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Russia: Strategic Missile Troops Commander Solovtsov Interviewed

Posted on: Monday, 5 December 2005, 18:00 CST

Text of interview with Russia's Strategic Missile Troops Commander Col-Gen Nikolay Yevgenyevich Solovtsov conducted by Aleksandr Vovk and Aleksandr Dolinin under rubric "Armed forces and society": "Topol's are long-lived" report by Russian newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda on 2 December

Krasnaya Zvezda recently reported the launch of an RS-12M Topol intercontinental ballistic missile from the Plesetsk Cosmodrome. A reader uninitiated in "strategic" subtleties has the right to think: everyday news; missilemen launch Topol's in packs, and each time they impact "on the mark" on Kamchatka's Kura Range. We'll reveal a secret: our strategic missilemen attached special importance to this launch. For the first time not only in domestic, but also world missile building practice, they had sent a solid-propellant missile off in flight that had been in operation for 20 years.

It must be said that they had been more nervous than ever here. Why? And why does Russia attach such importance to missile complexes about which everyone has heard? About this and much more in our correspondents' conversation with Strategic Missile Troops Commander Col-Gen Nikolay Solovtsov.

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[Solovtsov] Developing and creating mobile missile complexes and outfitting the Strategic Missile Troops with them during the 1970's and 1980's involved the need to increase the troops' survivability under conditions of a possible preventive nuclear strike by the probable enemy and to organize an effective launch on warning. The possibility of a nuclear war being initiated and missile-nuclear strikes exchanged was not excluded in that period under conditions of the international tension, tough confrontation of the USSR and United States, and exacerbation of relations between them.

The sides' modernization of the USSR and US strategic nuclear forces had the objective on the one hand of increasing the counterforce potential of delivery vehicles and, on the other hand, of lowering the vulnerability of strategic platforms. A portion of the deployed Minuteman III missiles in the United States was equipped with more powerful warheads with enhanced accuracy, which substantially increased these missiles' capabilities of destroying assets of very same class at intercontinental ranges. Considerable attention was given to completing the work of creating, deploying and ensuring invulnerability of the MX missile. The new sea- launched Trident II missile was being developed at accelerated rates and there were preparations for its deployment on new submarines. Trident II had an accuracy comparable with the MX MBR [ICBM], and the counterforce capabilities of sea-launched ballistic missiles to destroy highly hardened targets was a very serious potential problem.

Modernizing the arms of US strategic offensive forces by increasing the number of warheads on one platform and improving the accuracy of their delivery considerably increased counterforce potential when the opposing side had only fixed-site offensive weapons in the ground component of the SYaS [Strategic Nuclear Forces], and if the combat capabilities of its own SNS [strategic offensive forces] were realized in a preventive [vnezapnyy] strike, this left no chance for the opposing side to realize its deterrence potential even at the minimum level necessary for this. A devaluation of deterrence potential disrupted the strategic balance and attuned each side to first use of strategic weapons.

[KZ] Nikolay Yevgenyevich, in those years fixed-site ground- based and silo-based missile complexes were the basis of SMT [Strategic Missile Troops] missile armament. It was believed that the latter have higher survivability compared with mobile complexes...

[Solovtsov] Exactly the other way around; their survivability became insufficient with the accuracy achieved in the probable enemy's ICBM's (MX, Trident II, Minuteman III) by that time. Calculations showed that even with a high degree of engineering hardness, SMT launch silos could be damaged by a single nuclear warhead of these ICBM's and SLBM's and could be destroyed by two warheads with a probability close to unity. A further increase in engineering hardness of the ShPU's [launch silos] required considerable outlays, provided little increase in survivability, and became inexpedient.

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Creating a mobile component of the SMT strike grouping possessing higher survivability and the capability of delivering a payload to intercontinental range became an urgent task under these conditions.

That's why the state's military-technical policy set a course towards equipping the SMT with mobile missile complexes having increased survivability because of the capability of maskirovka [lit. "camouflage", however, includes "concealment" and "deception" - FBIS], dispersal, manoeuvre, getting out from under a strike, movement along a route, uncertainty as to their location at the moment of an expected strike and the impossibility of conducting aimed fire against them.

In the latter half of the 1970's the first ground-mobile missile complexes were created for the SMT with solid-propellant missiles of intercontinental range (Temp-2S with RS-14 ICBM's) and of medium range (Pioner with the RSD-10). The Temp-2S RK [missile complex] was imperfect and had insufficient survivability. The need matured to develop, create and place in operation a more improved ground- mobile missile complex with a solid-propellant missile of intercontinental range. By that time scientific research organizations and industry already had the necessary S&T backlog of accomplishment for creating more modern mobile strategic offensive weapons, and the troops had gained experience of operating the Temp- 2S and Pioner mobile missile complexes.

In this connection the new Topol ground-mobile missile complex (PGRK) with the RS-12M ICBM was created by the mid-1980's and began coming into the inventory along with the RS-22 ICBM rail-based combat missile complex. Despite the considerable size of position areas required for stationing and combat patrolling of PGRK's, the country's territorial capabilities permitted stationing PGRK's throughout its territory from the western borders to the Far East. Missile regiments and missile divisions were deployed with these PGRK's.

The Topol PGRK with an intercontinental-range missile that now is part of the SMT became operational in 1988 and was delivered to the troops up to 1994. A total of around 350 self-contained Topol PGRK launchers were deployed in the SMT during this period. The necessary infrastructure was created that permitted supporting the performance of alert duty.

The Topol complex was a further development of the Temp-2S and Pioner mobile missile complexes. On 19 July 1977 the government made the decision to begin creating the RS-12M missile. The Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology headed by A. D. Nadiradze was specified as prime developer of the RK. Titan TsKB [Central Design Bureau] developed the mobile launcher for the complex at the Volgograd Barrikady Plant.

[KZ] What is the uniqueness of the Topol, which now is known to the entire world?

[Solovtsov] The Topol complex uses a three-stage ballistic missile with a solid-propellant mixture. Engine cases of all three stages are made of composite materials.

The missile launch is a mortar type. The Topol carries one warhead with an enhanced-yield charge. The nose section includes a propulsion unit and guidance and control system, which provides the extremely small deviation from the aiming point required for destruction of targets.

In the process of operating the RK, the missile is in a transport- launch container accommodated on a mobile launcher created on the basis of the MAZ-7917 seven-axle wheeled prime mover. The launcher's speed reaches 40 km/hr. It is equipped with an onboard inertial navigation system, which provides the possibility of executing a launch autonomously from any point on the combat patrol route. The launch also can be made from a shelter (a special structure with a sliding roof) in the permanent stationing location. In addition to a mobile launcher, the complex includes a command post and other auxiliary hardware accommodated on four-axle wheeled chassis with offroad capability.

Some Topol PGRK's were deployed at newly created position areas (PR) and some in reequipped PR's used for Pioner medium-range PGRK's dismantled in accordance with the 1987 INF Treaty.

Massive deployment of the Topol PGRK as part of the grouping of SMT RK's permitted solving the problem of its survivability in a possible nuclear strike. Because of the survivability of the Topol PGRK's, they accounted for preservation of over 60 per cent of the requisite launch-under-attack potential with consideration of the presence in the grouping of rail complexes with RS-22 missiles.

The use of solid-propellant missiles provided certain advantages: it considerably reduced their launch preparation time compared with liquid-propellant missiles, for which fuelling with liquid fuel was envisaged at launch; it simplified operation of the RK; it excluded the possibility of a liquid fuel spill during fuelling, with a toxic effect on personnel and environmental contamination by aggressive components of this fuel; and as a result, this increased the environmental safety of SMT assets. There no longer was a need to have liquid fuel component storage facilities at the position area or the large amount of fuelling and neutralization equipment hardware there is in liquid-propellant missile position areas... In addition, in the assessment of American specialists, solid- propellant missiles are more economical to operate. It has been reported in information materials that the system based on the solid- propellant Minuteman missile had ten times less operating expenditures than the system based on the Titan II liquid- propellant missile. And based on the experience of operation in the United States, the service life of solid-propellant missiles is from 10 to 15 years and can be taken to 20 years. Confirmation of this is the MX ICBM, which has been on alert duty from 1986 through 2005.

The Topol PGRK with fourth-generation ICBM differed favourably from its predecessors, the Temp-2S and Pioner RK's. By the way, the RSD-10 missile for the Pioner RK was created based on the first two stages of the RS-14 ICBM developed for the Temp-2S RK. The main advantages of the Topol PGRK included higher manoeuvreability, degree of maskirovka, possibility of launching missiles from previously prepared points on the route, and because of this higher accuracy. The more advanced warhead of the RK and higher accuracy on target permitted using it to accomplish the entire range of strategic missions, and the capabilities of controlling this RK enabled its operational use in all forms and methods of operations applicable to force elements [formirovaniye] equipped with this missile complex.

[KZ] According to the Russian-American START I Treaty, Russia was forced to provide the United States with precise coordinates of all its missile silos and bases. It turns out that we made our Topol's vulnerable?

[Solovtsov] No indeed, the Americans also did the very same thing. The purpose of that step on the US part was the need for constant monitoring of the status of the ShPU's and location of launchers of the SMT's mobile complexes. They rested great hopes on the space surveillance system with respect to verification, but it turned out to be imperfect. Therefore the Russian Topol's only have to leave the territory of their bases for combat patrol areas and not one surveillance satellite presently is capable of providing their accurate coordinates any longer. In 24 hours the mobile launchers of the Topol complex together with the PKP [mobile command post] and support vehicles are capable of covering hundreds of off- road kilometres and camouflaging themselves, awaiting the command for combat employment. And vehicles of the complex are autonomous not only in the capability of displacing in any direction, but also in receiving target designations for weapon employment and in conducting aimed fire on order (at a signal), which can come not only from a satellite, but also over secure military communications channels. All this makes the mobile missile complexes superdangerous weapons, persuading an aggressor country that its actions won't go unpunished.

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The following are among the main combat characteristics and capabilities of the Topol PGRK grouping: high operational efficiency of battle management and enhanced reliability in communicating orders for employment of missile-nuclear weapons; high technical readiness of missiles for launch; dispersed nature of elements of the missile complex and, as a result, high survivability against one enemy warhead; high operational efficiency of measures for building up survivability of the missile complex by dispersing on combat patrol routes or by changing field positions; presence of centralized built-in command post monitoring of the status of missile-nuclear weapons and of fulfilment of measures for precluding unsanctioned use; absence of the possibility of enemy use of sea- launched antimissile complexes and air-based laser weapons for engaging PGRK missiles; possibility of putting to use Russia's considerable territorial resource that is a zone of relative security for deploying the PGRK. This limits the range of possible enemy means of effect; as a factor of deterrence against an effect and with consideration of the special role of missile-nuclear weapons in the military-political sphere and impact of the destruction of these weapons on development of a military conflict as a whole, there is no possibility of an enemy strike against PGRK elements without their identification; there is universality of conditions of combat employment of PGRK's (in launch-on-warning and launch-under-attack strikes and in counterforce and countervalue strikes), determined by sufficient accuracy of fire, warhead yield and short missile prelaunch preparation time; and there is great territorial distribution of PGRK bases, dictating enhanced survivability of the supporting infrastructure and of the PGRK grouping's combat composition itself.

It must be noted that the PGRK's high qualities were understood in good time abroad and it wasn't by chance that missile complexes of this type were a subject of special US concern in preparing all strategic offensive arms reduction treaties. The results of such concern were attempts first to ban their deployment and subsequently to limit the size of combat patrol areas and establish a system of strict verification of PGRK movement (right down to the identifying markings).

The Topol PGRK grouping in the SMT presently is the main component ensuring necessary survivability of offensive might of the SMT as a whole.

[KZ] What is Topol like compared with foreign missile complexes?

[Solovtsov] The level of combat characteristics and reliability of this complex is comparable with the TTKh [specifications and performance characteristics] of missile complexes of foreign countries, and surpasses them in a number of parameters.

The Topol's combat capabilities correspond to prescribed requirements and ensure performance of missions assigned to the Missile Troops at the prescribed time with requisite effectiveness.

The missile's warranted service life as part of the complex was specified during development as 10 years. In view of this, a successful launch of a Topol ICBM that had been on alert duty for more than 10 years was carried out on 16 September 1998 from the 1st State Test Cosmodrome in Plesetsk within the scope of work to extend warranted service life. Fifty-seven combat training launches of RS- 12M missiles had been made prior to this, and all were successful.

[KZ] Topol has functioned beyond warranted service life. The actual service life of the first RK's of this type presently is 17 years counting their extension, and that of the missiles previously fabricated for them is 20 years. How long-lived is it?

[Solovtsov] With consideration of the military-economic situation in the country, requirements of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty between the Russian Federation and United States (2002), and expiration of the already extended service life of the Topol PGRK, it was planned to eliminate a number of missile divisions (regiments) of these RK's during the period 2002-2005, with a 25 per cent reduction in the number of launchers of the initial grouping. Further removal of Topol PGRK's from alert duty without a service life extension leads to reduced numerical strength and survivability of the SMT RK grouping with consideration of the removal from its makeup and elimination of the BZhRK [rail-based combat missile complex], and to a reduction in the number of position areas and of the necessary infrastructure for subsequent deployment of future PGRK's.

The need arose for a further service life extension of Topol PGRK's in the inventory. It was dictated chiefly by the need to maintain the numbers and combat capabilities of the RK grouping with consideration of the mass removal from its order of battle (expected in the next 3-5 years) of around 200 RS-18 and RS-20 missile complexes, which have been operational for over 25 years. The production and procurement rates of new advanced Topol-M missiles for introduction to the SMT order of battle are rather low.

The possibility of retaining Topol PGRK's in the grouping also is connected with the fact that the experience gained in operating these RK's, in maintaining combat effectiveness and in executing a number of launches confirms their high reliability. An analysis of results of an assessment of the technical condition and reliability of the Topol missile complex and its component parts shows that no degradation of technical properties of the complex has been seen from the moment the missile complex became operational with the SMT, and reliability indicators achieved in recent years are stable and even exceed prescribed levels (by 0.1-1.8 per cent).

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The fact that the reliability level of the complex isn't declining is confirmed by annual launches of the missiles. All launches in the last 19 years (combat training and under the long- term storage, Start and other programmes) were successful. With the existing system of operation preserved, experts believe that during the extended service life of the complex, the predicted assessments of RK reliability indicators will remain at the level that has been reached. The latest launch also confirmed this.

With consideration of these arguments, by joint decision of the SMT and FKA [Federal Space Agency] of 31 December 2004, the service life of RS-12M missiles made during 1986-1994 was extended to 19 years. In realization of the 20-year service life, the PGRK with missiles can be in the grouping up through 2014, and around 70 launchers can be on alert duty in 2010. The expected outlays for the Topol PGRK service life extension will be considerably lower than possible outlays for accelerated creation and introduction of a new missile complex. In addition, a Topol PGRK service life extension will permit maintaining the necessary level of the grouping's numerical strength and preserving the infrastructure of position areas in the period when it is being reequipped with the advanced and highly effective Topol-M RK.

At the same time, research of the Topol RK's strength characteristics shows that in operating the RK, the rate of "aging" of completing articles is not a constant value, but has a tendency to increase with increased service life. Therefore a further extension of it will require a set of work to study the aging mechanics of the articles with consideration of the integrated impact of operational factors, and will require the development of methods and means of diagnostics of the articles' parameters that determine their working capacity.

[KZ] What is the procedure for service life extension of missile complexes?

[Solovtsov] Increasing the duration of operation of missile complexes is one of the priority tasks in the SMT with presently existing limitations on material and financial resources. A service life extension is accomplished in accordance with the "Statute on the Procedure for Assigning, Establishing and Confirming Warranted Periods and Extending the Service Life of Missile Complexes (Statute GS, SE-2000)," which is in force in the SMT. The "Statute..." was developed by SMT organizations and the prime enterprises developing the RK SN [strategic missile complexes] and was placed in force by a joint decision of the SMT commander and RKA [Russian Space Agency] general director in August 2003.

The "Statute..." contains type programmes for performing the work and a methodology for calculating residual service life (resource), as well as particular programmes and methodologies used by developing organizations (manufacturers) of the RK SN in performing experimental research. In the course of work on each specific RK, a set of experiments is carried out within the scope of the prescribed OKR [experimental development]. Based on the latter's results as well as on operating data and results of combat training launches of missiles, the complex general developer and prime NII [scientific research institute] of the SMT issue a finding each year on the possibility of a service life extension. Based on a positive finding, the SMT and FKA make the decision on a service life extension of the RK SN.

That kind of assessment of the possibility of a further service life extension also has been done with respect to the Topol RK.

An analysis of operating data shows that basic reliability indicators of this complex are stable and will remain the very same up to 2010. The noted tendency for an increase in the number of malfunctions of individual devices will have no impact on the degree of reliability of the complex. The forecast evaluation of reliability and of technical condition indicates the fundamental possibility of a service life extension of the Topol RK up to 23 years with fulfilment of a number of measures. They include an annual flaw detection of the RS-12M missile with an assessment of the condition of RDTT [solid-propellant rocket motor] propellant charges; technical inspections of hardware and systems of complex ground equipment; and annual combat training launches of missiles having the maximum service life.

In case a decision on service life extension of Topol RK's is made based on results of the work, they can be on alert duty up to 2016-2018. With planned rates of introduction of the Topol-M PGRK in this period, this will permit preserving the position area infrastructure for new ground-mobile RK's and, with minimal outlays, realization of measures for maintaining the requisite numerical strength and combat capabilities of the grouping of nuclear deterrence assets. The presence of the Topol PGRK grouping in the SMT will permit preserving two mobile components in the structure of Russia's Strategic Nuclear Forces (the grouping of PLARB [SSBN's] in the MSYaS [Naval Strategic Nuclear Forces] and the grouping of PGRK's in the SMT) that are capable of delivering a launch-under- attack nuclear strike against the aggressor on a guaranteed basis and with rather high effectiveness.

Source: BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union

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