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Commentator Views Conditions for Future Palestinian-Israeli Violence

Posted on: Saturday, 30 July 2005, 18:00 CDT

Text of article by Dr George Jaqaman entitled "The future of the Palestinian [National] Authority in the stage of lost time" published by Palestinian newspaper Al-Ayyam on 27 July; subheadings inserted editorially:

"Absence of a serious political course"

The file of the Palestinian-Israeli file is currently passing through the stage of lost time. This stage - that can be divided into two phases - may last for a long time. The first phase is that which will come after the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the conclusion of the Israeli elections scheduled for November 2006. The second phase - whose ending is unknown - will begin in the spring of 2007 after the formation of the new Israeli government (if the elections are held on time.

The basic characteristic of this stage of lost time is the absence of a serious political course that is convincing to the Palestinian masses in light of the continuation of the settlement building activities and the completion of the separation wall and its ramifications on the lives of the Palestinians. He main reason and justification for the existence of the Palestinian [National] Authority [PNA] in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip may be a political course that is hoped to lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders, including in east Jerusalem. But this justification for the presence of the PNA will collapse in the absence of political accomplishments that are convincing to the Palestinian masses. This dilemma for the PNA is not new. It is linked to the faltering of the Oslo political course and began in the "events of the tunnel" in 1996 that ignited a field conflict between Palestinian fighters and the Israeli army that ended with the agreement that handed over the city of Hebron to the Palestinian side. These events made the Israeli army conclude that a conflict in the field may erupt in the future if the political course faltered.

"Negotiations under a shaky balance of forces"

And this is what happened after the failure of the Camp David negotiations in the summer of 2000 and the eruption of the second intifadah at the end of September of the same year. A number of Israeli analysts and some politicians and army commanders had concluded that if the Camp David talks failed - as was expected by the Israeli side - Arafat would resort to "violence". That is, they speculated that he would try to make a change - even if it were a partial one - to the balance of forces for political purposes through a conflict on the ground. One of the main reasons for the failure of the Oslo process was due to the fact that this political process resorted to one single mechanism, namely, negotiations under a shaky balance of forces, US support for Israel and lack of effective Arab support. This equation - that is endorsed by Israel and the United States - is expected to continue to prevail in the foreseeable future.

President Arafat was fully aware of this point of weakness. This explains his stand on the conflict in the field during the second intifadah when he tried to hold the stick from the middle. Unofficial support for the resistance (the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades and others) and official restraint in involving the security organs in the battle (with the exception of some individual cases). Perhaps the late president hoped that the conflict on the ground would activate the political process as happened in the "events of the tunnel". Israel did not have any tangible evidence to show the world that the late president was involved in the conflict in the field (with the exception of the incident of the Karin A vessel [in January 2002 Israel impounded a ship laden weapons, reportedly travelling from Iran to the Palestinian territories]). However, it held him responsible and penalized the PNA in various ways. Israel also tried to isolate the late president politically and refused to negotiate with him.

"An alternative to the political process"

What would have happened had President Arafat not passed away? This is a hypothetical question. However, what is more important here is to keep in mind that the "unilateral disengagement plan" was crystallized and adopted prior to Arafat's death as an alternative to negotiations with him and as an alternative to the political process, including the road map. The United States approved this step just as it had approved other steps that enabled Sharon to drag the United States to support his stand over the past four years. In other words, there is no basic difference to the current Israeli government between Arafat and Abu-Mazin because the final solution that Israel may accept (without effective external pressure) was unacceptable to Arafat just as it is unacceptable to Abu-Mazin. In other words, Palestinian public opinion inside and outside would not support and would thwart any agreement of this kind. This explains Sharon's adoption of the policy of unilateral fait accompli on stages, that is, withdrawal from Gaza and completion of the building of the wall with the approval of the United States. This would give him time (at least two years) and fill the political void temporarily. Meanwhile, the Palestinian side is marking time on the political level and reacting to Sharon's steps instead of being proactive. In the meantime, the situation on the ground would remain unstable and subject to explosion in various ways, including through Israeli initiatives (such as detentions, assassinations and incursions). In other words, Israel can control the degree of the conflict in the field by raising it or lowering it based on tactical political needs at this stage of lost time.

"A vicious circle"

If the conflict in the field erupts once again at the end of 2005 or the beginning of next year (as several Israeli official spokesmen expect, which may be construed as a declaration of intentions), this would give Israel more lost time. It would also postpone the second step of withdrawal from some areas in the northern West Bank perhaps until after the Israeli elections. Once again, the PNA finds itself in the same situation that it had been under since the eruption of the second intifadah until the death of President Arafat. In fact, it is in a vicious circle. If the "violence" escalates, Israel and the United States will hold it responsible for not doing enough to stop this "violence", that is, by clashing with the various resistance elements. And if the "violence" ends through an agreed- upon cease-fire or if it drops to its minimum level, Israel and the United States would not offer a political process that is convincing to the masses and that saves the PNA. The United States and Israel know the degree of force that the PNA may exercise and President Abu- Mazin [Abbas] has repeatedly proclaimed that he would not be pushed into a civil war. But the pressure on the PNA will continue in the short term and will remain between the anvil and the hammer in the absence of a serious political process. This is the recipe of political paralysis that the United States supports.

If this situation continues after the Israeli elections, the PNA will find itself in a position where it has to make a choice since the conflict in the field is expected to erupt once again in a third intifadah if the current political paralysis persists. It would not be able to remain neutral, at least politically. This is especially true since after the upcoming parliamentary elections, the opposition will be part of the Palestinian political system, at least inside the Palestinian Legislative Council. This will give the PNA a political power to face the US and Israeli pressures to keep the negotiations as the only mechanism for political progress without any external pressure on Israel. The equation of the future Palestinian-Israeli conflict is clear and visible.

"Fuel for a future conflict"

On one hand - as several Israeli officials as well as Israeli army commanders have stated - it does not serve Israel's interests to reoccupy the West Bank or the Gaza Strip and remove the PNA. But on the other hand, Sharon's current plan to corner the Palestinians inside the wall and in three isolated locations will provide fuel for a future conflict with various forms of resistance. No future PNA after the parliamentary elections will be outside the circle and management of the conflict. It is unlikely that any future PNA would want this in the first place in view of the lessons learned since the beginning of the Oslo process until today, especially if Palestinian public opinion in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip supports such a trend.

As Abu-Mazin himself said at the time, the Oslo agreement was a major venture. The lesson that President Arafat deduced in the second intifadah following the failure of the Camp David talks was that negotiations as the sole mechanism leading to progress in the political process and to a just and stable solution is not effective and is not enough without other mechanisms.

Source: BBC Monitoring Middle East

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