British officer blisters US Army in Iraq critique

By Will Dunham

WASHINGTON (Reuters) – The U.S. Army has displayed damaging
cultural insensitivity in Iraq, while being blinded by
unrealistic optimism and predisposed to use maximum force, a
senior British officer wrote in a blistering appraisal in a
U.S. military publication.

The essay by British Army Brigadier Nigel Aylwin-Foster,
who served with U.S. forces in Iraq from December 2003 to
November 2004, appeared in the latest edition of the magazine
Military Review, published by the U.S. Army.

Aylwin-Foster said U.S. Army personnel struggled to grasp
the nuances of battling insurgents while also winning the
hearts and minds of ordinary Iraqis.

“Moreover, whilst they were almost unfailingly courteous
and considerate, at times their cultural insensitivity, almost
certainly inadvertent, arguably amounted to institutional
racism,” Aylwin-Foster wrote, arguing that the Army exacerbated
the task it now faces by alienating significant parts of the
Iraqi population.

An Army spokesman at the Pentagon, Paul Boyce, said “we may
not agree with it” but the Army wants to present candid views.

“The U.S. Army encourages alternate and diverse opinions so
that we may find out more about our effectiveness, lessons
learned and how to adapt in the future. We invited this
particular commentary and published it in our magazine,” Boyce
said on Wednesday.

Britain has been the chief U.S. ally in the Iraq war,
launched in March 2003, and about 8,500 British troops serve
alongside 147,000 U.S. troops there now. Two dozen other
countries also have troops in the U.S.-led coalition.

Other critics also have accused the U.S. military of a lack
of understanding of Iraqi and Islamic culture. The military
concedes that the vast majority of U.S. troops do not know
Arabic, and has launched an effort costing $750 million over
five years to improve foreign language skills in the ranks.

‘DAMAGING OPTIMISM’

Aylwin-Foster, whose rank equates to a one-star U.S.
general, referred to U.S. Army officers’ “damaging optimism”
that seemed out of touch with a more sobering reality.

“Self-belief and resilient optimism are recognized
necessities for successful command, and all professional forces
strive for a strong can-do ethos. However, it is unhelpful if
it discourages junior commanders from reporting unwelcome news
up the chain of command,” he wrote.

“Force commanders and political masters need to know the
true state of affairs if they are to reach timely decisions to
change plans: arguably, they did not always do so,” he added.

Aylwin-Foster faulted “moral righteousness” felt by U.S.
personnel that “encouraged the erroneous assumption that given
the justness of the cause, actions that occurred in its name
would be understood and accepted by the population, even if
mistakes and civilian fatalities occurred in the
implementation.”

Aylwin-Foster said U.S. forces in Iraq were more disposed
to use offensive military operations than the forces of
coalition partners, and U.S. rules of engagement “were more
lenient than other nations’, thus encouraging earlier
escalation.”

Aylwin-Foster lauded the U.S. Army’s sense of patriotism
and its talent, and said it was “in no way lacking in humanity
or compassion.”

“Yet it seemed weighed down by bureaucracy, a stiflingly
hierarchical outlook, a predisposition to offensive operations,
and a sense that duty required all issues to be confronted
head-on.”