Persistent Themes in Colleges of Business
By Bohanon, Cecil E
ABSTRACT. In this article, the author examines a number of issues in colleges of commerce in their formative period from 1900 to 1930. He discusses 4 areas: content of business curriculum, professional nature of business and business schools, social responsibility of corporate managers, and integration of the business curriculum. Many of the topics are still important today and can arguably be considered persistent themes in colleges of business. Keywords: business curriculum, business education, curriculum integration, economics, social responsibility of business
Copyright (c) 2008 Heldref Publications
In this article, I examine a number of issues in collegiate business education that emerged during the early years of business schools, roughly from 1900 to 1930. After providing a cursory history of the formation of colleges of business, I examine four issues of the era: curriculum content, claim of the professional nature of business and business schools, social responsibility of corporate managers, and the desire for integration of the business curriculum. The issues were not resolved during the period and have persisted as continual topics in collegiate business education to this day. In the final section, I offer tentative insights as to what educators can conclude from this historical exploration.
A Cursory History of Colleges of Commerce
Colleges of commerce and business began forming at U.S. universities in the late 19th century. The Wharton School at University of Pennsylvania began in 1883. Other university-based business schools were established before 1900 at the University of Chicago, the University of California, the University of Ohio, and Columbia University. By 1900, schools of commerce existed at Dartmouth College, the University of Vermont, New York University, the University of Michigan, and the University of Wisconsin and were planned for the University of Illinois and the University of Iowa (James, 1901).
Much of the impetus for establishing the schools came from the business community. As an early Wharton professor pointed out, members of the Philadelphia business community “did not see why their sons could not be learning something bearing on their future business while acquiring a liberal education” (James, 1901, p. 154). In Wisconsin, it was argued that many of the best high school students in the state were going directly into business and not going to the state university. Other good students were enrolling as special students at the university, taking courses only relevant to business and never bothering to complete a formal degree. By 1900 this was seen as so untenable by the university administration that a commerce college was established at the University of Wisconsin (Scott, 1913). Laughlin (1902) argued that universities should develop commerce colleges to attract able students.
It was also noted that, increasingly, university graduates were entering business. Of the Harvard class of 1896, 35% developed a business career, whereas 2 decades later, the percentage had risen to 55% (Mears, 1923). Universities established colleges of commerce in response to an increased demand for commercial education at the collegiate level.
Establishing a business curriculum was met with hostility and resistance at many universities. The study of business was seen as too vocational and outside the spirit of liberal education. Deans of colleges of commerce seemed to continually argue that their institutions were not trade schools (McCrea, 1926). At the University of Wisconsin in 1900, many faculty members considered accounting courses “unworthy of a place in the curriculum” (Scott, 1913, p. 131). By 1913, there had been some “breaking down this faculty prejudice” (Scott, p. 131) so that accounting and business administration courses were taught. However, none of these courses counted for general credit for the undergraduate bachelor’s degree (Scott, 1913). As late as 1928, a participant at a roundtable discussion at a joint meeting of the American Economics Association and the American Association of Collegiate Schools of Business stated, “Which one of us has not heard the slurring remarks that truly cultural courses are not found in the college of commerce” (Bogart, 1928, p. 74). Distancing itself from the label of commercial, the economics curriculum at Amherst stated in 1917 that it “considers itself under no obligation to meet vocational or professional demands, either directly or indirectly” (Hamilton, 1917, p. 2).
Curricular Responses to Hostility Toward Business Courses
Desiring a place in the university, the administrators of early colleges of commerce had a number of curricular responses to the unwelcoming attitude of those in more traditional quarters of the university.
Liberal Arts Courses Outside the College
Early proponents of the business curriculum always affirmed business education as a part of a general university education. From the beginning, the question of how much of the business student’s coursework should be traditional and how much practical was a lively issue. At the 1903 Ann Arbor Conference on Higher Commercial Education, one businessman’s speech was “devoted to the praise of the old classical college course” (Loos, 1903, p. 462), whereas another “inveighed against useless education and pleaded for the practical” (Loos, p. 463). The conference seemed to conclude that the ideal business curriculum would be one with which 60% constituted the old classical curriculum, with the remaining 40% devoted to new business studies (Loos).
The specific arrangement of the nonbusiness courses varied. The Tuck School required 3 years of general undergraduate work in the liberal arts before a 4th and 5th year of business study (Person, 1913). In contrast, Wharton offered commercial studies grouped with liberal education for a 4-year period. General courses in economics, politics, and sociology were all given in the Wharton school, and “as much as (they) are of the liberal type . . . Wharton students get a strong infusion of the traditionally cultural type of education” (McCrea, 1913, p. 113). At the University of Chicago, the first 2 years of the business curriculum emphasized general education and social sciences. This curriculum was shared with public administration and social work students (Marshall, 1913).
Liberal Elements in Business Curriculum
Another approach was to infuse the commercial courses with liberal and scientific elements, making them more than mere descriptions of business phenomena. One prominent dean suggested that “descriptive (business) courses that do not promise to be analytical should be replaced” and that all subjects in the curriculum must “embody scientific principles” (Hotchkiss, 1920, p. 90). Another stated that “every business course shall have its analytical and philosophical phase” (McCrea, 1926, p. 220). The dean of the Tuck school heralded the use of a textbook in finance that went beyond “descriptions of different securities and methods” but rather “continually asks and explains why in corporate finance” (Person, 1913, p. 123; emphasis in original). Business studies were to be disciplined studies based on general and scientific principles that could be outlined and transmitted.
Preponderance of Social Science and Economics Courses
Economics was often seen as the core of the commercial curriculum that ensured its academic standing. An early commentator described economics as a “fundamental element” of a commercial curriculum and argued that “the man who grapples in earnest with the problems of economics will secure, if nothing else, a mental discipline” (James, 1901, pp. 157-158). At Dartmouth, economics was the “foundation upon which the work of the Tuck school is based” (Person, 1913, p. 117). Economics was seen by some educators as the component that made a school of commerce more than a trade school (Bogart, 1928; Dowrie, 1928; McCrea, 1926). In the words of one commentator, “Without the presence of economics in some vital form . . . the school of business is likely to degenerate into a detailed description of business organization and procedure with no organizing principle” (McCrea, 1926, p. 222).
Many have affirmed this analogy: Economics is to business what physics or mathematics is to engineering, or what biology is to medicine (James, 1901; Kiekhofer, 1928; Mears, 1923). However, others have disagreed with such a characterization (Bonbright, 1926; Howard, 1917; Marshall, 1917). Some researchers have argued that the social implications of business were better covered in other disciplines, such as political science or philosophy, than in economics (Phillips, 1926), whereas others have asserted that business administration would likely develop into its own science separate from economics (Jones, 1913).
Professional Nature of the Business School
From the very beginning, business schools claimed to be, or at least were aspiring to be, professional schools similar to those that had been established in engineering, medicine, law, and theology at universities in the previous decades. One dean described colleges of commerce as “strictly educational institutions with professional emphasis” (McCrea, 1920, p. 108). Others have affirmed the professional aspirations of the early schools of commerce (James, 1901; Loos, 1903; McCrea, 1926). This aspiration was at the heart of the newly founded colleges of commerce in 1900. Although not dismissing personal gain as a motive for the business student, the early business school administrators distanced their school from its pursuit, insisting that public service be upheld as the ideal of business education. The dean of the University of Chicago argued that schools of commerce “missed their purpose if . . . [the] money making side is permitted to have a ruling hand” (Marshall, 1913, p. 101). Marshall (1913) argued that especially in a school of commerce, the “professional attitude” (p. 101) is constantly tempted by “merely a moneymaking attitude” (p. 101) and that “eternal vigilance” (p. 101) was necessary to ensure that money making did not dominate in schools of commerce. At the meeting of the Association of Collegiate Schools of Business in 1919, the leading speaker argued that public responsibility was the first aim that “the curriculum of a collegiate school of business should reflect” and that “sound business rather than individual rewards is the first concern of a collegiate school of business” (Hotchkiss, 1920, pp. 89- 90). In 1926 another commentator emphasized that money making must not be allowed to overshadow cultural, social, and ethical considerations (Phillips, 1926). However, the claim that colleges of commerce were professional schools was not uniformly accepted, even within the colleges themselves. A member of the college of commerce at the University of Iowa noted that given the popular usage of the term professional, it was “difficult to understand how any school of business can be professional in character” (Phillips, 1926, p. 231). Wooster (1919) of the University of Missouri decried that the college of commerce “has had to undertake professional training for nonprofessional pursuits” (p. 48). He argued that business was not a profession because it had little in terms of a code of ethics or commitment to public service that were the hallmarks of other professions. Wooster, however, thought that business could establish such a code that could eventually raise it to a professional status and saw colleges of commerce essential in that quest. Wooster said, “It is not impossible, however, that business may become a profession” (p. 48). These sentiments were echoed in an essay titled The Emerging Profession of Business (Donham, 1927a).
Recent authors in Harvard Business Review argued that “business schools are on the wrong track” (Bennis & O’Toole, 2005, p. 1) because they fail to impart useful skills for actual work in business. The authors attribute this state of affairs to business schools adopting a model of academic excellence that treats business disciplines as traditional academic fields. Under this model, faculty members focus on scientific research at the expense of practical application. The authors suggested that “business is a profession akin to medicine and the law” (Bennis & O’Toole, p. 2) and that business schools ought to reflect this by being more willing to “deliberately engage with the outside world” (Bennis & O’Toole p. 2).
Then, as now, this question arises: Are business schools professional schools? The answer lies in what is meant by professional. Both then and now, a number of criteria typically emerge. Wooster (1919) argued that professions were modeled after medieval craft guilds that required extensive periods of specific training. Moreover, the professional has definitive ethical obligations to the public, his fellow craftsmen, and his clients, and these obligations are often counter to his pecuniary interests. For example, Wooster argued, a physician is often called on to provide service when an epidemic arises “for the public good . . . given freely and without complaint” (p. 49).
More recently Khurana, Nohira, and Penrice (2004) argued that professions have (a) common bodies of knowledge, (b) certification procedures affirming the acquisition of the body of knowledge, (c) a commitment to the public good, and (d) an enforceable code of ethics. Those authors went further and suggested that business and society would do well to establish clear professional status for business managers, although they were vague about how such a system of managerial professional certification and public control would operate.
Although the two definitions of professional are 85 years apart, little separates them in terms of content. Moreover, just as Wooster (1919) thought that business was a long way from being a profession, Khurana et al. (2004) lamented that “In comparing management with the more traditional professions of law and medicine along these criteria, one inevitably finds it wanting” (p. 3).
The Corporate Social Responsibility Debate
Questions about the ethical and social obligations of business and businesspeople are pervasive in contemporary business education. Although many issues are involved, a central question is this: To whom do corporate officers have a fiduciary obligation? Discussion about how the various groups that interact with a corporation are to be regarded by corporate managers has been vigorous.
Economists such as Friedman (1970) argued that corporate executives are agents of the shareholders, duty bound to advance their interests over the executive’s own personal interest. This is typically accomplished by maximizing the firm’s profits in a way that is subject to the rules of business as outlined by legal restraints and by the admonition of forgoing the use of force and fraud in business dealings. The use of corporate resources to promote other social agendas is a misappropriation of shareholder wealth and an unethical indulgence on the part of the corporate manager.
This view is often identified as the shareholder theory of management responsibility. This is often inaccurately identified as a minimal ethic, as if putting others’ interest over one’s own and adhering to a code of transparency are morally simple tasks. Its critics often ignore that under the shareholder theory, corporate managers do have responsibilities to customers, employees, and suppliers in their decision making. Managers are restrained by law and contract and-more important-by competitive pressures. Failure to pay attention consistently to the interests of these other parties leads to legal consequences or erosion of market share that directly harms the long-run interest of shareholders. Smith’s (1987) “invisible hand” works to promote a balanced harmony of interests between shareholders and other corporate constituencies through the price and profit mechanisms.
In contrast, professors of management such as Carroll (1991) and Donaldson and Preston (1995) have offered an alternative stakeholder theory of corporate responsibility. Under this approach, corporate officers have an explicit obligation not only to shareholders but also to all of those affected by corporate decision making. The corporate executive becomes, in effect, the agent of all who are affected by the corporation (the stakeholders) is duty bound to advance their interests over his own personal interest, and is duty bound to balance the interests among the different groups. In this view, contractual, legal, and competitive restraints are not enough to ensure that adequate attention is paid to the interests of nonshareholders affected by corporate decision makers. The invisible hand is seen as generally nonoperative and ineffective. Under this approach, the mandate for profit maximization for shareholder interest is clearly attenuated. Corporate officers will and should often sacrifice shareholders’ financial interests for other constituencies such as employees, customers, suppliers, and the general public. Making the correct tradeoff between the shareholders’ interests and other interests is the essence of responsible management.
Although the terminology varied, the issue was discussed among early business educators, and the conflicts between perspectives were parallel to those of contemporary positions. One early leader argued that administrators of colleges of commerce should try to influence business policy to ends that clearly went beyond instructing students to maximize profits for shareholders in a Friedman-like way. Jones (1913) of the University of Michigan argued that the ultimate purpose of collegelevel business education was “to put industrial policies on a scientific basis and to control them by [the] ideals of social welfare” (p. 187). He elaborated a view consistent with current theories that emphasizes taking a stakeholder viewpoint in business management:
There has begun to emerge a special class of administrators who are not capitalists, but stand midway between the multitude of stock- and bondholders on one side, and the wage earning classes and public as consumers on the other. . . . This special class is more and more responsible for the inauguration and execution of industrial and commercial policies. It is a great opportunity of the college to assist this rising profession to a consciousness of itself, to help it realize its trusteeship and to stimulate it to conceive itself as an intellectual aristocracy in the world of affairs. (pp. 187-188)
Jones concluded that the task for colleges of commerce was to raise the tone of industry by setting forth new ideals of efficiency, of distributive justice, and of democracy “. . . [to] stimulate the ambition on the part of industrial leaders to realize these newer and more social ideals (as opposed to the desire for material acquisition)” (p. 195).
Wooster (1919) argued that the hallmark of a profession was a willingness to place public service above gain and argued that “the principle thing necessary to make a profession of business is the substitution of service for selling as the proper end of business” (p. 52). Although recognizing that competitive pressures require the businessman to not “slight the customer too much” (Wooster, p. 52) he argued that part of the purpose of business education was “to tame the leopard before we set him loose” (Wooster, p. 59). The dean of the Harvard Business School argued that because business leaders control the “mechanisms of material wealth of modern society” (Donham, 1927b, p. 415), the objective of business education was “the multiplication of men who will handle their current business problems in a socially constructive way” (Donham, 1927b, p. 407). The corporate executive was “to consider not only the permanency and good standing of his institution but the sound stability and development of his community” (Donham, 1927a, p. 401), and he observed that “the big national corporations inevitably tend to higher ethical standards, to more a feeling of trusteeship, for the community and for the employee, as well as the shareholder” (Donham, 1927b, pp. 415-416). Donham (1927b), however, also argued the Friedman point that “neither has the corporate executive the right to use other people’s property in ways which they might or might not approve, simply because he feels quite apart from his business the results would be socially desirable” (p. 415).
There was, however, another discussion that was more in line with the shareholder view. One professor argued that the objective of business practice was “not social service but private profit” (Howard, 1917, p. 106). Viewing a business organization as a set of social relations, he distinguished between the proprietors of a business organization and its creditor, employees, purveyors, and others that in contemporary jargon would be identified as stakeholders, and argued that “Successful business administration is measured by the . . . maximum of ultimate profit for the proprietors” (Howard, p. 106). He argued that the “science of business is the science of profit-making” (Howard, p. 109) and that this was the domain of business education. He recognized that deviations from profit maximization, either as social policy or as individual choice, were possible but that they were not the domain of business study but of political economy, sociology, religion, and ethics (Howard).
Another professor at a panel discussion distinguished between the view that the business curriculum “should be designed . . . to teach students how to make the most money in their business careers” (Bonbright, 1926, p. 234) in comparison with one that would teach how to run industry from “the point of view of the public interest” (p. 234). He called the first the “acquisitive test” (234) and the second the “social test” (234). Arguing that the social test was “a very vague and ill-defined concept” (Bonbright, p. 234), he proceeded to defend the acquisitive curriculum in light of the “mean and slurring comments” (p. 235) that other panel members had made about it. He argued in the economic tradition of Smith and Mandeville that self-interest and the public good coincide. The most important exception was making money in the short run at the expense of the long run, but this was a problem that was easily remedied in business instruction. Indeed, most business faculties were aware of the trade-off. “The businessman who tries to higgle his wage earners down to the last farthing or who says mean things to his stenographer may be richer next year, but in ten years he will be a pauper” (Bonbright, p. 236).
Bonbright (1926) lampooned the social concept of business education that “taught business men to make decisions not merely on their reactions on his pocket book” (p. 241). How could a business graduate decide, for example, whether to become a stockbroker or to sell fruit on the basis of a social test?
On one hand, he needs to know all about the theory of stock speculation and its social utility and disutility. On the other hand, he should have accurate information about the nutritive value of bananas, and he should also be in a position to weigh critically the possible incidental results of his business, such as those that might normally be expected to follow from the promiscuous throwing of banana peels on the sidewalk. (Bonbright, p. 241)
Early Efforts at Curriculum Integration
In the past 20 years or so, colleges of business have made a persistent effort to promote curriculum integration. Although the definition of curriculum integration may vary, the idea is that business schools should inculcate their students in a “broad understanding of how the functions work together in a business enterprise” (Stover, Morris, Pharr, Reyes, & Byers, 1997, p. 1). Business education, it is argued, has been relegated to departmental silos where students receive excellent training in selective functional business disciplines-such as accounting, marketing, or production-but fail to see the big picture of how functional business areas fit together. Collegiate business schools have implemented various models to promote curriculum integration, ranging from extensive curriculum redesign to the introduction of common themes in the curriculum (Cannon, Klein, Koste, & Magal, 2004).
It is often argued that curriculum integration is a by-product of changing business conditions. Because of the increasingly dynamic nature of commercial enterprises, businesses have moved from function-based organizational structures. The university business curriculum, however, is still mired in a functional mentality. The modern curriculum must be more integrated to meet current demands of business (Cannon et al., 2004; Hartenian, Schellenger, & Fredrickson, 2001; Stover et al., 1997). This suggests that demands for curriculum integration are primarily driven by contemporary business conditions. However, a reading of the literature describing the formative years of university-based schools of commerce indicates that the early business schools were aware of the integration issue. Then, as now, different methods were used to promote integration. However, the demand for broad integrative thinking by business graduates is not particularly a by-product of contemporary business trends (although such trends may accentuate the demand) but, rather, an inherent component of any sound collegiate business education curriculum.
At the first meeting of the Associated Collegiate Schools of Business in 1919, Willard E. Hotchkiss, who served as dean at a number of early schools of commerce, outlined the elements he thought appropriate for the curriculum. In Hotchkiss’ view, the freshman and sophomore years of the business student should be composed of a prebusiness course of study. This should include a large component of liberal education and what we would today call foundational courses in business, such as economics, accounting, and statistics (Hotchkiss, 1920).
This should be followed by a more specialized curricula-because a number of alternative courses of study could be pursued-in the junior and senior years. Each of those curricula should begin with a discipline-specific survey course. Although the course was to be in the specific discipline, the point of the course was not to be discipline specific. Rather, he argued that the important component of each of the survey courses lay in developing the habits of mind conducive to a broad view of business:
The idea of the survey then is not to give the student an insight into all the subjects he may have occasion to use, but rather to give him samples coming from a wide-enough range of subjects whose content is pertinent to his problem so that he will develop the habit of following collateral as well as direct lines of inquiry. The fact that a student has been unable to take a course in transportation would not necessarily imply that he would omit transportation phases in analyzing a problem in marketing. (Hotchkiss, p. 100)
In current jargon, Hotchkiss called for the survey course to provide curriculum integration and develop critical-thinking skills. A second case of early integration awareness and efforts was outlined by Wallace B. Donham (1922), dean of the Harvard School of Commerce. He extolled the pedagogical virtues of case studies in graduate business education (a method still associated with Harvard Business School). He noted, however, that after the first year of foundational and functional courses
the typical first-year man at the end of the year seemed to have studied individual courses with little conception of their interrelation. Accounting was . . . simply accounting, and finance only finance. There was no clear understanding of the usefulness of factory management training for the accountant. He wished in far too many cases to make himself a narrow specialist. (Donham, 1922, p. 63)
Donham (1922) indicated that the problem was resolved with a business policy course that was given in the 2nd year of the curriculum but asserted that an integrated view ought to be presented in the 1st year, and he offered a method to accomplish that end:
Yet there is a great need that men should from the beginning of their work build toward a coordinated structure of training rather than toward isolated units whose interrelationship is beyond their vision. In the effort to bring about this coordination we give the first-year class immediately after their arrival a very complicated business case which should for its solution depend upon the subject matter of a large part of the courses given in the school. Of course such a problem is beyond the capacity of every man in the class. It nevertheless is presented for their consideration and after careful study by them discussed by the instructor. This discussion serves as an object lesson in the preliminary analysis of a complicated business problem, and at the same time brings out the relation of the problem to the different courses. In this way the student at once realizes how the individual courses in the school work together as a preparation of a solution of a single executive problem while at the same time he acquires a more adequate conception of the general and interlocking nature of business problems. (Donham, 1922, pp. 63-64) Although described in dated language, the problems that Donham (1922) and Hotchkiss (1920) considered and the solutions they offered are familiar to those in the contemporary discussion of curriculum integration. Perhaps the desire for curriculum integration of business courses is not only a result of the changing business world. Perhaps an integrated curriculum is the manifestation of the persistent value of a broad, liberal, and interconnected course of study in collegiate business education.
Conclusion
Many of the issues that colleges of business face today are the same as those faced in the early part of the 20th century. The same issues will likely be with business schools in the 22nd century. From the earlier educators of business, two conclusions and one admonition readily arise: First, collegiate business education is part of a general university education. Business students at universities and colleges have always and will always be “learning something bearing on their future business while acquiring a liberal education” (James, 1901, p. 154). This implies not only that much of their coursework will inevitably be outside the business college, but also that business courses must be disciplined, analytically rigorous, and beyond mere descriptions of business phenomena. These were the aspirations of the first generation of business educators. This was reinforced 50 years later when the Carnegie report on collegiate business education entreated, “Both undergraduate and graduate course works needs to be kept in a broad context and limited to problems of solid analytical content” (Pierson, 1959, p. xi). Although the exact blend between the practical and the liberal will always evolve, both will be necessary components of business studies.
Second, for almost 100 years, business schools have unsuccessfully sought professional status. It seems business educators have always been anxious over the absence of clear professional status of business occupations. Yet the reality is that most undergraduate business degrees never did and currently do not lead to occupations that are professional in the strict sense of the term. Perhaps it is time to ask: So what? Business schools should think of themselves as academic hybrids. Parts of the business school curriculum, notably economics and finance courses, are academic in nature. Other components such as accounting and certain specialized coursework in management (e.g., human resources) are professional or quasi-professional in nature. Others such as communications and technical courses are somewhere between the two and aptly considered vocational. So what? Business schools have been around for a century. Do they need to make extraordinary claims of professional status to justify their presence in a university setting? Such self-confident clarity might do much to improve interdepartmental and intercollegial relationships.
Last, an admonition arises. Contemporary business colleges are subject to demands for change from both internal and external constituencies and accreditations agencies on any number of issues. Although such pressure is undoubtedly necessary and usually healthy, it would be useful if the proponents of reform adopted the scholarly habit of reviewing the history of the issue in business education. This would serve the two-fold purpose of helping the advocates of change to better understand and refine their position and simultaneously giving their claim increased legitimacy.
If an advisory board member of a college of business wants to make a case that students are deficient in their writing skills and that the faculty and administration of the college should do something about it, the board member’s case and credibility would be enhanced if he or she documented the problems of student writing in colleges of business over time. Of course, this would require a broader knowledge of the history of business colleges among all the constituencies of business colleges. This article contributes somewhat to that end.
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CECIL E. BOHANON
BALL STATE UNIVERSITY
MUNCIE, INDIANA
NOTES
Dr. Cecil E. Bohanon’s research interests are applied microeconomics, public choice analysis, and business curriculum.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Dr. Cecil E. Bohanon, Department of Economics, Ball State University, Muncie, IN 47306.
E-mail: cbohanon@bsu.edu
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