Russia: Beslan Commission Head Answers MPs’ Questions
Text of report by Russian Ekho Moskvy radio on 28 December
Members of the parliamentary commission investigating the Beslan tragedy are far from united in their view of events, the commission head said when answering questions from MPs. Aleksandr Torshin said members had voted on several issues they were unable to agree on, had not yet made final conclusions, and would vote “on every point”"in the final stages”. During the session, on the whole Torshin showed sympathy to the security services’ difficult situation, saying they had done their best and their priority had been to save hostages’ lives. He implied that the North Ossetian Beslan commission had not checked its facts, unlike the one he headed. He said he was confident that measures had been put in place that would help prevent a repeat of the tragedy, although there could be no guarantees. The following is the text of part of the session, as broadcast on Ekho Moskvy radio on 28 December 2005. The recording appeared to be cut off prematurely:
[Presenter] Aleksandr Plyushchev is in the studio. You may know from Ekho Moskvy’s extended news bulletin that deputies and senators today heard a report from the head of the parliamentary commission investigating the terrorist act in Beslan [school siege on 1-3 September 2004]. After the report the members of parliament wanted to clarify a number of points. The questions which [Aleksandr] Torshin answered were read out by a member of the commission, Duma deputy Valeriy Dyatlenko. We are offering you an excerpt from Torshin’s answers.
[Q] Do all members of the commission agree with the conclusions made by the commission and its report? If the answer is no, then what are the differences? [This was a question from] Respectfully, Deputy [Dmitriy] Rogozin.
[Torshin] I must say that the commission represents people who are members of different political factions but fortunately the political sympathies have not so far made a radical impact on our commission. And I must say that over this period we had serious and rather heated discussions on quite a few questions.
I could not say that the commission was unanimous all the time. The majority of disputed issues were voted upon but only as a last resort. No final conclusions or recommendations are ready at this point. But if [name indistinct, possibly Dmitriy] Vitalyevich insists, I can say that there are positions on quite a number of points which are different from those of the commission. I can say this about [Yuriy] Savelyev and Ivanov. [Aleksandr] Moskalets has a position of his own. [Valeriy] Dyatlenko stands by his own position. (?Iskozhin) and Torshin have their own positions. I could go on. Depending on the nature of the issue, we had our own points of view. I must also say that one reason the commission has been working for such a long time, is that we as the majority were not putting pressure on those who were asking difficult questions. Every single time, we called for an additional investigation. There were the fire service and the explosives experts’ reports.
But we returned them because the commission was not unanimous. The Defence Ministry, which was responsible for one part, and the Justice Ministry’s experts will also have to answer numerous questions.
I must say that in the final stages we will certainly hold a ballot on every point. Those members of the commission who have a different point of view on one or another matter, will have an opportunity to express their own opinion.
[First name indistinct] Nikolayevich, if you insist that the points should be specified, these were the use of special means and heavy equipment, the presence of accomplices of the terrorists and the explosive experts’ investigations.
[Q] The next question is as follows. Why did the authorities not know in advance that the terrorists were going to attack?
[Torshin] In fact I must say that our agents were on the case. There were numerous tip-offs. But none of them mentioned school number one. Measures have to be taken. We will try to include a reference in our report. But in fact there was a plethora of information that some bandits were gathering somewhere.
[Q] Who and when issued the order to fire at the school and what was the nature of the order? Which tasks were set for those storming the school? Was it to kill the terrorists or to save the hostages?
[Torshin] In the final stages of the killing of the terrorists, especially after nine o’clock, when it was certain that the target was at the final stage [as received], it was to minimize own losses, because ten special-purpose unit servicemen and two Emergencies Ministry people had already been killed. Numerous people were wounded. This is what happened. Certainly people were doing their best. Believe me, had the target been a different one, the number of FSB [Federal Security Service] officers killed would not have been so large. The FSB has enough capabilities to do things in a different way and to save their own lives. They did not. The people went in to save the children, hence the casualties. I must say that the order was issued by Gen [Valeriy] Andreyev, the head of the operative headquarters. I must say that we examined the situation in every detail. A total of 73 per cent of the hostages were rescued after all.
[Q] Who stopped the negotiations that had started between [Chechen separatist leader Aslan] Maskhadov and the terrorists who seized the school?
[Torshin] You know, this is a separate question, and by the way I would like to draw your attention to it once again: Maskhadov never spoke with anyone at all. This has not been recorded anywhere. Yes, efforts were made to contact him, through mediators and through [Chechen separatist envoy Akhmed] Zakayev. If you don’t believe us, then you can believe [journalist] Anna Politkovskaya, who contacted Zakayev three times. She came to talk to our commission – you know, one of the unique features of the commission was that no one refused to talk to us, [journalist Andrey] Babitskiy was the only one we couldn’t find because he is constantly abroad. Politkovskaya contacted Zakayev three times – you know, some time we will have to publish the words the journalist used to try to persuade Zakayev to make Maskhadov drop everything and, without any preconditions, come to get the children out. The replies were evasive – along the lines that the communications were only one-way, and so on – so there was nothing to stop, because there was absolutely no contact with him.
[Q] Who ordered the terrorist attack, who organized and financed it?
[Torshin] That’s a very difficult question. We have a great deal of material which was taken from the terrorists after they had been killed, but as regards those who ordered the attack, I’m not yet ready to give a reply. The organizers – yes, the organizers were Maskhadov and [Chechen separatists Shamil] Basayev, [Magomet] Khashiyev and Abu-Dzeyt, we have strong grounds for saying this. Maskhadov and Abu-Dzeyt have already been killed, Basayev and Khashiyev haven’t been killed yet, obviously it’s not so easy, you will understand this yourselves, the Americans can’t catch Bin Ladin either, in spite of their powerful resources. This is not an excuse, not at all, it’s just an illustration that it’s a difficult matter. As regards finance, I would say our commission has some indications as to whose hands this passed through, so we can only wait for the final deciphering of Maskhadov’s and Abu-Dzeyt’s archives.
[Q] The next question – why was it reported that there were 354 hostages in the school when it was already known that there were more of them?
[Torshin] This was an individual decision taken by Andreyev, and by him alone.
[Q] I would also like to know, as a member of the commission, what this decision was. It’s a question of disagreement. The next question: Why was it heads of the republic [of Ingushetia] staff rather than federal politicians who entered into negotiations with the terrorists?
[Torshin] The point is that these decisions were made by the head of the operational staff, that’s the first thing. Secondly, the terrorists were behaving in such a way – perhaps, for political reasons, we won’t be publishing how the terrorists spoke to the negotiators. When the world-renowned [children's doctor Leonid] Roshal speaks to them and he is subjected to abusive language – which they have a good command of – and they reject everything, when there is hysterics on the other side, then you need professional negotiators. And I should say that, as regards the republican leaders, [the hostage-takers] kept saying clearly the whole time – no negotiations, all four must come to the school. They had no intention even of talking.
[Q] Did a sniper shoot at the terrorist who was sitting on the detonator?
[Torshin] We paid special attention to this question in particular. But, believe me, the terrorists are not fools, they chose this place specially for the button, it was a blind spot. Also, according to the evidence of a number of witnesses, the only window through which he might have been seen was hung with material, so [the sniper] couldn’t shoot. What’s more, we contacted [North Ossetian parliament speaker Taymuraz] Mansurov, this was his home school, and he said that the last time they repaired it they deliberately decided not to put up glass in the sports hall but to make the windows out of special plastic. We have got samples of this plastic, and it produces a distorted image – all that could be seen through the plastic was blurred shadows, this was a very difficult situation, [special troops commander Aleksandr] Tikhonov asked [former North Ossetian President Aleksandr] Dzasokhov, and Mansurov, and other people – show us, all we can see in places are blurred shadows. So the possibility that our sniper could have killed this terrorist can be ruled out – it just wouldn’t have worked.
[Q] How does the parliamentary commission view the actual organization of the special operation to free the hostages? Was it possible to avoid such a large number of fatalities?
[Torshin] You know, always, when time passes and you note things down on paper, you think – probably it could have been done like this, or like that. But put yourself in the place of people who had all this responsibility, all this horror thrust on them. And you know, in actual fact it isn’t all that simple. We could see very well on the television screens that the situation around the school was difficult. An enormous number of people living in Beslan and the relatives – and I repeat, they were armed – were keeping careful track of what the law-enforcement authorities were doing. So I wouldn’t want to draw any conclusions just now. We now have expert analysis of the situation, we have our own interpretation of how it should have been done, or how it shouldn’t have been done, and I think we’ll talk about all this in our final report.
[Q] And a Q from (?Vladimir Ryzhkov). Does the commission believe that everything was done for the success of the negotiations? The fact that [Ingush President Murat] Zyazikov, Dzasokhov and so on did not take part?
[Torshin] You know, we didn’t discuss this issue in particular at the time, but it is clear from the materials – we have a radio intercept, the progress of the negotiations is clear to us – that in that situation they were ready for anything in order for the negotiations to succeed, and they proposed everything, but every time on the other side they came up against – it’s even difficult to convey to you the kind of reaction on the part of these people, who were not, in fact, acting independently. After all, the aim of the exercise was to destabilize the situation in the North Caucasus at any cost, and I think it was difficult to reach any kind of agreement with them, there was no person to negotiate with as such. But even so everything was done – you can see, there were some successes, after all. Look, as a result of the negotiations, [former Ingush President Ruslan] Aushev went there and 26 people were saved. As a result of the negotiations, look, they even went as far as dragging out our dead, who were lying out in the heat of the sun there, risking the lives of the living. As a result of the negotiations, they succeeded in drawing out the time during which some of the hostages managed to escape. Once again, colleagues, every time you put yourself in the position of those people who are responsible – think about that responsibility, take a look at how you can act when they had taken everything into account after Nord Ost [Moscow hostage crisis in 2002], they had even taken gas masks with them in case gas was used, and they were acting according to their own scenario. We don’t yet have any methods for dealing with kamikaze terrorists, and probably there cannot be any such methods anywhere in the world. How can you get into the head of a person who has decided on terrorist acts and who is pining for the gardens of Allah?
[Plyushchev] What differences are there between the report prepared by the North Ossetian commission and the parliamentary commission?
[Torshin] That is a subject for a separate discussion. I wish to tell you that we worked for a long time in very close contact. We helped them, they helped us. They are more orientated towards – [changes thought] then, when we went off to write our reports, we did not get in each other’s way, so that we did not just copy each other. But now, when we come to look, we see that of course there are quite a lot of differences, both chronological ones and factual ones. But with all due respect to our North Ossetian colleagues, I have to say that when I read at the commission that they were claiming there were 38 bandits, and that they had established their nationalities, names and codenames – ones like Fantomas, Russkiy [Russian], Pulemetchik [machine gunner], and were quoting the newspaper Sovershenno Sekretno [Top Secret] as a source – [changes thought] with all due respect to the newspaper Sovershenno Sekretno, if you take a newspaper as a source, you should check [the facts are right] before you publish, especially things like this. For us this is not proof. Our rule was to ensure that there was documentary proof for every line, either the testimony of witnesses or other information. So, they reckon there were 38. We say there were 32 – and eight unidentified bodies, so far. [Presumably, he means "32, including eight unidentified bodies"]
The same applies to the drugs. A witness claims that not all of them were high on drugs, that there were no drugs there at all. But, in that case, what about the medical reports which say there were traces of drugs in the blood. So there are differences. This is another reason why we delayed issuing our report – so that there could be explanations for all this.
[Plyushchev] Here is a question from [leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation] Gennadiy Andreyevich Zyuganov. Following your inquiry, are you more confident that there will be no repeat of crimes of this kind in the country, that the authorities have taken the necessary measures?
[Torshin] The objective indicators are such that there should be more confidence. We have to say that, yes, there has been a shake- up in the special services. Operational control groups have been set up. That was the problem at Beslan. There were many problems there. The town was just unlucky, you know. There were so many unfortunate coincidences. For instance, four of the nine kindergartens, the four nearest ones, were not open on 1 September. For the simple reason that repairs had not been completed. So, the women came [to the school] with their babies. Also, there was no gas. Once again, this was negligence, a failure to fulfil a simple plan, so to speak. There was no [gas]. As a result, they ended up there [at the school].
You ask me whether I am more confident or not. In actual fact, nothing can be guaranteed. But the GRU [Main Directorate of Intelligence] units, which, I think, were set up a month previously – isn’t that so – they had simply not had time to deploy by the time the Beslan school was seized. On paper they were all set up and ready. In fact, there were many, many other things that needed doing. In general, my colleague Kulakov was right when he asked Col Tsyban what it was like to be a colonel commanding generals. This also needs tackling, there needs to be some kind of coordination. But the GRU were there at Nalchik.
[Plyushchev] In Groznyy and Nalchik.
[Torshin] They are already working better in Groznyy and Nalchik. There is already combat coordination and so on. So, I am more confident. But there is still a lot to be done, of course. [recording ends abruptly, in mid-sentence]