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Olmert-Abbas “Agreement” Falls Short of Arab Initiative – Palestinian Paper

September 19, 2007
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Excerpt from report by Hamas-backed newspaper Filistin website on 16 September

[Article by Yusuf Rizqah: "The Olmert-Abbas 2007 agreement is a compulsory course that has no mandate"]

On 12 September 2007, the Palestinian Ma’an News Agency published the eight points of what it called the Agreement of Principles reached between Olmert and Abbas. Sources in the Ramallah muqata’ah described the document published by the Ma’an News Agency as genuine. Policy experts said the document’s formulation and content indicate it is authentic. These experts then said: “Let us not be harsh on the Oslo accord and the Arab initiative! Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine have rejected the Arab initiative, although it is more superior to these principles in as far as meeting Palestinian demands. The Arab initiative speaks of a full withdrawal from the Arab territories to the 1967 borders. This means the removal of the settlements, the restoration of Jerusalem, and the return of the geographical status quo to what it was before the [ 1967] setback in return for Arab normalization with Israel.”

The Olmert-Abbas principles have a lower ceiling than the Arab initiative. The Palestinian President is offering the Palestinians and Arabs a project less than what the Arab leaders are offering. The Palestinian President is pushing the Arab leaders to develop their initiative in order to make it meet the US-Israeli demands, in line with the Arab slogan, which says, “We will not be more royalists than the king.”

For the benefit of the Arab leaders, who have registered their adherence to their initiative since 2000, this newspaper herewith reviews the concessions [made by Abbas]: A first reading of the Olmert-Abbas Project of Principles (This is what it should be called because it lacks a popular mandate) says that Olmert has been able to achieve the Israeli demands, as seen by all the Israeli parties, without departing from the declared Israeli no’s:

1. Under the agreement, President Abbas accepts an Israeli principle, which says “no return to the 1967 borders.” He also frankly accepts the principle of a “land swap at a 1:1 ratio.” This means border modifications that correspond to Israel’s concept of security and demography. It also means the retention of the settlements in the Jerusalem envelope and other areas under Israeli sovereignty.

The retention of the settlements will have adverse effects on Jerusalem and on the territorial continuity between the northern and southern West Bank. It will also have adverse effects on the freedom of movement of the citizens. “The person who receives blows is not like the one who counts them.” [Arabic proverb]

2. Under the agreement, President Abbas accepts an Israeli principle, which says “no to the return of the Palestinian refugees to their towns and villages from which they were displaced.” The agreement offers a naive alternative remedy, which contravenes international resolutions in this regard, which contradicts the Palestinian national will, and which undermines the basic principles of the PLO. The remedy is confined to two levels. The first is political and it calls for the establishment of a “national homeland for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip” to which the refugees will return. It also calls for recognition of a “Jewish homeland in historic Palestine to which only Jews will return.” Tellingly, this is a reformulation of the Balfour Declaration, which the Palestinians rejected 90 years ago. The second level is humanitarian and naive, in accordance with which Israel acknowledges the suffering of the refugees, without defining the causes of the suffering or who was responsible for it.

3. The agreement upholds an Israeli principle, which says no to terrorism, that is, no to resistance. The agreement says: “Both sides will do their best to cooperate against any aspect of terrorism and violence from either of the two states against the other.”

4. The agreement approves the principle of the restoration of Gaza and the expulsion of Hamas. The agreement says: “The establishment of a regime in Gaza that will be part of the peace process. Or else, Israel will not view the West Bank and Gaza Strip as one political unity.”

5. The agreement does not tackle the issues of the foreign borders, crossings, and external security of the areas that will be classified as a “Palestinian national homeland” at a time when it decides that the Sate of Palestine will be demilitarized.

There are scientific observations on the Agreement of Principles project. They include:

A) The agreement does not constitute a Palestinian success against any of the rules of Israeli political action, which the Palestinians have rejected and resisted. This means that a clash in the political vision of the Palestinian factions will make the battle a Palestinian-Palestinian battle.

B) The agreement is written in a language that includes something and its contradiction, in addition to deliberate ambiguity in language and formulation. It is the same crisis that the Palestinian negotiator faced in implementing Oslo.

C) The agreement lacks details. Each of the eight principles has several details, which contain contradictions and differences in view. A Palestinian proverb says the devil lies in the details. Signing the principles before knowing the details means submission to the will of the stronger during implementation.

D) The agreement is a victory for the Israeli will over the Palestinian vision. Abbas has been left empty-handed, not possessing anything other than the Israeli offer, especially as he is still experiencing the Gaza shock on its personal and political levels. The Agreement of Principles is a compulsory course without a mandate. Either he follows this course with Olmert and Rice or he will lose the last card in his hands.

It appears that President Abbas sees that the compulsory course gives him an escape route better than a return to dialogue with Hamas and that his political future, when it ends in signing an Agreement of Principles, will be better than when it ends in him losing control over Gaza. In Israel, no one views the present situation as a chance for a final settlement with the Palestinians. Hence, they are less interested in the Abbas-Olmert principles and less optimistic about the fall conference. Some Israelis even hope the conference will not convene. They view what Olmert is doing as a desperate and unsuccessful attempt to save his political future and strengthen the chances of Kadima’s success in future elections.

The Agreement of Principles is a big declaration that Palestine is in a crisis. The history of Palestinian action is the captive of a leader who insists on the absence of a regime and institution. The crisis will remain sharp long as the regime and institution are absent. The fall conference will not throw a lifeline to three weak persons who are on their way to retirement within a year.

Originally published by Filistin website, Gaza, in Arabic 16 Sep 07.

(c) 2007 BBC Monitoring Middle East. Provided by ProQuest Information and Learning. All rights Reserved.