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Force on Force Part II: Execution

Posted on: Wednesday, 20 July 2005, 03:00 CDT

AMC CONDUCTS THE FIRST-EVER DENIAL EXERCISE

Editor's Note: In preparation for the arrival of performance- based inspections, Air Mobility Command conducted the first-ever Denial Exercise in a Department of Defense Nuclear Surety Inspection (NSI). The AMC Inspector General Team conducted the non-graded event in January. In the May-June TIG Brief, the team dealt with planning. This second of two articles looks at execution and lessons learned.

When we executed our denial exercise, our controllers were as vulnerable to the fog of war as the warriors themselves.

As opposed to compliance-oriented exercises that seem clinical in nature, we planned the denial exercise to be highly charged, potentially chaotic, and unpredictable for the exercise players. We had some formidable obstacles, though. Just as "no plan survives contact with the enemy" (Clausewitz), we knew that no force-on- force exercise plan would ever fully survive the start of the exercise (STARTEX).

True enough, before the first shot was even fired, situational awareness (SA) became a casualty.

Since our exercise was a night-time, winter exercise, two predictable challenges to SA were darkness and bad weather. Since NSIs must be conducted at 18-month intervals, we didn't have the latitude to reschedule. We also chose night since it would favor the attacker. So, we expected certain challenges.

As actual events unfolded, we found ourselves in a near- freezing, driving rain at STARTEX. That made it extremely difficult for inspectors to see the exact locations of all of the exercise players and opposing forces (OPFOR). Our SA relied on the exercise controllers' knowledge of the exercise plan, familiarity with the surrounding terrain, and their ability to discern the sounds of weapons firing, vehicle movement, ground burst simulators, and radio transmissions from other exercise controllers.

Another threat to our SA was the controller communications network itself. Regardless of the quality of our communications equipment, any push-to-talk system can only transmit one call at a time.

In an exercise with literally dozens of moving parts, relying on a single-caller radio network to coordinate all of these actions real-time would have been akin to draining a swimming pool with a drinking straw. It was simply impossible to communicate everything necessary. Based on these conditions, radio discipline and empowerment were musts among all controllers.

As experienced inspectors and instructors, our controllers were proficient in radio use. They were also knowledgeable and competent to operate independently yet stay within exercise guidelines. All exercise controllers understood that centralized control and decentralized execution were the orders of the day.

The exercise players themselves posed a threat to SA. Even before establishing hostile contact, Security Forces and OPFOR tried to tactically deceive each other and get inside each other's decision loops. Once they made hostile contact, however, parts of their own decision loop broke as enemy action terminated exercise players. When that happened, both sides began to improvise, adapt, and overcome at every level to attain their objectives.

From an inspector's perspective, it's crucial to have a disciplined, professional OPFOR with a fluent understanding of exercise methods that can replicate adversary tactics, techniques, and procedures. They serve as "inspector multipliers" by staying within guidelines even as the tactical situation deteriorates on both sides. The OPFOR also provides accurate, objective data when debriefing after the exercise.

Besides having a professional OPFOR, we realized that one of the most effective measures to minimize these issues was bringing enough exercise controllers to the fight. Every controller was an additional set of eyes to monitor safety, keep the exercise on track, check MILES (Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement) gear as needed, and gather key exercise data for the eventual report.

In future denial exercises, one of our standard operating procedures will be to assign at least one controller to each maneuver element for Security Forces and OPFOR, plus one controller at each critical command and control node. Beyond that, a number of controllers had oversight of the exercise play area as a whole. Ultimately, they were in the best positions to anticipate problems and provide direction to other controllers.

Though it was impossible to prescribe a formula for every eventuality in our denial exercise, detailed planning and a well- trained, well-manned cadre of exercise controllers and OPFOR overcame our most difficult obstacles. We learned that the "fog and friction" of war are unavoidable but can be controlled.

War is the realm of uncertainty; three-quarters of the factors . . . are wrapped in a fog of greater or Ledger uncertainty. Clausewitz

Maj. Greg Nowak AMC/IGI gregory.nowak@scott.af.mil

Major Nowak is chief, Force Protection Inspections for AMC/IG. He is a veteran of 6 ORIs, 2 NSIs and 9 UCIs.

Copyright Norton Air Force Base Jul/Aug 2005

Source: TIG Brief - The Inspector General

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