Commentary Sees Three “Systemic Problems” Facing Kremlin in 2007 Duma Campaign
Text of article by Tatyana Stanovaya, head of the Analysis Department at the Centre for Political Technologies: “Campaign 2007: A Week Before the Elections” by Russian political commentary website Politkom.ru on 26 November
Next Sunday, parliamentary elections take place in Russia. A week before the outcome, it makes sense to single out three systemic problems of the 2007 election campaign that are largely unique to present-day Russia and which the Kremlin is having difficulty resolving (and in some cases is not resolving). These are the problem of the mobilization of the pro-Putin electorate, the problem of the party structure of the future Duma, and the problem of the low level of legitimacy.
The first problem is the mobilization of the electorate to vote for the party of power. In contrast to all the previous campaigns, in the course of the 2007 elections this problem has been particularly significant. The upcoming replacement of the head of state considerably increases the stakes in the political game. Vladimir Putin must bring a successor to power, thereby guaranteeing both the continuity of the course and the opportunity for himself to continue to exert a decisive influence on political decision- making. It is not yet known how the 2008 problem will be resolved for Putin, but one of the instruments of that guarantee could be the maximization of the presence of the party of power in parliament. The better United Russia’s result, the more manageable the political system will be.
The mobilization problem is also exacerbated by the fact that, in contrast to previous elections, the Kremlin is gambling unequivocally and uncompromisingly on the victory of just one party – United Russia. It is worth pointing out that in the 1999 elections the LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia] and the SPS [Union of Right-Wing Forces] were the Kremlin’s “partners.” The main rivals were the OVR [Fatherland-All Russia], and to a lesser extent the CPRF [Communist Party of the Russian Federation]. In 2003 the Kremlin helped United Russia and did not hinder the LDPR, but it also gave active support to the Motherland [Rodina] bloc, thereby limiting the influence of the Communist Party. By that time the main rival was the CPRF: In the course of the 2003 election campaign the party lost practically all its peripheral electorate, retaining only its “electoral nucleus.”
In the current elections all the political parties except United Russia have become either real rivals whose “admission” to the Duma is being seriously discussed in the Kremlin (with the exception of the CPRF, whose results are being minimized as far as possible), or spoilers for those rivals. The president’s decision to head United Russia means that only one political force has received the official right to present the “Putin course.” In this way the parliamentary elections are being artificially reduced to a referendum on confidence in Putin.
The mobilization problem had to be tackled by means of a large- scale, unprecedented campaign for “Putin as national leader.” The campaign was supposed to overcome the mobilization crisis that arose some time after Putin’s decision to head the United Russia list: The party’s rating went down six points (and the polls show that the crisis has been overcome – according to VTsIOM [All-Russia's Centre for the Study of Public Opinion] and FOM [Public Opinion Foundation] polls, United Russia’s rating last week was 62 per cent of active voters, while the Levada Centre poll showed 67 per cent). The “For Putin” movement was created, and with United Russia’s participation it organized a forum of 5,000 Putin supporters. The Kremlin’s main objective in this context (this analysis is confined solely to electoral matters) is to swell the United Russia electorate with Putin supporters who previously did not want to vote for the party of power. That is why Putin criticized the party at a meeting with workers from Krasnoyarsk, calling it the “lesser evil.” That is why Putin called on people to vote for United Russia not at a party event but at a forum of his own supporters, who keep a visible distance from the party of power.
At the same time, the problem of the ideological content of the mobilization arose. The idea of mobilization around the “Putin plan” proved insufficient. Polls showed that the population does not understand what is behind this “plan” or what its competitive advantage is. The growth potential of the social base of the “Putin plan” was very small and was confined to the president’s existing support. In the end the Kremlin had to seek an additional basis for mobilization, reviving old or repeatedly used topics, including anti- Western, anti-oligarchy, and anticorruption mobilization. However, all of these are to some extent spent, less interesting to voters, or impossible from the viewpoint of the Kremlin’s own interests. Thus, anti-Western mobilization has been “operating” for some years, and “spinning” it further could lead to very negative consequences for relations with the West, especially since those relations are already extremely cool. In other words, anti-Western mobilization, from the electoral viewpoint, is simply a spent force.
The anticorruption theme, in contrast to 2003, is even more limited in nature. Putin has created a system such that the pursuit of a broad anticorruption campaign is capable of jeopardizing any of his closest colleagues. The battle against corruption is waged quietly, as far as possible, and is not permitted in any circumstances to turn into a “campaign.” It should also be recalled that the cases that are currently being pursued against officials are not so much based on an anticorruption component as they are the consequence of showdowns between clans in Putin’s entourage.
Finally, the anti-oligarchy theme is largely spent. After becoming one of the “trendiest” in 2003, it has lost its relevance in recent years: Relations between the authorities and business are settled, and high-profile cases against “oligarchs” (who, incidentally, no longer exist – big business does not interfere in politics) are superfluous and dangerous to Russia’s economy.
So a situation has developed in which mobilization around the “Putin plan” is insufficient, while counter-mobilization against “enemies” is not very relevant. Nonetheless, for lack of an alternative, the Kremlin was forced to look at old ideas. Thus, at the forum of the president’s supporters, Putin once again spoke about the danger of “oligarchic revanche,” in effect accusing the SPS of planning this. There was also harsh anti-Western rhetoric: United Russia’s opponents were accused by the president of trying to weaken and destroy Russia with the support of the West. The renewal of the anti-oligarchy theme, as well as the comparison of present- day Russia to the 1990s, indicates precisely that the Kremlin is confronting the problem of consolidating the pro-regime electorate.
Solving the mobilization problem has a tangible cost. First and foremost it is important to note here that Putin, for the first time in his political career, has made up his mind to set himself against all other political forces except United Russia. In this way Putin makes it considerably more difficult to position himself as a national leader, as head of all citizens of Russia, the head of state who is above parties. Here we see a clash of two objectives that the Kremlin was trying to achieve simultaneously: to widen the support for United Russia by exploiting Putin’s popularity as national leader, and to try to prevent Putin sympathizers from voting for the CPRF or the SPS. The president has reduced the choice to a point that is familiar from Soviet times: “he who is not with us is against us” – at risk, however, of alienating the potential electorate among the opposition to United Russia.
In the context of the mobilization problem, the Kremlin is having to pay particular attention to increasing the turnout. Many voters, seeing that a United Russia victory is “predetermined,” may simply not turn out to vote. The turnout problem is one of the most difficult in these elections. Putin warned at the forum: “Nothing is yet predetermined once and for all.”
The second systemic problem of the 2007 election campaign is the problem of the party structure of the Duma: All the parties except United Russia are now, to one degree or another, in opposition, and that means that it is necessary to seek the optimum composition of parliament, such that manageability will be preserved at the highest possible level without damaging legitimacy. One of the main elements of suspense in these elections stems from this – the suspense over the third party.
The Kremlin has passed through two stages in tackling the problem of the opposition. The first stage is to separate opposition within the system from opposition outside the system. The latter was not permitted to participate in the elections. The second stage is to divide the parliamentary and nonparliamentary opposition.
Among United Russia’s rivals who are participating in the elections, it is important to distinguish between two types: The first is the real opposition, which represents some kind of problem for the authorities, while the second is too weak or is only a semblance of opposition. The CPRF and the SPS are in the first category. All of Vladimir Putin’s criticism at the forum of his supporters was aimed at them. Yabloko is not seriously regarded by the Kremlin as a dangerous force, and moreover the party itself rejects radical methods of waging the political struggle. The oppositionism of the other parties is clearly feigned. Putin accused the Communists of “leaving people without the most elementary goods and services in the late 1980s: without sugar, without meat, without salt, without matches,” and also of causing the breakup of the USSR. The SPS came in for much stronger criticism: The president accused them, highly emotionally, of trying to deceive the people, and blamed them for poverty, the 1998 default, corruption, and so forth. Putin hinted at the link between “these” people and foreign states, and warned of attempts to exploit “orange [revolutionary] techniques.”
In the course of the election campaign the Kremlin has had to tackle the question of what composition of the State Duma is optimal, taking into account that a two-party parliament is an undesirable scenario. Thus far, it is obvious that only the CPRF, among the opposition, is guaranteed a place in parliament, and there is no great suspense about that – all that matters for the Kremlin is to minimize the party’s result. According to the latest VTsIOM polls, the party will get into the State Duma by a minimal margin: with 12 per cent of the votes. The FOM’s poll results show 12 per cent, and the Levada Centre’s – 14 per cent.
Just Russia and the LDPR lay claim to the place of the third party. On the one hand, there is a requirement to “allow” one of the feigned opposition forces into the State Duma so as not to allow the CPRF to monopolize the status of parliamentary opposition. On the other hand, whom to let in is by no means an idle question. Just Russia is a party that lays claim, in the long term, to the far- reaching role of the main centre-left party in a two-party system. In this respect it is potentially undesirable for the Kremlin spin doctors who control the party of power. On the other hand, Putin has a long-term strategic interest in the formation of a two-party system without the CPRF. According to Kommersant’s information, the Presidential Staff has “not given instructions” to “pull in” Just Russia. And VTsIOM’s poll results show that the number of Just Russia supporters among active voters has fallen from 7 per cent-8 per cent in August-September to 3 per cent-6 per cent in October- November. Admittedly the most recent poll showed 7 per cent again. FOM shows the same figures. It is interesting that we are once again hearing about projects to “split” United Russia into two parties, which is one option for resolving the problem of a replacement for the CPRF. In any event, the downward trend in the political relevance of Just Russia is obvious, and this is confirmed by the fact that the party’s candidates are leaving the party wholesale (the party’s Kirov and Nizhniy Novgorod lists are being withdrawn from the elections entirely).
The situation with the LDPR is contradictory. At the beginning of the election campaign there were persistent rumours that the LDPR might not get into the State Duma: This was supposed to be because instructions had been issued to “let in” Just Russia, meaning that allowing a fourth party to get in could be dangerous to United Russia’s majority. This talk has now died down. It could be assumed that the resurrection of the idea of dividing United Russia, the end of the campaign against the LDPR, and the relatively unstable situation with Just Russia indicate that the third party might after all be the LDPR. In any event, the suspense over the third party will be one of the most interesting points. The rating of Zhirinovskiy’s party, according to VTsIOM, is 8 per cent, according to FOM it is 9 per cent, and according to the Levada Centre 6 per cent. However, as a rule it turns out to be markedly higher in reality.
So if we go by the data from opinion polls, the LDPR claims the place of the third party. Just Russia is hovering on the brink of getting into the Duma. However, it should be noted that if a fourth party were to get in this could create a threat to United Russia’s Constitutional majority, and whether Just Russia gets in will be based largely on problems of long-term political expediency – the need, from Putin’s viewpoint, to maintain a manageable centre-left.
It should be observed that according to VTsIOM figures all the opposition parties except the LDPR and Just Russia will get around 1 per cent, which squeezes them out onto the distant periphery. According to FOM’s calculations, only the APR [Agrarian Party of Russia] and Yabloko could get more than 1 per cent (2 per cent-3 per cent).
And the third and last systemic problem of the 2007 elections is the unprecedentedly low level of legitimacy of the elections. The refusal of OSCE observers to monitor the elections, the open use of administrative resources, the ubiquitous obstacles to opposition parties, and the unconcealed and extremely dubious campaigning in favour of the party of power both by the president and by the media – all of this will have a highly negative effect on the level of legitimacy of the elections, not only abroad but also at home. In the immediate future this will have no serious consequences either for Russia’s relations with the West or for the domestic situation. But in the long term many grounds are being created for deeming these elections illegitimate. Contempt for formal procedures means that plenty of scope is being created for contesting the election results, which in turn would significantly increase the political price of “victory” for United Russia in the future.
The campaign shows that none of these three systemic problems has been resolved or can be resolved fully by the Kremlin. It has proved very difficult to raise United Russia’s rating to a level of just over 70 per cent – because the result achieved by the party of power will be compared with Putin’s result in the 2004 elections and assessed accordingly. Resolving the problem of the opposition has led to its radicalization, while Putin’s backing only the one party of power, to which there is now no alternative, leads to the risk of a political polarization of society, which could be intensified in the event of the exacerbation of social problems. Finally, the low level of legitimacy could create big problems for the authorities in the future and will sooner or later demand compensation in the shape of a political and administrative toughening of the regime. The 2007 elections have proved to be crucial not so much because of the importance of the results (here, in fact, everything was more or less known a long time ago), as because of the nature and methods of the holding of the elections.
Originally published by Politkom.ru website, Moscow, in Russian 26 Nov 07.
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