writers saw him as anti- Soviet. Neither could understand an independent, critical, and creative Marxist.

Like every other social process, Sweezy's thought about Veblen evolved over time. In an early essay, Sweezy was still a skeptic who had both praise and criticism of Veblen (1953; originally published in 1946). Then ensued more than a decade in which Sweezy's thought matured and moved toward Veblen, while he carefully reread much of Veblen's work. The result was that in 1957 and 1958 he wrote three articles on Veblen, heavy with praise and very light with criticism (see Sweezy 1957, 1958a, and 1958b). For instance, in 1958 Sweezy spoke of Veblen's "towering genius as an insightful and creative social scientist" (1958a, 177). He went on to say that

Anyone reading [Veblen's] major works on capitalism today must, I think, be struck by the fact that the vision which they embody remains astonishingly fresh and relevant. No one understood so clearly the growth of monopolistic (or, if you prefer, oligopolistic) big business with its ramifications and implications in such fields as advertising, distribution, and popular culture. No one grasped so thoroughly the unity of economics and politics.. . . Also, only Veblen has built these elements [of war, militarism, and nationalism] into a reasoned and coherent theory. . . . Veblen's pessimism may be a good deal more meaningful and relevant than it is now fashionable to admit.

Sweezy's work on Veblen is quite different from the views of many other scholars on both sides of the Marx-Veblen divide. Many Marxists dismissed Veblen as a soft-headed, fuzzy-thinking, well- intentioned liberal, completely incompatible with Marx. Ironically, it was Baran, albeit some years before the publication of his book with Sweezy, who criticized Veblen as a "bourgeois theorist,""a stranger to the historical method" whose '"economic determinism' is of a peculiarly vacillating, bloodless nature," and whose "wisdoms of last resort are always of a biological or psychological nature" (Baran 1957, 84-91). Indeed, Soviet authors dismissed both Veblenian institutionalism and Sweezy's radical political economy, the former for supposedly omitting "the relations between classes, relations in the production process, and capitalists' exploitation" and the latter for introducing "a category of 'economic surplus' instead of the concept 'surplus value,' and giving erroneous interpretations of exploitation, labour power, and so on" (Smirnov et al. 1984, 18, 22).

Sweezy (1958a) contrasted Veblen's institutionalism with neoclassical economics, noting that Veblen saw neoclassical theory as being inadequate due to problematic preconceptions. Sweezy emphasized that, according to Veblen, neoclassical economics assumes that "nil other things remain equal" and takes as "given the state of the industrial arts." Instead, Veblen believed that "the state of the industrial arts has at no time remained unchanged during the modern era" (1920, 85-86). According to Sweezy, Veblen believed that nonevolutionary theory should be abandoned in favor of an evolutionary theory of political economy, where evoMtion potentially includes revolution.

In The Theory of Capitalist Development ([1942] 1970), Sweezy discussed the evolution of capitalism through various stages, including detailed analysis of each stage as well as the endogenous mechanisms of change from one stage to the next. In Sweezy's book with Baran, Monopoly Capital (1966), they focused on how the latest stage of capitalism evolved and the dramatic impact of this new evolutionary stage on institutions. They placed special emphasis on the evolution from competitive to monopoly capitalism. Sweezy's view that Marxist theory should now place monopoly (or oligopoly) at the center of analysis contradicted the old dogma that all theory must start with competitive capitalism-so Sweezy was attacked by many dogmatic Marxists on this point. Thus Sweezy followed with a vengeance Veblen's view that economic theory must be evolutionary and applied to ever-new phases of society (see Veblen 1898).

Conflict and Contradiction

In studying U.S. capitalism, Sweezy noted that Veblen's central thesis emphasizes evolution resulting from the dichotomy or tension between "The Modern Point of View" and "The New Order" (Veblen 1920). The Modem Point of View is that which emerged in the eighteenth century as the ideology and basic institutions of the capitalist business system-including the capitalist class, the working class, and unrestricted private enterprise and laissez- faire-as well as the institution of parliamentary democracy. The New Order, on the other hand, includes the technology and relationships of industry that emerged with the Industrial Revolution. According to Sweezy, it was Veblen's view that "the profound crisis of the twentieth century ... is at bottom the outcome of the tension between a social order that was stabilized in the eighteenth century and an industrial order that can function properly only if the restrictions of private property ownership and national boundaries are done away with" (1958a, 180). Again according to Sweezy: "If this be an accurate distillation of Veblen's central thesis, there can be no doubt that it is essentially Marxian." Thus Sweezy defined Veblen as an institutionalist whose most fundamental theory relates to the clash between the vested interests and the common people.

Sweezy's work has concentrated on this primary thesis, one shared by Marx and Veblen. For example, in The Theory of Capitalist Development ([1942] 1970), Sweezy showed at length that capitalist business recessions and depressions, including the Great Depression, are based on the fact that the business/class institutions have held back socioeconomic progress. This dichotomy, or tension, frequently leads to a backward, downhill movement of production and employment. Over and over again in The Theory of Capitalist Development he applied this proposition to the then current stage of the economic crisis in great detail in lucid prose. He explored in that book howthe tension is reflected not only in the economic disaster in both the real and financial sectors but also in the rise of fascism and the clash of imperialist states.

Many liberal institutionalists and dogmatic Marxists deny that Veblen had any class analysis (see Gordon and Adams 1989; Smirnov et al. 1984). Sweezy, on the contrary, found not one but two theories of class conflict in Veblen, one very distinct from Marx and one fairly close to Marx. In his early work, such as The Theory of Business Enterprise (1904), Veblen stressed occupational disciplines. According to Sweezy, Veblen found that business owners tend to respect the status quo and are not in a hurry to change, but those who work with machines take change as a matter of fact. So most workers are sympathetic to new technology, whereas the owners are cautious and do not wish to rock the boat-though there are many exceptions. Thus Veblen wrote that because of their occupational disciplines, "trade unionism is ... to be taken as a somewhat mitigated expression of what the mechanical standardization of industry inculcates" (1904, 330). So, according to Sweezy, the conflict for Veblen in 1904 is a difference in occupational attitude, whereas the conflict for Marx is a difference of class interest. This occupational theory of class is problematic as numerous observers and Veblen specialists have recognized.

But, in Sweezy's interpretation, Veblen's view of class conflict evolved over time until in his last book, Absentee Ownership (1923), Veblen sounded much closer to Marx. By that time, Sweezy pointed out, there are few traces of the initial occupational theory but rather a discussion of the "new alignment of material interests." As Veblen said, "The effectual division of interest and sentiment is beginning visibly to run on class lines, between the absentee owners and the underlying population" (1923, 6). Yet Veblen still did differ from Marx, not only in his own striking terminology, but in content as well. According to Sweezy, Marx saw the conflict arising from the exploitation of one class by another in the production process. Veblen did not contradict that point of view, but his own argument is a different one. Veblen argued that the conflict is because the owners are happy with high prices, high profits, and a lower output. The underlying population strongly prefers lower prices and a larger product. So where Marx stressed exploitation, Veblen stressed a reduction of the total product, or the waste of the economic surplus, a view that was later emphasized by Baran and Sweezy (Stanfield 1989).

Sweezy, in his own work, was careful to consider both bases of class conflict. The class struggle over the rate of exploitation is pervasive and central to The Theory of Capitalist Development and many other works. Yet the influence of Veblen-and Keynes-showed up early on when he discussed the waste of advertising as well as the enormous waste, caused by capitalist refusal to produce a higher amount of product, in the Great Depression and in every other cyclical downturn. In Monopoly Capital there is remarkably little direct emphasis on the rate of exploitation. Rather, there is an entire chapter on how capitalists use their monopoly power to restrict output. Capitalists are terribly wasteful in terms of advertising expense, planned obsolescence, model changes, and so forth. Thus, much of Sweezy's work emphasizes the Veblenian causes of class conflict, often more so than the Marxian class processes and conflicts.

Monopoly Capital and Innovation

There is another important example of Sweezy's application of an evolutionary approach to economics in Baran and Sweezy's Monopoly Capital (1966), which explicitly acknowledges the importance of Veblen. As they say, "Veblen . . . was the first economist to recognize and analyze many aspects of monopoly capitalism" (136). The main point of this book was to show that the institutions of U.S. capitalism have evolved to a new stage. This evolution has profoundly changed some of the tendencies of capitalism. Under monopoly capital there is increased waste, particularly in relation to the sales effort, business expenses, and executive salaries. This waste is critical to the growth process under the institutions of monopoly capitalism (Sherman and Kolk 1996). Baran and Sweezy agreed with Veblen's primary thesis about the "subdued conflict between workmanship and salesmanship," in which workmanship is being pursued in the interests of sales of often superfluous goods rather than those that are socially necessary. Baran and Sweezy went so far as to say that Veblen's view of the matter (published in 1923) "as a description of the situation in the 1950s and 1960s ... is 100 per cent on target" (136).

Under monopoly capitalism, although workmanship may have a subdued form of conflict with salesmanship, true innovation, according to Veblen, is often separated from sales and profit. While the engineers produce innovations that could be used by the whole community, the capitalists often obstruct and sabotage technological progress. Baran and Sweezy stressed the sabotage of industry by business and the wastefulness of capitalism, such as planned obsolescence, where engineers design cars, light globes, and other commodities that will break down after a certain length of time or use. In the contemporary scene, for instance, computer programs are developed that can only be used on larger and larger hard disks. They stress that the problem is not the technological ability of the engineers but that the bottom line of profit drives the capitalists to ignore innovations that might reduce profit. The military capitalists encourage patriotism in order to sell useless military goods to the nation at outrageous prices.

Sweezy thus very much followed Veblen in his concern to incorporate into institutional analysis changing trends and structures of capitalism. Monopoly power can be a source of profit for business that may stimulate accumulation, but on the other hand it may result in a relative reduction in output for the consumer, as well as representing a form of waste of the economic surplus. It follows logically from their analysis, therefore, that where major changes have occurred in the institutions, and if these changes are ongoing and relatively durable, then such changes need to be incorporated in the theory. Theory should not be simply an abstraction that is supposed to be applied to every situation, but requires historical and institutional specificity. The trend to globalization, for instance, which Marx saw as inherent in capitalism, was common in the 1870s-1910s, as with the 1970s-2000s, and requires being incorporated into theory. This is true despite the continual importance of national and regional economies, the nation state, and local technological and social organization.

Crises and Stagnation

Sweezy emphasized that, for Veblen, within modern capitalism there was a continuous downward pressure on profits, so Veblen held that "chronic depression, more or less pronounced, is normal to business under the fully developed regime of modern industry" (Veblen 1904, 234). Veblen argued that during the late 1800s large- scale industry developed, along with a fairly high degree of competition, such that overproduction was common during the 1880s and early 1890s in the Western world. Business responded by enhancing the role of takeovers, advertising, creative financing, and globalization around the turn of the century, which led to greater profit and hence accumulation for the first decade and a half of the 1900s. However, as the 1910s and 1920s progressed, an extension of business activities led it to dominate industry and hence propel speculative bubbles in the 1920s and depression through the 1930s (see O'Hara 2000). Business is thus a problem because it cannot function effectively under the dominance of industry, while problems also arise when business starts to dominate industry. Overall, Veblen finds sharp limits to the accumulation tendencies of capitalism in a way that is very reminiscent of Marxian crisis theory, including that of Sweezy.

Sweezy's own theory of stagnation followed rather closely that of Veblen, with some exceptions in the details of the argument. The Tkeory of Cupitaiist Development placed an emphasis on the process of underconsumption or overproduction, arguing that improving technology led to a mighty flood of goods that met limited effective demand because of the restrictive distributive relations of capitalism. This disproportion between industrial supply and monetary demand led to periodic and often accentuated downturns. In the protracted downswings, there is no effective endogenous pressure for an upswing. Expansions are caused by exogenous causes, such as the second World War, and major inventions such as automobiles or the information revolution. Throughout his career, Sweezy consistently followed the theory that capitalism is in a more or less permanent state of stagnation but with temporary expansions due to various inventions or wars. He spelled out these external causes of expansion in great detail, emphasizing military production and deficit spending. In Monopoly Capita! (1966), Sweezy and Baran stressed that waste in both the public and private sectors has been an enormous factor in preventing a return to the Great Depression-a unique appendix even strives to measure the amount of waste in the whole economy.

Veblen believed, according to Sweezy (1958a, 1984; Baran and Sweezy 1966), that the problem of capitalist stagnation could be greatly influenced by unproductive expenditure by government, by monopoly waste, and by monopoly control of prices. This behavior brings profits for business-though with many other evil effects on the population. Sweezy agreed with Veblen that monopoly and government waste have a major influence on the economy and on effective de\mand, though Sweezy stressed that even monopoly waste and government waste do not end depressions under capitalism. Rather, as Veblen emphasized, when business profit making begins to dominate industry, problems arise such as speculative bubbles, the unproductive use of the surplus, and chains of bankruptcy as recession or depression sets in.

This is a critical view that is of much significance in the current business regime in the early years of the twenty-first century. Speculative bubbles in the equity, foreign exchange, and property markets-due to the dominance of business profit making over industrial production-is of great importance in Japan, the USA, and Europe. The rise and fall of such bubbles contributes much to the onset of recession and further instability in the global economy (see O'Hara 2005).

Despite all the lavish praise that Sweezy heaped on Veblen, however, he thought there was one significant area in Veblen's work in need of development. Sweezy described Veblen's macroeconomic theorizing as being "unsystematic" and "highly frustrating" (1958a, 188), so that-in spite of his powerful insights-his "analytical attempts to lay bare the elements and modus operand! of the economic system are weak and often confused" (Sweezy 1957, 107). The chief problem with Veblen's macroeconomic analysis is said to be the lack of a Keynesian-type theory of aggregate effective demand, although, he added, this problem is both "remediable" and implicitly resolved in some of Veblen's works (1958a, 27). The Keynesian approach, for instance, is implicit in Veblen's Theory of Business Enterprise (1904), where he discussed the unproductive use of the economic surplus as a way of temporarily resolving the problem of business overproduction.

Sweezy, however, overlooked Veblen's argument m Absentee Ownership (1923) that business can dominate industry in such a way that the unproductive use of the surplus may lead to economic demise (O'Hara 2000, 81-89). It can even be argued that Veblen's argument here is an advance on Sweezy's since rather than assuming, as Sweezy did, that there is a stagnation tendency inherent in capitalism, which is then potentially overcome through "exogenous" factors (Sherman 1991, 193), Veblen tried to endogenize the evolutionary transformations of capitalism. Every new change in capitalism becomes imbedded in the institutions in an inextricable fashion, and therefore it is necessary to see this as an evolutionary metamorphosis, whatever the cause of the change. Veblen realized that change could come from blind drift, emergent novelty, and conscious plans, all of which were specifically causal in their own way. To assume these to be exogenous was outside his ontology. While Sweezy was certainly correct to argue that Veblen's macroeconomic theorizing was often vague and convoluted-and required a deeper infusion of the demand analysis of Keynes-Veblen's method of endogenizing changing aspects of capitalism was an advance on Sweezy's own method of exogenous analysis of recovery (though Sweezy agreed with Veblen on the endogeneity of most other processes).

State, Patriotism, and Nationalism

Veblen recognized that politics and economics were two aspects of a unified social whole to be understood together. The state is the guarantor of the existing social order and protects existing property rights and the interests of the leisure class. A democratic, representative government fits very well into this function by protecting the interests of the capitalist owners of business. As Veblen wrote: "A constitutional government is a business government. . . . Representative government means, chiefly, representation of business interests" (1923, 37). Veblen made it very clear that the interests of the capitalist absentee owners are the primary concern of the government: "So the constituted authorities of the democratic commonwealth come, in effect, to constitute a Soviet of Business Men's Delegates, whose dutiful privilege it is to safeguard and enlarge the special advantages of the country's absentee owners" (1920, 16).

Sweezy emphasized a similar theory of the state through his work, beginning with chapter 13 in The Theory of Capitalist Development. Here the state is seen as a social institution that cannot be separated from economic institutions. He criticized the liberal theory that the state reconciles opposing interests. Rather, he argued that the state acts for the vested interests-except insofar as the working class and other groups can exert contrary pressure. It is noteworthy that Sweezy and Veblen stressed the role of state spending on wasteful items, such as military spending, as a temporary solution to depression. Sweezy's approach to the state is an advance on Veblen's since, ironically, Veblen tended to accept the old, dogmatic view of some Marxists that the state is simply a tool of the ruling class (see Tilman 1996, 199-216; 2002, 112-15). Sweezy, on the contrary, saw the state as a venue for conflict between the vested interests and the common people (or working and middle classes).

If Veblen's view of the state was problematic, he had a rich analysis of why the common people may come to accept a system that careful analysis may conclude does not support their long-term interests. E. K. Hunt (1979) believed that the answer Veblen provided is an improvement on the old Soviet Marxist argument that the "objective conditions of the proletariat" determine their thought in the final analysis. Veblen's argument is a useful complement to contemporary Marxist thought in recognizing that the common people are affected by the habits and institutions in which they are brought up. Socialization can play a role in conditioning people to variously accept some of the institutions of nationalism, business, religion, and the establishment. The population may be successfully conditioned by the "enabling myths" that are prevalent in the society to support such a system.12

Veblen explored in some detail the myth of "national integrity," which Sweezy said may be described briefly as "nationalism." Veblen believed that nationalism (or local sentiment) is deeply rooted as far back as the solidarity of the savage tribe against enemies. Because it was so important for survival, the trait of tribal or national solidarity was long thought to be an inherent psychological trait. The myth of nationalism is a primary (witting or unwitting) "tool" of the vested interests, enabling them to influence the underlying population. A related myth is that the interests of the "ruling class(es)" are the same as those of the "nation." As Veblen (1923, 36-37) said:

By stress of this all-pervading patriotic bias and that fantastic bigotry which enables civilized men to believe in a national solidarity of material interests, it has come now to pass that the chief concern ... of the constitutional authorities in any democratic nation is a concern about the profitable business of the nation's substantial citizens.

According to Sweezy, Veblen showed that nationalism and patriotism allow the government to take aggressive actions that justify profitable military spending and divert the attention of the underlying population, disciplining them to business activities in the name of the nation. "The largest. . . factor of cultural discipline . . . over which business principles rule is national politics. . . . Business interests urge an aggressive national policy and business men direct it" (Veblen 1904, 391). Veblen went on to speak of how patriotism and nationalism help to curb social unrest and to inculcate the habit of subordination. Veblen was no vulgar economic determinist, emphasizing, for example, that "Business-as-usual and the national integrity are joint and integral factors in that complex of habits of thought that makes up the official mentality" (1923, 430). He treated the "psychological" and "economic" as integral parts of the social whole.

This theme is still highly relevant and a powerful antidote to the old Soviet Marxian theory that workers will recognize their exploitation and rise up in revolt. For instance, in the United States over the past several decades since the Vietnam War, there has been a successful effort to re-inculcate the "common people" into a belief in business principles and national patriotism. Successive conservative-liberal governments have led the charge to reinstate the power of capital over labor, promote a greater sense of national identity, and propel unilateral global action by the USA. The "terrorist threat" and the "axis of evil" have reinforced the message and led people to bind together for national consensus against "monsters" from abroad. Attention has been thus drawn away from the early 2000s recession, massive fraud in the private sector in the wake of Enron-type activities, and environment degradation. Veblen's message about why there is neither socialism nor often progressive change in the USA is as strong as ever.

Socialism

There are many models and varieties of socialism, from extended worker cooperatives through to the system of market socialism, extended welfare state, central planning, and community organizations (Sherman 1971; Paul et al. 1989). Hence, to say that Veblen and Sweezy were both socialists is to say both much and little. They both sought to comprehend the inner contradictions of capitalism in a fashion similar to Marx. That is, they scrutinized both the positive aspects of capitalism-such as the tendencies for accumulation, extended markets, globalization, and profit-as well as the negative aspects-the tendencies to exploitation, instability, crises, and financial dominance.

They also examined certain systemic policy measures that may reduce such contradictions through structural change. Both attempted to associate with modern reform movements that could possibly challenge capitalism. For instance, Veblen advocated the reform moveme\nt led by groups of technocrats in the 1910s (199Ob), while Sweezy was one of the leaders of the New Left movement of the 1960s and 1970s, and he believed in the role of the workers as agents for change (1973). Both were unlikely to make piecemeal policy recommendations of a short-term nature, and both supported socialist governments of their time. However, Veblen frequently played down his political views and was often pessimistic, while Sweezy put forward political proposals very frequently and was more optimistic. Veblen's pessimism was conditioned by his recognition that change can take a number of alternative forms, and that often the dominance of "imbecilic institutions" holds sway over more progressive ones.

It has been said that Veblen believed in some combination of worker control and central authority, or anarchism and central plan (Tilman 1972, 310). It is further argued that he was a "utopian realist" in the sense that he was willing to make policy proposals to government but only on his own terms (Tilman 1973, 161-2). Sweezy denounced the Soviet model as a form of state capitalism and believed in more power to the workers and a reduction in market relations (1973). Although he gave advice to government in his early years, later he only gave advice to so-called revolutionary governments. One thing that united both Veblen and Sweezy was the need for more power to workers or the common people in the production process and in the community (Veblen 1892; Sweezy 1973).

They both utilized an economic surplus approach to political economy whereby the surplus needed to be controlled and distributed more to people and activities that enhanced sociality and community (Davis 1992). They both wanted an expansion of investment in fundamental education, community organizations, and innovation and less in the vested interests of financiers, business people, and the military. They had a vision for a new society where there is greater trust, equality, and justice.

However, there is one area where Veblen had a decided methodological difference with Sweezy. Sweezy had a firm belief in the historic role and potential of the proletariat because of its place in the structure of capitalism, as a prime mover for socialism. Veblen criticized the socialist tendency for downplaying the role of conscious agency over structure. He emphasized the critical importance of individual influence on the road to socialism (1892). Both Sweezy and Veblen recognized that the individual and society interact, but Veblen emphasized the individual somewhat more than Sweezy in most areas of method and politics.13

Conclucion

Sweezy was the most eminent Marxist in the history of the United States, but his Marxism has always been an independent and creative force, critical of many existing institutions and ideologies. Sweezy was influenced by Veblen and developed criticisms of dogmatic Marxism similar to those of Veblen. Sweezy saw Veblen as a great American radical and was sympathetic to his radical form of institutionalism. Sweezy recognized the importance of Veblen's work in coming to terms with institutional change through an evolutionary economics. In particular, he incorporated much of Veblen's analysis in his own examination of monopoly capital. Special reference was given to the dynamic and changing conflict between industry and business, the conflict between the vested interests and the common people, and the importance of waste in the unstable dynamics of capitalism.

Sweezy thoroughly deserved the Veblen-Commons Award since he learned a lot from Veblen and incorporated much of Veblen's work in his own theories of monopoly capital, crises, the state, and nationalism. Sweezy's work also shows the advantages of linking many of the themes of institutional and Marxian political economy. Both traditions can learn from each other, making modifications so as to improve their perspectives on institutions and evolution. Institutionalism can learn a lot from Sweezy about how to study the institutions of the corporation, socioeconomic crises, and accumulation. Marxist economics can learn a lot from Veblen about the need for an open-ended view of evolution, coevolution between structure and agency, and the role of habits in human action. In the process conceptual tolerance, creative fusion and new research programs can instill fresh perspectives into theory and policy. Nothing less than a thorough-going comprehension and critical analysis of the nature and evolution of institutions depends on such progress.

Noies

1. Apart from the journals already mentioned, some of the other important ones include the Review of International Political Economy, Review of Political Economy, New Political Economy, Capital and Class, Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, and Rethinking Marxism. Also, there are many more nationally oriented political economy journals, such as the Journal of Austraiian Poiiticai Economy and Studies in Poiiticai Economy (from Canada).

2. The main heterodox political economy encyclopedias, dictionaries, and companions include Arestis and Sawyer 1994; Hodgson, Samuels and Tool 1994; Smelser and Swedberg 1994; Davis, Hands, and Maki 1998; Kurz and Salvador! 1998; O'Hara 1999; Pctcrson and Lewis 1999; and King 2003.

3. This is especially the case with Daniel Fusfeld (AFEE president in 1971), Bill Dagger (1998), and Ron Stanfield ( 1999).

4. In the issue of the Journal of Economic issues dealing with Sweezy receiving the Veblcn-Commons Award, there were two short articles dealing with Sweezy. The first, by Paul Burkett (1999, 219- 20) mentions a number of potential linkages with Veblen and institutionalism. These include that Sweezy's writings (a) have a "profoundly evolutionary content" and "vision," (b) influenced the "direction of research among more institutionally minded industrial organization analysts," (c) developed "a path breaking class- institutional analysis of fascism," (d) "helped shape the research agendas of a whole generation of ... radical institutionalists," and (e) examined "a broad range of institutional issues." The second short article, by John Bellamy Foster (1999, 223-28), mentions that Baran and Sweezy's analysis of the "sales effort" was "inspired in part by Veblen" and that their examination of the economic surplus was developed in a "more institutional context."

5. Our discussion of the linkages between the various schools of heterodox economics does not necessarily question the autonomous existence of institutional economics. Some years ago, the Association for Institutionalist Thought was commenced on the basis of the assumption that the editor of the JEi at the time (Warren Samuels) was taking an approach to publication that was too eclectic, in particular by including institutional dimensions of Marxist, Post Keynesian, and even neoclassical thought. O'Hara (2003) has argued elsewhere that the respective schools of heterodoxy each have a comparative advantage in bringing to political economy a vision and research agenda that can enhance the overall project of developing a unified perspective for political economy as a whole. Hence the individual schools can certainly continue their work, even with this more general theme being developed by a number of scholars. Dugger and Sherman (2000) and O'Hara (2000) have, more specifically, examined the linkages between Marxism and institutionalism.

6. As O'Hara (1997, 83) concluded, "Both Veblen and Marx sought to develop a materialistic view of political economy, in the sense of examining the interaction between the real institutions of material life and the institutions in thought and ideology. Veblen more or less followed the preconceptions of the materialistic conception of history, but he wanted to modernize it by incorporating an evolutionary analysis of modern capitalism, more in line with the spirit of the revisionist Marxists."

7. Following the German Social Democrats, the dominant Marxist view in much of the twentieth century was that of the Soviet Marxists. Revolution from capitalism to socialism was seen as inevitable. Furthermore, evolution must produce that form of socialism found in the Soviet Union, with a one-party dictatorship and central planning. Such views, criticized long ago by Veblen, were dominant in world Marxism until the dethroning of Stalinism in 1956, though they took until the 1990 death of the Soviet Union itself to die out in most countries.

8. Radical political economists who are especially close to Veblen in his method and analysis include Sam Bowles, Douglas Dowd, Bob Pollin, Howard Sherman, and the late David Gordon. Certain radical institutionalists who specifically follow and update the conceptual framework of Veblen include Bill Dugger, Ron Stanfield, Rick Tilman, Doug Brown, Ann Jennings, and Phil O'Hara. Most of these scholars, however, do not utilize the instinct psychology that Paul Twomey ( 1998) has argued is to some degree back in vogue. For a summary of specifically Vehlenian concepts in modern guise, see the work of James Ronald Stanfield (1995), William Dugger (1995), Doug Brown (1998), and Geoffrey Hodgson (2004).

9. See, for instance, Sweezy and his cowriters1 views of socialism in Sweezy 1949, Huberman and Sweezy 1968, and Bettleheim and Sweezy 1971.

10. One of the most balanced positions on Veblen was put forward by a Soviet Marxist, K. B. Kozlova (1981). On one hand, he praised him for TKe Theory of the Leisure Cis.s such that "it is hardly surprising that interest in Veblen's book had a comeback more than half a century after its publication, when the evils of the US 'consumer civilization' were exacerbated to an extreme and when the question of the 'criteria of values' appeared in a new light in connection with the 'quality of life' problem." But then he got to the root of Veblen's anomalous view of capital when he said that "Veblen saw t\he basic economic contradiction of 20th-century capitalism as that between 'industry' and 'business,' which geared production to its own financial interests. According to Veblen, 'industry' as such . . . does not contain any social antagonisms. . . . Veblen gave a 'dicbotomous' reading of the real processes separating capital as a function from capital as property. . . . Veblen portrayed property under the corporate system as something external to production. . . . [This] dichotomy of industry and business reflected definite technocratic illusions and, to some extent, helped to sustain these" (337, 346). In contrast, A. G. Mileikovsky's (1981) critique of "radical political economy" in the same volume is much weaker and less thoroughly examined.

11. For instance, Wesley C. Mitchell (1969, 637) rightly stated that Veblen thought that "people who are engaged in working machinery come to think of things not in terms of natural rights but in terms of cause and effect. The machine tenders are a much more material sort of people." There is no evidence to support this notion. As C. Wright Mills (1957, xvii) said, "we cannot go along with what seems to us an oversimplified view of the relations of technology to tbe institutions and the men who adapt and guide its development and uses."

12. Sweezy in his own work also refuted the economic reductionism of dogmatic Marxists. He often examined the myths that enable the capitalist class to rule in a representative government. In Monopoly Capital, he and Baran spent all of chapter 11, "The Irrational System," on the psychological impact of capitalism in shaping the working class. Baran and Sweezy explored the foundations of racial prejudice, class prejudice, alienation, andsuperpatriotism.

13. There seems to be much in common not only between radical political economists and radical institutionalists but also between certain radical political economists and neoinstitutionalists. For instance, the policy program developed by Samuel Bowles, David Gordon, and Thomas Weisskopf (1990) has a lot in common with that of Marc Tool (2001). Both programs advocate balancing individual and social incentives, promoting more participatory democracy, and instilling just reforms into the institutional fabric.

References

Arestis, Philip, and Malcolm Sawyer, eds. The Elgar Companion to Radical Political Economy. Aldershot, Hants., U.K., and Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar, 1994.

Baran, Paul A. "The Theory of the Leisure Class." Monthly Review 9 (July-August 1957): 83-91.

Baran, Paul A., and Paul Sweezy. Monopoly Capital. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966.

Bettleheim, Charles, and Paul M. Sweezy. On the Transition to Socialism. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971.

Bowles, Samuel, David M. Gordon, and Thomas E. Weisskopf. After the Waste Land: A Democratic Alternative for the Year 2000. London & Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1990.

Brown, Doug, eel. Thorstein Veblen in the Twenty-First Century: A Commemoration of "The Theory of the Leisure Class " (1899-1999). Cheltenham, Glos., and Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1998.

Burkett, Paul. "The Veblen-Commons Award: Paul M. Sweezy." Journal of Economic Issues 33 (June 1999): 219-21.

Davis, John B., ed. The Economic Surplus in Advanced Economies. Aldershot, Hants., U.K., and Brookfield, Vt.: Edward Elgar, 1992.

Davis, John B., D. Wade Hands, and Askali Maki, eds. The Handbook of Economic Methodology. Cheltenham, Glos., U.K., and Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1998.

Dugger, William M. "Veblenian Institutionalism." Journal of Economic issues 29 (December 1995): 1013-1027.

Dugger, William M., and Howard J. Sherman. Reclaiming Evolution: A Dialogue between Marxism and Institutionalism on Social Change. London and New York: Routledge, 2000.

Foster, John. B. "Remarks on Paul Sweezy on the Occasion of His Receipt of the Veblen-Commons Award." Journal of Economic Issues 33 (June 1999): 223-8.

Gordon, Wendell, and John Adams. Economics as Social Science: An Evolutionary Approach. Riverciale, Md.: Riverdale Publishers, 1989.

Harris, Abram L. "Economic Evolution: Dialectical and Darwinian." In The Foundations of Evolutionary Economics: 1890-1973, vol 1, edited by Geoffrey M. Hodgson. Cheltenham, Glos., U.K., and Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1998. Originally published in Journal of Political Economy 42, 1934, 34-79.

Hill, Forest G. "Veblen and Marx." In The Foundations of Evolutionary Economics: 1890-1973, vol 1, edited by Geoffrey M. Hodgson. Cheltenham, Glos., U.K., and Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1998. Originally published in Thorstein Veblen: A Critical Reappraisal, edited by Douglas F. Dowd. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1958, 129-149.

Hodgson, Geoffrey M. The Evolution of Institutional Economics: Agency, Structure, and Darwinism in American Institutionalism. London and New York: Routledge, 2004.

Hodgson, Geoffrey M., Warren J. Samuels, and Marc R. Tool, eds. The Elgar Companion to institutional and Evolutionary Economics, 2 vols. Cheltenham, Glos., U.K., and Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1994.

Huberman, Leo, and Paul M. Sweezy. Introduction to Socialism. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1968.

Hunt, E. K. "The Importance of Thorstein Veblen for Contemporary Marxism." Journal of Economic issues 13 (1979): 113-119.

King, John, ed. The Elgar Companion to Post Kejnesian Economics. Cheltenham, Glos., U.K. and Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar, 2003.

Kozlova, K. B. "Institutionalism." In Present-Day Non-Marxist Political Economy: A Critical Analysis, edited by A. G. Mileikovsky et al. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1981, 333-369.

Kurz, Heinz D., and Neri Salvador!, eds. The Elgar Companion to Classical Economics. Cheltenham, Glos., U.K., and Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar, 1998.

Mileikovsky, A. G. "Radical Political Economy and the 'New Left.'" In Present-Da^ Non-Marxist Political Economy A Critical Analysis, edited by A. G. Mileikovsky et al. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1981, 533-546.

Mills, C. Wright. Introduction to Thorstein Bunde Veblen The Theory of the Leisure Class. London: Alien & Unwin, 1970.

Mitchell, Wesley C. Typas of Economic Theory: From Mercantilism to lnstitutionalisrn, edited by Joseph Dorf man. New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1969.

O'Hara, P. A. "Veblen's Critique of Marx's Philosophical Preconceptions of Political Economy." European journal of the History of Economic Thought 4 (Spring 1997): 65-91.

_____. Marx, Veblen, and Contemporary Institutional Political Economy: Principles and Dynamics of Capitalism. Cheltenham, UK, and Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2000.

, ed. Encyclopedia of Political Economy. 2 vols. London and New York: Routledge, 1999. Paper edition 2001.

_____. "The Contemporary Relevance of Thorstein Veblen's Institutional-Evolutionary Political Economy." History of Economics Review 35 (Winter 2002): 78-103.

_____. "The Revival of Political Economy and Its Main Protagonists: 1960s to the Present." History of Economics Review 36 (Winter 2003): 140-151.

_____. Growth and Development in the Global Political Economy! Social Structures o/Accumulation and Modes of Regulation. London and New York: Routledge, 2005.

Paul, Ellen Frankel, Fred D. Miller, and Jeffrey Paul, eds. Socialism. Oxford: Biackwell, 1989.

Peterson, Janice, and Margaret Lewis, eds. The Elgar Companion to Feminist Economics. Cheltenham, Glos., U.K., and Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar, 1999.

Sherman, Howard J. Radical Politicai Econonry: Capitalism and Socialism from a Marxist-Humanist Perspective. London and New York: Basic Books, 1971.

_____. Foundations of Radical Politicai Economy. London and Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1987.

_____. The Business Cycle: Growth and Crisis under Capitalism. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991.

_____. Reinventing Marxism. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1995.

Sherman, Howard J., and David X. KoIk. Business Cycles and Forecasting. New York: HarperCollins, 1996.

Smelser, Neil J., and Richard Swedberg, eds. TKe Handbook of Economic Sociology. Princeton. Princeton University Press, 1994.

Smirnov, A. D., V. V. Golosov, and V. F. Maximova, eds. TKe Teaching of Political Econonry: A Critic/He o/ Non-Marxian Theories. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1984. Translated by H. Campbell Creighton.

Stanfiekl, James Ronald. "Veblenian and Neo-Marxian Perspectives on the Cultural Crisis of Late Capitalism." Journal of Economic issues 23 (June 1989): 717-734.

_____. Economics, Power, and Culture: Essays in the Development of Radical /nstitutionalism. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995.

Sweezy, Paul M. TKe Theory of Capitalist Development. 1942. Reprint, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970.

_____. Socialism. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1949.

_____. "Thorstein Veblen: Strengths and Weaknesses." in TKe Present as History: Essays and Reviews on Capitalism and Socialism. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1953, 295-301. Originally published in TKe New Republic, February 1946.

_____. "The Theory of Business Enterprise and Absentee Ownership." Monthly Review 9 (July-August 1957): 105-112.

_____. "Veblen on American Capitalism." In Thorite in Veblen: A Critical Reappraisal, edited by Douglas F. Dowd. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958a.

_____. "Veblen's Critique of the American Economy." American Economic Review 48, no. 2 (May 1958b): 22-29.

_____. "The Future of Socialism." In Modern Political Economy: Radical and Orthodox Views on Crucial Issues, edited by James Weaver. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1973.

_____. "Monopoly and Competition." In TKe Faltering Economy: The Problem o/Accumulation under Monopoly Capitalism, edited by John Bellamy Foster and Henryk Szlajfer. New York: Monthly Review, 1984, 27-40.

Tilman, Rick. "Veblen's Ideal Politicai Economy and Its Critics." American Journal of Economics and Sociology 31 (July 1972): 307- 318.

_____. "Thorstein Veblen: Incrementalist and Utopian." American Journal of Economics and Sociolog\y 32 (March 1973): 155-169.

_____. The Intellectual Legacy of Thmstem Veblen. Westport, Conn, and London: Greenwood Press, 1996.

_____. "Thorstein Veblen and Western Thought Fin de Siecle: A Recent Interpretation." Journal of Economic Issues 37, no. 1 (March 2002): 107-130.

Tool, Marc. The Discretionary Economy: A Normative Theory of Political Economy. 3d cd. New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2001.

Twomey, Paul. "Reviving Veblenian Economic Psychology." Cambridge Journal of Economics 22 (July 1998): 433-448.

Veblen, Thorstein Bunde. "Some Neglected Points in the Theory of Socialism." In Thorstein Veblen, The Place of Science in Modern Civilisation and Other Essays. New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 1989, 387-408. Introduction by Warren Samuels. Originally published in the Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science (1892).

_____."Why Is Economics Not an Evolutionary Science?" Quarterly Journal of Economics QuIy 1898): 373-397.

_____. The Theory of Business Enterprise. New York: Scribner's, 1904.

_____. The Vested Interests and the Common Man. New York: Huebsch, 1920.

_____. Absentee Ownership and Business Enterprise in Recent Times: The case of America. New York: Huebsch, 1923.

_____. "The Socialist Economics of Karl Marx and His Followers. 1. The Theories of Karl Marx." In Thorstein Veblen The Piace of Science in Modern Civilisation and Other Essays. New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 1989, 409-430. Introduction by Warren Samuels. Originally published in The Quarter!} Journal of Economics 20 (August 1906).

_____. "The Socialist Economics of Karl Marx and His Followers. 2. The Later Marxism." In Thorstein Veblen The Place of Science in Modern Civilisation and Other Essays. New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 1989, 431-456. Introduction by Warren Samuels. Originally published in The Quarterly Journal of Economics 21 (February 1907).

_____. The Engineers and the Price System. 1921. Reprint, London and New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1990b.

Phillip Anthony O'Hara is Director of the Global Political Economy Research Unit and Associate Professor of Political Economy at Curtin University, Perth, Australia, email: philohara@runbox.com, and Howard Jay Sherman is Emeritus Professor of Economics at the University of California, Riverside, and Visiting Scholar, Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles, email; Sherman@polisci.ucia.eciu. They wish to acknowledge the excellent constructive criticism of the following, which greatly improved tKe article: tKe anonymous referees, Paul Burkett, William Dugger, Howard Engelskirken, JoKn Bellamy Foster, Mason Gaffney, and RicKard Sklar.

Copyright Association for Evolutionary Economics Dec 2004

Source: Journal of Economic Issues

More News in this Category