Recent Decision-Primary & Secondary Education
By Anonymous
Constitutional Claims & Civil Rights
Teacher with disabilities sued school for violation of federal disability laws. A teacher requested that her school make accommodations for her various handicaps. When the school partially complied, the teacher alleged discrimination and violation of federal disability laws. Held: For the school. Even though the school had failed to fully adapt its facilities for the teacher, the teacher was unable to show that the school’s actions were intentional. Also, she unable to prove that the school created a hostile work environment. Carmona-Rivera v. Cmmw. of P.R., 464 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2006).
Parents sued school district, on behalf of minor son, alleging violation of his First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The school discovered that the student possessed a diary containing a fictional story that depicted the student as the leader of a Nazi group planning the takeover of the school. The student was then arrested, suspended from school, and required to attend an alternative school for three days. Held: For the student in part and the school district in part. The parents could bring a First Amendment claim due to a lack of reasonable belief that the diary would cause disruption. However, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims were dismissed. Ponce ex rel. E.P. v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 432 F. Supp. 2d 682 (W.D. Tex. 2006).
Minor challenges legality ofpatdown search which revealed possession of knife on school campus. A school safety officer approached the minor and determined that he was not a student at that school. The officer conducted a pat down search of the minor. Held: For the school district. The minor was not a student at the school, so he had a diminished right of privacy in that environment. Furthermore, the governmental interest in preventing violence in schools outweighs the invasion of the minor’s privacy rights. Therefore, the patdown search was proper. In re Jose Y., 46 Cal. Rptr. 3d 268 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2006).
Student filed motion to suppress evidence found during search at school. The student was stopped by a school security guard for being out of the classroom without a pass. The student appeared nervous and fidgety, and a search by the security guard revealed drugs. Held: For the student. The fact that the student was out of the classroom without a pass and appeared nervous and fidgety did not provide the security guard with a reasonable basis to search the student. Therefore, the search was unreasonable. State v. Pablo R., 137 P.3d 1198 (N.M. App. 2006).
Mother, on behalf of minor son, sued school district for discrimination. During the school lunch hour, an organization, which requires its members to believe in a theistic God, made a presentation. Then, students who were interested in the organization were invited to an informational meeting held off school grounds. The mother and her son are atheists and opposed the presentation. Held: For the school district. The recruiting efforts were aimed and presented to all students and the religious requirement was not made clear. Neither the school district nor the organization discriminated against students holding the informational session. Powell ex rel. Powell v. Bunn, 142 P.3d 1054 (Or. 2006).
High school student sued state board of education alleging First Amendment rights infringement. When a student refused to stand and recite the Pledge of Allegiance, his teacher informed him that he must get written permission from a parent before being excused from reciting the Pledge. Held: For the student. Neither the school board nor its members could compel the student to recite the Pledge of Allegiance or to remain standing while the Pledge was recited by other students. Frazier v. Alexandre, 434 F. Supp. 2d 1350 (S.D. Fla. 2006).
High school student sued city and four police officers for violation of Fourth Amendment rights. After refusing to surrender a videogame to school officials, the student became combative when officers tried to search him. Held: For the city and its police officers. Since the student refused to comply with a directive to turn over the game, the search was justified at its inception. The search was reasonable in its scope; therefore, the student’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated by the search. Johnson ex rel. Smith v. City of Lincoln Park, 434 F. Supp. 2d 467 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
Student was handcuffed by officer and argued her Fourth Amendment rights were violated. After the student threatened a teacher, the school resource officer (SRO) handcuffed the student. Held: For the student. The SRO did not have qualified immunity because his actions were clearly unreasonable and unconstitutional. Gray ex rel. Alexander v. Antonio, 458 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2006).
School district sought declaration that it was fully integrated per negotiated desegregation plan. Pursuant to a class action suit, the district agreed to meet the requirements of a negotiated desegregation plan before it could be declared fully desegregated. Eventually, the district met most of the requirements. Held: For the class. The district could not be declared fully desegregated until it met all the terms of the agreement. Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. N. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 451 F.3d 528 (8th Cir. 2006).
Student sued school district alleging suspension violated constitutional due process. The district suspended the student for a year because the student carried a knife at school. Held: For the district. The punishment was rationally related to the school’s interest in keeping the learning environment safe. Therefore, the punishment did not violate the Constitution. Vann ex rel. Vann v. Stewart, 445 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Tenn. 2006).
Student claimed school district violated his freedom of speech. The district made the student cover certain portions of shirt, which contained political statements, with tape. Held: For the student. The district could not censor the shirt because it was not plainly offensive, and it did not cause a disruption. Guiles ex rel. Guiles v. Marineau, 461 F.3d 320 (2d Cir. 2006).
School district employees sued state education department under Title VH and state laws, alleging violation of their civil rights. The employees argued that a teacher competency test violated the rights of AfricanAmerican and Latino teachers. Held: For the state education department in part and for the employees in part. The test requirement exhibited a valid concern for teacher competence, and did not violate Title VII. However, further deliberation was required to ascertain the test’s “job relatedness” and whether the test violated other civil rights. Gulino v. N.Y. St. Educ. Dept., 460 F.3d 361 (2d Cir. 2006).
Student sued school district and principal alleging violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The student claimed his constitutional rights were violated when he was summoned from class so that police officers could interrogate him and obtain a DNA sample. Held: For the school district and principal. The student’s allegations lacked evidentiary support. Burreson v. Barneveld Sch. Dist., 434 F. Supp. 2d 588 (W.D. Wis. 2006).
Parent sued school board on behalf of child alleging school district violated child’s First Amendment rights. The parent sued after the school board voted to remove a series of books from school libraries in the district. Held: For the parent. Local school districts may not remove books from libraries simply based upon the ideas or points-of-view therein. No evidence was presented that the books were educationally unsuitable. Moreover, since the actual motivation for removal was personal disapproval, the removal was deemed unconstitutional. Am. Civ. Liberties Union of Fla., Inc. v. Miami-Dade Co. Sch. Bd., 439 F. Supp. 2d 1242 (S.D. Fla. 2006).
School district would not allow Christian band members to perform at school assembly and band members alleged free speech and due process violations. The students in the band asked the school principal if they could perform Christian themed music at the assembly. After receiving permission to perform, the band was replaced by a secular group. Held: For the school. The assembly was not a governmental open forum subject to the requirements of viewpoint neutrality. Thus, the band could be excluded without violating free speech or equal protection. Golden v. Rossford Exempted Village Sch. Dist., 445 F. Supp. 2d 820 (N.D. Ohio 2006).
Religious group claimed school district violated their First Amendment rights. The group wanted to distribute flyers that advertised an after school program held on school property. The school’s policy permitted distribution of informational materials and announcements but did not permit the religious group’s flyers. Held: For the religious group. The school’s take home flyer forum policy violated the First Amendment because the school discriminated on the viewpoint expressed by the flyer. Child Evangelism Fellowship of Md., Inc. v. Montgomery Co. Pub. Sch., 457 F.3d 376 (4th Cir. 2006).
Private school association sued Department of Education alleging that procedures for terminating certification were unfair. The association claimed that the Department of Education was not enabled by statute to revoke a license without assigning a pre-suspension hearing. Held: For the Department o\f Education. Since the statute provides for three separate options from which the association’s school members may choose following a suspension, there was no concrete controversy or facts to sustain a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. Cal. Assn. of PSES v. Cal. Dept. of Educ., 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 888 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2006).
Litigation
School district argued that lower court awarded parents excessive attorney’s fees contrary to law. Congress placed a cap on the amount of attorney’s fees an individual can collect in an action under the Individual with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Accordingly, when the parents brought actions to enforce IDEA’S right to a free appropriate public education (FAPE), the district contended that these actions were subject to the cap. Held: For the district. The phrase “under the IDEA” encompasses actions to enforce the right to a FAPE. Thus, the lower court impermissibly awarded attorney’s fees over the requisite cap. Blackman v. D.C., 456 F.3d 167 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
Parent entered into settlement agreement with school district and sought attorney’s fees under Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). The settlement agreement provided that the district would reimburse the parent for the costs of private school tuition and the child’s psychological evaluation. The district claimed that the settlement agreement was not the type of relief that rendered the parent a “prevailing party” entitled to attorney’s fees. Held: For the school district. Since the relief did not bear elements of judicial sanction, the parent was not a “prevailing party” under the IDEA. RN. ex rel. T.N. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2006).
Father and child sought attorney’s fees under Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) for legal representation provided by child’s mother. The child’s mother provided legal services in negotiations with the district regarding the child’s Individualized Education Program. Held: For the school district. In order to avoid emotionally charged representation, parents bringing actions under the IDEA are encouraged to retain independent counsel. Thus, in order to further this policy, the IDEA statute does not provide for awards of attorney’s fees to parents providing legal representation for their children. Ford v. Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 461 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2006).
Mother of disabled child claimed she was “prevailing party” in hearing brought under Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and was entitled to attorney’s fees award. The mother, who claimed her son was not receiving his education in the least restrictive environment, received a due process hearing. The hearing officer ordered the school district to provide “extended year services . . . for the next two calendar years” conditioned upon the mother’s performance of certain duties. Held: For the school district. Since the relief was limited and conditional, the mother was neither a “prevailing party” nor entitled to attorney’s fees. Drennan v. Pulaski Co. Special Sch. Dist., 458 F.3d 755 (8th Cir. 2006).
Mother of disabled student sued school district alleging violations of Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and seeking relief. The mother complained that the district committed procedural IDEA violations and denied her child a free appropriate public education (FAPE). She also claimed that she was entitled to attorney’s fees for the costs of a previous due process hearing. Held: For the district in part and the mother in part. There were no procedural or FAPE violations because the district provided both sufficient explanations for its actions and adequate support services. However, because a hearing officer had directed the district to devise a new educational plan for the student, the mother was a “prevailing party” entitled to attorney’s fees. Park ex rel. Park v. Anaheim Union High Sch. Dist., 464 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2006).
Student was denied free appropriate public education (FAPE) and argued he received insufficient compensatory education in return. After a due process hearing, the hearing officer determined that the student was not provided with an individualized education. Consequently, the student was granted compensatory education. However, the student was displeased with the amount of compensatory education awarded. Held: For the school district. Compensatory education is sufficient if it places the student in the position he or she would have been in but for the lack of a FAPE. Given the evidential record and the hearing officer’s specialized expertise, the amount of compensatory education awarded was sufficient. B.C. ex rel. J.C. v. Penn Manor Sch. Dist., 906 A.2d 642 (Pa. Cmmw. 2006).
School board attorney argued board was responsible for costs he incurred when he defended suit brought against board. State law requires the board to indemnify those who hold “any office, position, or employment” with the board of education. Held: For the board. The legislative history demonstrates that only school employees, school board members, and those in preparation for careers in education are entitled to indemnification. In contrast, the law does not cover school board attorneys who simply provide legal advice. Thus, the school board was not responsible for the attorney’s legal fees. Sahli v. Woodbine Bd. of Educ., 902 A.2d 296 (NJ. Super. App. Div. 2006).
Student Conduct & Discipline
Mother of student appeals student’s suspension from school. The student, who was involved in an altercation with a teacher, the student was suspended for five days and transferred to an alternative school within the school district. Held: For the school district. A disciplinary suspension is not an appealable local agency action. Under the appropriate local statute, the student was allowed an informal hearing which provided sufficient due process protections for the student. Tyson ex rel. Jefferson v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 900 A.2d 990 (Pa Cmmw. 2006).
Student sued district alleging her suspension was based upon insufficient proof. The district suspended the student, based solely on circumstantial evidence, for making a bomb threat. Held: For the district. Circumstantial evidence can carry the same weight of proof as direct evidence. A.B. ex rel. Bennet v. Slippery Rock Sch. Dist., 906 A.2d 674 (Pa. Cmmw. 2006).
Students with Disabilities
Parents claimed school district failed to provide their child with free appropriate public education (FAPE). The school district increased the child’s time in a mainstream classroom, but kept her in the special education program for a significant period of the day. Held: For the school district. While a mainstream education is preferred, a school district may remove a student from the mainstream classroom if the student will not progress, or if the benefits to the student are far outweighed by the benefits he or she will receive in the alternative program. Pachl v. Seagren, 453 F.3d 1064 (8th Cir. 2006).
Parents sued school district claiming school’s Individualized Education Plan (IEP) did not adequately meet their child’s needs. After a number of problems, the parents and the school district signed two separate mediation agreements which purportedly resolved all claims arising prior to signing the agreements. The parents alleged that the agreements were not binding because the school district broke the agreements by failing to make a tutor available for their child. Held: For the school district. The parties settled any breach of the first agreement by signing the second agreement. In addition, the school district provided a free appropriate public education (FAPE), after the second agreement, by providing the student with a tutor. Amy S. v. Danbury Local Sch. Dist., 174 Fed. Appx. 896 (6th Cir. 2006) (unpublished opinion).
Parents claimed school failed to maintain safe educational environment and practiced discrimination. The parents’ child suffered from various neurological and developmental disorders. Over a period of three years, the student was involved in a number of physical altercations. The parents claimed the school failed to take appropriate measures to prevent the incidents and discriminated against the student. Held: For the school. The parents did not produce evidence that indicated discrimination or gross negligence for the failure to maintain a safe environment. Thus, the court dismissed the case. 5.5. v. E. Ky. U., 431 F. Supp. 2d 718 (E.D. Ky. 2006)
School board appealed administrative decision that student’s Individualized Education Plan (IEP) was not reasonably calculated to provide educational benefit. The student was autistic, and the parents disagreed with the school regarding which method of education was best for their child. Based on the testimony of the parents’ experts, the administrative agency found that the student lacked the sufficient attending and imitation skills to learn using the school’s IEP. Held: For the student. Since most of the evidence favored the decision of the administrative agency, the court affirmed the agency’s decision. Co. Sch. Bd. v. R.T., 433 F. Supp. 2d 657 (E.D. Va. 2006).
Parents countered school board’s suit challenging student’s educational placement. The parents wanted their autistic child placed in a private school that specialized in teaching autistic children. The state hearing office ruled that the private school placement was appropriate and the school board challenged the ruling. Held: For the parents. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) requires a school district to assume the costs of a private educational placement once a state hearing officer rules in favor of that placement. Co. Sch. Bd. of Henrico Co. v. RT, 433 F. Supp. 2d 692 (E.D. Va. 2006).
Student appealed court decision that ordered medical examination. The school district determined that a medical examination was necessary in order to develo\p an Individualized Education Program (“IEP”) for a disabled student. A state hearing officer deemed the examination proper and the student appealed. Held: For the school district. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) allows for reevaluation when necessary to assess a child’s special education needs. Shelby v. Conroe Indep. Sch. Dist., 454 F.3d 450 (5th Cir. 2006).
Student sued school district alleging denial of free appropriate public education. The school district developed an Individualized Education Program (“IEP”) that placed the student in a more restrictive environment. The student’s mother disagreed with the placement and sued the school district. Held: For the school district. The IEP was not pre-determined by the school district, the IEP did not cause the student any educational harm, and the school district made several attempts to address the student’s needs. Thus, the IEP was valid. Nack v. Orange City Sch. Dist., 454 F.3d 604 (6th Cir. 2006).
Parents claimed school district denied their child free appropriate public education. The disabled student was evaluated in order to develop an Individualized Education Program (“IEP”). The evaluator determined that the child needed a small class size, but the school district disagreed. The parents enrolled their child in a private school and sought tuition reimbursement. Held: For the parents. The school district failed to show that placement in a public school was adequate because the child was not placed in a small class. Thus, the parents are entitled to reimbursement for private school tuition. Gellert v. D.C. Pub. Sch., 435 F. Supp. 2d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
Parents appealed decision that school district provided free appropriate public education. The parents alleged that their child’s rights under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) were violated when physical restraints and isolation were used to control the child’s behavioral outbursts. Held: For the school district. School districts do not violate the IDEA when normal procedures are used to discipline disabled students who are acting in a dangerous manner. However, the procedures must not constitute a unilateral change of the student’s placement. Melissa S. v. Sch. Dist. of Pin., 183 Fed. Appx. 184 (3d Cir. 2006) (unpublished opinion).
Fifth-year high school student sued school for prohibiting him from playing football his senior year. The student, who was previously diagnosed with Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD), was barred from playing football because the school limited eligibility to students who attended the school for no more than four consecutive years. The student alleged the school violated the local anti-discrimination act because his extended high school education was the result of his ADD. Held: For the school. The school did not violate either state or federal anti-discrimination laws because the student was not deemed disabled. Tesmer v. CoIo. High Sch. Activities Assn., 140 P.3d 249 (CoIo. App. 2006).
Teachers-Employment & Dismissal
Teacher sued school district for wrongful termination in violation of his First Amendment rights. When the teacher’s employment contract was not renewed, he alleged that he was terminated because he often wore clothing that expressed his support for the teacher’s union. Held: For the school. The teacher habitually chastised other teachers who did not share his same views. Thus, even though the teacher’s clothing expressed constitutionally protected speech, the teacher’s constitutional interest was outweighed by his behavior and the school’s interest in maintaining order in the workplace. Mantle v. Westwood Heights Sch. Dist., 437 F. Supp. 2d 652 (E.D. Mich. 2006). 0
Teacher sued district alleging she was terminated in retaliation for exercising her free speech rights. The teacher refused to use district mandated teaching modules in the classroom because she believed they were inferior to traditional methods. She notified the school board of her concerns by letter. After repeated refusals to comply with requests to use the modules, the teacher was terminated. Held: For the district. The board presented evidence that the teacher’s letters played no role in its decision not to reemploy her. The board’s decision rested on her unprofessional conduct, violation of school policies, and insubordinate behavior. Greenshields v. Indep. Sch. Dist. 1-1016 of Payne Co., 174 Fed. Appx. 426 (10th Cir. 2006) (unpublished opinion).
Teacher sued district claiming she was fired because of her race, national origin, and age. The teacher was terminated after the district substantiated charges that she used corporal punishment and attempted to coerce a student to lie. Held: For the district. The claim of discrimination under Title VII was barred because the teacher did not file the claim within the time limit. In addition, her claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act was meritless because she failed to show that the reasons behind her termination were illegitimate or pretexts for discrimination. Finally, she held no property interest in her employment that warranted Due Process protection. McPherson v. N.Y.C. Dept. of Educ., 457 F.3d 211 (2dCir. 2006).
Teacher claimed Department of Education terminated her without adequate hearing or chance to cleanse her reputation. An untenured teacher was fired and placed on a statewide list of banned teachers. Held: For the Department of Education. The Department of Education’s hearing system adequately protected the untenured teacher’s liberty interest in protecting her good reputation, because the system provided the teacher with an opportunity to clear her name. Segal v. N.Y.C., 459 F.3d 207 (N.Y. 2006).
Former teacher sued religious school for civil rights violations after she was fired for violating church doctrine. A school operated by a religious group dismissed an elementary school teacher from her teaching position after learning that she was pregnant and unmarried Held: For the teacher. The teacher’s duties were primarily secular, so the school had no legal justification for violating civil rights protections based upon religious beliefs. Redhead v. Conf. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 440 F. Supp. 2d 211 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
Other Employees-Employment & Dismissal
Administrator argued school board violated Americans with Disabilities Act. A school administrator claimed the school board failed to accommodate his severe depression and that his demotion was retaliatory. Held: For the school board. The administrator failed to demonstrate that the reasons behind his demotion were pretext. In addition, he was not considered “disabled” under the statutory definition. Therefore, the suit was dismissed. Cassimy v. Bd. of Educ. of the Rockford Pub. Schs., 461 F.3d 932 (7th Cir. 2006).
Principal sued district demanding court order that school board enter into two-year employment contract with him. The district hired the principal as an assistant elementary school principal. One year later, he accepted a promotion as an assistant high school principal. Then, he requested a two-year contract for the new position. The board denied his request. Held: For the principal. The principal’s contract terminated upon his acceptance of a promotion. Pursuant to a local statute, the board was obligated to enter into a two-year contract with the principal because, when he accepted the promotion, his current contract terminated. Sund v. St. Helena Parish Sch. Bd., 935 So. 2d 219 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2006).
Custodian sued district alleging demotion was racially motivated and in violation of Civil Rights Act. The custodian was demoted after failing a certification exam. He claimed the scoring and administration of the exam were conducted to demote him on account of his race. Held: For the custodian. The custodian was meeting the district’s employment expectations. In addition, he identified similarly situated individuals outside of his protected class who were treated more favorably on the exam. Thanongsinh v. Bd. of Educ., 462 F.3d 762 (7th Cir. 2006).
Torts
Teachers and parents sued a construction company alleging emotional distress based on fear of future disease due to asbestos exposure. Construction to the school’s heating, ventilation, and air conditioning system resulted in the teachers and students being exposed to dust and debris. Held: For the construction company. The teachers and parents were unable to show substantial exposure to asbestos and medical or scientific evidence supporting a reasonable basis for their emotional fear. Brooks v. Stone Architecture, 934 So. 2d 350 (Miss. App. 2006).
Parents sued school and district after student fell from playground slide and suffered injury. The student fell from the slide after his foot became caught under another student. Held: For the school. The parents failed to allege any evidence that the inadequate ground cover caused the injury to their son, and could not rebut evidence that the defendants maintained the playground in a reasonably safe condition. In addition, the parents could not prove negligent supervision since the accident was sudden and unforeseeable. Swan v. Town of Brookhaven, 821 N.Y.S.2d 265 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dept. 2006).
Middle school student sued school district for injuries suffered during game of floor hockey. The student was accidentally struck in the mouth with the blade of a hockey stick and suffered injury to his teeth. Held: For the school district. The students were required to wear protective eyewear, and there was no proof that the use of mouth guards was a generally accepted standard or practice in middle school settings. Walker v. Commack Sch. Dist., 820 N.Y.S.2d 287 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dept. 2006).
School challenged award of damages to mother of student who sustained injuries in fall at school. The student slipped on a wet bathroom floor and, when she tried to break her fall, the pencil she w\as holding in her hand lodged into the area beneath her eye. Held: For the parent. The school was negligent in its failure to address unreasonably dangerous conditions caused by students carrying pencils into the bathrooms which school personnel knew had damp, slippery floors. Agnor v. Caddo Parish Sch. Bd., 936 So. 2d 865 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2006).
Student who suffered permanent brain injury after being struck by golf ball sued student who hit golf ball. The student who hit the ball was receiving one-on-one instruction from the golf class teacher who directed the student when to strike the ball. The injured student was struck when he crossed into the zone of danger to retrieve another golf ball. Held: For the non-injured student. The duty of care toward fellow golfers had entirely shifted to the teacher. Wu v. Sorenson, 440 F. Supp. 2d 1054 (D. Minn. 2006).
Employee sued school board, co-worker, and supervisor for defamation and negligent supervision after co-worker alleged she witnessed said employee engaged in suspicious transaction on school property. When the employee’s co-worker reported to a supervisor that the employee engaged in a monetary transaction in the school parking lot, the employee took a drug test. Pending the outcome, she was suspended. However, when test results came back negative, the supervisor re-instated her. The board claimed immunity. Held: For the school board, supervisor, and co-worker. The parties were immune under the doctrine of qualified immunity and qualified privilege, which protects personnel evaluation information communicated in good faith. Bd. Of Sch. Commr. of the City of Indianapolis v. Pettigrew, 851 N.E.2d 326 (Ind. App. 2006).
Former student of private boarding school for boys brought action under Child Sexual Abuse Act (CSAA) against school, predicated on alleged sexual abuse by school employees. Years after leaving the school, a former student sued the school for sexual abuse he suffered at the hands of school personnel. The school claimed immunity under the Charitable Immunity Act (CIA) and alleged that criteria for suit under CSAA was not met because the school was not a ‘person’ within the meaning of the Act. Held: For the former student. The school operated in a parental capacity toward its students and was, thus, a ‘person’ under the CSAA. Since the CIA does not immunize willful and wanton negligent behavior, the school was not immune from liability. Hardwicke v. Am. Boy Choir Sch., 902 A.2d 900 (N.J. 2006).
Parents sued foster care agency for negligence when foster care agent had sexual intercourse with minor daughter. When the foster care agency heard a rumor that an agent was having intercourse with a minor foster child, the agency investigated the rumor and decided it was unfounded. One month after the foster care agent quit, the agency discovered that the minor was pregnant with the agent’s child. Held: For the foster care agency. The agency could not reasonably have known that the agent would commit statutory rape, even in light of the rumor. Ernest L. v. Charlton Sch., 30 A.D.3d 649 (NY. 2006).
Parent of disabled child sought damages from school district for child’s death by asphyxiation. The disabled child died by asphyxiation when his trachea tube became dislodged and none of the employees of the school could reinsert it. The parent of the child asserted damages under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and The Rehabilitation Act. The parent argued that she did not have to show intentional discrimination on the part of the school district. Held: For the school district. Although the parent could collect damages under the ADA and The Rehabilitation Act, she was unable to prove intentional discrimination by showing that a school employee took notice of her son’s special needs and failed to accommodate them. Ortega v. Bibb C. Sch. Dist., 431 F. Supp. 2d 1296 (M.D. Ga. 2006).
Student sued school for negligence after injury caused by another student in hallway. The student alleged that the school was negligent for failure to use hall monitors because there was a history of roughness in the halls. The school claimed immunity pursuant to the Tort Claims Act. The student then argued that the school’s immunity from tort claims would be unconstitutional. Held: For the school. There is clear legislative intent to exempt governmental agencies, including schools, from tort claims. Warner v. Lawrence, 900 A.2d 980 (Pa. Cmmw. 2006).
Parents sued school district after daughter was hit in the eye by teammate’s golf club. A student on the school’s girls’ golf team was blinded in one eye when her teammate, while loosening up on the driving range per the coach’s instructions, accidentally struck her in the head on her backswing. Held: For the school. Since the girls were voluntarily participating in the sport, the victim could only win the lawsuit if the other girl had intentionally struck her with the club. Bowman ex rel. Bowman v. McNary, 853 N.E.2d 984 (Ind. App. 2006).
Parents sued school after their daughter died during physical education class. The daughter died from an asthma attack after a substitute physical education teacher required her to do more strenuous exercise than usual. The school was aware of the student’s asthma and informed her that she would be allowed to stop exercising if she believed she was about to have an attack. The student told the substitute teacher she felt an attack coming on, but the teacher forced her to continue the exercise. Held: For the parents. The school created a dangerous situation by forcing the student to continue exercising when she felt the beginning of an attack. The school’s failure to follow established emergency procedures exacerbated the problem. Upton v. Clovis Mun. Sch. Dist., 141 P.3d 1259 (N.M. 2006).
Student sued school and principal after principal pushed student into wall. The student was at a high school dance and leaning toward the cafeteria window. The principal pulled the student through the window and pushed him against a wall, causing injury to the student’s hip. Held: For the principal. School principals are considered public officials rather than public employees; they enjoy public official immunity and cannot be sued unless they act maliciously, corruptly, or outside the scope of their duties. Since supervising the school dance was within the scope of the principal’s duties and there was no evidence that he acted corruptly or maliciously, the student could not prevail on his claim. Webb ex rel. Bumgarner v. Nicholson, 634 S.E.2d 545 (N.C. App. 2006).
Former student sued school board for sexual abuse. The student sued the school board and the estate of a former board member alleging that the board member had sexually abused him several times over a six-year period, beginning when the student was twelve years old. The student claimed that the board member would remove him from school and assault him at the board member’s home and office. Held: For the student. The student was allowed to pursue his claim against the school board because he alleged that the board had a policy of ignoring sex abuse complaints. Doe v. Faerber, 446 F. Supp. 2d 1311 (M.D. Fla. 2006).
Student sued school alleging school did not prevent attack. The student was attacked, at home, by a male classmate. The male student was suspended from school at the time of the attack for having made death threats against the student one month prior. Held: For the school district. A school’s duty to its students is co-extensive with the school’s physical custody and control over them. Since the attack took place at the student’s home, the school had no duty to prevent it. Maldonado v. Tuckahoe Union Free Sch. Dist., 30 A.D.3d 567 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d 2006).
Parents of sixteen-year old student sued school for negligence after student was killed in motor vehicle accident while driving to school softball game. The school granted excused absences to students who voluntarily attended the softball game, which occurred on a regular school day. However, the school did not provide the students’ transportation to or from the game. The student, driving with two passenger students, was en route to the softball game when he lost control and collided with a tractor-trailer. All three students were killed. Held: For the school. Since the game was an off-campus school event, the school did not owe a duty to students traveling to the game because the students were not in the school’s physical custody. Davis v. Lutheran S. High Sch. Assn. of St. Louis, 200 S.W.3d 163 (Mo. App. 2006).
Miscellaneous
Charter school challenged city zoning board’s refusal to grant variances and parking lot permits needed to operate the school. The zoning ordinance did not list schools as an allowable property use. The school claimed that exclusion of schools in commercial zones was unconstitutional. Held: For the city and the school. The provisions of the zoning ordinance prohibiting educational uses of land in commercial districts were unconstitutional, but the city was still permitted to impose reasonable conditions on land use. Albany Prep. Charter Sch. v. City of Albany, 818 N.Y.S.2d 651 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dept. 2006).
Copyright Jefferson Law Book Company Apr 2007
(c) 2007 Journal of Law and Education. Provided by ProQuest Information and Learning. All rights Reserved.