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Selective integration: Knowledge and interests in the Model Forest Program

Posted on: Tuesday, 29 July 2003, 06:00 CDT

This essay examines the federal Model Forest Program (1992- 1997), focussing on the process by which model forests were selected at the start of the program. The outcomes of this process suggest that ecological ideas cannot be readily separated from the prevailing material interests, including forestry experts, that advocate them. This study supports the concept of partial integration of new knowledge into resource policy, in which some ideas are favoured while others are discarded or modified so as to fit the orthodox point of view. As a result of the selectivity of expert interpretation of ecological ideas, the program fell short of innovation. This conservatism will constrain the choices available to Canadian forest management in the future.

Cet article examine le programme federal de forets modeles (1992- 1997) en mettant l'accent sur le processus de selection de ces forets au debut du programme. Les resultats de ce processus semblent suggerer que des idees ecologiques ne peuvent pas etre facilement separees des principaux interets se rapportant au materiel, y compris les experts forestiers qui les recommandent. Cette etude confirme le concept de l'integration partielle de nouvelles connaissances dans les politiques sur les ressources dans le cadre de laquelle certaines idees seraient encouragees tandis que d'autres seraient eliminees ou modifiees pour respecter un point de vue orthodoxe. En raison du caractere selectif de l'interpretation des idees ecologiques par les experts, le programme n'a pas pu etre novateur. Ce conservatisme restreindra les choix futurs des gestionnaires forestiers canadiens.

This essay describes a recent attempt to facilitate the transition in Canadian forest management from a mode dominated by the classical paradigm of ecology to a new mode patterned on the dynamic nature of ecosystems. I present the results of an empirical study into the place and fate of ecological knowledge in federal forest policy. The case concerns the selection process for the first phase of the federal Model Forest Program, initiated in 1991 at a time when Canada's forest industry was under pressure to become sustainable.

The so-called classical paradigm of ecology borrowed from the Enlightenment the idea that above all nature is uniform and unchanging. It envisioned nature as composed of closed, self- regulating systems in which change proceeds along the fixed path of succession to a stable end point uniting all the parts in equilibrium, a state of enduring balance. The new paradigm, in contrast, emphasizes the dynamic elements of nature: ecosystems are open to fluxes of materials and organisms, disturbances - external agents of change - contribute in major part to the development of ecosytems, and the result, rather than a stable end point, is a dynamic landscape in which several successional pathways may coexist in adjacent patches of different sizes and composition, interacting with each other and outside agents to create what is known as a shifting mosaic. From this perspective, processes and their effects on functions and structures are more significant than end points.1 Ecosystem management is the attempt to put the new paradigm into practice.

It may appear a rather abstract matter, this question of the most appropriate formulation of how nature works, but the different paradigms (in Kuhn's sense) lead to different conceptions and practices for the management of natural resources on the ground, making how we perceive nature - the ideas we hold about nature - a critically important if usually disregarded component of natural resources policy analysis. For instance, under the old paradigm, fire was considered a foe, a cataclysmic event not part of how nature works and therefore unnatural; consequently, forest managers responded with a policy of fire prevention. The new paradigm, however, acknowledges that the exclusion of fire from ecosystems normally prone to it has undesirable consequences: for exampl, the failure of certain forest species to regenerate and the subsequent conversion of stands as the original fire-resistant species give way to others that are vulnerable to fire. Fire becomes friend rather than foe, and management may even go so far as to plan for the controlled inclusion of fire events.

The Model Forest Program was initiated explicitly to foster sustainable forestry in Canada. Sustainability is a concept firmly linked to ecosystem management, in that the long-term viability of human communities depends on their successful coexistence with the physical environment. Speaking less generally, however, sustainable development and the contemporary paradigm of ecology intersect at this point, that ecosystems are open to external influences, for that includes the effects of human action, and that ecosystem management must be linked to institutions and to the public. As environmental issues tend to be controversial, involve many interested parties and must grapple with the fact that human attitudes and practices affect natural ecosystems, ecosystem management by definition must involve the public. The preferred mechanism is the so-called stakeholder or public consultation.2

The confluence of sustainable development and ecosystem management has given rise to the expectation among some policy analysts that the advent of ecosystem management marks a great opportunity to begin and sustain a long-overdue dialogue between scientists, policy-makers and affected parties.3 Implicit is the assumption that thus far science and politics have not mixed. As if to confirm this perception, we find in the policy literature a long- standing distrust of ideas, particularly in political economy, where material interests alone were believed to be the real force behind policy action. Several researchers - such as Goldstein and Keohane among rational (public-choice) institutionalists and John Hall among historical institutionalists - have brought the question of the importance of ideas in policy making to the fore again. Mark Blyth and John Jacobsen note, however, that these efforts do not examine whether ideas have causative or independent importance; instead, the papers enlist the ideas as a way to correct the shortcomings of their theoretical approaches. Blyth suggested one way to study ideas "as more than an addendum to institutions" is to examine the role of ideas "in the redefinition of existing interests and the creation of new ones among agents."4 The evidence of this study suggests an actual redefinition and creation of interests, or at least a nuanced and skilled formulation by existing interests of the meaning of pertinent ideas. In other words, it seems to be less the case that ideas help redefine interests than that the interpretation of new ideas plays a role in strengthening or hampering the policy-making clout of particular policy actors.

The common perception in the scientific community is that good science and good ideas are lost on policy-making. Gordon Baskerville said, "scientists and academics might as well write in Sanskrit on the far side of the moon."5 Behind his statement is the belief that the effective and undistorted incorporation of scientific evidence into policy is assured so long as a free and independent relationship exists between scientists carrying out and communicating their research and the senior government officials who are regarded as the chief policy-makers.6

It is nearly impossible in resource management to separate scientific evidence-gathering and analysis from management, since much of the evidence gathering developed within the context of resource management. Scientific forestry arose in the last decade of the eighteenth century as a venture that linked the new scientific field of financial management and the equally new field of forest growth and tree mensuration to understand the problems of a strategically important but threatened resource, not the least of which was thought to be the free access to forests enjoyed by the common people. At McGill University in the last years of the nineteenth century, prominent paleobotanist J.W. Dawson urged his colleagues to apply advances in methods and technologies to the study of wood in the hope of assisting the timber industry with practical solutions to the disappearance of the most desirable species. Part of the value of the study of forestry history, and environmental history in general, is precisely that it punctures the legend of pure science (ideas) versus utilitarian motivations (interests or power) by demonstrating that scientific forestry, from its origins in the Enlightenment to its implementation in North America, whether now or a century ago, has been at the crossroads of material interests and ideas. Canadian forestry history shows a close interweaving of public policy with science or knowledge and ruling government and commercial interests.7

What we are dealing with is environmental science, an instance of what Salter has called "mandated science."8 Mandated science refers not only to scientific reports commissioned by regulators; it also includes work produced in the mainstream scientific community, which is "evaluated in terms of the conclusions it can offer to policy makers about the merit of particular regulations." In recognizing the mutual influence of politics on science and sc\ience on politics I follow the lead of Sandberg and Clancy, who speak of a "politics of science," namely external circumstances and influences that affect scientific research, and "science politics," the arena of scientific debate amongst scientists themselves. Here systems of beliefs, held by epistemic communities of experts who may be called upon to contribute their knowledge to the policy-making process, come into play. While epistemic communities will be united by shared understandings of scientific evidence, more than one such community may vie for policy relevance; as scientists align themselves with one position or another the debate becomes polarized. Haas, in a volume dedicated to epistemic communities, argues that experts' possession of knowledge in times of uncertainty gives them policy- making power.9

To understand something of the dynamics of science-policy interactions, we must adopt a larger framework than the simple separation of government and presumed neutral or academic interests. In brief, the parameters of the politics of science to be considered in our case study of federal forest policy are the four factors of a largely historical and institutional character, identified by Beyers and Sandberg, which circumscribe Canadian forest policy most extensively, to wit: a colonial legacy in the form of an economy built on export staples and a very high degree of Crown ownership of forested land; provincial jurisdiction; a closed policy network; and the influence of professional foresters, who help keep in place the timber-oriented industrial paradigm.10 A taste of the difficulties faced by the federal government in trying to get a forestry program off the ground in a climate of strong provincial jurisdiction is given in later sections.

I will consider the role of professional foresters (an epistemic community of experts who, through their work in government and industry, have both material interests and a knowledge claim) in interpreting the new paradigm in ecology for operational use; that is, in charting the policy path to sustainable practices for Canadian forests. My lens is the selection process at the start of the Model Forest Program. I shall argue that in policy-making, ideas count as much as interests. As Hessing and Howlett have said, policy- making is "an activity of government that fuses knowledge and interests." In particular, the study supports the concept of what Margaret Weir has called "bounded innovation" - innovation that favours some ideas while discarding or modifying others to fit the orthodox point of view.11 So, although some ideas from ecology are indeed finding their way into policy as a consequence of the clash between traditional and contemporary views of forestry, the selectivity with which they are taken up serves to preserve, not overturn, the dominant policy framework. Significantly, by setting a standard, this conservatism constrains the future choices for Canadian forest management.

The selective character of the process by which knowledge becomes embodied into policy means that it is political, in the sense of being associated with interests. In other words, successful ideas cannot be separated from the material interests of those who advocate them; the most powerful skillfully negotiate the encounter with non-conformant ideas. The point is not that less privileged, marginalized parties cannot make their voices heard - the MFP took care to include them - but that much of what they have to say is too disruptive to the status quo to be accepted into mainstream policy thinking; consequently, they are ignored or co-opted. Jeremy Wilson characterizes the successful or credible policy advocates as those who adhere to an anthropocentric world view, while those who are marginalized adhere to a biocentric view.12 My findings support his basic division in principle. Paradigms buoyed or thwarted the hopes of the candidiates who submitted proposals to the Model Forest Program. Paradigms also matter in terms of on-the-ground results, however, which prompted me to accord them a prominent role in my analysis. I developed a more nuanced taxonomy of world views, which takes into account the range of variations contained in the program submissions. I present it below.

In practical terms, the selectivity of the expert interpretation means that the Model Forest Program fell short of innovation, despite intentions, because the program did not challenge industrial forestry. The MFP opted for the wrapping of the ecological message, not the substance. Thus forestry practice in this experiment acquired an up-to-date vocabulary featuring terms such as ecosystem management and biodiversity, but it did not shed its timber-heavy, industrial orientation.

It may be argued that scientific uncertainty favours the status quo. Scientists cannot predict the outcomes of particular interventions. Thus, for example, Hutchings and his colleagues believe that the apparent incapacity of Department of Fisheries and Oceans officials to deal with scientific uncertainty was critical to the detrimental outcome of fisheries management. I contend that if adequate response to scientific uncertainty were indeed the problem, then the elements absent from policy should be those having direct bearing on scientific uncertainty. The DFO was uncertain about the health and location of Atlantic groundfish. They left this uncertainty out of the picture and focussed on other policies - for example keeping offshore boats in the water and fish plants operating as long as possible. While standard scientific procedure requires the calculation of error brackets to delineate the range of uncertainty, by contrast in natural resource management the path to handling uncertainty and surprise was long ago shown by C.S. Holling, who called it adaptive management. Adaptive management is almost synonymous with the use of computer-decision support systems. Both predict, verify and adjust management practices.13

Adaptive management refers to a learning cycle of interventions on a range of values, monitoring for effects and subsequently adjusting planned actions to reflect the outcome of the earlier experiment as well as society's changing views. It is commonly regarded as the scientific support for ecosystem management, but adaptive management lacks exactly that scientific rigour associated with real scientific experiments. There is no clear hypothesis- building and testing in the method, since observations on the ground are corrected continuously, and the all-important baseline against which to measure action is either absent or incomplete. Adaptive management seems to offer "a fair, common standard" in which theory is based "on observation, history, and experience," rather than observation on theory.14 It is true that without observation theory cannot be confirmed or rejected, but without theory one may not know what to look for or how to interpret what has been observed; the necessary confirmational tests, which are derived from theory, will be impossible. For this reason, adaptive management's ability to understand the mechanisms driving an ecosystem is limited. Weyerhaeuser, whose company was successful in bidding for a spot in the Model Forest Program, suggests that adaptive management would allow "a good understanding of how different forest ecosystems evolve, work, and change under different conditions and scenarios." The prediction is unduly optimistic.

By the same token, it would be a mistake to isolate the element of uncertainty from the context of ecosystem management and assign it an importance all its own. As an approach, and a contested one at that, ecosystem management comprises a cluster of concepts. Uncertainty is only one element in that cluster. The key to a proper evaluation of the place of uncertainty is not that it exists, nor that different epistemic communities tend to judge it differently. The key is that the way it is resolved in natural resource management, namely adaptive management, implies that industrial forestry has satisfactorily accounted for uncertainty. As well, policy conditions, including the network of material interests and knowledge, help to sustain its legitimacy. Part of the standard management approach used to adjudicate the proposals submitted to the MFP was the adoption of an adaptive management strategy and the availability of decision-support systems.

I begin with a short introduction to the Model Forest Program. Next I describe the solicitation of proposals and the adjudication process. In the analysis I present in detail the range of management philosophies available to the adjudicators and the taxonomy I developed to group them. Finally, I examine the most weighty criteria in the selection of the successful candidates, and the implications of those criteria.

Methods and Background

The selection process of Forestry Canada's Model Forest Program was analyzed, using the documents and stakeholder materials pertaining to the MFP, and a copy of each of the 50 proposals submitted. Between 1996 and 1997, I interviewed 46 parties involved in the development and implementation of the MFP and the related National Forest Strategy (NFS). I spoke to officials in the federal Forest Service who had been involved with these initiatives. The NFS is outside the scope of this essay but makes an appearance in summary form. Figure 1 is an outline of the elements that constitute the Forest Service's understanding of sustainable forestry. The NFS's content defined the standard by which proposals would be judged.15

The Model Forest Program originated in 1991 and was operational by the spring of 1992. It is currently approaching the end of its second phase. In 1991, Ottawa was concerned about the future of the forestry sector, whose image was suffering from industrial practices that had become the target of domestic and international boycotts. In general, Ottawa's interest i\n forestry is "a concern for the health, vigour, and continued profitability of the forest industry."16 In the spirit of sustainability and environmental leadership, in 1991 and 1992 the short-lived Department of Forestry (1988-1994) generated two fresh initiatives in forest policy development, the National Forest Strategy and the MFP. The MFP was part of a three-part strategy called Partners in Sustainable Development of Forests Program, which had been outlined in the Green Plan the year before. The MFP's goals were to enhance scientific research, expand information and knowledge, and lead the forestry industry out of the age of sustained yield into the new era of ecosystem management and stewardship. Forestry Canada stated the program's objectives in its guide to applicants: to accelerate the implementation of integrated resource management, a key concept in sustainable forest management; to innovate the practice of forest management; and to test and demonstrate sustainable forestry using the most advanced technology and best available forestry practices.17 By selecting and funding a number of model forest sites across the country, the MFP would lead the way in the transition to sustainable forestry using experiment, scientific research and knowledge transfer. The project would also tell the world that forestry in Canada was embracing environmentally sound practices.

Solicitation of Proposals and Judging Mechanism

The MFP announcement was made in September 1991. The Canadian Forest Service (CFS) held regional briefing sessions to explain the program. By the deadline of 28 February 1992, CFS had received 50 proposals. The Forestry Service recruited a national advisory committee to help with the design of the competition, evaluate the proposals and convey final recommendations to Minister Frank Oberle. Four of the committee's ten members were drawn from academe, two were industry representatives and two were senior Canadian Forest Service officials. The CFS officials served ex-officio; one acted as secretary. The committee also included the executive director of Wildlife Habitat Canada and a chief of the Algonquin First Nation. Art May, president of Memorial University and one-time president of the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council, was chairman. The committee and the CFS used the Cabinet-approved parameters to create selection criteria and guidelines for applicants.18

The committee also struck a technical review committee. Its nine members were well versed in sustainable forestry and had a thorough understanding of regional issues. They were drawn from academe, industry and government, represented all regions of the country and included someone from the Oxford Forestry Institute of the University of Oxford. There were no First Nations or environmental groups. The shared expertise of the committee members comprised forest ecology, wildlife management, operations, and information and decision support systems.

The technical review committee split into three teams of three. Each team was responsible for grading one-third of the proposals. Everyone reviewed five sample proposals, to calibrate their judgements; the results, reached by consensus, were discussed in meetings of the committee with and without the National Advisory Committee. For the final step, the group divided once again into three. Each team had someone from within the region of origin of the proposal, one reviewer from without and one who had seen the proposal at the outset. No one participated in final deliberations for any proposal in which an actual or perceived conflict existed. The proposals were categorized, and the rankings - outstanding, excellent, good, marginal and poor - were reported to the National Advisory Committee.

Guidelines, Assessment Criteria and Outcome

The committee's selection criteria and weighted values were published. Ranked highest, at 40%, were applicants' objectives, management philosophy and long-term commitment to the principle of sustainable development and integrated resource management; their fit with the objectives of the MFP; and their proposed structure and decision-making processes for the model forest, as indicated by the nature of the partnership and the anticipated involvement of key stakeholders. Next, at 25%, were the proposed activities and expected results using best forestry practices. The committee looked at how the applicants supported the objectives and goals of the model forest and how their proposal differed from present practices; how they proposed to use the most advanced technology; and how they would demonstrate techniques and results. Applicants explained how they would address any gaps in technology, expertise or knowledge, how the Model Forest would be linked to existing research programs, who their collaborators would be, and how the lessons would be communicated to others in the field, at home and abroad. The remaining 10% of the mark was for communication to the public and general financial and administrative management. The committee looked for a realistic budget and any leveraging obtained with the federal funds.

Other considerations mattered in the evaluation. The CFS favoured easily accessible, highly productive sites more than 100,000 hectares in size. They wanted sites that faced regional issues of concern to both the public and forest managers. Their goal was a national network representing Canada's major forest regions and a mix of land tenures. To be successful, an applicant had to plan for a variety of forest uses and values; production of timber was essential.

Despite their different experience and background, the reviewers shared a sense of what a successful proposal ought to contain. Forest management philosophy was deemed most important. Objectives had to be well articulated and planning tools identified. Reviewers looked for adaptive management and a monitoring plan that recognized the many uncertainties in natural systems. They looked for a range of resource values, and wanted to see how those values would be integrated into the planning process. At the same time they wanted a strong timber management component. They also looked for an eco- regional rather than a stand-level approach; that is, a long-term management that would preserve the forest ecosystem. They wanted to see a modelling of the effect of logging and silvicultural activities on a range of values; they wanted a projection of what the forest would look like well into the future.

Proposed partnerships were given much scrutiny. The committee looked for key partners with decision-making power, including First Nations and industry. Industry was a critical partner because of its access to timber, its legal role in implementing the forest management side, and its technical and managerial expertise.

Also important were research, technical tools and best practices. Reviewers looked for innovation, a realistic sense of what could be done with geographic information and decision support systems in a five-year period, and technical competence in planning, forest management, and the use of information and decision support computer systems. Budgets had to be realistic. The committee also looked for a mix of jurisdictions: large private, small private, provincial and federal. Size was an informal criterion but did count: in a smaller area it is more difficult to meet long-term landscape planning objectives. Proposals benefitted from professional presentation.

The technical committee drew up a list, and then the National Advisory Committee submitted its recommendations to the CFS. Adjustments were made for cross-country representation. The top five proposals for both committees were Manitoba Model Forest, Western Newfoundland Model Forest, Prince Albert Model Forest, Fundy Model Forest and Foothills Model Forest. These five were approved for funding. Four others were approved geographically: Une Foret Habitee, Eastern Ontario Model Forest, Clayoquot Sound Model Forest and McGregor Model Forest (on condition that it involve Lheit- Lit'en First Nation, which had submitted its own proposal). A tenth, Lake Abitibi, was added by the Ministry of Forests, also on the basis of geoclimatic representation.

Analysis

To rank the proposals, technical review committee members relied on a standard of forest sustainability. Their standard is essentially the standard in the National Forest Strategy of 1992 (revised slightly in 1998).19 The guidelines and criteria of the Model Forest Program were composed and applied by some of the same people who helped develop the National Forest Strategy. As well, the NFS and the MFP came out of the same office at about the same time. The National Forest Strategy of 1992 foresaw the creation of a model forest network. Their management profile standard is summarized in Figure 1.20

Figure 1: The Standard (Post-modern Era): Sustainable Development of Forests

Not every proposal conformed to the standard. Other forest management philosophies represented in the submissions can be described as modernist, bio-centric, geo-centric and cosmo-centric (see Table 1).21

A Taxonomy of Management Philosophies

The standard forest management philosophy captures what the country's top experts in forest management, in consultation with members of the interested public, understood by the phrase "sustainable management of forests" (Fig. 1). In the standard philosophy, forest dynamics are driven by disturbance or external agents. Nature is said to be subject to change, and change is an accepted part of nature. This philosophy is abstracted from the 1992 National Forest Strategy. I call it "post-modernist" (PM). The name maintains continuity with the forestry practice known as modernist, in part because of its presence in the literature. Post-modernism may be anything but homogeneous; however, the apparent rough break with the past, the focus on change or flux, the introduc\tion of uncertainty and the ambivalence about the notion of order - all support the choice of the term post-modernist. In describing the post-modernist forest, Taubeneck refers to "the ambivalence, instability, and uncertainty of 'the postmodernist condition.'"22 Hughes highlights post-modernity's "repressed memory," which makes the break with the past seem more real than it is. He also describes the synthetic, designed character of the post-modernist landscape. People who design landscapes today use technological aids, and technological aids are associated with post-modernism. The standard forest management philosophy emphasizes technology and the implied link between sustainability and technology.23 Post-modernists believe nature has been invented by humans according to a choice of desirable conditions and values. This theme runs through Soule and Lease's book, Reinventing Nature? McQuillan identifies this and other characteristics of the new direction as post-modernist: for example, its sometimes contradictory concerns and a preoccupation with diversity and complexity.24 In contrast, modernistic natural resource management adheres to the idea of a stable nature external to and uninfluenced by human actions. Until recently, modernism was the preferred industrial style. It is characterized by maximum sustained yield, multiple use and a timber-only focus.25

Both management systems have historical roots in the beginnings of scientific forestry in North America during the era of Conservation, which took its cue from the Enlightenment. One thread connects modernist, Conservation and Enlightenment philosophies: a belief in the paramount value of utility and a faith in science. The value of utility - called utilitarianism - is expressed in the drive to turn science and industry into the instruments of the Puritan project of world reform, in which prosperity or pleasure is increased for all and greed is eliminated. To own land, you must improve it and share the benefits. Estates must be productive and yield revenue. Estate owners should use scientific discipline to banish unruliness. (Unruliness includes the hunting of wild animals by forest people.) The forest should be economically organized on a utilitarian structure to achieve optimal tree growth; those species "most suitable for one purpose, like shipbuilding, could be efficiently harvested at the allotted time, while timber more suitable for building materials would be cultivated elsewhere." Foresters can find samples at the right stage of growth if trees are grown in stands separated by age.26

Table 1: Nature philosophies of the 50 Model Forest Program submissions with distribution by province and territory. Those that span two types were counted once in each category.

Utilitarianism was the model for the North American Conservation ethic of progress. In this view of history, infinitely perfectable humans progress towards the desirable end of perfect happiness. Perfect happiness can be achieved if humans apply reason and replace ignorance with knowledge. The ethic of progress spilled over into Canada and fuelled an optimism for the colony's potential to attain economic and social development. In the United States, under the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt, progressive ideology was paired with Democratic aspirations and spawned the Conservation movement, whose most forceful and articulate proponent was Gifford Pinchot.27 The Enlightenment and Puritan values of efficiency and utility and an indomitable faith in science are evident in the modernist and post-modernist profiles. (McQuillan believes that the post- modernist, or standard, approach has done away with utilitarianism.28) The link with the past is important. As it struggles to attain a more mature, environmentally aware character, Canadian forestry must become conscious of this legacy as it moulds our customary outlook on nature and forests. Only then will we be able to examine ourselves critically.

Alternatives to the post-modernist approach are the eco-centric, geo-centric and cosmo-centric management philosophies (Table 1). Eco- centrism borrows from conservation biology, the preservationist tradition and deep ecology. It differs from the standard in being less timber-focussed, less technocratic and less anthropocentric, but it maintains the focus on changeability in nature. Its timelines are longer than those in the standard, but it is still concerned primarily with contemporary nature. Ecological or natural-selection forestry principles apply.29 The geo-centric model builds on the eco- centric outlook. Its point of departure is the geologic record. It includes abiotic and non-contemporary nature and recognizes that stability and flux co-exist. Human intervention must acknowledge that nature predates humans. The spatial and temporal scale of our actions must approach natural background levels. Geo-centric forestry practices are those of eco-centrism except that wilderness and the overarching totality of nature are stressed.30 Finally, to classify the many Native proposals, I added a Native management profile (keeping in mind that there is no one Native outlook on nature or on what to do with the forests). For this philosophy, I have borrowed the term "cosmo-centric" from the Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples.31

Discussion

Table 1 records the results of classifying the 50 submissions according to their nature philosophy, forestry philosophy and geographical distribution. Most fall into the standard category. (This was to be expected, given the MFP's guidelines.) But the other three contemporary categories are all represented. One unsuccessful proposal, Saint John Regional Model Forest, combined the bio- technological focus of the post-modern philosophy with a modernist philosophy that is keen on management objectives of an earlier time, such as road building and herbicide use. I labelled it M-PM (modernist post-modernist). Long Beach, one of the successful applicants, pushed the edge a little and was typed PM-ECOC. On the whole, the standard post-modernist (PM) occurs in all the provinces; the least conforming submissions are concentrated in British Columbia and Ontario. One reason for this is that most of the First Nations proponents live in those two provinces, and their submissions were built on a different philosophy. Several submissions presumably came from post-materialist communities, for example the Kootenay region of British Columbia.32 The two most conservative proposals came from New Brunswick and Ontario.

Before delving more deeply into the results, some general comments are warranted. Obviously, although it was not critical, all 10 successful sites conformed to the size criterion.33 There was some variation in presentation; since content was more important, a lower performance did not preclude success. In accordance with program objectives, there was variation of tenure; as well, the model forests are located across the country and represent the major ecoregions. To achieve this distribution, the National Advisory Committee chose only five of those ranked highest by the technical review committee.

Partnerships

Partnerships were key to the selection of a proposed model forest. The most critical component was landholder inclusivity. Many proposals fell out in the first round on this account. (An exception was made for Long Beach Model Forest.)

Broadness of partnerships was desired but, as suggested by the Western Newfoundland and Prince Albert model forests, apparently not decisive, so long as some mechanism was in place to accommodate other voices. In many proposals the mechanism for accommodation was multi-tiered participation; however, as Foothills Model Forest demonstrates, a broad partnership did not necessarily mean that everyone was to have equal say or responsibility. At Foothills, only government and industry representatives would be involved in management. Members of the technical review committee disqualified proposals that did not include environmental groups or First Nations groups who were in the area, but Foothills and Prince Albert had no environmental group in their partnership.

The technical review committee wanted successful candidates to consult other voices and share decision making, but this criterion was not applied across the board. In spite of a broad partnership, Abitibi-Price meant to put only its own staff on the management team; even the model forest coordinator at Lake Abitibi was to be an employee. The Eastern Ontario Model Forest proposed a system of weighted voting, which would limit any sharing in decisions.

Last, a mix of administrations was appreciated. Proposals that included park-land in their area were viewed favourably, as were those such as Eastern Ontario that could contribute some variety of tenure to the cross-country network.

Landholder Representation

"Landholder" included the provincial government and companies that held tenure or freeholds, as well as the federal government, First Nations and small woodlot owners. Their role was to provide clear jurisdictional lines to ensure that forest management plans could be implemented.

Governments

Some proposals that included a national park within their boundaries, such as the Foret Modele de la Mauricie, failed to get the federal government on board. A fairly common mistake, especially in Quebec, was to assume that because all the land in the model forest area was private, provincial representation was not necessary. Some groups proposed having ministries on board, such as tourism or wildlife, but not the ministry responsible for forests. Companies and organizations involved in forestry need to reckon with provincial regulations even on private land, however. Provinces have jurisdiction over forests. Provincial approval was required so the federal government could carry out the program.

On the whole, the provinces were not enthusiastic or coope\rative. British Columbia imposed a condition: the BC Forest Service would not be obliged to divert resources to helping groups, nor could it be expected to change its policy focus or plans as a result of the Model Forest Program. Even successful model forests have had trouble attracting the interest of their provincial governments.34 Some provinces would not sign a partnership intention with those proposing the model forest. This happened to Western Strathcona, an otherwise competent submission. Other provinces said they would join once a site had been chosen, but would not sign. Provinces signed some proposals and refused to sign others, which sent conflicting messages to sponsoring groups.

First Nations

There was no successful First Nations proposal among the original sites - none made it past the first round. Yet nearly all the proposals included First Nations participation. The Lheit-Lit'en Nation filed a proposal based in their traditional territories, which include Northwood's Tree Farm License. National Advisory Committee member Chief Whiteduck urged McGregor to make the Lheit- Lit'en Nation a partner. In general, First Nations proposals were strong on decision making and Native aspects - socio-economics and traditional use of resources - but they did not include other elements of sustainability and were weak in technical and research areas. The James Bay Cree Model Forest,35 Oweetna-Kula Model Forest and one of the Gaspe model forests had a narrow partnership base; Wikwemikong had none. These shortcomings counted heavily against the proposals.

Many groups had no money to hire consulting foresters or professional writers. Wordsmiths and forestry professionals know how to make a good presentation, and they know the forestry language. The Prince Albert project could afford to hire a writer, paid for by Weyerhaeuser. One unsuccessful BC proponent said McGregor's proposal received financial support from Northwood. Some community proposals seemed put together on the run; they were incomplete and failed to grapple with the issues. Stan Rowe, a member of the technical review committee, said there was "a spirit of defeat written right into the submission."

Industry

Members of both committees repeatedly asserted that the timber industry was the key partner. Long Beach, which had only two of four industry interests on board, is an oddity. An unsuccessful applicant says Long Beach was chosen because it was "politically correct and geographically logical." Chief Whiteduck, in contrast, remembers much discussion because of the area's controversial history.

Several industry-led projects planned to draw on extraordinary resources at their disposal to further their management stake in the model forest. Some were offered use of company office space and managers, as well as the seconding of personnel to the model forest. Lake Abitibi, Fundy, Foothills and McGregor all have some direct company involvement. This clear conflict of interest was not judged problematic, however. It is of course possible to argue that such companies were showing commitment to the partnership. Practical experience at Fundy shows the negative effects that can flow from these arrangements.36

Timber Focus

What role did timber play in each proposal? The question became a prime point of tension in the selection procedure. Obviously, non- timber values had to be included - the more the better, according to Chief Whiteduck and Stan Rowe. McGregor featured very few non- timber values; Eastern Ontario did not display many either. Timber, however, was essential. Technical review committee member Jeff Patch explained that because this was a forestry program, a proposal that did not include managing the flow of timber would not have been a proposal in forest management. Some form of "exploitation and the harvesting associated with it" was a given. Proposals that advocated lowering the cut or that de-emphasized timber management stood little chance.

Patch's statement perfectly captures the ambiguity inherent in a program that seeks to accommodate old and new attitudes. The ambiguity operated in the choice of committee participants and in the directives of the guidelines. Most committee members were old hands at industrial forestry. Chief Whiteduck, no stranger to forestry, found himself surrounded by expertise that made him believe his role was to provide Native representation. Neither group was a "new paradigm" committee, however. Too many members were "strongly strongly on timber" for this to be possible. The hope of the Model Forest Program might have been to set objectives that would treat the forest's gifts equally, but the guidelines could not get past the fact that timber was the essential element.

Science and Technology

The technical review committee looked in vain for innovation in the proposals, which focussed on timber and high-tech integrated management. The committee thought the submissions were unimaginative and disappointing. There was innovation in several proposals - for example, the James Bay Cree Model Forest planned to use trap lines as the unit of management - but there was little innovation in the proposals considered for selection.

The Partners in Sustainable Development of Forests Program pamphlet included several scientific research projects - integrated pest management, ecological land classification, climate change, cutting techniques, waste and pollution reduction, fire management and effects of forestry practices. Applicants were told about these projects, and most proposals suggested research in a combination of these fields. The scientific guidelines were tied to a timber production paradigm, and thus were not innovative. For example, one research area, fire management, was given a very narrow scope, aimed at the increased use of decision support systems to reduce loss from fire. Guidelines ignored studies of the nature of wildfire and its effects compared with effects of cutting style, or of the use of fire as a management tool.

Despite a concern to minimize damage from logging, nothing in the program encouraged people to stay out of sensitive areas. The Lake Abitibi proposal included a plan to drain peat lands. The timber imperative was not questioned, nor were proponents asked to explore alternative fibres. One of the 50 submissions, Manitoba, mentioned alternative fibres, but only as a way to increase the wood supply, not as a way to reduce pressure on existing forests.

Alternatives were available to the National Advisory Committee and the Forest Service. Near the successful Fundy proposal was St. Mary's-Liscomb, in Nova Scotia. All landholders and industrial partners were on board. The scientific program was connected to regional institutions, and one goal was to increase timber production. Unlike Fundy, the industrial partners were not large; the proposal questioned traditional forestry practices and planned to build on an existing cooperative project. In its favour, Fundy had the presence of the forestry department at the University of New Brunswick.37 One problematic choice was Western Newfoundland. The proposal included a strong timber ethic in a sensitive region of slow growth, and its partnership was limited. The Western Newfoundland Model Forest completes boreal representation geographically, but the wisdom of the choice is debatable. The proposal presented a model forest that would protect the industry's holdings from "indiscriminate" fuel wood consumption by the public and repair Newfoundland's timber industry's credibility problem. The model forest continues to liquidate old growth, which is home to the threatened Newfoundland pine marten. The credibility problem is not going to disappear soon.38

The latecomer Lake Abitibi was picked to fill the gap in boreal cover between Manitoba Model Forest and Eastern Ontario, but Lake Abitibi lies just north-west of Eastern Ontario. A more convincing choice would have been Armstrong, located north of Lake Nipigon. The Lake Abitibi project seemed to use public participation and research agendas as tools to promote the company. At the time of submission, the proposed partnership committee favoured the provincial government and the company, but once the model forest was operating, the provincial government and company were given only one seat each. Armstrong, however, proposed that its sponsors be co-chairs. Armstrong meant to initiate an innovative project to return stumpage fees to the area. (The provincial government was on board.) Armstrong did not propose to drain peat land.

The Cariboo-Lower Peace Model Forest of Alberta was a superior First Nations submission. The provincial government declined to sign, although it said it intended to. Another stroke against this proposal was its narrow partnership base. There were no environmentalists or First Nations people on the technical review committee. This model forest's philosophy was not the dominant, industry-driven standard, and the incorporation of First Nations knowledge guaranteed innovation. The model forest was located in the boreal forest, which in terms of ecoregional representation was perhaps a disadvantage; other provinces, however, have been assigned two model boreal forests.

Conclusions

The promising initiative of the Model Forest Program in the end delivered only options lacking in innovation while ignoring viable alternatives. The program's potential was undermined by its guidelines and selection process. These were prepared and administered by forward-looking professionals, but the guidelines suffered from an industrially biassed mentality. In its perception of nature, the standard management approach seems consistent with the new paradigm in ecology, but its forest management practices follow earlier traditions. The emphasis on timber and the strong trust placed in technological fixes were most restrictive. These two notions were held over from the Enlightenment. Innova\tion was further curbed by the political need for countrywide representation. As well, Ottawa's weak position in the area of forest management limited the operational freedom of the selection process. Exceptions were made to accommodate weaknesses such as insufficient stakeholder representation and restricted partnerships. The inclusion of Cariboo- Lower Peace and St. Mary's-Liscomb would have permitted a marked measure of innovation and would have added Nova Scotia, the only province left out.

It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the lack of innovation was due to the particular interpretation of the meaning of sustainability in forestry. This standard amounts to the construction and deployment of baskets of bundled benefits that have little to do with forest system persistence because the benchmark remains human utility (Figure 1). The timber imperative, with its exploitive ethic, demands the application of advanced technology and imposes a timber bias; ecosystem care and economic expedience demand best forestry practices and involvement of all parties. The solution is an uneasy technocratic and anthropocentric compromise known as sustainable development. It selectively integrates scientific information into policy.39 Although it causes some uncomfortable adjustments and introduces welcome improvements such as "best forestry practices," it is really quite safe for established industrial interests because no transformation of attitude is necessary. The main finding of my study is the selective accommodation of the new ecology during the policy-making process.

The customary view is that policy and science literatures are isolated from one another; science cannot inform policy, or can inform it only slowly. The evidence of the MFP selection process suggests a contrary argument and supports Hessing and Howlett's contention that interests (or power) and ideas contribute vitally to policy making.40 We know that forestry science was invented with the express purpose of solving a financial problem for estate administrators. In that tradition, Pinchot established forestry in North America as "tree farming," and science served as the handmaiden of a program of societal reform. In Canada, the development and implementation of the conservation agenda confirmed and entrenched the eighteenth-century precedent of forestry's close alliance with economic interests. Governments and foresters implemented only those scientific elements (land classification, fire control) that supported the higher objectives of a benignly paternalistic, industrially patterned society.

Weir asserts that the "creation of policy networks narrows the range of ideas likely to receive a hearing."41 Canadian forest policy networks are dominated by an industry-government culture dating from before Confederation. Professional foresters in the bureaucracy, industry and academe joined this culture in the early twentieth century. The integration of scientific content into policy, its how and what, is mediated by this powerful conjunction of interests and ideas. The result is a selective openness to a new way of thought. The struggle over the meaning and relevance of certain concepts, including the correct way of dealing with uncertainty, is prominent. Other views are solicited, but they are made to fit the dominant frame during the process of operationalization, translating what is heard into the right language. Most of those called in to make the Model Forest Program a reality, although ahead of the rest of the community, were not a new paradigm group; they were steeped in the tradition of industrial forestry. The few who were not found themselves outnumbered. It would be inaccurate to say they were not listened to or that they had no influence. The Model Forest Program and the National Forest Strategy were nudged towards eco-centrism by their efforts, but could not escape the gravitational pull of the timber imperative. There are, in fact, two types of professionals involved: ecologists or conservation biologists, listened to along with Native representatives, eco-foresters and environmentalists and industrial foresters. Those whose methods and philosophy resisted politico- economic interests and were consequently marginalized, and those whose methods did not were considered credible.42

Gillis and Roach argued in 1986 that the history of Canadian forestry is marked by a series of promising initiatives that fail because of the restricted Canadian forest policy regime.43 This essay demonstrates the degree to which professional forestry is shaped by industrial objectives, a symbiosis that began during the Enlightenment and crystallized during the Conservation era. It is now impossible to think of a forestry program without a strong timber component. The adoption of an ostensibly ecosystemic outlook could not correct the traditional perception, in which forests are accumulations of trees. The choice of standard management philosophy for the Model Forest Program, the product of that complex of institutional and political factors associated with the dominant forest policy regime, curbed its potential sufficiently, in spite of positive achievements, so that it was tainted by that unhappy epithet, the lost forestry initiative.

Volume 37 * No. 3 * (Automne 2002 Fall)

Notes I thank Anders Sandberg, whose suggestions have benefited this paper greatly.

1. For an introduction to the old and new ecological paradigms, see S.T.A. Pickett, V.T. Parker and P.L. Fiedler, "The New Paradigm in Ecology: Implications for Conservation Biology Above the Species Level," Conservation Biology: The Theory and Practice of Nature Conservation, Preservation and Management, ed. P.L. Fiedler and S.K. Jain (New York: Chapman and Hall, 1992) 65-88.

2. Two sources on ecosystem management are Jeremy Rayner, "Implementing Sustainability in West Coast Forests: Core and Femat as Experiments in Process," Journal of Canadian Studies 31.1 (1996): 82-101; and C. Galindo-Real and F.L. Bunnell, "Ecosystem Management: Implications and Opportunities of a New Paradigm," The Forestry Chronicle 71 (1995): 601-06.

3. For the anticipated effects of ecosystem management on the dialogue between scientists and policy makers, see Hanna J. Cortner and Margaret A. Moote, The Politics of Ecosystem Management (Washington: Island Press, 1999).

4. See John A. Hall, "Ideas and the Social Sciences," Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change, eds. Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993) 31-54. Peter A. Hall writes about the effects of shifts in policy paradigms on economic Policy. "Policy Paradigms, Experts and the State: The Case Of Macroeconomic Policy-making in Britain," Social Scientists, Policy, and the State, eds. S. Brooks and A.-G. Gagnon (New York: Praeger, 1990) 53-78. For the status of ideas in the policy literature, see Mark M. Blyth, "'Any More Bright Ideas?' The Ideational Turn of Comparative Political Economy," Comparative Politics 29 (1997): 246. John Kurt Jacobsen, "Much Ado about Ideas: the Cognitive Factor in Economic Policy," World Politics 47.1 (1995): 283-310. Margaret Weir, "Ideas and the Politics of Bounded Innovation," Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis, eds. Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen and Frank Longstreth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) 188-216.

5. Quoted in Joanna M. Beyers, "The Forest Unbundled: Canada's National Forestry Strategy and Model Forest Program, 1992-1997," PhD dissertation, York University, 1998. See also Gordon Baskerville, "The Forestry Problem: Adaptive Lurches of Renewal," Barriers and Bridges to the Renewal of Ecosystems and Institutions, eds. L.H. Gunderson, C.S. Holling and S.S. Light (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995) 37-102. Another version of this view is found in M.J.G. van Eeten, "'Dialogues of the Deaf on Science in Policy Controversies," Science and Public Policy 26.3 (1999): 185- 192, and Michael E. Kraft, "Clean Air and the Adirondacks: Science, Politics, and Policy Choice," Environmental Science & Policy 1 (1998): 167-73.

6. A good illustration is Jeffrey A. Hutchings, Carl Walters and Richard L. Haedrich, "Is Scientific Inquiry Incompatible with Government Information Control?" Canadian Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Science 54 (1997): 1198-210. The authors examine the filtering process to which research findings are subjected from the time of their submission to the decisions of senior Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) bureaucracy. The authors say the failure of the DFO to protect the health of northern cod and Pacific salmon was due to the influence of non-scientific elements ("political and bureaucratic interference"), which caused scientific uncertainty and the nature of the variation in scientific opinion to be misrepresented or omitted.

7. On the origins of forestry science see Henry E. Lowood, "The Calculating Forester: Quantification, Cameral Science, and the Emergence of Scientific Forestry Management in Germany," The Quantifying Spirit in the 18th Century, ed. Tore Frangsmyr, J.L. Heilbron and Robin E. Rider (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990) 315-42. For its application in the United States, see Samuel P. Hays, Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency: The Progressive Conservation Movement, 1890-1920 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1999), and Paul W. Hirt, A Conspiracy of Optimism: Management of the National Forests Since World War Two (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994). For an introduction to Canadian aspects, see Robert Peter Gillis, "The Ottawa Lumber Barons and the Conservation Movement, 1880-1914," Journal of Canadian Studies 9.1 (1974): 14-31; Robert Peter Gillis and T.R. Roach, Lost Initiatives: Canada's Forest Industries, Forest Policy, and Forest Conservation, 1900-1980 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986); C.K. Leman, "The Canad\ian Forest Ranger: Bureaucratic Centralism and Private Power in Three Provincial Natural Resources Agencies," a paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Halifax, 27-29 May 1981; T.R. Roach, "Stewards of the People's Wealth: the Founding of British Columbia's Forest Branch," Journal of Forest History 28.1 (1984): 14-23; Suzanne Zeller, "Darwin Meets the Engineers: Scientizing the Forest at McGill University, 1890-1910," Environmental History 6.3 (2001): 428-50.

8. Two important areas of environmental science have grappled with the problem of interpretation of scientific ideas. One is evaluation and risk management of environmental impact assessments; the other is toxicological and similar assessments in the areas of health and safety, including the biotechnology industry. Cost- benefit analysis is a common methodology. The bulky literature with respect to these fields draws on different traditions in science and displays affinities with engineering and actuarian science; it is not infrequently concerned with mitigation of effects or negotiation of differences to settle disputes. I have discussed the element of dispute resolution within the framework of the Model Forest Program in Joanna M. Beyers, "Model Forests as Process Reform: Alternative Dispute Resolution and Multi-stakeholder Planning," Canadian Forest Policy: Adapting to Change, ed. Michael Howlett (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001) 172202. The Model Forest Program did not have risk-management or impact-assessment components, except as might have been proposed as a separate project by individual model forests. The literature pertaining to them falls outside the scope of this essay. Liora Salter, with the assistance of Edwin Levy and William Leiss, Mandated Science: Science and Scientists in the Making of Standards (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1988), and Carole Weiss, in the edited volume Using Social Research in Public Policy- Making (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1977), are two sources.

9. See P.M. Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination," International Organization 46 (1992): 1-35.

10. For background to forest policy in Canada, see Canadian Forest Policy: Adapting to Change, ed. Michael Howlett (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001); Monique M. Ross, Forest Management in Canada (Calgary: University of Calgary, 1995); Michael Howlett, "The 1987 National Forest Sector Strategy and the Search for a Federal Role in Canadian Forest Policy," Canadian Public Administration 32 (1989): 545-63. For a discussion of uniquely Canadian institutional and historical factors constraining the forest policy regime, see Joanna M. Beyers and L. Anders Sandberg, "Canadian Federal Forest Policy: Present Initiatives and Historical Constraints," Sustainability: The Challenge - People, Power and the Environment, eds. L. Anders Sandberg and S. Sorlin (Montreal: Black Rose, 1998) 99-107; G. Bruce Doern, "Canadian Environmental Policy: Why Process is Almost Everything," Commentary #19 (Ottawa: C.D. Howe Institute, 1990); and George Hoberg and Kathryn Harrison, "It's Not Easy Being Green: The Politics of Canada's Green Plan," Canadian Public Policy 20 (1994): 119-37.

11. Melody Hessing and Michael Howlett, Canadian Natural Resource and Environmental Policy: Political Economy and Public Policy (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1997) 9; Michael Howlett and M. Ramesh, Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy Subsystems (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1995); and Weir, "Ideas and the Politics" 188. Professional foresters in Canada have received little attention, but see C.K. Leman, "The Canadian Forest Ranger: Bureaucratic Centralism and Private Power in Three Provincial Natural Resources Agencies," a paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Halifax, 27-29 May 1981; and L. Anders Sandberg and Peter Clancy, Against the Grain: Foresters and Politics in Nova Scotia (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2000).

12. Jeremy Wilson, "Talking the Talk and Walking the Walk: Reflections on the Early Influence of Ecosystem Management Ideas," Canadian Forest Policy: Adapting to Change, ed. Michael Hewlett (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001) 94-126.

13. Jeffrey A. Hutchings, Carl Walters and Richard L. Haedrich, "Is Scientific Inquiry Incompatible with Government Information Control?" Canadian Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Science 54 (1997): 1198-210; C.S. Holling, Adaptive Environmental Assessment and Management (Chichester: John Wiley, 1978); Joanna M. Beyers, "The Forest Unbundled: Canada's National Forest Strategy and Model Forest Program 1992-1997," PhD dissertation, York University, 1998.

14. G.H. Weyerhaeuser, Jr., "The Challenge of Adaptive Forest Management: Aren't People Part of the Ecosystem, Too?" The Forestry Chronicle 74 (1998): 868-869. On the place of adaptive management in an uncertain time see Canadian Council of Forest Ministers, Sustainable Forests: A Canadian Commitment, 1998-2003 (Hull: National Forest Strategy, 1998) 9; and Bruce Mitchell, "'Beating' Conflict and Uncertainty in Resource and Environmental Management," Resource and Environmental Management in Canada: Addressing Conflict and Uncertainty, eds. Bruce Mitchell (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1995) 406-25. The critique of adaptive management is based on D. Simberloff, "Flagships, Umbrellas, and Keystones: Is Single- Species Management Passe in the Landscape Era?" Biological Conservation 83 (1998): 247-57. The critique is also based on personal observation at model forest sites, in particular McGregor in the summer of 1995. For a discussion of theory and confirmational tests, see Robert H. Peters, A Critique f

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