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“Race” and Gender in Non-Durkheimian French Sociology, 1893-1914

December 16, 2007

By Staum, Martin

The non-Durkheimian sociologists in the institutions founded by Rene Worms were not simply biological determinists. A hard-line contingent among Worms’s associates continued to accept the anthropological paradigm of racial hierarchy, but a larger group questioned the validity of the concept of race as its anthropological precision faltered. The critique of race, however, did not challenge the French civilizing imperial mission. The male sociologists did not parallel this critique with a corresponding critique of gender roles. The positivists in the Worms group, sometimes more liberal on race, believed in an essential, complementary nature of women. However, the participation of well- known feminists revealed that most male sociologists endorsed a “relational feminism” that was based less on essential nature than on the need for stable social roles. The sociologists’ discussions displayed the cultural assumptions about stable households that prevented revision of old gender stereotypes. At the same time the degree of responsiveness to feminist claims foreshadowed a more expanded notion of citizenship. Les sociologues non-durkheimiens dans les institutions creees par Rene Worms n ‘etaienlpas uniquement des deterministes biologiques. Parmi les associes de Worms, un contingent pur et dur continue de soutenir leparadigme anthropologique de hierarchie raciale, mais un groups plus important s ‘interroge sur lajustesse de la notion de race alors que sa precision anthropologique est chancelante. La critique sur la race toutefois ne mettait pas en question la mission imperiale civilisatrice de la France. Les sociologues males n ‘associerent pas cette critique parallelement a une critique des modeles des sexes. Les positivistes du groupe de Worms, etant parfois plus large d ‘esprit sur le sujet de race, croyait en une nature complementaire et essentielle des femmes. Toutefois, la participation de feministes celebres revela que laplupart des sociologues males adherait a un “feminisme relationnel” base plus sur le besoin de roles stables en societe que sur la nature essentielle. Les discussions des sociologues exposaient les suppositions culturelles sur les menages stables qui empechaient une revision des vieux cliches sexuels. En meme temps, le degre de reaction aux reclamations des feministes annoncait une notion de citoyennete plus elargie.

I. The Durkheimian and Non-Durkheimian Sociologists

Aspiring French social scientists in the nineteenth century frequently asked how much “nature” fixed the status of non- Europeans and all women, and how much “nurture” could alter it.1 The emergence of sociology in specialized periodicals and institutions in the 1890s elicited a direct revolt against anthropological varieties of biological determinism and “raciology.” Emile Durkheim and his collaborators on the Annie sociologique (first published in 1898) have long had the reputation of promoting this “discovery of the social.”2 The neglected nonDurkheimian sociologists associated with Rend Worms (1869-1926) have suffered from the taint of “organicism – advocating the analogy of societies to biological organisms. The academic expectation has been that the nohDurkheimians were more rigid on “race” and gender. Some scholars have even associated the Worms group with individualistic social Darwinism as well as racial hierarchy.3

This general portrait is due for re-evaluation. The revolt of the Durkheimians against the biological now seems less definitive. Durkheim recognized a certain rationality in traditional castes in previous epochs and rejected equal perfectibility of all races.4 His early work in the Division of Social Labour contained biological models and organic metaphors.5 Durkheim’s dominant gender theory argued that sexual similarity and equality in structure and function were primitive, while greater sexual differentiation occurred with modern division of labour.6 Despite agreeing to legal equality for women, he thought their natural aptitudes and their functions in modern society would limit choices of occupations.7

The approach to race and gender of the sociologists affiliated with the philosopher, lawyer, and political economy teacher Ren6 Worms did not consistently allow nature to trump nurture. They were not uniformly on one side of the nature-nurture axis with regard to race, nor were their views on gender entirely congruent with their views on race. A substantial contingent among Worms’s associates, including critical anthropologists, Russian emigres, and active contributors to the Revue Internationale de sociologie, criticized racial theory, while a minority remained committed to old anthropological concepts of hierarchy disavowed by the Durkheimians. Worms himself retained a belief in the inequality of races.

While belief in racial hierarchy often helped legitimize empire, its absence did not guarantee opposition to French imperial expansion. Organicists in the Worms group viewed colonization as a necessary form of reproduction in growing societies. Other associates shared the common economic and strategic motives of French politicians and imperial theorists.

The inadequacy of an exclusive nature-nurture framework becomes even clearer on gender issues. While many non-Durkheimians did not insist on an indelible biological nature of women, their acknowledgment of socially variable gender roles did not easily translate into approval of full civil and political equality for women. They were progressive in admitting women as Society members and listening even to the most radical feminists. But a strong contingent worried about childbearing in a context of depopulation if women worked outside the home and participated in the public sphere. Some still defended traditional theories of the “nature” of women. The most numerous group used social, not biological, justifications to refuse radical feminist demands. The stability of households, as with Durkheim himself, remained a major issue. In this way the sociologists illustrate with some qualifications the general historiographical claim about cultural assumptions (shared by conservatives, so not uniquely liberal or republican) creating obstacles to women’s full citizenship.

Rene Worms established three sociological institutions – the periodical he edited, the Revue Internationale de sociologie (founded in 1893); the prestigious International Institute of Sociology (1893), with publication of annual or periodic accounts of its congresses; and the Paris Society de Sociologie (1895). The International Institute of Sociology, with 100 members and 200 associates, included well-known philosophers, anthropologists, and sociologists from Europe and from the Americas. The Institute had a preponderance of university lecturers already famous in their home countries and often established in the neighboring disciplines of law, economics, history, and anthropology. At any given annual (or later triennial) congress there might be only twenty delegates in attendance. The Revue contributors included an assortment of Spanish and Italian scholars as well as a conspicuous circle of Russian emigres to France who had also joined the Institute. Since Britain, Germany, and the United States had their own sociological journals, they were less likely to furnish periodical authors than members of the Institute. The Paris Soci&6 de Sociologie had between 100 and 300 members in the period from 1895 to 1914. The famous criminologist Gabriel Tarde was the first president, but the animated discussions usually occurred among a small group of ten to twenty journalists, civil servants, and the same Russian Emigres.8 Eclipsed by the Durkheimians as founders of the discipline in France, the group, like its founder Worms, remained eclectic, without a unifying theoretical outlook. Their discussions of race and gender, however, remain fascinating. To understand the context, a brief detour through anthropological assumptions is necessary.

II. Anthropologists and the Nature-Nurture Issue

Early anthropologists debated the “perfectibility” of various ethnic groups (1860-61) and measured the allegedly smaller brain size of non-European “races” and of all women.9 The influential psychologist Theodule Ribot published a thesis on “psychological heredity” that attributed the most important psychological aptitudes to inherited “organic memories.” In his view innate endowment largely accounted for moral and intellectual differences in races and national character.10

Anthropologists and psychologists who were aware of anthropological discourse thus set the tone for the widely prevalent nature-nurture discussions of the nineteenth century. In France their predominantly neo-Lamarckian outlook complicated their tendency to stress the importance of physical endowment and the measurement of crania. Exceptional conservative hereditarians such as Gustave Le Bon (1841-193l),Tater acclaimed for his crowd psychology, argued that the disparity from the male European norm in brain weight or cranial capacity for other races and women increased with civilization. But mainstream republican anthropologists such as Paul Broca (1824-1880) believed that milieu had to play a role in the inheritance of acquired characteristics affecting intelligence and character. However, milieu did not affect all people in equivalent fashion, so its influence could be neutralized. Education of European men and women, for example, could lessen intellectual and social inequalities among them. NonEuropeans on the other hand might take centuries to catch up despite the influence of the milieu.11 Race and gender were thus asymmetrical, since the advancement of European women could be more easily contemplated than the rapid development of “retarded” races. The non-Durkheimian sociologists would end up reversing this asymmetry with more flexibility in practice on race than on gender. By the time emerging sociologists created their own institutions, an anthropological counter-current had emerged. Leonce Manouvrier (1850-1927), a pupil of Broca, lab director and teacher of physiological anthropology at the private Ecole d’anthropologie, opposed common notions of racial inferiority and, while far from being a wholehearted feminist, refuted the idea mat small brain size indicated lower intelligence for women.12

The old racial paradigm did not entirely collapse in the face of this critique. While the late nineteenth-century sociologists almost all attributed a lesser influence of race to the complexity of developed societies, including mixing of groups, and the phenomena of modernization, the actual difficulty of finding reliable racial indicators and demarcation lines via anthropometry was principally responsible for the critical onslaught. Neither the cephalic index nor the facial angle nor cranial size seemed to suffice. Peoples and nations were not homogeneous, and there was no firm agreement on the substratum of races.13 Hence the fin-de-siecle era witnessed the increasing inadequacy of a nevertheless persistent paradigm.

III. The Race/Gender Parallel and Defining Feminism

As Nancy Stepan has maintained, opinions on race and gender often intersect. For many scientists, “gender was found to be remarkably analogous to race, such that the scientists could use racial difference to explain gender difference, and vice versa.”14 Routinely anthropologists used alleged low brain weight or alleged emotional immaturity to draw analogies between women and men of “lower races.” The exploitation of the bodies of non-European women and the dilemma of the national, racial, and cultural identity of metis children were also issues in the common denigration of certain “races” and the feminine.15 Yet male sociologists did not consistently parallel race and gender. In some cases, conservatives and liberals were consistent on both issues, while the views of others attacked social conventions on one issue but not the other.

Any discussion of feminism in this era should also acknowledge the problem of definition. The most popular view both among men and women members of the Paris Sociology Society was the “relational feminism” retrospectively defined by Karen Offen. Rather than being focused on a gender-free abstract individual bearing rights, relational feminism challenged male domination by the “primacy of a companionate, non-hierarchical, male-female couple” with significant support for childbearing, nurturing, and “womanliness.”16 This view allowed for a “biologically differentiated, family-centered vision of male-female complementarity,” a “sexual division of labour in both society and the family.”17 Joan Scott has articulated the long- standing paradox within the feminist movement – the more women emphasized their difference with special concerns about motherhood and household, the more difficult it became to argue for the extension of universal rights.18 However, Scott counsels against a forced choice between equality and difference. Offen has argued against excluding more conservative feminists who chose complementarity.19 Clearly both individualist and relational feminists participated in the sociologists’ discussions.

The difficulty of conceiving non-Europeans as well as French women as republican citizens has been a staple of recent historical scholarship.20 The scandal has been the paradox of liberal ideals and illiberal behavior. However, recent studies of family legislation have complicated the picture by showing divisions among republicans themselves on the degree of responsiveness to feminist demands.21 The male adherents to the Paris Sociology Society did not have foreordained opinions about gender. They demonstrate a range of opinions from support of full civil and political rights for women to limiting women to the domestic sphere. The most numerous seem to have embraced cultural assumptions about the household common not to just to adherents of liberal republican ideology, but to conservatives and anti-republicans.

IV. Rene Worms on Racial Hierarchy and Colonization

Worms in a way represents the split personality of his group. His conflicted view of race considered it an important, though not predominant, variable. In 1895, he criticized the work of the conservative, pessimistic, anti-republican racial theorist Arthur Gobineau as an “effort to glorify the white race.”22 The same year he commended the republican philosopher Alfred Fouillee for opposing “doctrines too widely spread today about the radical inferiority of certain fractions of the human species and the progressive elimination of more enlightened races by the inferior fractions.” Three years later he also agreed with Fouillee, in a very commonly expressed outlook, that “the more a people approaches a modern type, the action of the social milieu wins out over the physical milieu, and even more, physical factors tend to be transformed into social factors.”23 In the 1902 discussion at the International Institute, Worms warned his colleagues not to attribute too much to race: “Milieu is a factor of social evolution, modified by social functioning, while race cannot be modified and cannot modify other factors. It can only prevent transformations as a conservative factor.”24

For someone eager to highlight the influence of milieu rather than heredity, Worms stubbornly refused in later years to give up the racial paradigm. Somatic structure was a measure of progressive adaptation to the environment. “To the extent one rises in the series of human races,” cranial volume and brain weight increase, the facial angle increases, and prognathic (receding forehead and prominent jaw) face conformation decreases. Jn trying to “modify the mentality of Negroes by a European education,” Worms believed there were “countless disappointments,” such as the return of a dark- skinned Filipino to savage life after failed efforts to civilize him. He attributed the failure of democracy in Liberia or Haiti to racial inferiority. On the other hand, he conceded that remarkable recent progress of the Chinese and Japanese might herald a “transformation more profound than we can now believe.”25

Like many pro-colonialists who argued for the civjlizing mission, in 1898 Worms believed that “inferior races” needed the influence of a “superior race for progress.”26 Worms’s nuanced view on the importance of race did not prevent him from encouraging the “praiseworthy task of development of our far-flung possessions by sending workers and capital” to the colonies and from acting as secretary of the Colonial Congress in 1905.27 Nor did the Dreyfus Affair make Worms more receptive to the arguments of the noted Durkheimian critic of racial theory Celestin Bougle.28 Worms warned that Bougie’s exclusion of physiological and psychological methods from sociology “would restrain the resources of the science.”29

Worms also permitted publication of the views of the anti- democratic extremist “anthroposociologist” Vacher de Lapouge.30 In 1893 Lapouge argued contrary to Broca that the effects of education were limited and did not enlarge the brain.31 Lapouge believed that the narrow head shape of “Homo Europaeus” created an aristocratic elite of intelligence and character compared to the more round- headed, plodding peasant types. Moreover, he advocated eugenic measures to assure that war, urban-induced alcoholism, disease, marriages to the merely wealthy, or healing the mediocre sick would not threaten the dominance of the elite. The Revue published discussions of the so-called cephalic index (ratio of width to anterior-posterior length of the head) by his disciples. In the first years of the Annee sociologique, of course, even the Durkheimians allocated space to Lapouge, though they removed the “anthroposociology” heading by 1901.32 One cannot, however, conclude that Worms’s institutions were mouthpieces for extremist advocates of racial hierarchy. A more nuanced interpretation emerges from three substantive discussions of race and heredity.

V. The Sociology Society and International Institute on Racial Hierarchy

At the 1895 second annual Congress of the International Institute the Polish expatriate, anarchist pamphleteer, and literary critic Mecislas Golberg (18681907) highlighted the importance of milieu in more recent times by asserting that the “stable morphological units” of races in early times adapted to their geographic milieu to create a division of labor. Conquest and enslavement of one race by another was one possible outcome, but another, as with Durkheim, was greater specialization leading to natural commerce and cooperation. In historical times Golberg called races “subjective and unstable social units” since nations are unions of different peoples.33

A recalcitrant hard-line critic of Golberg was a former Proudhonist typographer, Charles-Mathieu Limousin (1840-1909), a councilor and eventually officer of the Paris Society. For Limousin, racial attributes were permanent, and the hereditary constitution of Africans made progress toward civilization impossible.34 In the subsequent discussions of 1900 and 1902 Limousin again insisted that the once-useful ideals of equality had no place in a science of society where one could not contest the “differences of social aptitude for each race.”35 Asians were in a state of arrested development, and Native Americans in a “state of decadence.”36 Limousin represented almost the stereotype of the “reactionary Left,” a type of intellectual steeped in French revolutionary values harking back to Jacques-Rend Hubert, an opinion receptive to nineteenth-century socialism, and a firm conviction that progressive science taught hierarchy, not egalitarianism.37 However, at the Congress of 1895, after the conviction of Dreyfus, but before the press helped create the Dreyfus Affair of 1898-99, three major figures, all active in the Paris Society, strongly supported the primacy of social, not racial, factors. The Odessa cordage manufacturer, Jacques Novicow (1849-1912), was a staunch organicist, social Darwinist, and economic liberal, but also a strong pacifist. For him, Golberg’s adoption of Le Bon’s “historical races” confused race and culture. The physiological aspects of race, however useful in biology, were unimportant in sociology. Therefore, sociologists should “abandon this criterion of race for tracing serious limits between human groups.” He remarked on his own sensitivity to prejudice because others frequently assumed him to be Jewish, but he had no such ancestry.38 The next year Novicow argued against any correlation of intelligence with brain size or physiology, and found no evidence that primitive races or present-day Africans were not “perfectible.”39 Novicow would also turn out to be an ardent supporter of equality for women.

The statistician, economist, and future president of the Society Adolphe Coste (1842-1901) asserted that marriages, uniform traditions, and education were far more important for group mentality than physical attributes. Physiology had no direct influence on mental characteristics, and, like most colleagues, he believed all existing races were mixed.40 Finally, in 1895, four years before his attack on Lapouge, Leonce Manouvrier, an officer of the International Institute and critical anthropologist, stressed the importance of “conditions of civilization” attainable by all races. Rejecting “original and inherent features of a race,” Manouvrier wished to react against “the habit of explaining by race, blood, heredity, atavism what is explicable by the external milieu and the action of living beings assembled together.”41 He had little doubt, he said, that on the average “as a whole the Europeans are superior to exotic races” but he thought culture, education, and favorable conditions could counteract current inferiority. Manouvrier later admitted the cerebral inferiority of some existing human “races,” but still rejected Le Bon’s serial ranking of intelligence testifying to progressive evolution.42 He would take a similarly nuanced position on feminism – against considering women to be of inferior intelligence, but convinced that women’s nature meant adherence to certain social roles.

The second explicit discussion on race in sociology occurred at the International Institute Congress of 1900, well after the Dreyfus Affair had galvanized concern about prejudicial labeling of individuals. Here another nobleman and wealthy emigre, Eugene de Roberty (1843-1915), who still lived half the year in Russia and also taught at the Paris College libre des sciences sociales, vigorously attacked the “prejudices of contemporary sociology.”43 The positivist Roberty blamed political conservative Hippolyte Taine, as well as republicans Jean-Marie Guyau and Fouillee, and British philosopher Herbert Spencer for overemphasizing organic adaptations transmitted by heredity. They made race significant, but it was actually a deus ex machina with the “external veneer of science.” Even so-called “ancestral concepts” were acquired. As long as education and instruction were different from animal raising, he believed race itself not a great social factor. Furthermore, he called anti-Semitism “the greatest infamy the nineteenth century will have to blush about before posterity.”44 Race was a biological fact, good only for prehistory, but otherwise civilization was a more essential sociological factor than race.

In the subsequent discussion, Novicow and Coste endorsed Roberty’s opinions. Coste insisted Egyptians were a black African civilization, and deliberately cited the failure of Lapouge’s cephalic index as a successful indicator of racial difference.45 The Breton magistrate, sociologist of law, and South American linguistics expert Raoul de la Grasserie (1839-1916) contradicted Roberty in maintaining that nations were now artificial, historically created races – a principal premise of his view that all true nations deserved self-determination. The analyst of Russian peasantry Maxime Kovalewsky supported the conventional anthropological assumption that all races evolve along the same path, but some are in a state of arrested development. Limousin adhered to his hard-line position about the pure sentimentality of egalitarianism.46

In the third discussion of this theme, at the Paris Societd de sociologie in April 1902, La Grasserie translated race as an “ethnic” quality anterior to society, necessary for “anthroposociological practice,” a term used by Vacher de Lapouge.47 He agreed this ethnic quality was most powerful in earlier eras and unmixed groups. However, he refused to surrender a firm naturalistic component – poor ethnic stock would hamper a people regardless of the two other dimensions of geographic milieu and historical epoch. La Grasserie postulated a perpetual struggle between a hereditary ethnic factor (a “better name” for race, given their mixing), remade by history, and the geography of soil and climate. At present the nations, or “sociological races,” were more significant, but nations now took on the characteristics of races. He unabashedly noted that the “ethnic” characteristics of Jews, including an aptitude for international commerce and finance, always triumphed over the “telluric” (geographic) milieu.48

In the discussion Worms took his usual conciliatory position by cautioning that while race was an immutable factor important in the past, only the milieu promoted social evolution. Limousin again endorsed La Grasserie’s argument for the importance of race. The anthropologist Georges Papillault, a laboratory colleague of Manouvrier, insisted on the old paradigm – a parallel between racial morphology and functional aptitudes in an evolutionary series. In a given epoch different races reacted differently to the same excitation, so the influence of the milieu was limited, though important. However, he tried to separate his science and his ethics – there was no excuse for savage destruction of an inferior race.49

The increasing disunity at the Ecole d’anthropologie appeared in the critique of the cartographer Francois Schrader, a colleague of Manouvrier. Schrader argued that the constantly changing nature of “races” robbed the word of its meaning. The criminologist and magistrate Gabriel Tarde agreed, like Durkheim and Worms, that as evolution continued, the ethnic factor decreased in importance, while “continually operating causes” such as social life increased. He concluded peremptorily, “the idea of exclusive or preponderant influence of race leads, at bottom, only to a historical fatalism…a sociological mysticism.” Moreover, the genius, not the average person, promoted social evolution, so that differences in racial averages had relatively little significance for the establishment of civilization.50

Hence Limousin and Papillault, and to a lesser degree Kovalewsky, defended the traditional anthropological paradigm relating physical natural attributes, intellectual aptitudes, and moral character. La Grasserie postulated a pre-existing ethnic factor that could strongly affect adjustments to the milieu. Worms remained in an intermediate position, refusing to deny or magnify the influence of race. Manouvrier and Schrader from the Ecole d’anthropologie, Novicow, Coste, and Tarde declined to attach great significance to racial variables alone. For Coste and Manouvrier, at least, the failure of anthropological indicators was a major influence.

Was there another argument that attracted all the participants as well as the Durkheimian – the increasing importance of social factors as ethnic groups became more mixed? It would be a tempting reading of these debates to say that processes of modernization in Europe in the late nineteenth century made it impossible to defend a fixed racial category. But modernization did not eliminate the old paradigm. Some anthropologists still questioned whether metis of allegedly “distant” races would result in the deterioration of the species.51 Moreover, the racial ideology of Vichy as late as 1941 still gained anthropological support with Ecole d’anthropologie professor George Montandon working for the Commissariat for Jewish Affairs:52 Hence it is still speculative to attribute the fall of the old paradigm to an overarching process of modernization.

VI. The Revue on Race and Ethnic Identity

Aside from these explicit discussions, the book reviewers of Worms’s periodical demonstrated a mostly critical attitude toward racial theory. However, Society discussions or publications about African-Americans and Jews were less clearcut. The workhorse reviewers after 1900 included the lycee philosophy teacher Guillaume Leonce Duprat and the social democratic lawyer Alfred Lambert. The most far-reaching disavowal of conventional anthropology was Duprat’s review of the Austrian sociologist Ludwig Gumplowicz’s theory of conflict among historical races. While Duprat believed in hereditary dispositions, he noted, “we find contestable the hypothesis of the natural existence of race.”53

Lambert also favorably reviewed the noted work of the naturalized Polish journalist Jean Finot, who attacked the racial theories of Gobineau and Vacher de Lapouge.54 Lambert approved Finot’s strictures against the “harmful and vain doctrine of races,” an “intransigent dogma unleashed by political passions,” not scientifically justified. He concluded, “the cultivation of hatred of races is criminal; internally it would be a seed of death for peoples that would let it take root; externally, it would lead to the worst sort of decline; it is therefore a human and patriotic desire fulfilled by Jean Finot in chasing from the scientific throne a disastrous usurper.” However, the direct comments on African- Americans and Jews in the Revue were far from uniformly sympathetic. La Grasserie failed to criticize an American statistician’s pessimism on educating African-Americans.55 A former southern American resident, Mrs. Oscar Lovell Triggs, one of the few women who participated in the debate on race, told the Society that blacks would never achieve the superior qualities of whites.56 Conversely, the historian, economist, and commentator on Haiti, Paul Vibert (1851-1918), married to a West Indian woman, argued that the “savage mentality” of poor white Americans handicapped blacks. In the same discussion, the Haitian embassy official and lawyer Georges Sylvain deplored the Americans’ maintenance of segregated hotels even in New York.57

The atmosphere of the Dreyfus Affair produced several comments on the status of the Jews. Duprat’s review mentioned some of the replies to the writer Henri Dagan’s inquiry into the causes of anti- Semitism. Manouvrier, in particular, saw no inherent “pretended flaws” in the “pretended” Jewish race.58 Clearly Worms himself, of Jewish ancestry, at one time rejected the notion that the Jews were a race, but he still later referred to the psychic transformations of Jews as representing one group “among white races.”59 The Worms group, like the Durkheimians, had no wish to be associated with the nationalist anti-Semitic views of Vacher de Lapouge or Le Bon.

Anti-Asian prejudice dominated the commentary of labour law expert Leon Douarche.60 However, Novicow was strongly opposed to any notion of a “yellow peril” because he was confident that Chinese labour competition could not easily undermine European productivity.61 On the whole the editorial staff of the Revue, including Lambert and Duprat, criticized the extremist anthroposociology of Lapouge and discarded conventional anthropological assumptions. But the old prejudices survived in me more casual contributors to sociological discussions on Asians or Africans.

VII. Heredity and Professions

While the subject of heredity and the professions is not directly related either to race or gender, it forms another chapter in the relative role of nature and nurture that affected all of these debates. Francis Galton and Ribot had insisted on a hereditary component in choice of professions, while even Durkheim had conceded that traditional caste societies had a natural substratum. Worms remained convinced in 1910 that inheritance of intellectual aptitudes in family dynasties was important, though he could not determine the relative influence of education. Moreover, after a series of generations, acquired characteristics could be embedded in the organism. However, like Durkheim, he thought the influence of heredity declined in modern society.62 Worms’s own sampling for the legal profession in 1899 showed that about half the Paris bar had fathers connected to law, while all families sought to ascend to more prestigious positions.63

Coste had previously argued that large families would provide more opportunities for achieving a desirable transmission of professions to the next generation (unlike Durkheim, who thought such transmissions hindered progress).64 He now found that out of 97 Frenchmen, 22 had the same profession as their father, 25 a closely related or similar profession, while 50 were in an unrelated field. But both Coste and the socialist demographer Arsene Dumont agreed that imitation, education, and the stability and prosperity of the field all influenced professional choice. The physician Fernand Gaucher suggested that the real subject should be heredity of aptitudes, not professions, especially when mechanization was displacing artisans at every moment.65

Limousin, a strong advocate of racial theory, argued that psychic heredity for professional aptitudes was not the same as physical heredity. In view of changing social conditions, the concept of heredity of professions was an error of “secondhand scholars” who tried to transform a physical law of heredity into a psychic law. Similarly, Leon Philippe, a bureaucrat in the Agriculture Ministry and teacher of political economy and statistics, joined the general consensus that there is inheritance of general aptitudes, not of specific professional skills.66 Most Society members realized that social values such as owning land or technological changes could influence the careers of children. Hence, the debate on hereditary professions worked in the direction of unseating comfortable cliches about transmission of specific callings and in favor of general dispositions amenable to social influences.

VIII. Colonization

Critique of racial theory rarely became anti-imperialist sentiment. Conservatives such as Le Bon and Jules Harmand were as vocal as liberal republicans in using racial hierarchy to justify empire.67 In this era of expansion in equatorial and west Africa and consolidation of control in Indochina, a paternalist ideology assuming the need of “less evolved” peoples for guidance predominated. The sociologists did not employ the universalist and assimilationist arguments cited by Alice Conklin as sometimes convincing to paternalist republicans – that is, bringing law and order and combating aristocracy and slavery among these peoples.68 For organicists such as Worms, colonization was an inevitable manifestation of the need of highly developed societies to reproduce.69 His participation in the Colonial Congresses testified to his keen interest. The strongest pro-hereditarian statement applicable to colonization came from the physician and librarian to the Navy Ministry Charles Valentino. He warned against destruction of caste systems in the empire as a flaw in “social economy.” Education could only deform heredity, but not seriously change it.70 Hence, in line with the “associationist”(as contrasted to “assimilationist”) imperial ideology which gained ground around 1900, he would advise colonizers to preserve the institutions of indigenous peoples, though they might be repugnant to the values of the imperial power.

However, Vibert earnestly questioned the practices, if not the premises, of colonization. In 1910, after Mme. Jeanne de Maguerie (another woman who participated in debates not about feminism in itself) recommended including women in the civilizing mission to uncover the secrets of the harem in north Africa, Vibert warned that colonizers would reap hatred of their subjects if they treated supposedly inferior peoples with hardness, brutality, and injustice: “There are no inferior races on earth, only more or less advanced.” Yet Vibert thought that even “advanced” peoples such as Annamites and Arabs needed protection and benevolence. Even as an opponent of racial hierarchy, he never flagged in his support for the economic motives of colonization. Indeed, he believed that the future salvation of Europe depended on development and “rational exploitation of colonies.”71

Even socially radical members of the Society seemed well disposed toward colonization. The young Marxist noble from Poland, Baron Casimir de KellesKrauz, insisted that a practical application of sociology could be its justification of colonization for worldwide progress.72 The social democratic lawyer Lambert, also a critic of racial theory, reviewed in 1899 the most famous exposition of “associationist” imperial policy by the retired naval officer Leopold de Saussure, Psychologie de la colonisation franqaise. Lambert noted without criticism the need to understand “psychological races” and to replace failed assimilationist ideals with a better colonial policy that would stave off revolt. Thus, security and road building must precede the teaching of French and educational or administrative reform. According to Saussure, one must, like the British, respect indigenous customs as long as they do not violate public morality. Lambert never questioned the delay and perhaps permanent refusal to grant colonial subjects the rights of republican Frenchmen. In fact some years later, Lambert’s review of the journal L ‘Annee coloniale commented that modern colonial policy displayed comparative sympathy for indigenous peoples, despite isolated revolts.73

Similar support for “associationism” came from the legal historian and appeals court lawyer Marcel Pournin, who reviewed the fifth edition of the economist Paul Leroy-Beaulieu’s De la colonisation chez les peuples modernes. He, too, pointed out the need to respect native practices, so that even radical abolition of slavery might be postponed to allow for gradual, progressive evolution.74 While a few members openly declared their refusal to extend citizenship to the colonized, no one questioned French domination in the allegedly civilizing mission. While the associationists retained racial hierarchy to legitimize imperial rule, opponents of racial theory among the sociologists invoked economic motives or the need for strategic security to overcome the paradox of a republic with imperial subjects.

IX. Discussion on Gender Roles

The Paris Societe de sociologie debated the social role of women at its meetings and in the Revue with the participation of feminists. Using Karen Offen’s wide umbrella definition of feminists, there were both moderate “relational” feminists and radical “individualist” feminists among them. Ever since the 1880s, women’s organizations had campaigned for the opening of schools and careers to women, protection for women workers, and protection for young women sold into prostitution. Objectives for reform of the Civil Code at first included legalization of divorce and then the facilitation of divorce by mutual consent or in some cases at the demand of one partner. Feminists also wanted legal recourse against abusive husbands and the right to launch paternity suits. Ultimately, especially during the first decade of the twentieth century, more and more women campaigned for the right to vote. Only a few of the most radical feminists raised issues of reproductive freedom.75 This period witnessed several major congresses dealing with women’s rights. The glass could be perceived as half full or half empty. In the words of one historical survey, “equality was on the march,” yet progress toward each objective was glacial, and political rights did not materialize.76 On these issues the divisions among male sociologists reflected those in society at large. There was no predetermined confinement of women to home and family, but they also did not usually endorse unrestricted participation in the public sphere. Only the positivists and several anti-feminists voiced rigid notions of an “essential nature” of women that precluded professional opportunities or civil rights. The concern about depopulation and the childbearing nature of women remained a subtext for debates on the social status of women. The most popular view expressed sympathy for the “relational” kind of feminism (or what Judith Surkis calls “conjugal complementarity”) that assured social stability, even when they favored law reform or suffrage for women.77

Jacques Novicow serves as an example of a critic of racial theory who was also an ardent feminist.78 He advocated education to change women’s condition, enable women to earn a living and to marry without constraint, and assure independence and dignity. He also supported opening all professions to women, as well as all civil and political rights, and sensationally, would allow free love outside of marriage. Lambert’s review, however, showed that not all critics of racial hierarchy were equally progressive on gender. Lambert warned that the “sexual nature of women does not permit full intellectual development” or aptitude for all occupations. Moreover, some “division of tasks would always be necessary both within and outside the family,” with motherhood being the most noble task. He was also scandalized by the idea of discarding the marriage contract.79

Manouvrier, another critic of racial theory, has the reputation of being a feminist because he demolished the traditional anthropological view of smaller brain size in women affecting their intelligence.80 Nevertheless, by 1909, twenty years after his presentation to the feminist congress of 1889, Manouvrier had become wary of granting full equality to women, possibly because of the visibility of the feminist campaign. He argued that sexual differentiation “penetrates the totality of the organism.” Maternal and familial roles of women would be complementary to me male provider, whereas rivalry with men in all professions would result in childlessness or neglected households.81

Charles Letourneau was another anthropologist who had asymmetric views on race and gender, but with more flexibility on gender. While he thought “retarded races” would take millennia to catch up, he also thought women had to “masculinize their brains by suitable instruction” over many generations.82 Yet in writing on the future of women just before his death, Letourneau indicated no inherent reason to assume the psychological or physiological inferiority of women. He foresaw a bright future of equal rights. Lambert’s review, however, reiterated his assessment about the necessity of division of household tasks.

Lambert also reviewed without criticism the companion volume to Jean Finot’s essay on racism, Le Prejuge et le probleme des sexes.93 Finot had argued that female physiology gave no indication of a less robust intellect, less creative genius, or moral aberration. Women’s suffrage did not promote divorce in his view. The “new woman,” much criticized in France, would develop her intellect and conserve her beauty in a renewal of the ideal of the eternally feminine, while she would still fulfill the roles of mother and spouse. However, Lambert also failed to comment critically on the rather more restrictive view of the positivist prison director Paul Grimanelli, who had argued that women should remain primarily devoted to the family, and that working in industry should be recognized as unhealthful and undignified for women.84 Grimanelli acknowledged that single women would need an occupation, but he clearly rejected political functions for women as “altering her characteristic qualities and corrupting the best and surest source of her influence.” Auguste Comte’s ideas of women as moralizing arbiters of men’s projects clearly affected Grimanelli.85

La Grasserie was not especially liberal either on race or gender issues. He opposed legal discrimination against women, but kept the traditional stereotype of the moralizing woman. Compared to men, women would be thriftier, more honest, less alcoholic, and they might calm class struggles and help prevent warfare.86 La Grasserie found divorce harmful, and thought women should remain married and modest.

The first woman’s intervention came with the report of the moderate feminist Clotilde Dissard, wife of a physician member of the Society and editor of La Revue Feministe, on the sessions of the International Feminist Congress of 1896.87 The next year, her prediction that the future would bring equal civil and political rights for women provoked Tarde to insist without elaboration that mere must be sexual differentiation in social functions.88

The Societe de sociologie meeting of November 1905 touched off a lengthy debate on the social role of women. During the previous year, the centennial celebration of the Civil Code had roused a massive feminist counter-demonstration highlighting the injustices in the Code. A disciple of the very conservative sociologist of families Frederic Le Play, me civil engineer Emile Cheysson (1836- 1910), a political and social economy professor at the Ecole libre des sciences politiques, proclaimed that women are equal but distinct beings. As wives of employers or proprietors, they should show appropriate kindness and tact. Women of all ranks should learn domestic hygiene and me promotion of good order in the household. Jeanne de Maguerie, a correspondent of the suffragist Cecile Brunschvicg, responded that learning only household tasks was commendable as a first step, but insufficient and infantilizing for women. Wage-earning women in any case needed higher pay and better education.89

Madeleine Pelletier (1874-1939) added that merely running a household and assisting husbands’ careers would maintain women in an inferior condition. Women could thus neither develop their reason nor demonstrate interest in social and political issues.90 Pelletier’s participation is remarkable because she was a physician, former anthropological researcher, and later psychiatric intern. She personified “integral” individualist feminism rather than conformist gender roles, and at the time was a socialist in the Marxist faction of Jules Guesde.91

The historian Hippolyte Monin (1854-1915), also a conservative on racial issues, supported Cheysson by pointing out the danger of abandonment of the home and family, the “element of society.” Women could not have identical rights and duties as men. The anti-racist Vibert supported Cheysson’s school for housewives, but opposed keeping women in tutelage. Limousin, so vocal a supporter of racial ideology, also thought household schools important, but conceded that women could have political rights.92 Hence Monin was a conservative on both gender and race, Vibert seemed far more conventional On gender issues than on racial theory, while Limousin was far more flexible on gender than on race.

Cheysson pleaded that he only wished to develop the potential of all women to help distressed working families by learning, for example, how to cure a sick child and how to bring a pure and solid love into the home.93 The next month the moderate feminist, but pro- suffrage editor of L’heure de la femme Lydie Martial (nee Anna Carnaud, 1861-1929) asked, why not teach men to be fathers and to keep household order? Further, why not allow women full education and initiative in agricultural and colonial enterprises? Cheysson again commented that he would like women to fulfill the familial role first, and then enlarge their place in society, so that their external contacts would then elicit gratitude and recognition.94

Vibert raised the Civil Code issue by pointing out that the shame of modern society was the failure of the law to protect women from the abuse or extravagance of drunken husbands. The cleric and philosophy teacher J. A. Clamadieu agreed that mere were inequities in adultery provisions in the Civil Code and in the inability to launch paternity suits. This latter issue resulted in the limited reforms of the Rivet law of 1912, which excluded non-French citizens in the Empire. Clamadieu also believed that educated women would become social treasures.95

Moderate sympathy for feminism continued in several periodical articles of the following years. Both a Marxist economics professor from Turin, Achille Loria, and a socialist international lawyer from Modena, Francesco Cosentini, rejected the anthropological theory of brain size, and favored civil equality and female suffrage.96 Loria used Manouvrier’s calculations of brain size to show that women’s brains have increased in size since the Stone Age and therefore there is “no ineffaceable inferiority.” Cosentini cited several measurements of small brains such as that of Leon Gambetta to show that such men were not necessarily less intelligent.97 Loria also predicted that the triumph of feminism would bring a “true civilization based on equality and fraternity.” Cosentini endorsed John Stuart Mill’s diagnosis that the “social milieu limits women’s activity” and that the vote would help women realize their aspirations.98 As women’s organizations and women members became more vocal, antifeminists emerged in the next stage of the Paris Society of Sociology discussion in January 1906. L. Ponsinet of the Chalons prefecture found women’s claims too audacious, not so much from naturalizing feminine capacities, but because each sex has its sociological function for the common interest and solidarity. He, too, depicted women as family educators, benefactors, and moralizing pacifiers of conflict.99

The president of the society in 1901-2, the positivist physician Ernest Delbet, had apparently been more moderate on the race issue, if one may judge by his hearty welcome for the Haitian lawyer and advocate of racial equality Antenor Firmin. Delbet had avowed that Firmin’s participation in a discussion on gold reserves was “proof of the equal rights and fraternity of all races.”100 Now he endorsed Comte’s denial of equality of the sexes in favor of complementarity. For Delbet, “irreducible organic differences” made equality an error both in biology and sociology. The feminist John Stuart Mill was “absolute and metaphysical,” and subject to the harmful influence of Harriet Taylor. Delbet thought Cheysson’s household schools appropriate, and that women could provide Christian charity for the weak and sick as part of a new moral solidarity. He foresaw at best a slow evolution of women toward some civil and political rights.101

Madeleine Pelletier immediately responded that women did not wish to be rivals of men, only to develop their activity in society. Le Bon was wrong to argue increasing differentiation of the sexes in civilization, and Comte was an overly systematic thinker. Mill, far from being metaphysical, was willing to adjust his views to the temperament of individual women. Jeanne de Maguerie also added that without political rights one could not hear the voices of women demanding changes in the Civil Code.102

A relational feminist far more conservative than Pelletier and de Maguerie provoked protests from more radical women, as did the Cheysson paper. Augusta Moll-Weiss, an expert on child rearing and founder of a School for Mothers, spoke to the Society in 1910 on the woman housekeeper and feminism. Working-class mothers could help their husbands by household savings and promotion of better family health, and thus become better feminists. Even wealthier women needed a similar education about their own physiology, nutrition, and child rearing.103

Lydie Martial responded again with a plea to educate fathers, and Novicow by advocating the right of women to work outside the home. But La Grasserie thought the time for necessary housework implied limited working hours. He concluded that French women were ill suited for “integral feminism,” though wealthier women could afford to be like the Anglo-American housewife. Worms himself admitted that factory women needed their wage, and without them the economy would suffer.104

In the periodicals, the German-language teacher, Theodore Joran, expressed the most extreme reactionary views. A conservative Catholic and virtually professional anti-feminist, Joran insisted that young single women should have a dowry.105 The sexes were not equal in any respect, and the feminists’ campaign for divorce by mutual consent (resolutions of feminist congresses in 1896 and 1900) was a rebellion against marriage and showed a fear of motherhood. Feminists denigrated the teaching of household science because they disdained to have a household.106

A frequent reviewer in the periodical, Emile Chauffard, a law and letters graduate, shared Joran’s aversion for feminists, but thought his condemnations too generalized. Chauffard could not accept denial of the legitimate claims of a single woman to earn a living. Nor was the right to vote of women any worse than the voting of “debauched males or morons.” The following year Chauffard was exasperated with Joran’s caricatures that condemned all feminists as “stupid, immoral, and dishonest.”107

On the whole, however, Chauffard disliked the best-known radical feminists. He dismissed a pamphlet by the famous crusader for women’s suffrage, Hubertine Auclert, as “intemperate and intolerant” special pleading, despite the admittedly sound argument. This was the year, after all, when Auclert overturned municipal election ballots. It was the mode of expression that alienated him more than the content.108 He thought Madeleine Pelletier’s pamphlet on the struggle for women’s rights harmed her cause more than anti- feminist arguments. She would recommend birth control, permit abortion, and masculinize women, with the unintended consequence that men would become indifferent to them. This “absence of sociological knowledge and balance” should alarm “intelligent women” who “should be on guard against the wrong it causes them.”109

Ghenia Avril de Sainte-Croix (1855-1939) was a founder of the federation of feminist groups, the Conseil national des femmes francaises, in 1900-1, a teacher of “feminism” at the private College libre des sciences sociales, a wealthy widow of a magistrate and a crusader against the sexual double standard, the international traffic in women, and regulated prostitution, which she saw as promoting slavery for women.110 The future urban sociologist and student of North Africa, Rene Maunier (1887-1951), in 1907 reviewed the historical account of feminism by Mme. Avril. Maunier cautioned that feminism disturbed domestic society, increased divorces, and lowered the birth rate.111 Thus once again the subtext of population concerns was prominent, while upsetting the household was the major concern.

The Societe de sociologie repeatedly displayed these polarities. The tireless suffragist, drama critic, and journalist Jane Misme (1865-1935), speaking on the “woman of letters,” insisted that changes in women’s lifestyles, including their freedom to write, did not threaten morality.112 The philosopher and critic of the symbolist poets Andre Barre (1878-19?) strongly condemned any public activity of women outside of happy marriages. For him, a numerous family was far better than producing books. He expressed this reaction to Misme so strongly that even the positivist presiding officer, Grimanelli, warned him to be polite. Joran, while acknowledging that the public would appreciate any talented writer, thought women’s rivalry to male writers inappropriate. At that point, Worms wondered if women actually wrote their own literary works.113

A few years later, Arthur Bauer, who won an Academy of Moral and Political Sciences prize for an essay on feminism and moral culture, expressed a similarly patronizing attitude toward aspiring career women. Artistic education was fine, but women needed to learn household skills, needlework, and ethics; to cultivate feminine dress and a feminine walk; and to act with a reserved and prudent grace.114

There was no overarching conflation in this discourse of race and gender, nor were the women who participated in the debates on race the same as those who participated in the debates on gender. Of those who spoke or wrote on both race and gender, Novicow was one of the few consistent progressives, while Manouvrier, a critic of racial theory, backtracked on his earlier enthusiastic feminism. Letourneau was pessimistic on the evolution of “retarded” races, but quite confident in a better future for women, at the price of “masculinizing” their minds. La Grasserie and Monin were examples of moderate conservatives who adhered to the older paradigms on both issues. The positivist Delbet seemed more tolerant on issues of race than on gender, while the reverse was clearly true of the racial hierarchy advocate Limousin. Even Vibert was not among the most flexible on me gender issue. Among women members there was clearly a division between the more advanced individualist feminists like Maguerie and Pelletier, who were more radical than all the men, and relational feminists like Moll-Weiss, who advocated lifestyles of gender complementarity like the majority of male sociologists.

X. Conclusion

While Worms and his colleagues may have been deficient in the sophisticated ethnological research of a Durkheim or a Marcel Mauss, they reflected current interest in aptitudes for professions and the nature-nurture controversy as it affected race and gender. Despite the organicist bias of Worms, there was no uniform belief in either national or international settings in an indelible human nature. The emerging study of sociology could be expected to highlight, as the Durkheimians did, the importance of social milieu rather than biological endowment. Since the anthropological community was already fragmenting over the validity of craniometry, temperate voices such as Manouvrier and Schrader encouraged the sociologists not to attribute too much to inherited brain size.

Still the Revue had once given ample space to the anthroposociology of Vacher de Lapouge and allowed questioning of the potential of African-Americans. Worms himself, the anthropologist Papillault, and hobbyist sociologists such as Limousin relentlessly trumpeted European supremacy over “inferior races.”

Two noteworthy conclusions on racial issues emerge from study of the non-Durkheimian sociologists’ periodicals. The first is that, as among the Durkheimians, there was a strong faction, represented by the Russian emigres Novicow and Roberty in the Society, as well as the periodical reviewers Lambert and Duprat, who denied the sociological usefulness of the old racial hierarchies. While some scholars see the Dreyfus Affair as a critical turning point, this opposition was manifested in 1895, even before the Dreyfus Affair became the focus of the national press in 1898-99. The second conclusion is that, while racial hierarchy could sometimes justify colonialism, questioning it did not automatically lead to the disavowal of empire. The sociologists seemed reconciled to the French civilizing mission. Vibert clearly supported it for economic reasons and for the prestige of France. In Worms’s case his support stemmed from his perception of a need for the expansion of all healthy societies. The discourse of associationism that rejected non- Europeans as potential citizens was acceptable even if racial hierarchy was questioned. While there seems to be no indication that liberal or republican discourse entailed imperialism in the minds of the sociologists, the cultural acceptability of imperialism was not seen as violating their republican convictions. The right to colonize and dominate triumphed over any conceivable rights of non- Europeans. Nor did they use universalist arguments like the administrators of French West Africa cited by Alice Conklin. The sociologists admitted a small group of well-known women members, and conducted extensive discussions on the social role of women. The intersection of race and gender on questions such as brain size or imperial exploitation of women did not seem to affect the discussion about feminism. Most male sociologists were willing to admit that, with the exception of the need for childbearing, there was no fixed feminine nature. The most militant and individualist feminists, such as the crusaders for political rights Madeleine Pelletier and Hubertine Auclert (via pamphlets), elicited little sympathy. However, most participants in the discussion were sympathetic toward reform of the Civil Code, and even a racial hierarchy supporter such as Limousin supported political rights for women. The critical stumbling block was not the educability of women but rather male notions of social stability.115 In this view, women should be subordinate in marriage and retain responsibilities for the household.

There was still a coterie of positivist traditionalists (who in the case of Delbet and Grimanelli played important official roles in the Society) and a few virulent anti-feminists such as Joran and Barre. For them, scientific arguments about women’s nature were an auxiliary tool to assert that women should never challenge male social dominance, and should remain in complementary roles. In the crucial suffrage decision, when the Senate rejected the vote for women in 1922, there were ready-made arguments that republican citizenship for women would destabilize society and distract women from their natural functions.116

Considering Durkheim’s own views on gender issues, one could conclude that many of the non-Durkheimians were hardly less progressive. However, the Durkheimians were less likely to act as the non-Durkheimian minority did supporting the old anthropological paradigm as a matter of principle. The range of non-Durkheimian views shows the weakness of proponents of indelible nature as well as the social obstacles to admitting women to full citizenship. Neither gender stereotyping, nor the racial paradigm, nor the enthusiasm for empire would disappear in the years before World War I. The enshrinement of society and culture as all-important explanatory entities in the social sciences would gain momentum in the interwar years.117 The sharp decline in racial stereotyping, at least in the scholarly community, along with the evident triumph for women’s suffrage, had to await the aftermath of the horrors of the Second World War.

1 Robert A. Nye, Crime, Madness and Politics in Modern France: The Medical Concept of National Decline (Princeton, 1984); Claude Blanckaert, (ed.) Les politiques de Vanthropologic Discours et pratiques en France (1860-1940) (Paris, 2001); Elizabeth Fee, “Nineteenth-Century Craniology: The Study of the Female Skull,” Bulletin of the History of Medicine, 53 (1979), pp. 41533.

2 Laurent Mucchielli, La decouverte du social: Naissance de la sociologie en France (Paris, 1998), especially pp. 144, 271-75 on Worms; Laurent Mucchielli, “Sociologie versus anthropologic raciale. L’engagement des sociologues durkheimiens dans le contexte ‘fin de siecle’ (1885-1914),” Gradhiva, 21 (1997), pp. .77-95.

3 The quotation marks around “race” will be dropped as the participants were convinced of the reality, if not always the utility, of the idea of races; on Worms, see Snait Gissis, “Late Nineteenth Century Lamarckism and French Sociology,” Perspectives on Science, 10 (2002), pp. 69-122; on the social composition of Worms’s group and failure to advance sociological theory, Terry N. Clark, “Marginality, Eclecticism, and Innovation: Rene’ Worms and the Revue Internationale de sociologie from 1893 to 1914,” Revue internationale de sociologie (hereafter RIS), 2nd series, 3 (1967), pp. 1227; Roger L. Geiger, “Rend Worms, Porganicisme et l’organisation de la sociologie,” Revue francaise de sociologie, 22 (1981), pp. 345-60; an exception to the view of the Worms group as racist is Daniela Barberis, “In search of an object: organicist sociology and the reality of society in fin-de-siecle France,” History of the Human Sciences, 16 (2003), pp. 51-72, especially p. 56.

4 Jennifer Lehmann, “The Question of Caste in Modern Society: Durkheim’s Contradictory Theories of Race, Class, and Sex,” American Sociological Review, 60 (1995), pp. 566-85; Jean Pedersen, “Sexual Politics in Comte and Durkheim: Feminism, History, and the French Sociological Tradition,” Signs, 27 (2001), pp. 229-63; Carole Reynaud Paligot, La Republique raciale, Paradigm racial et ideologic republicaine, 1860-1930 (Paris, 2006), pp. 192-93.

5 Emile Durkheim, De la Division du travail social [1893] (Paris, 1991), pp. 24-25; Durkheim, Le Suicide, Etude de sociologie (Paris, 1990), pp. 57-58; Lehmann, “The Question,” pp. 570-71; Philippe Besnard (ed.), The Sociological Domain: The Durkheimians and the Founding of French Sociology (Cambridge, 1983); Steven Lukes, Emile Dur




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