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Afghan Interior Minister Interviewed About His Career, Resignation

Posted on: Friday, 30 September 2005, 18:00 CDT

Minister of Interior Ali Ahmad Jalali, looking back on his three years in the ministry, has said the government's problems in devolving power to the provinces were compounded by the lack of coordination between government departments, the lack of appropriate professionals cadres and proper institutional framework for reform. He added the delay in reconstructing and reforming the national police force also hindered the establishment of general security and law and order in the country. He said that coordinated plans are now in place in the ministry and with the successful completion of the disarmament programme, improvements are to be expected. Replying to a question on his future plans after his resignation as interior minister, he said that he to wanted remain an advisor to President Hamed Karzai and "at the service" of his country. The following is text of exclusive interview with Interior Minister Ali Ahmad Jalali broadcast by Afghan independent Tolo TV on 27 September; subheadings inserted editorially:

[Jalali in Dari] As a journalist working with the Voice of America and as a result of my researches, I was very well aware of the situation in Afghanistan. During the jihad, and during my job with the Voice of America and my research activities in American academic institutions, I was aware of the situation in Afghanistan. I was closely watching events in Afghanistan through the media. I used to hear a lot about Afghanistan from different people in conferences. But as they say, seeing is believing, when I came to Afghanistan after a long time and saw the situation in Kabul, it was unbelievable. You could see destruction everywhere and the extent of the tragedy was very great.

When I say tragedy, I do not mean that roads and buildings were destroyed, but that all institutions had been demolished. There was confusion everywhere. Even though I was appointed as the interior minister one year after the interim and transitional governments was set up, still there were very serious challenges and we had a lot to do. People's expectations were very high, but our resources were very limited. When I came here, I realized that we faced very serious challenges.

Minister's past career

[Presenter] Can you tell us about your background in education, work experience, and your memories from the time when you were in your homeland and when you were studying in Kabul?

[Jalali] I was born in Kabul, but my family is originally from a district of Ghazni called Waghaz. It is in south-west of Ghazni Province.

My father in his youth worked in several government posts in different cities and provinces such as Kandahar, the northern provinces of Afghanistan, Ghazni and Paktia, but he spent a long time of his life in Kabul. I was also born and grew up in Kabul.

I started and finished high school in Habibia High School. It was then in Pol-e Bagh-e Omomi [area in Kabul.] I think now it is the Aysh-e Dorani [girls] high school.

[Presenter] Yes it is.

[Jalali] At that time, Habibia was smaller than now. It had an old building. Our school had developed relations with some American institutions and most of our teachers came from America to teach us English. There were 110 students and we all graduated in the same year. The number of students was not very high. University entrance exams were different then. They used to take tests just to check talents. As I was the first in school, they awarded me a scholarship to America, but at the same time I was admitted at the faculty of medical sciences. But in that year the government decided to enrol a number of high school graduates in the military school. It was compulsory and therefore I went to the military college. After I graduated, I went to the United States for higher education.

I then returned home and after completing another educational period called Korsia [as heard], I went to Britain to obtain my degree in military studies. I started my studies in the Staff College of Kimberly.

After working in Afghanistan for some time, I studied defence management at the American Sea College in California [name as heard]. Later, when I was in America, I obtained my masters degree in political sciences from the Political Sciences Institute in Washington which is a branch of the Boston University.

I have very good memories from my past in Kabul, a safe, secure, prosperous, well-lit, and yet, smaller Kabul. People, mostly intellectuals, knew each other and they usually met in very warm and friendly atmosphere. We did not have several parks then, only had Ariana Cinema and Park Cinema where young people used to go. There were a few restaurants near the cinemas. Qargha and Paghman were the two picnic spots where young people from Kabul usually went. I was also part of those groups of young people. I was working and on work days, I was mostly involved in academic researches and wrote programmes for Radio Afghanistan for six years.

[Presenter] What academic books have you written?

[Jalali] I have several books. My books have been published in English, Pashto, Dari and Persian languages in Afghanistan, Pakistan , Iran, America and Britain. I have written several articles that have already been published, but the number of books and brochures that I have written reaches 20.

My last book was in English, entitled The other side of the mountain, which was published more than five times by several publishing houses in different countries. The book is an analysis of the military characteristics of the Afghan resistance.

Challenges of the Interior Ministry

[Presenter] Thank you very much. In response to the first question, you said that when you came to Afghanistan, you faced a series of challenges. These challenges were definitely related to the Interior Ministry affairs. Can you explain these challenges ?

[Jalali] In a country that emerges from war, there are several challenges related to each other. You have to seek different ways to fight these challenges and to find effective and balanced ways out of them.

If you only concentrate and work on one specific field, you cannot guarantee that your efforts would be fruitful. Uncoordinated efforts usually lose efficiency very soon.

Two points should be taken into consideration here.

First, how can we create balance between our efforts to give us quick results because our people want urgent results. Secondly, how can we coordinate our short-term efforts under a long-term plan so they can be useful for our long-term plans and projects. This is a very difficult job.

The situation in Afghanistan was the same as that of a sick man. For example, first you need to mitigate his pain. This primary treatment will help you in your later operation and treatment for that sick person. We had the same problem in Afghanistan.

[Presenter] You highlighted two points for the implementation of such plans. One was the coordination of affairs and the other, specific approaches in these activities. The ground should be prepared for implementation of such activities. Do you not think that personal relations were of a higher order than principles, before you came to the Interior Ministry? Was it not a serious problem when you came?

[Jalali] You are right. Our police officers were affiliated to specific parties or people. Provincial departments were not really in touch with the capital. Sometimes, when we wanted to change or fire one official, we had to send more troops to remove that official and replace him with someone else. This was very difficult.

I remember that in the first days, the situation in Gardez and Paktia was not good. The level of irresponsible activities was very high in Gardez city. Based on our proposal, the government decided to change all local authorities in that province. When we made the decision, we had to send a large group of police officers from Kabul to help put the decision into practice in that city. When the new officials occupied their posts, administration and security improved there.

There were such problems. On the other hand, in some provinces of Afghanistan, the governors considered themselves as the absolute powers of their province. Government revenues were not sent to the capital. Police officers and other government workers were hired by the governors. We made a lot of efforts, in cooperation with other government departments, to change this and we finally managed to change the situation in several provinces.

In the first stage, the Interior Ministry had to form a rapid reaction police unit strong enough to carry out activities anywhere in Afghanistan. That time, senior officials in a province had their own police forces and those working in government departments were working in their favour . The situation was the same in 34 provinces of Afghanistan. We had to use the preserved and rapid reaction police units of the Interior Ministry to change the situation in 25 provinces.

Devolving power from the centre

[Presenter] Do you not think that the distribution of authority would have a quicker and more effective impact? We can see that only the Interior Ministry has authority in Afghanistan. Can we not devolve the authority to different zones and give them the responsibility for the specific zones?

[Jalali] It can be devolved, but it should be done according to a specific strategy and specific principles. We can only do it if we can establish institutions, but if there is no institution, the devolution of authority means isolation. Once we were discussing issues such as federalism. This ideology worked very well in some countries in the beginning, but the point is that these countries should have the institutions to manage all those conditions.

I wanted the central government to be strengthened. At that time we should have first established the central government and brought together the country. Once we are united, then we would have a parliament and the parliament can make decisions on such issues.

When we have competent institutions, they can take any measure in the interest of the country and our people. Democracy means implementation of people's demands and desires. But in such critical condition, if you think that authority should be devolved, it would have increased tension. Therefore, when I came to the Interior Ministry three years ago, the structure of the Interior Ministry was different, but in the new structure of the ministry, in addition to security commands of provinces, we now have security commands in different zones and we want to give some authority to these zones.

Now that our national police force is strong enough, I support this idea and in the new structure, we have taken into consideration this issue. Security commanders of zones will be appointed and they will control security commanders of provinces and coordinate affairs between security commands of different provinces.

Provincial government, security

[Presenter] You spoke about appointment of governors and said that you have managed to bring changes in some provinces. What is your authority in appointing governors and security commanders and in making decisions?

[Jalali] In fact, we do not expect governors to create miracles. They are faced with more problems than we are. On the one had, there are several challenges and problems, and on the other hand, our resources are limited.

Therefore, some governors have managed to have remarkable achievements even with sparse facilities and resources, but some of them have not done very well with their limited resources. We have had these problems because different people have different management skills.

On the other hand, some governors were not appointed by the government, but continued their posts using their power. It took some time until we changed them. The Interior Ministry proposes changes or appointment of new governors and the president approves it.

In certain circumstances, when political considerations were involved, even the National Security Council would get involved in the decision as to who should be appointed as governor. In the current situation in Afghanistan, there are a lot of considerations, so one should take into account two points. First, we need to establish peace and stability and secondly we should improve the state of the administration.

Achieving both these goals is sometimes difficult. We should understand that in Afghanistan, and in other countries that have similar situation, very ambitious objectives will be of no use in the given situation. Once the situation is normal, then absolute professional people should be appointed to posts.

[Presenter] Do you not think that the level of compromises is high?

[Jalali] We should understand that Afghanistan is a country that relies on international assistance. The countries that have established Provincial Reconstruction Teams have their own conditions. They are not all the same. The PRTs that you see in Afghanistan do not carry out similar activities. They have their own national limitations. Afghanistan had to rely on military and economic assistance of several countries. Therefore, some of these issues are related to Afghanistan's reliance on other countries. Once Afghanistan stands on its feet and is able to do everything on its own, then the situation will change.

[Presenter] Security has deteriorated over the past six months. Security is a main challenge today. There are both internal and external factors behind this. Can you explain why the Interior Ministry has so far failed to address this problem? Security in the southern provinces of Afghanistan is a serious problem and it is our people's main concern.

[Jalali] It is clear that in the southern provinces of Afghanistan, terrorism threatens security. Terrorism is not a local problem and the supporting sources of terrorism are not local or regional, but has foreign sources. It is also a phenomenon that threatens Afghanistan, the international community and Pakistan. Only joint cooperation between all countries can curb terrorism and take effective measures against it. And I hope that this joint cooperation will further increases.

On the other hand, security cannot be established if there is a gap. Security depends on stability and roots of political, economic and social development in Afghanistan.

For example, let us talk about the disarmament programme. Weapons were collected from a large number of militias and officers of the National Defence Ministry.

It is a principle. It has been experienced that, in all countries that emerge from war, if you do not create jobs for people whom you disarm, they will form other smaller groups or will join criminal groups or they might even join terrorism. The DDR [Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration] programme was successful in Afghanistan because many military units were dissolved under the programme. The Afghan National Army also developed under the programme. The rehabilitation process of the national police was not as fast as the national army.

Afghanistan needs to have a national army, but from the very first day, I have always said to my people and to the international community that we are mainly facing internal threats and it is the responsibility of the police to deal with it. Police is everywhere and they work with the people. They are on the borders, in districts, on highways and on the roads and streets of cities. There is police everywhere. Over the past three years, it was only the national police that have continuously fought terrorism and organized crimes, but unfortunately the same attention that was paid to the rehabilitation of the national army was not paid to the national police. I struggled a lot for rehabilitation of the police, from Washington and London to Berlin in Germany which is the leading country [in the rehabilitation of the police].

Fortunately, the international community approved projects to reconstruct our police force last year and vast police reforms have started this spring. I wish these reforms were launched three years ago, but now it has started and I hope in three years, the Afghan police will be equivalent to the modern police of a developed country with vast resources, air and land facilities, modern equipment, modern technology and good salary. Now, as we are speaking here, people are taking tests in a free atmosphere for the main posts of the Interior Ministry. Yesterday, we took tests. Those who took the test will then be interviewed and we will ask them about their experiences and education. They will then be appointed to posts on the basis of their competence. I am happy about this, but it would have been more useful if it had started earlier.

Terrorism alone does not challenge security. Drugs smuggling is another main problem. Drugs smuggling is itself a source of crimes and insecurity, particularly when it is coupled with administrative corruption. Drug smugglers try to mislead government workers, including security forces.

Disarmament

[Presenter] Obviously, there are two factors behind insecurity. There are foreign and internal factors. We mainly focus on the internal one here.

You indicated that different elements threaten security, for instance terrorism, local commanders, drugs, and illegal armed militants. You also said the DDR [Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration] was successfully completed, however we think that the DDR must be judged on it results, therefore, it wasn't a successful programme in general.

Today, it is the illegally armed militant and local commanders who aggravate the people rather than terrorism. How long does it take to address this problem and what kind of programmes are needed which might be different from the DDR in terms of implementation?

[Jalali] I said that the DDR was successful because it dissolved unwanted military units and segments. However, we can say that DDR were successful but there were some problem in R, which is Reintegration. Reintegration is not simple and entirely depends on the economic development of a country. For instance, in our fight against narcotics, if we consider the provision of alternative livelihood or improved seeds to farmers, they are technical ways, while the strategic thing could be the changing of the economic culture in the regions. People will voluntarily give up and replace poppy with other useful crops if roads are paved and economic opportunities are enhanced.

The first round of the DDR was successful but it has other phases as well, the current phase is called DIAG, which means disarmament of illegal armed groups. Obviously, the numbers of illegal groups are too much, because five or six people are called a group.

Let us see our distinguished leaders, their bodyguards constitute a military unit.

Today everyone wants to keep bodyguards. Of course in some cases they require protection, but on the whole, a huge number of people keep bodyguards. This is a grave problem, we should find ways to address this problem. We must assure people that they no longer require bodyguards. This important job takes quite much longer.

Currently the disarmament commission under the chairmanship of respected Mohammad Karim Khalili, vice president of Afghanistan, has a plan under consideration to encourage armed militants to hand over their weapons voluntarily. Fortunately some people joined the process voluntarily before the elections; maybe some of them did so to make their candidacy legitimate. In the second phase, the commission will negotiate and encourage armed groups to surrender their arms, and finally force will be used.

[Presenter] Thank you very much. My understanding from your comments is that as of today there is an orientation to ensure security, and now we are beginning to adopt policies in specific ways.

[Jalali] From the beginning, there were orientations and policies but without coordination. Much work has been done in different areas but not in a coordinated manner. It is not something new, we have witnessed this in every post-war country and Afghanistan cannot be an exception.

As much as our institutional capacities develops and new and effective intuitions are established, policies and plans will be effectively implemented. On the other hand, the outcome of progress and improvement of the situation depend on how much you invest. Unfortunately, in comparison to other post-war nations, limited investment has been made to normalize and improve the situation in general.

By investment I mean utilization of sources and forces. Taking into account the number of international forces, there are more international troops in Haiti, Kosovo, Bosnia, Cambodia and eastern Timor than in Afghanistan.

Possible future post

[Presenter] Today there is an important question. Will you remain interior minister?

[Jalali] I will not remain as interior minister because I have proposed to pursue my academic and scientific researches, and I feel very comfortable in this field. I served at the Interior Ministry for three years and now I think the time is again ready to start my academic and scientific researches once again.

[Presenter] Very good, you said that you would start academic career, do you want to be involved in the political arena of Afghanistan or not?

[Jalali] Yes, I am willing to have a role in Afghanistan's political process. I have asked His Excellency the President that I would remain his advisor, and I will remain at the service of my country. I hope I can serve Afghanistan in some other areas as well.

[Presenter] Though the answer of this question cannot be predicted but still I would like to know if you would stand in the next presidential elections of Afghanistan in 2009?

[Jalali] I have not thought about this issue.

[Presenter] Thank you very much for the interview with us.

[Jalali] Thank you too.

Source: BBC Monitoring South Asia

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