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BP Kept Unit Running Despite Memo on Eroded Pipes

Posted on: Friday, 9 September 2005, 18:00 CDT

Sep. 9--BP Texas City refinery managers in May knowingly kept running a unit with thinning and eroding pipes -- which they considered a serious safety risk -- just two months after a blast at another unit killed 15 people, according to an internal BP e-mail the Houston Chronicle obtained.

If pipes within a refinery become too thin and the erosion is severe, they can quickly fail and lead to fires and explosions.

The Occupational Safety and Health Administration confirmed it is investigating the recent operations of the refinery's Ultraformer No. 4 unit, said spokeswoman Elizabeth Todd.

It isn't the first time OSHA has investigated that unit. In March 2004, a ruptured pipe in that same unit, which produces blending components used to boost the octane of gasoline, caused a series of explosions and fires. An OSHA investigation found 14 serious violations and led to a $63,000 fine.

Among the violations was that "the employer did not inspect and test areas of high corrosion concern," according to records obtained by the Chronicle.

According to a copy of an e-mail sent May 27 of this year by the head of that unit -- called the UU4 -- thin piping and at least one crack were discovered during inspections. But managers decided to continue operating it anyway.

That decision, according to the e-mail, was made because another ultraformer unit, the UU3, was shut down for maintenance. Consequently, shutting down the UU4 would force the shutdown of several other units dependent on its sole operation, the e-mail said.

"The piping is a serious safety risk," wrote superintendent Ross Vail to other unit superintendents and BP top management. "However UU4 will remain operating until UU3 has returned to safe operation. ... The decision to operate UU4 was not easy, but the risk to the site was very apparent."

BP spokesman Ronnie Chappell said inspectors found one problem line with weld erosion -- a condition that weakens the pipeline and can cause it to fail -- on May 26 and were able to isolate it, preventing any dangerous liquids from flowing through it. But another line with erosion detected the next day could not be isolated, he said.

Posed risk at least 3 days Knowing that the UU3 would be started up again within days, managers decided to wait until then to shut down the UU4 for repairs, he said. That wasn't accomplished until May 30.

That means the unit operated with a known serious safety risk for at least three days.

During this critical time, Vail wrote in his e-mail, extensive safety measures were put in place. Among other things, access to the unit was strictly limited, workers in surrounding areas were told to use a remote gate and a street in the area was blocked off.

"The unit personnel are taking this situation very seriously," Vail wrote in the e-mail.

The head of the safety arm of the United Steelworkers of America, the nation's largest industrial union, said that he was deeply concerned about the matter and that it appeared BP was putting production ahead of safety.

"This tells a lot about the company's attitude toward safety," said Mike Wright, director of health, safety and environment for the Pittsburgh-based union. "They clearly didn't learn much since March 23."

It was on that afternoon that the refinery's isomerization unit exploded as workers were trying to re-start it after a month-long maintenance turnaround.

In addition to those killed, 170 people were injured and many homes and businesses in Texas City were damaged in what is considered the worst U.S. refinery accident in recent memory.

Workers accidentally overflowed a vent stack, spilling hydrocarbon fluids and vapors onto the plant grounds, where they quickly ignited.

Federal investigators looking into the blast say they have found several instances of mechanical failure. They also have said that the accident might have been avoided if the stack had been equipped with a flare, as is the industry standard, safely burning away the excess materials.

Vail could not be reached for comment on his e-mail regarding the UU4. And Chappell said the company would not make him available.

Dangers of shutdown Chappell said that the decision to keep the UU4 operating and avoid shutting down other units was not made because the company didn't want to slow production and face revenue loss. Rather, he said that the shutting down of units is generally considered dangerous, and this case it was deemed more so than keeping the UU4 in operation.

"The decision was made to proceed speedily and appropriately to bring UU4 down, weighed against the alternative of shutting down multiple units, creating significant other risks," Chappell said.

Glenn Erwin, a former Texas City refinery worker who monitors refinery safety nationwide for the USW, said he was skeptical of that reason. But even if true, that rationale was not good enough to continue operating the unit, even for a day, he said.

"As a general rule, we can safely shut down our units and bring our units up," Erwin said. "By taking the position that we have a dangerous unit but shutting it down would be even more dangerous means there are pretty significant safety issues in the whole operation."

Scott Berger, director of the Center for Chemical Process Safety, which writes guidelines for the safe operations of refineries and other chemical plants, agreed that having to balance the two risks should be avoided.

"It would certainly ruin my day if I was in charge of the unit and basically found the piping got thin, and there was a bigger risk if I shut it down," said Berger."You are making the choice of the lesser of two evils. ... You should never let yourself get into that position in the first place."

The U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board is looking into the UU4 matter as well, spokesman Daniel Horowitz said.

The CSB has been investigating the March 23 blast, as well as two other incidents on July 28 and August 10.

"We are concerned about this e-mail report and our investigators will follow up with BP for more information," Horowitz said. "Mechanical integrity has already been identified as an important issue in the incidents on March 23, July 28 and August 10."

Chappell refused to provide a copy of BP's internal investigation report stemming from the UU4 explosions last year.

But he said an informal settlement with OSHA reduced the number of violations to five and the fine was lowered to $13,000.

After that incident, he said, BP conducted routine inspections of pipes on that unit, but he declined to say how often.

Last month, the CSB urged the BP Global executive board of directors to form an independent panel to assess the corporate safety culture, including mechanical integrity programs, at the company's five U.S. refineries.

BP Texas City Plant Manager Colin Maclean said he welcomed the review, but the panel has not yet been formed.

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Source: Houston Chronicle

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