The Role of Epistemic Communities in Offering New Cooperation Frameworks in the Euphrates-Tigris Rivers System
Posted on: Wednesday, 14 May 2008, 03:00 CDT
By Kibaroglu, Aysegul
The Euphrates-Tigris region has faced significant political changes since the late 1990s. These changes can be attributed to improvements in bilateral relations, mainly in the security domain, between two of its major riparians, Turkey and Syria. In the meantime, another major riparian, Iraq, has lived through devastating war and occupation, which has had implications for regional water issues. These changes have brought new actors, involved or interested in the hydropolitics of the two-river basin, to the region. This article will analyze the politics of water resources in the Euphrates-Tigris River basin, focusing on current developments. But first, an overview of past events is deemed necessary to evaluate, in the proper context, the current situation in the basin. Historical research has traced the opportunities for more interactions in the river basin with broader aims for socioeconomic development, in addition to the limited goal of watersharing.
In this respect, one significant development in the region is the Euphrates-Tigris Initiative for Cooperation (ETIC) established in May 2005 by a group of scholars and professionals from the three major riparian countries.1 The overall goal of the initiative is to promote cooperation among the three riparians to achieve technical, social and economic development in the Euphrates-Tigris River basin. The composition and the role of ETIC remarkably fits the epistemic community theory and its role in institutional bargaining. Epistemic communities are a "network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue- area."2 This article will introduce the origin, objectives and activities of ETIC within the epistemic community theory with particular references to new areas of cooperation in the basin.
EUPHRATES-TIGRIS RIVERS SYSTEM: POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY
The Euphrates-Tigris River basin comprises Iraq, Syria and Turkey as the major riparians.3 The two greatest rivers of southwest Asia, the Euphrates and the Tigris, originate in a particular topographic and climatic zone and end up in quite a different one. The basin is characterized by high mountains to the north and to the west, and extensive lowlands in the south and in the east. The two rivers begin, scarcely 30 kilometers from each other, in a relatively cool and humid zone with rugged 3,000 meter-high mountains, and are visited by autumn and spring rains and winter snows. From there, the two rivers run separately onto a wide, flat, hot and poorly drained plain. In their middle courses, they diverge hundreds of kilometers apart, yet meet again near the end of their journey in the Shatt al- Arab, and discharge together into the Persian Gulf. The great alluvium-filled depression, Shatt al-Arab, and the combined area of the lakes and swamps have a length of 180 kilometers and constitute the combined delta of the Euphrates-Tigris River basin.4
We observe, in conformity with the expert judgments of geographers, that the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers are considered to form one single transboundary watercourse system.5 They are linked not only by their natural course when merging at the Shatt- al-Arab, but also as a result of the man-made Tharthar Canal connection between the two rivers in Iraq.6
In the upstream region, the Euphrates and Tigris pass through a Mediterranean subtropical climate characterized by rainy winters and dry, warm summers. This climate prevails in southeastern Turkey, as well as in northern Syria and Iraq. However, the two rivers flow through semi-arid and arid regions within Syria and Iraq, since 60 percent of the Syrian territory receives less than 250 millimeters of precipitation while 70 percent of Iraq is subject to 400 millimeters per year. Another important climatic feature in the Euphrates-Tigris River basin is the high temperature resulting in high evaporation. Heavy evaporation also reinforces water salination and water loss in major reservoirs like the Keban and Ataturk Dams in Turkey, the Assad Reservoir or Tabqa Dam in Syria, and Lake Habbaniya and the Tharthar Canal in Iraq.7
The discharge, or flow, of the Euphrates and Tigris is still a matter of dispute among scholars and experts. This is not only because the flow patterns have shown great deviations, which impede the computation of a representative average discharge value, but the rapid development on both rivers, which has disrupted the natural flow, has also created difficulties for hydrologists to determine the discharge values.8 In addition to this, the lack of mutual trust and confidence inhibits the riparians of the basin from releasing the necessary data and information relevant to rainfall and runoff. Analysts have concluded that the annual mean flow of the Euphrates, 32 billion cubic meters per year, is a valid value.9 Approximately 90 percent of the mean flow of the Euphrates is contributed by Turkey; the remaining 10 percent originates in Syria.10 As for the Tigris and its tributaries, the average total discharge is determined to be 52 billion cubic meters per year.11 Turkey contributes approximately 40 percent of the total annual flow, whereas Iraq and Iran contribute 51 percent, and 9 percent, respectively.12
It should be noted that the Euphrates and Tigris rivers have extremely high seasonal and multi-annual variance in their flow.13 Further, the natural flows of both rivers passing from Turkey to Syria, and from Syria to Iraq, change due to irrigation and energy projects, which the riparians have already initiated. The rapidly increasing populations of these countries and the importance given to agricultural development and food production necessitate further utilization of these rivers. The major problem, however, arises from the fact that the projected water demands of the riparians surpass the actual amount of water that can be supplied by the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers.14
WATER POLITICS IN THE EUPHRATES-TIGRIS RIVER BASIN: AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
Harmonious Transboundary Water Relations (1920 to 1960)
In the first half of the 20th century, after the demise of the Ottoman Empire, new political entities such as the independent Republic of Turkey, Iraq (under British mandate), and Syria (under French mandate) emerged as the major riparians in the region. From the 1920s to the 1960s, Iraq, Syria and Turkey were all engaged in state consolidation efforts including, inter alia, the investigation, exploitation and management of natural resources, namely water and land resources. The new government institutions, established at the national level, investigated the development potential of water and land resources in each country, as well conducting preliminary hydrological surveys.15
At the transboundary level, harmonious water relations were observed in the Euphrates-Tigris basin, regulated through a series of historical, bilateral political treaties. None of the countries engaged in major development projects, which would have resulted in excessive consumptive utilization of the rivers.16 The treaties signed between France, on behalf of Syria, and Turkey, and between Turkey and Iraq, had little significance as the riparians were utilizing small amounts of water and they did not need to rely on the treaties to resolve disputes.17
Competitive Transboundary Water Relations (1960 to 1980)
As the riparian states further consolidated in the decades between 1960 to 1980, they paid more focused attention to socioeconomic development, based on water and land resources. The central agencies designated the major river basins, with their recorded potential for water and land resources, for large-scale development projects. In this respect, the Euphrates and Tigris rivers were determined to be the backbone of water development. To illustrate, it was the vast development potential of both the Euphrates and Tigris rivers which, in the 1960s, led to the idea of harnessing the waters in a region where nearly one-fifth of Turkey's irrigable land could be found. In this context, Turkey implemented the Lower Euphrates Project to build a series of dams on the Euphrates to increase hydropower generation and expand irrigated agriculture. Later on, in the late 1970s, the Lower Euphrates Project evolved and expanded into a larger multi-sectoral development project called the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP, its Turkish acronym), which includes 21 large dams, 19 hydropower plants and irrigation schemes extending to 1.7 million hectares of land.18 The Euphrates and Tigris River basin accounts for 28.5 percent of the surface water supply in Turkey.19
The Euphrates River basin provides 65 percent of surface water supply in Syria, and contains 27 percent of overall land resources.20 Therefore, when the Baath Party came to power in the early 1960s, Syria initiated the Euphrates Valley Project. The government set a number of objectives to be met by the project: irrigating an area as wide as 640,000 hectares, generating electric energy needed for urban use and industrial development, and regulating the flow of the Euphrates in order to prevent seasonal flooding.21 The main tributaries of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers constitute the entire fresh water supply in Iraq, which pioneered and built its first dam, the Euphrates Dam, in 1955-1956 to divert the water to the Al-Habbaniya Lake. The Samarra Dam on the Tigris, completed in 1954, protected Iraq from catastrophic floods.22 The Baath Party, which came to power under Saddam Hussein's presidency in 1968, emphasized agricultural and irrigation projects in order to provide food security for the Iraqi people. Toward that end the "Revolutionary Plan" was developed. The Higher Agriculture Council, attached to the presidency, and the Soil and Land Reclamation Organization, attached to the Ministry of Irrigation, and many other new departments, were established to carry out studies, create designs and provide maintenance and construction for water projects.
Due to the competitive and uncoordinated nature of these water development projects, disagreements over transboundary water issues surfaced in the late 1960s. At the same time, water negotiations were held by the riparian technocrats. The main theme of these technical negotiations was the impact of the construction of the Keban Dam in Turkey and the Tabqa Dam in Syria on the historical water use patterns of Iraq. While Turkey suggested establishing a joint technical committee with a mission to determine the water and irrigation needs of the riparians, Iraq insisted on guaranteeing flows and signing a sharing agreement. Despite Turkey releasing certain flows during the construction and impounding of the Keban Dam, no final allocation agreement was achieved at the end of numerous technical meetings.23 During this period, transboundary water issues were dealt with in the middle-range of economic and technical objectives, which were carried out by the official technical delegations.
Political Confrontations and Escalating Transboundary Water Disputes (1980 to 1990)
From the 1980s to the late 1990s, transboundary water issues moved into the realm of high politics when non-water issues became decisive factors that led to greater tensions and disputes. Bilateral relations between Turkey and Syria have long been uneasy. Two principal sources of friction were Syria's extensive logistical support to the separatist terrorist organisation, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and Syrian irredentist claims to the province of Hatay in Turkey. Despite official denials by Damascus, Syria's support of subversive actions against Turkey since the early 1980s have been widely known and documented.24
Despite the fact that the regional political environment was not conducive for water cooperation in the early 1980s, at the end of the first meeting of the Joint Economic Commission between Turkey and Iraq, the permanent Joint Technical Committee (JTC) was established in 1980 to discuss and finalize the water issue among the riparians. Turkey's initiation of the GAP was the major reason for Iraq to take the lead to establish the JTC. Syria joined the JTC in 1983 whereupon Turkey, Syria and Iraq held sixteen meetings until 1993. Yet, the riparians failed to empower the JTC with either a clear or jointly agreed mandate. Instead, they continued unilateral and uncoordinated water and land development ventures. Thus, a series of diplomatic crises over the development and usage of transboundary waters erupted.25
Turkish foreign policy circles regarded the transboundary water relations with Syria and Iraq in the context of political and legal relations, which are governed by official treaties, diplomatic correspondence and contacts. Even though the terrorism issue marred bilateral relations with Syria, official policy of Turkish authorities, particularly that of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was to deliberately separate the terrorism issue from water-related matters. However, one significant deviation from this official stance was the signing of two protocols at the prime ministerial level, which linked security and terrorism issues with water- sharing arrangements. The Turkish-Syrian Joint Economic Commission met on 17 July 1987 and at the end of the meeting, Turkey and Syria signed the Protocol of Economic Cooperation. It included several articles pertaining to the water issue. There was also a security protocol signed concluding that both states will prevent activities against the other from originating in their countries. It is important to note that this protocol was regarded as a temporary arrangement.26
These bilateral water-sharing agreements did not provide sustainable solutions to the depletion and degradation of the water and land resources in the Euphrates-Tigris River basin. Furthermore, the short-sighted stipulations of these agreements proved to be unsatisfactory to both upstream and downstream riparians, as they kept complaining about the mismatches between their growing needs and the deteriorating water resources in the basin.27
Syria and Iraq perceived the interruption to the flow of the Euphrates, caused by the impounding of the Ataturk Dam, as the beginning of many such interruptions that would result from the envisaged projects of the GAP. The thirteenth meeting of the JTC, held in Baghdad on 16 April 1990, provided the occasion for a bilateral accord between Syria and Iraq, according to which 58 percent of the Euphrates water coming to Syria from Turkey would be released to Iraq.28
These transboundary water relations were not taking place in a vacuum. A severe political crisis occurred between Turkey and Syria when Turkish authorities' frustration with Syria's lack of cooperation reached its peak in October 1998. High-ranking Turkish military officers and politicians made public statements that they wanted Syria to stop supporting terrorists immediately. This Turkish initiative, the implications of which seemed to be clearly understood in Damascus, produced results and the Syrian authorities deported the head of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, soon after. On 20 October 1998, a framework security agreement, the Adana Accord, was signed between the two countries.29 Meanwhile, Turkish and Iraqi policies have often coincided on the issue of Kurdish separatism. This was extended to tacit military cooperation in the second half of the 1980s to fight the PKK. Turkey carried out cross-border operations into northern districts of Iraq to fight the terrorists. However, the situation drastically changed after the First Gulf War. Turkey joined the Allied embargo against Iraq, and Iraq became less cooperative.
New Perspectives and New Actors in Transboundary Water Politics (late 1990s onwards)
Relations between Turkey and Syria improved considerably after the signing of the Adana security agreement in 1998, and new and promising initiatives have been undertaken since then. In 2001, Turkey's Southeastern Anatolia Project Regional Development Administration (GAP RDA) made contact with Syria by sending a delegation on the invitation of the General Organization for Land Development (GOLD), part of the Syrian Ministry of Irrigation. As a result, a joint communique was signed between the GOLD and GAP RDA on 23 August 2001. Once again the water issue was relegated to the technical level and was handled by intergovernmental networks composed of technocrats. GAP-GOLD cooperation is based on the common understanding of providing sustainable utilization of the region's land and water resources through conducting joint rural development and environmental protection projects, joint training programs, expert and technology exchanges and study missions. Syrian and Turkish delegations paid visits to each other's development project sites. During these contacts they had opportunities to exchange experiences pertaining to the positive and negative impacts of the decades-old water and land resources development projects. Unlike the technical negotiations in the 1960s, the GAP-GOLD dialogue included diversified issues such as urban and rural water quality management, rural development, participatory irrigation management and agricultural research.30
Furthermore, the improved political and economic relations among the riparians since the late 1990s have produced fruitful impacts on water-based development in the region. The significant progress in the economic relations of Syria and Turkey can be observed in the major sectors of sustainable development, such as agriculture, energy, health and other water-related sectors. A series of government, private sector and civil society delegations paid numerous mutual visits reaching productive understandings and agreements on trade and economic matters. These culminated in the signing of a free trade agreement in 2004, a real breakthrough in the advancement of bilateral economic relations. The years 2003 and 2004 witnessed the signing of two framework cooperation agreements on health and agriculture, respectively. Both agreements underlined the importance of enhanced cooperation and development in the two neighboring countries. They included, among other things, discussion of water-related issues, such as soil and water conservation in agricultural practices and combating waterborne diseases.31
Most recently, the American invasion of Iraq has had drastic implications for water policy and management in Iraq, and is likely to have repercussions on transboundary water politics as well. Since 2003, the U.S. government has been closely involved in water policymaking in Iraq. The U.S. State Department, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USAGE), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), as well as research and education institutions, such as the University of California at Davis, University of Pennsylvania, and Sandia National Laboratories, have played significant roles in reformulating water policy and management in Iraq, particularly in the area of reconstruction.32
Iraq has been facing political crises and extraordinary conditions since the early 1980s. Due to the long years of war and negligence, the water situation in Iraq has considerably deteriorated in terms of quantity and quality, which has led to human, environmental and economic disasters with regional and international implications. This has directly affected the living standards of the Iraqi people and their environmental systems. In addition to the devastating effects of war, the long-term natural changes in river flow channels, soil erosion, and salinization of irrigated land have caused a reduction in per capita agricultural production. Poor irrigation and drainage practices in Iraq have devastated the natural rivers systems. They are also wasteful in the sense that they put exceeding pressure on the limited supply of the Euphrates and Tigris. Thus, in the Iraqi water sector, urgent attention has been paid to providing adequate and safe water supply and maintaining good water quality in response to the needs of the community. Medium- and long-term plans are also under way to review and reform water supply and demand management in the country.33
In the aftermath of the U.S. invasion, the U.S. Bureau of Oceans, Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES), through the U.S. State Department, functioned as the main body for strategic decisionmaking over water resources in Iraq.34 The United States gave priority to the provision and distribution of water within the context of Iraqi reconstruction activities. Moreover, in the South, rehabilitation of the Mesopotamian Marshlands, and in the North, new water resources development projects, namely dam-building, have moved high on the agenda. In this context, the international community extended financial and technical support for these priority projects. Additionally, with an aim "to manage waters of the Euphrates and Tigris in an optimum manner," the concerned U.S. institutions have initiated studies to prepare a master plan for the Iraqi waters.35
The Ministry of Water Resources in Iraq, in close collaboration with the USAGE, has been reorganized in a different format than the earlier bureaucracy. In dealing with the administrative and technical aspects of water resources management, new approaches and practices have been adopted.36 Within this new institutional framework, establishment of a complete and updated information database, which comprises information about water quantity and quality, particularly as it relates to water supply and management, as well as implementation of integrated water resources management at the river basin level, have become the main objectives. Moreover, the Ministry of Water Resources in Iraq has shown a keen interest in capacity-building projects.
Authorities at the Ministry of Water Resources, as well as their American counterparts, assert that river basin planning and management can only be done when the necessary data, pertaining to water quantity and quality, is retrieved and collected. According to the same authorities, data concerning these transboundary waters can only be completed if Turkey and Syria agree to share it.37 Another prevailing view adopted by U.S. institutions and Iraqi authorities is that along with these data, information concerning the operation of the upstream dams in Turkey and Syria is equally necessary for river basin planning and management.
Since 2003, Iraq has been destabilized under the American occupation and domestic security has not been restored. Under these chaotic circumstances, it has been severely challenging to achieve political, social and economic targets for reconstruction, including the ones related to water resources management. Moreover, Iraq's foreign relations with its neighbors could hardly be built on a durable cooperative framework. Thus, in the Euphrates-Tigris transboundary rivers system, mutual trust and confidence among the riparians is lacking. Uncertainty still prevails in bilateral and multilateral interstate relations, where there is no permanent institutional mechanism to ascertain rights and obligations of the riparians for transboundary water management. Hence, the aspirations of the Iraqi authorities and the United States to obtain technical data deemed necessary for river basin planning can only commence when a political dialogue for regional cooperation begins among the riparian governments. One necessary condition for such a high-level transboundary water dialogue is the consolidation of the Iraqi state and the establishment of a permanent democratic regime embraced by the Iraqi people. Insofar as current evolution of water policymaking in Iraq addresses the socioeconomic development targets of all riparians, it will serve the end of regional cooperation in the basin.
EPISTEMIC COMMUNITIES AND THE ROLE OF THE ETIC IN THE EUPHRATES- TIGRIS REGION
Establishing a coordinated regional action in the Euphrates- Tigris basin still presents a great challenge. The riparians adhered to stringent positions that changed little over the course of three decades of negotiations and until the suspension of the negotiations in the early 1990s. Since the 1960s, mostly state officials, such as technocrats, diplomats and legal advisers, have entered into lengthy negotiations over water allocations and achieved little. While the political issues in the river basin are perceived as relevant and complex in the delegates' eyes, those related to water and development are more complicated but less evident.38
Academics from Iraq, Syria, Turkey and the United States, fitting the description of an epistemic community, worked out a new approach for sustainable cooperation on regional development by founding an initiative in May 2005 known as the ETIC.39 The ETIC provides a test of propositions drawn from epistemic community literature from the international relations discipline, which posits that nongovernmental experts can influence governmental decisionmaking. The epistemic community approach regards scientists and scientific knowledge as the key elements in explaining and analyzing international reality. The conflict and uncertainty inherent in interstate negotiations generate the need for expertise in developing each country's policy position. Insofar as epistemic communities develop common understandings of problems and solutions cross-nationally, they may help their respective governments reach convergent solutions. From the perspective of constructivist theory, this may entail new learning and discourse. Peter M. Haas argues that epistemic communities function as the promoters of cooperation by decreasing, or sometimes by completely eradicating, the uncertainty factor, which hinders cooperation over international resources. Hence, they spread knowledge and facilitate learning processes, which consequently motivate states to reconsider their preferences.40 Members of these communities share common beliefs, in the causal structure of the issue area, in the possible technological solutions to the problem, and in policy applications of these technologies. Epistemic communities help define the problem and narrow the range of options available to decisionmakers. They help integrate environmental concerns into economic and political decisionmaking. Epistemic communities think outside the box. They address issues that are not yet on governmental agendas, serving as a kind of early warning mechanism. Additionally, they might provide fresh approaches to problems that seem to be at an impasse in deliberations among officials. Epistemic communities can function very well across national boundaries because the scientific community has transnational traditions. This makes them a good base for conducting negotiations on transnational problems. Resource politics demand an interdisciplinary approach and a balance between the scientific study of the problem, subsequently generating solutions, and applying scientific solutions to society through the political process.
As a multi-riparian initiative, ETIC has been unique in that it looks beyond water rights, per se, to themes related to environmental protection: development and gender equity, water management and governance, and grassroots participation in a holistic, multi-stakeholder framework. The origin of ETIC may be traced to early meetings among concerned scientists from Iraq, Syria, Turkey and the United States in 2004.41 This group of dedicated scholars has been meeting with flexible agendas. At the first stage of these gatherings, the participants shared information concerning national water policies and raised the significance of water issues in their socioeconomic development targets. In a short period of time, the members of the group have been able to develop a common understanding of existing conditions, pressing the problems and needs of the region. In doing so, these concerned scientists have decided to turn their expertise and experience into the joint initiative of the ETIC.
The ETIC is a Track II effort, meaning that it is voluntary, unofficial, non-binding, non-profit seeking and nongovernmental. It is not affiliated with any government, but it aims to contribute positively to the efforts, official and unofficial, that will enhance the dialogue, understanding and collaboration among the riparians of the Euphrates-Tigris system. The ETIC was initiated from inside the region. However, collaboration among the riparian representatives and concerned scientists from two universities in the United States, Kent State University and the University of Oklahoma, was integral to the creation of the ETIC.
The composition and the role of ETIC remarkably fit Peter Haas's epistemic communities definition and their role in institutional bargaining. The members of ETIC have backgrounds in either academic or professional institutions. With their common scientific language, concerns and involvement with water and development issues in their societies, the ETIC founding members smoothly debated and agreed on the vision and the mission of the initiative in 2005. The ETIC's objectives and guiding principles display a blend of lowest common denominator statements and some creative efforts to move beyond existing national positions.42 The ETIC focuses on the conditions, needs and opportunities for development and cooperation in the Euphrates-Tigris region. It embraces a holistic, development- focused, multi-sectoral approach as opposed to one simply aimed at sharing the river flow. The latter has proven to be divisive and unproductive. The ETIC does not promote a certain model of cooperation or a formula of water sharing. Instead, it envisages being a facilitating platform.
The ETIC program areas were delineated with the active participation of the stakeholders during a series of meetings in 2005 and 2006.43 They contain the three pillars of sustainable development, developed at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg: economic development, social development and environmental protection as they relate to water and land resource development in the region.44 Development is a uniting issue that creates multiple opportunities for win-win alternatives for regional cooperation. Cooperating around a development-based theme provides synergy and added value to individual efforts. It also helps catalyze progress and enrich other processes.
The ETIC's overall mission, as well as its program areas, are more comprehensive than the earlier attempts at cooperation made by the JTC in the 1980s. The ETIC focuses on the key concepts of sustainable regional development, namely water quantity and quality management, health issues, agricultural development, energy production, infrastructural development and environmental protection. Moreover, ETIC action takes the form of focused meetings, expert exchanges, training programs, curriculum development, joint projects, site visits and stakeholder meetings. The JTC had been endowed with a limited mandate compared to the ETIC, which was not particularly effective in creating innovative solutions for water-based social and economic development in the region. Whereas the JTC meetings were convened with the participation of concerned diplomats and legal advisors only, ETIC gatherings have been more inclusive with the participation of academics, professionals, representatives of civil society organizations and business circles, as well as concerned authorities from international agencies. This broad range of stakeholders has defined the urgencies, needs and action modalities for regional cooperation under the leadership of ETIC.45
The ETIC intends to open the cooperation process beyond government circles and the academic community to civil society organizations and society at large. The ETIC intends to lead dialogues not just about resolving narrow bilateral water disputes, as important as such efforts may be; it is also about creating a regional context through which important socioeconomic development issues affecting a larger region can be discussed and addressed.
During the years 2005, 2006 and 2007, ETIC founding members and the invited riparian officials participated in international meetings in India, Sweden, Japan and Mexico.46 ETIC organized a training program on dam safety in collaboration with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) for professionals from Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey. The ETIC organized a stakeholder workshop and conference on Technical Cooperation for Regional Development in the Euphrates and Tigris region in September 2007.47 ETIC prospects were discussed, and collaboration in ETIC activities by international agencies, such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), Swedish International Water Institute (SIWI) and USAID's Blue Revolution Initiative were explored with the representatives who participated in the workshop. Project concepts have been worked out by the ETIC founding members for implementation within the scope of its objectives. The ETIC strives to mobilize faculty members and students in regional universities for developing joint research and activities on regional development. Moreover, ETIC intends to promote dialogue and networking among stakeholders from water-based development sectors, and foster implementation of collaborative activities.
The ETIC members contend that awareness of socioeconomic development is compulsory to understand the real dynamics of the region. Hence, the vision of the ETIC is defined by the founders as "quality of life for people in all communities, including rural and urban areas, is improved, and harmony among countries and with nature in the Euphrates-Tigris region is achieved," which contributes to the overall goal of the ETIC: the promotion of cooperation for technical, social and economic development in the Euphrates-Tigris region.48 In line with its vision and overall goal, ETIC will continue to prepare and implement joint training and capacitybuilding programs as well as research and implementation projects with an aim to respond to the common needs and concerns of people in the region. In building confidence and trust among riparians, ETIC will act toward decisionmakers in a responsive and cooperative manner and be transparent in all actions. The ETIC aims to enhance the consciousness of decisionmakers and the wider public for a broad range of policy issues in the region. If left unattended, these issues have the potential to evolve into serious crises.
However, ETIC is faced with challenges, including the need to establish institutional structure, that is, a legally-binding, tangible status, which is deemed necessary to formalize relations with institutions regionally and internationally. Moreover, the ETIC needs to secure funding for the implementation of projects. The ETIC has prepared a project portfolio, which comprises projects on research, assessments and evaluations as well as implementation of development interventions. The academic community, government institutions, farmer organizations, municipalities and other concerned civil society organizations are determined major partners for conducting these projects.
The general regional security environment can affect calculations about whether such efforts like ETIC can be introduced to a larger audience. Thus, in more favorable regional security environments, there is a greater chance for the development of epistemic communities like the ETIC, allowing greater exposure and therefore, acceptance at the broader societal level. Conversely, high levels of regional conflict and tension make the transmission of cooperative ideas to official policymakers and the wider public more difficult. The Euphrates-Tigris region still lacks an institutionalized framework of political and economic cooperation. Border insecurity, terrorism and the prolonged effects of war and occupation inhibit the development of trust and confidence among the states. The ETIC is trying to detach collaborative activities from political conflicts in such a volatile region. Against all the odds, the region still hosts a web of cultural, social and economic interactions, and bilateral political relations are improving, particularly between Syria and Turkey. The ETIC tries to seize such opportunities for cooperation to carry out water-based development activities in the region.
NOTES
* Acknowledgements: The discussions on ETIC largely benefited from the invaluable contributions of the co-founders of ETIC, namely Faisal Rifai, Okay Unver and Mukdad Ali. The author would like to acknowledge the contributions of the members of ETIC to the deliberations in this paper with their innovative ideas and scholarly collaboration.
1 The author of this article is a co-founder of the Euphrates- Tigris Initiative for Cooperation (ETIC).
2 Peter M. Haas, "Obtaining International Environmental Protection through Epistemic Consensus," Millennium: Journal of International Studies 19, no. 3 (1990), 349.
3 Some of the discussions in this section are drawn from Aysegul Kibaroglu, Building a Regime for the Waters of the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin (The Hague: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002); Iran is also a riparian because it contributes between 9.7 and 11.2 cubic kilometers a year to the Tigris through its tributaries in the North. It also contributes between 20 and 24.8 cubic kilometers of water to the Shatt al-Arab waterway, which unites the Tigris and the Euphrates through the Kharun River.
4 The Euphrates and its tributaries drain an enormous basin that covers a large area of 444,000 square kilometers of which 33 percent lies in Turkey, 19 percent in Syria and 46 percent in Iraq. On the other hand, the Tigris and its tributaries drain an area of 387,600 square kilometers of which 15 percent lies in Turkey, 0.3 percent lies in Syria, 75 percent lies in Iraq and 9.5 percent lies in Iran. See M. L. Belul, "Hydropolitics of the Euphrates-Tigris Basin" (M.Sc. thesis submitted to the Graduate School of Natural and Applied Sciences, Middle East Technical University: June 1996), 67. See also John F. Kolars and William A. Mitchell, The Euphrates River and Southeast Anatolia Development Project (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1991), 3-8.
5 Nurit Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict in the Middle East (London: Routledge, 1994), 100; E. W. Anderson, "Water Geopolitics in the Middle East: Key Countries" (Conference, Center for Strategic and International Studies, U.S. Foreign Policy on Water Resources in the Middle East, Instrument for Peace and Development, Washington, D.C.: 24 November 1986) 18-19; P. Beaumont, "Water: A Resource Under Pressure" in The Middle East and Europe: An Integrated Communities Approach, ed., G. Nonneman (London: Federal Trust for Education and Research, 1992), 183.
6 The canal, which links the Tigris to the Euphrates through the Tharthar Valley, has already been realized and has been operative since 1988. See A. Dhanoun, "Tharthar Canal to be Opened" Baghdad Observer (4 January 1988). 7 Kliot (1994), 108.
8 Belul (1996), 35-36.
9 J. Kolars gives the Euphrates flow as 32.7 billion cubic meters per year in "Water Resources of the Middle East," Canadian Journal of Development Studies 106 (1992). While P. Beaumont, T. Naff and R. Maison assert that the annual discharge varies from 16.8 billion cubic meters to 43.4 billion cubic meters. See P. Beaumont, "The Euphrates River: An International Problem of Water Resources Development," Environmental Conservation 5 (1978), 36; T. Naff and R. Maison, Water in the Middle East: Conflict or Cooperation (Boulder, CoIo.: Westview Press, 1984), 86. Yet, in this study we adopt the mean annual flow rate of the Euphrates as 32 billion cubic meters per year as the amount Nurit Kliot, D. Hillel and M. L. Belul have accepted as a reliable and valid figure in their studies.
10 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, "Profile: Tigris-Euphrates River," Water in the Sand: A Survey of Middle East Water Issues (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1991), 2.
11 The total for Tigris and its tributaries is between 48.7 and 52.6 billion cubic meters, or between 43.0 and 49.2 billion cubic meters. See K. Ubell, "Iraq's Water Resources," Nature and Resources 7 (1971), 3-9; C. Gischler, Water Resources in the Arab Middle East and North Africa (Cambridge, England: Menas Resources Studies, 1979); M. Shahin, "Review and Assessment of Water Resources in the Arab World," Water International 14 (1989), 206-219.
12 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 2.
13 The Euphrates' annual flow in Turkey at Birecik near the Syrian border ranged from 42.7 bcm in 1963 to 15.3 bcm in 1961. The peak flows recorded at Hit, Iraq, during the period 1924-1973 were as high as 7390 cubic meters per second in 1969 and as low as 850 cubic meters per second in 1930. See Kolars and Mitchell, (1991), 90- 97; and John F. Kolars, "Problems of International River Management: The case of the Euphrates," in International Waters of the Middle East: From Euphrates-Tigris to Nile, ed. Asit Biswas (Oxford University Press, 1994), 47.
14 Belul (1996), 139.
15 That is, the Ministry of Public Works (1920) and the Electrical Power Resources Survey and Development Administration (1935) were established in Turkey with missions to explore the country's hydropower potential, and to carry out civil works and land development, respectively. The years 1954 to 1956 brought a period of intensive planning for the Euphrates and Tigris region when the Kingdom of Iraq established the Board of Development and the Ministry of Development to carry out plans, surveys, designs and the construction of dam and canals. see Associates for Middle East Research (AMER), "Water Issues in Iraq" (special report, University of Pennsylvania, 1989), 2. In Syria, the water law (no. 165) of 1958 defined the utilization of water resources for agricultural production. This law contains several important provisions. For instance, Article 3 states that the Ministry of Public Works and Water Resources determines, in accordance with the water in each basin, the maximum amount of water that can be licensed for use, the area that can be irrigated, the restrictions that must be imposed on the method of extracting water, the conditions of protecting this water and the limits of its use. See Associates for Middle East Research (AMER) Syria: Political, Economic and Strategic (University of Pennsylvania, 1989), 54-55.
16 Ayesgul Kibaroglu and Olcay Unver, "An Institutional Framework for Facilitating Cooperation in the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin," International Negotiation: A Journal of Theory and Practice 5 (2000), 312.
17 Kibaroglu (2002), 222.
18 For further information on the GAP, see http:// www.gap.gov.tr.
19 Aysegul Kibaroglu, et al., "Cooperation on Turkey's Transboundary Waters" (status report, German Federal Ministry for Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, Berlin: 2005), 8.
20 Marwa Daoudy, "Syria and the Euphrates Tigris River Systems" (paper presented at the Transboundary Water Management International Training Course, Swedish International Water Institute, Amman, Jordan, 13 November 2007).
21 H. Meliczek, "Land Settlement in the Euphrates basin of Syria," in Land Reform: Land Settlement and Cooperatives (Food and Agriculture Organization Publications, Rome, Italy, 1987), 111.
22 M. Ali, "Hydrological Constraints and Solutions to Improve Water Resources Management in Iraq" (paper presented at the Transboundary Water Management International Training Course, Swedish International Water Institute, Amman, Jordan, 13 November 2007).
23 Kibaroglu and Unver (2001), 311-330.
24 M. Benli Altunisik and O. Tur, "From Distant Neighbors to Partners? Changing Syrian-Turkish Relations," Security Dialogue 37 (2006), 232-234.
25 Turkey started impounding the Keban Reservoir by February 1974 at the same time that Syria had almost finalized the construction of the Tabqa Dam. This was a period of severe drought. The impounding of both reservoirs escalated into a crisis in the spring of 1975. Iraq accused Syria of reducing the river's flow to intolerable levels, while Syria placed the blame on Turkey. The Iraqi government was not satisfied with the Syrian response, and the mounting frustration resulted in mutual threats bringing the parties to the brink of armed hostility. A war over water was averted when Saudi Arabia mediated that extra amounts of water be released from Syria to Iraq. On 13 January 1990, Turkey temporarily intervened in the flow of the Euphrates River in order to fill the Ataturk Reservoir. The decision to fill the reservoir over a period of one month was taken much earlier. The month selected for this purpose was January, a month with no demand for irrigated agriculture. Turkey had notified its downstream neighbors by November 1989 of the pending event. Turkey released twice the usual amount for two months prior to the impoundment, sent delegations to Middle Eastern countries to explain the need for the impoundment, and the measures taken. However, the Syrian and the Iraqi governments officially protested Turkey, and consequently called for an agreement to share the waters of the Euphrates, as well as a reduction in the impounding period. Another crisis occurred in 1996 after Turkey started the construction of the Birecik on the Euphrates River. Both Syria and Iraq sent official notes to the Turkish government in December 1995 and January 1996 indicating their objection to the construction of the Birecik Dam on the grounds that the dam would affect the quantity and quality of waters flowing to Syria and Iraq.
26 The text of Article 6 of the Protocol reads as follows: "During the filling up period of the Ataturk Dam reservoir and until the final allocation of the waters of Euphrates among the three riparian countries the Turkish side undertakes to release a yearly average of more than 500 cubic meters per second at the Turkish- Syrian border and in cases where monthly flow falls below the level of 500 cubic meters per second, the Turkish side agrees to make up the difference during the following month." Resmi Gazete, (Ankara, Turkey) 10 December 1987.
27 "Suriye Firat'dan Daha Fazla Su Istiyor," NTV, 2 January 2008; see http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/431406.asp.
28 See Law No. 14 of 1990, ratifying the joint minutes concerning the provisional division of the waters of the Euphrates River, httpy/ ocid.nacse.org/qml/research/tfdd/toTFDDdocs/25 7ENG.htm.
29 See Anatolian News Agency (AA), 20 October 1998.
30 A joint comminique between Republic of Turkey, Prime Ministry, Southeastern Anatolia Project Regional Development Administration (GAP) and Arab Republic of Syria, Ministry of Irrigation, General Organization for Land Development, 23 August 2001, Ankara, Turkey.
31 Aysegul Kibaroglu, "Cooperation for Development: Emerging Frameworks for Sharing Benefits in the Euphrates-Tigris River Bain," Bogazici Journal 20 (2006), 135-152.
32 "Army Engineers Support Reconstruction in Iraq," http:// www.usace.army.mil/inet/functions/cw/hot_topics/ reconstruction_8may.htm.
33 "Road To 2050: Iraq Waters, Prospects for Future Developmental Work" (United Nations Development Program in Iraq, Amman, Jordan, 2007), 4-5.
34 http://www.state.gov/www/global/oes/; "Iraq Reconstruction: Environmental Protection and Natural Resources Management," httpyAvww.state.gov/g/oes/rls/fs/2003/19225.htm.
35 Edwin A. Theriot, "Reconstruction Assistance for Iraq's Water sector," U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 2007. http:// www.waterforum.jp/jpn/iraq/doc/expert_meeting/plenary/3.pdf.
36 http://www.iraqi-mwr.org.
37 The Coalition Provisional Authority, Ministry of Water Resources (IraqJ-Progress and Priorities, http://www.cpa-iraq.org/ pressreleases/2004051 l_water_progress.html.
38 Aysegul Kibaroglu and Faisal Rifai, "New Framework of Cooperation over Water in the Euphrates Tigris Region Through Epistemic Community Activities: the Euphrates Tigris Initiative for Cooperation," published online for Geophysical Research Abstracts, 2008, http://www.cosis.net/abstracts/EGU2008/015 79/EGU2008-A-015 79.pdf?PHPSESSID=.
39 ETIC Founding Document at http://www.ou.edu/ipc/etic/.
40 Peter M. Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination," International Organization 46 (1992), 13.
41 As a spin-off from a project conducted by the International Center for Peace at the University of Oklahoma, some Iraqi, Syrian and Turkish participants in the said project have decided to launch a cooperation initiative, in collaboration with the University of Oklahoma and Kent State University. see http://www.ou.edu/ipc/etic/ .
42 http://www.ou.edu/ipc/etic/aboutETIC.html.
43 ETIC Newsletter 1, no. 3, March 2006, httpy/www.ou.edu/ipc/ etic/ETIC_Newsletter_Voll_Issue3.pdf. 44 http://www.un.org/esa/ sustdev/documents/WSSD_POI_PD/English/POI_PD.htm.
45 Summary statement presented at the conclusion of the XII World Water Congress (World Water Congress, 26 November 2005, New Delhi, India; ETIC Newsletter 1, no. 3.; ETIC workshop synthesis document (World Water Week, Swedish International Water Institute, Stockholm: 21 August 2006).
46 ETIC Newsletter I, no. 4, Summer 2006. http://www.ou.edu/ipc/ etic/ETIC%20News%20Vol%201-%20Issue%204%20Aug%202006.pdf.
47 "Euphrates Tigris Initiative for Cooperation," (stakeholders workshop final report, Bahcesehir, University, Istanbul, Turkey: 11- 17 September 2007).
48 http://www.ou.edu/ipc/etic/aboutETIC.html.
Aysegul Kibaroglu ("The Role of Epistemic Communities in Offering New Cooperation Frameworks in the Euphrates-Tigris Rivers System") is an associate professor of international relations at the Middle East Technical University in Ankara, Turkey. Kibaroglu earned her Ph.D. in international relations at Bilkent University in Ankara. She pursued post-doctoral research at the International Water Law Research Institute at the University of Dundee in Scotland. Her areas of research include transboundary water politics, international water law, environmental security and Turkish water policy. Kibaroglu has published extensively on the politics of the water resources of the Euphrates-Tigris River basin, including Building a Regime for the Waters of the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin (2002). She has previously worked as the advisor to the president of the Southeastern Anatolia Project Regional Development Administration from 2001 to 2003. Dr. Kibaroglu is also a founding member of the Euphrates-Tigris Initiative for Cooperation (ETIC). She is currently coediting a forthcoming collection of research, Water Policy: National Frameworks and International Bearing, which will be published in 2008.
Copyright Journal of International Affairs Spring 2008
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