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Disaster Risk Management in Southeast Asia: A Developmental Approach

Posted on: Wednesday, 21 September 2005, 03:01 CDT

Countries in disaster-prone regions need to manage their disaster risks with a long-term view, going beyond disaster reconstruction and relief. The heart of a country's strategy for managing disaster risk should not be loss-financing. Instead, it should be development enhancing to optimize post-loss funding capacity and budgetary discipline to protect and sustain current and future development projects. This is especially so when natural disasters directly threaten a country's development strategy and socio-economic performance. Against this background and drawing lessons from the recent Asian tsunami disaster, this article proposes that risk financing, disaster mitigation, knowledge management, and an accountability governance framework must be built into future and existing disaster risk management frameworks to protect and sustain current and future development projects of Southeast Asian countries.

I. Introduction

Are countries affected by the recent tsunami disaster trading an ounce of misery now for a pound of misery later? Although countries have access to liquid funds such as emergency aid and debt-relief following a disaster, they often exhaust their funding capacity on immediate recovery and reconstruction needs and may find themselves unable to fund new development projects after the reconstruction stage.

The Asian Development Bank (ADB), Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), and ASEAN Secretariat reported that the December tsunami disaster would have limited impact on the economies of ASEAN, with the ten member nations continuing to see an average growth rate of over 4 per cent in 2005 (ADB 2005; EIU 2005; ASEAN Secretariat 2005). However, we must take note of some secondary effects which may appear some time later such as rising poverty and unemployment, increasing fiscal deficit, and problems with balance of payments and international reserves.

Some signs of such secondary effects are already showing. More than 400,000 tsunami survivors in Banda Aceh have lost their homes and jobs. Living in makeshift shelters, many have food and clothing from aid agencies but are still unable to earn money to rebuild their lives. Important human capital has also been lost. The Indonesian Government estimated that 1,750 primary school teachers were dead or missing, and 700 to 1,100 schools in the province were destroyed by the tsunami.

The EIU (2005) estimated that in Indonesia alone, nearly one million people could be thrown into poverty by the lingering effects of the tsunami's devastation. In India, the number of poor in the country could increase by 645,000. In Sri Lanka, the figure was estimated at about 250,000. In the Maldives, more than half of the country's residential areas were affected and more than 50 per cent of the population could fall into absolute poverty resulting in 23,500 additional people going below the poverty line. According to ADB (2005), the damage of the tsunami to Thailand was centred on southern resort areas that contributed about 3 per cent to the country's GDP.

FIGURE 1

Economic and Human Impacts of Natural Disasters in Southeast Asia, 1975-2004

About 75 per cent of the world's major natural catastrophes between 1970 and 1997 occurred in the Asia-Pacific region, mostly in poverty-ridden developing countries (UNESCAP and ADB 2000). In Southeast Asia, the trend during the last three decades shows an increase in the number of natural disaster events and an increase in the number of affected populations (Figure 1).

The number of reported natural disasters significantly increased to 383 in the last decade from 270 disasters between 1985 and 1994 and 207 disasters between 1975 and 1984. Moreover, the combined economic loss of US$28.3 million in the last decade was ten times greater than that of between 1975 and 1984. 177,572 people died in the natural disasters, including the Asian tsunami, in 2004 which was an exponential increase from the average of 1,909.6 annual deaths in the 1970s and 1980s. These figures must be treated with caution, however, as the accompanying social and economic costs of disasters is difficult to estimate.

For countries like Indonesia and Vietnam, economic loss as a result of disasters can set back a decade of economic development. For Cambodia and Laos, the effect is even worse, as scarce resources that could have been used for social and economic development projects are lost or spent on recovery efforts.

The need to protect a country's long-term development projects is crucial and the purpose of this article is to introduce a development-oriented disaster risk management model to redress the inherent limitations of immediate post-disaster response. In particular the proposed model argues that both ex ante and ex post management initiatives must be considered to protect and sustain current and future development projects in addition to supporting the mitigation of impending disaster events and reconstruction efforts after such an event has occurred.

II. The Preoccupation with Post-Disaster Management

The suddenness of impact in many disasters and the urgency of need that such disasters cause have led to a particularly ahistorical approach in responding to disasters. This can be traced to the association of disasters with sudden, violent, and uncontrollable natural phenomena such as earthquakes, typhoons, and volcanic eruption. Oliver-Smith (1999) suggested that in most disaster examination, time was reduced to a relatively shallow duration in which only conditions immediately prior to the calamity were probed and only individual, group, and societal behaviour in moments of threat or short-term aftermath was explored. Indeed it has been observed that the dominant response and action on disaster management in Southeast Asia had been on post-disaster activities and particularly on emergency response (Bildan 2003; Jegillos 2003).

There has also been a tendency to over-rely on multinational development banks and donor agencies for post-disaster funding and aid which has contributed to the Samaritan's dilemma (Freeman, Keen, and Mani 2003) of donors committing to provide emergency assistance on a obligatory basis. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the ADB have been predominantly known for its emergency reconstruction loans to countries affected by natural disasters. Over the last twenty years, the World Bank has lent more than US$38 billion for emergency reconstruction projects in disaster- prone countries, which makes it the largest specialized catastrophe reinsurer in the world.

However, Gurenko (2004) argues that this form of post-emergency reconstruction lending has numerous serious drawbacks. First, being reactive by nature, it provides little incentive for countries to engage in active risk management to reduce their vulnerabilities to natural disasters before they occur. As a result, in anticipation of concessional reconstruction funding from multilateral organizations and donor agencies in case of highly catastrophic events, disaster- prone countries find themselves unprepared to deal with the devastating consequences of natural catastrophes when they occur. When they do, the main thrust of government efforts is likely to be focused on the physical reconstruction of destroyed assets, with little attention paid to the development of forward-looking catastrophe risk-management solutions.

Second, Gurenko (2004) reiterates that even when multinational development banks and donor agencies can finance a significant percentage of government reconstruction work in the aftermath of natural disasters, this funding comes with a significant delay, jeopardizing government efforts to quickly restart the economy due to the shortage of immediate liquidity. Scrambling for cash, governments often have to resort to internal and external borrowings, reallocation of budgetary resources, imposition of additional taxes and surcharges and cutbacks in funding earmarked for health, education, and capital investment in national infrastructure. At the end, post-emergency lending tends to produce little visible improvement in countries' economic and fiscal vulnerabilities to future natural disasters, leaves countries with higher debt burdens, and dampens the incentives for active, forward- looking risk management.

Countries in disaster-prone regions need to manage their disaster risks with a long-term view beyond disaster reconstruction and relief. The heart of a country's strategy for managing disaster risk should not be loss-financing. Instead it should be development enhancing to optimize post-loss funding capacity and budgetary discipline to protect and sustain current and future development projects. This is especially so when natural disasters directly threaten a country's development strategy and socio-economic performance.

Like all investment activities, investments in disaster risk management will add value if the social benefits exceed the social costs. The question is not how to provide immediate relief and to pay for what has been lost but rather how to protect post-loss funding capacity and to allocate that capacity to the most beneficial projects. The emphasis on a development-enhancing disaster risk management is to ensur\e that scarce post-loss funds are put to uses that create the most value, where value is not confined to short-term disaster needs.

FIGURE 2

A Developmental Framework for Disaster Risk Management

III. A Developmental Model of Disaster Risk Management

Figure 2 presents a proposed framework for disaster risk management. In particular the proposed model argues that both ex ante and ex post management initiatives must be considered to protect and sustain current and future development projects in addition to supporting the mitigation of impending disaster events and reconstruction efforts after such an event has occurred.

The first component of an ex ante management of a country's disaster risk considers the array of potential risk financing instruments and risk-transfer solutions that can be used by countries to increase their financial preparedness for natural disasters. The explicit objective of the country-level disaster risk financing is to mobilize financial resources to adequately fund the risk exposure countries to natural disasters, once all costeffective risk-reduction strategies have been implemented. The second component under an ex ante management strategy involves the effective knowledge management deployment of disaster data and information to derive reliable scientific knowledge of the various disaster risks facing a country. In addition, robust knowledge sharing involving network interactions between actors and organizations through a framework of shared institutions, including law, ethical norms, behavioural regularities, customs and so on is argued to be a prerequisite for the purpose of creating explicit and timely knowledge on potential disaster risks.

Under the ex post category of the management of disaster risks, the accountability governance of the model examines how post- disaster assistance, funds, and pledges can be channelled effectively for their intended use, such as for immediate relief to the victims and to rebuild damaged assets. In particular, it is argued that governance measures must be instituted to protect against opportunistic siphoning and the feeding of corrupt purposes. The final component on mitigation refers to measures that can be taken before a disaster occurs or after disaster to minimize the destructive and disruptive effects of disasters.

Drawing lessons from the Asian tsunami disaster of December 2004, the following is a discussion of the various components contributing towards a disaster risk management model that is development enhancing to optimize post-loss funding capacity to protect and sustain current and future development projects. The emphasis on a development-enhancing disaster risk management is to ensure that scarce post-loss funds are put to uses that create the most value, where value is not confined to short-term disaster needs.

III.1. Risk Financing

Different risk financing instruments provide different degrees of flexibility and vary in the budgetary discipline they impose. Insurance, derivatives and securitization, debt forgiveness and domestic funding sources are by far the most common instruments.

The most common instrument is insurance. Insurance funds are payable upon the loss of declared assets. However market-based insurance solutions for governments have experienced low appeal in the past because of the pronounced volatility of the global reinsurance market, the lack of volatility hedging instruments, and the short-term nature of reinsurance contracts.

Compounding the problem is that insurance plays a limited role in funding existing and future development projects beyond the reconstruction stage. Insurance funds essentially provide monies for asset replacement and are not earmarked for other development purposes. Insurance is especially ineffective as the domestic insurance market is thin in many developing countries in Asia in the first place. Non-life (i.e. property/ casualty) insurance penetration rates are low in the countries affected by this disaster (Table 1). In other words, relatively little insurance is purchased in the affected countries. Although overall insurance premium volume in Asia has been on the increase in recent years, penetration and growth rates for insurance products vary significantly between individual regions and markets.

Table 1 shows there is relatively little penetration of non-life insurance products in the countries worst affected by the December 2004 earthquake and associated tsunamis (India, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka). In Indonesia, for example, just US$8.1 per capita was spent on non-life insurance in 2004. Measured in terms of GDP, Indonesia has an insurance penetration rate of 0.68 per cent for non-life business in 2004. Penetration of non-life insurance in Sri Lanka, the country perhaps suffering the most severe impact from the tsunami, is even lower. By comparison, a total of US$2,062.60 per capita was spent on non-life insurance in the United States in 2004, nearly 250 times as much as in Indonesia and more than 280 times that in Sri Lanka. Measured in terms of GDP, non-life insurance premiums as a percentage of GDP (i.e. penetration rate) in the United Slates were equal to 5.14 percent of GDP in 2004, more than six times that of Indonesia and seven times that of Sri Lanka.

Derivatives and securitization are other instruments. They are essentially hedge instruments that are packaged as forgivable debt. The country seeking to hedge disaster risk issues a bond whose interest and/or principal repayments can be scaled back in the event of a disaster. In return for debt forgiveness, the borrower pays a higher rate of interest. In contrast to insurance, the funds released by such bonds may not be conditional on the amount that has been lost. Whereas insurance finances the replacement of a specific post-lost investment, the catastrophe bond is a non-specific hedge and can be used for any purpose. This can be a bane or a blessing. Greater flexibility can lead to more rational post-lost project selection by a disciplined user, or can feed opportunistic ventures.

TABLE 1

Non-life Premiums Per Head, 2004

Debt forgiveness can be a strategy for making repayment loans for development projects or sovereign debt conditional on the non- occurrence of disaster events. Normal debt used for funding social, educational, and economic programmes and projects are forgivable in the event of a disaster. In this sense, forgivable debt achieves the same objectives as disaster bonds. If both are triggered by disaster, then both can be used to restore post-loss funding capacity which can then be deployed in the most efficient manner. Debt is reduced which can free up new borrowing capacity.

In addition to the instruments above, governments can pay for reconstruction using a variety of domestic sources including reorienting national budget, raising taxes and new domestic credit.

III.2. Knowledge Management

Globalization brings about a vast increase of what we know, but an even greater amount of ignorance, i.e., of what we know that we do not know (Lyotard 1984; Evers 2000). While on one hand we are truly heading into the direction of becoming a society where crucial and useful knowledge, such as disaster forecast data and warning, can be disseminated and shared, we are still unable to mediate the increasing risk faced by Southeast Asian countries in forecasting and modelling disaster risks based on available and past knowledge.

Although current disaster loss models are highly advanced in the United States and other highly developed countries, there are limitations in applying such models to Southeast Asia. Apart from Japan and Taiwan, and to a certain extent Indonesia, there is generally a lack of reliable scientific data about disaster risks and trends. For example, information on fault characteristics, soil mapping, flood risk mapping, and topographical mapping is often poor in Southeast Asia compared to other data on earthquake occurrence and typhoon tracks and intensities.

Walker (2004) also observed that in respect of property portfolios, such data is often difficult to find and may not exist in a readily available form. Even if the data exists, it may not contain information directly related to the proposed insured value, may only exist in aggregated form at a relatively coarse geographical level or may not capture the building characteristics that are relevant to loss risk from the disasters for which insurance protection is sought. Even in the developed countries, modelling the effect of mitigation measures untested by events is uncertain. A further complication is that most vulnerability modelling in developed world countries is based on replacement value insurance, which will not be relevant if policy conditions restrict claims to "total loss", and most models do not have the flexibility to vary policy conditions as part of the design process required, if this is the case.

A major consequence of this is that the loss modelling in many countries is very dependent on expert opinion, and extrapolation from developed world models (Walker 2004; Evers and Menkhoff 2004). As a result, the models may not be completely relevant. For example, most existing commercial models base their typhoon losses on wind damage, but in many Asian countries the main typhoon losses are from flood. Another result is that because they are so dependent on expert opinion, "rational planning" in the narrow sense of the word has become almost impossible. In fact, ignorance is the prerogative of the expert (Evers and Menkhoff 2004). Only the expert can assess the risk involved in planning under conditions of minimal knowledge and maximal ignorance. When the balance between what we know and what we do not know is tilted towards the latter, experts are needed to fill the void of ignorance with authorized opinions. And because expert opinion can differ significantly, the output from different models can be very diffe\rent.

Although much about the architecture of loss models is generic, there is a great deal of customization based on local knowledge required to make them reliable for individual countries. This raises the issue of the relevance and production of knowledge for local needs. Walker (2004) suggested that a solution was to foster local public-research-based activities with the objective of producing, by a consensus process, national standard assumptions for modelling vulnerability and hazard risk, which could be used freely by any disaster modellers. This means that the development costs are based on local costs; locally based research on hazards and their consequences is fostered; and, most importantly, local researchers will develop an ownership of the models, which will provide a driving force for the continual upgrading of the models with time as a result of their continuing research.

Another area countries should consider with regard to knowledge management is the institution of robust knowledge sharing initiatives involving network interactions between actors and organizations through a framework of shared institutions, including law, ethical norms, behavioural regularities, customs, and so on to create explicit and timely knowledge on potential disaster risks.

Bildan (2003) argues that the effective co-ordination of knowledge and action from different organizations is important in preparing prevention-preparedness-mitigation aspects of disaster management, which are proven to be effective in reducing loss of lives and properties and are less costly than post-disaster response and rehabilitation. However, there is still a general need to establish or strengthen institutional frameworks for disaster preparedness and mitigation at national, regional, district and community levels. Action plans of various sectors at different levels are yet to be developed, with clear roles and responsibilities for each.

As reflected in the policy declaration of the Ministerial Meeting on Regional Co-operation on Tsunami Early Warning Arrangements held in Phuket on 29 January 2005, knowledge sharing among institutions across borders is key to minimizing disaster risks and the implementation of early warning preventive initiatives (Matsuura 2005):

We realize the importance of strengthening national and regional capacities in providing public confidence against tsunamis. To do so an effective early warning system should contain the following components: risk assessment; hazard monitoring and detection; prediction and formulation of warning; dissemination and communication of warning messages; and knowledge and preparedness to act. It thus requires not only technology but an adequate supporting infrastructure that provides for awareness, information and knowledge sharing, and training. Capacity-building also encompasses technical assistance for countries and communities to be able to receive and absorb technology. It demands action at various levels and close cooperation among technical institutions, national agencies, civil society and local communities. A holistic strategy is called for - one that integrates early warning with preparedness, prevention, mitigation and response. Meanwhile, any tsunami early warning system must be integrated into existing hazard warning systems to promote a multi-hazard approach, and be integrated into national development plans.

FIGURE 3

Asian Tsunami Aid Fund and Pledges

III.3. Accountability Governance

In the absence of effective market-based risktransfer arrangements, post-disaster assistance for major catastrophic events in Southeast Asia is often provided by multilateral finance institutions and bilateral donors. These funds are usually earmarked for immediate relief to the victims and to rebuild damaged assets. Figure 3 documents the breakdown of aid pledges and actual grant allocations by major international donors responding to the Asian tsunami disaster.

Aid pledges by governments and multilateral organizations total around US$6.9 billion, and over US$5 billion private donations were donated by individuals, companies, foundations, and religious groups. However, the impending task and issue is to ensure that such aids and donations will not end up in the wrong pockets, particularly after the imminent departure of several foreign groups from humanitarian assistance in the tsunami-affected countries.

Only days after the disaster struck in December 2004, Speaker of the People's Consultative Assembly Hidayat Nurwahid warned the Indonesian Government that it must ensure that aid did not end up in the hands of corrupt officials with a propensity to "fish for great catches in murky waters" (Asia Times, 29 March 2005). Former U.S. Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush also raised the corruption issue in a February meeting with Indonesian President Yudhoyono, who assured them that Indonesia would channel aid funds in a transparent, effective way.

Indonesia, ranked among the world's most corrupt countries, is ready to start rebuilding its tsunami-devastated northernmost province of Aceh. The National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas) released its reconstruction master plan which covers four main areas restoring livelihoods, restoring the economy, restoring infrastructure, and last, but hardly least, restoring local government. Implementation of the plan, to be tasked to a new Aceh Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Management Board appointed by a presidential decree and ensuring full accountability for each dollar spent under intense domestic and international scrutiny, will test to the full President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's commitment and ability to fight corruption (Adiningsih 2005).

In Malaysia, the institutional, legal and administrative structures built up over the years were reinforced following the tsunami disaster. Malaysia's Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA) personnel were deployed to actively ensure that the structures in place were working, and making it known that the ACA was monitoring tsunami aid relief (Abu Kassim 2005).

Good governance is the key element for reducing corruption in post-reconstruction countries for the long term. The main measures include establishing adequate reconstruction management procedures, passing anti-corruption legislation, creating implementing agencies, and reforming political party financing, bureaucracies, and the judiciary. Le Billon (2005) suggested that local authorities should make a public commitment to the priorities and principles guiding reconstruction, and demonstrate that clear and transparent fund allocation procedures and accountability mechanisms were in place to manage reconstruction efforts. The allocation of reconstruction funds, like all public budget expenditures, should be approved by the legislative branch of government and subject to the scrutiny of an inspector general's office. Contracting should be submitted to proper tendering procedures.

Other strategies include the setting up of community-based monitoring systems that follow up the flow of aid and other funds until the service/goods are delivered. Ultimately, it is important to ensure that local authorities have the capacity to manage transparent and effective reconstruction contracts so that the project is sustainable in the long run.

III.4. Disaster Mitigation

Mitigation refers to measures which can be taken to minimize the destructive and disruptive effects of hazards and thus lessen the magnitude of a disaster. Mitigation measures can be of different kinds, ranging from physical measures such as flood defences or safe building design, to legislation, training, and public awareness. Mitigation is an activity which can take place at any time: before a disaster occurs; during an emergency; or after disaster, during recovery or reconstruction.

Mitigation measures can play an important role, but cannot eliminate the bulk of the risk. Freeman, Keen, and Mani (2003) argued that governments, especially in developing countries, might take measures to mitigate failures of local insurance markets. This might involve, for instance, allowing tax deductibility for disaster insurance premiums, though the effectiveness at individual level may be blunted by the narrow reach of the income tax. Subsidizing premiums would have a more extensive reach, though it may be administratively more convenient to offer such support at the level of the insurer. This in turn leads to a wider range of possible measures, such as the issuance of guarantees to insurers and reinsurers, guarantees that might themselves be hedged on world reinsurance and capital markets. There may also be scope for simply mandating particular levels of insurance.

IV. Conclusion

Countries in Asia need a disaster risk management strategy that includes the capacity to secure post-loss funding capacity and the imposition of budgetary discipline on the selection of post-loss projects. The disaster risk management components outlined above are then part of a strategy for managing risk that protects and enhances the country's development project financing capacity.

The challenge remains of how to promote and facilitate policy changes that lead to future-oriented disaster risk mitigation and risk financing strategies. Extreme pricing volatility currently presents a significant challenge for Asian countries in accessing the reinsurance market. As a result, most of them are better off opting for disaster insurance pools which act as efficient intermediaries between the ultimate consumer and reinsurance markets. Due to the reinsurance pricing volatility, the pools need to accumulate sufficient funds to be able to smoothen the domestic cost of risk transfer by varying the level of local risk retention.

In this area, ASEAN can play a role in developing such co- operative pools, along with other disaster risk financial co- operation, as part of their ongoing regional finance co-operation initiati\ves which already include insurance, taxes, and regional self-help and support mechanisms. Such joint co-operation will also ensure that country ownership and readiness for reform will become key to effective adjustment and sustained development.

Currently in Southeast Asia, co-operation in disaster management is institutionalized through the ASEAN Experts Group on Disaster Management (AEGDM), which meets every two years to discuss issues and share experiences on disaster prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery, and recommend actions that the ten member countries may undertake. Other mechanisms for regional co- operation include the ASEAN Regional Co-operation on Trans-boundary Haze Pollution, Mekong River Commission (MRC), Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre's Regional Consultative Committee on Regional Co- operation in Disaster Management (ADPC-RCC), UNESCAP Typhoon Committee, and the Asian Disaster Reduction Centre (ADRC).

With regard to the option of debt forgiveness, the World Bank and the ADB may consider embedding a disaster risk management product in the existing loans. However such loans must be over and above existing funds, such as the ADB's US$684.6 million Asian Tsunami Trust Fund, as these are funds primarily designated for reconstruction and relief use. The key is the procurement and subsequent deployment of funds for future development needs.

An integrated management strategy in which all prevailing risks are addressed with balanced consideration of risk financing, knowledge management, accountability governance and disaster mitigation forms the conceptual frame of a comprehensive development- oriented disaster risk management approach. In addition, regional and community co-operation, where all actors have their stake in disaster reduction must be seen as interdisciplinary work and concerns all organizations involved. There must be clear vertical and horizontal distributions of duties requiring extensive knowledge sharing among various actors.

While it may be too late to mitigate the effects of the 26 December tsunami disaster, financial prudence with a sound disaster risk management strategy will go a long way in ensuring that future development projects are sustained and protected against unfortunate circumstances.

REFERENCES

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Benjamin Loh is a Research Associate at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore. He will be embarking on his Ph.D. studies in Economic Sociology at the University of Cambridge, United Kingdom.

Copyright Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Aug 2005

Source: ASEAN Economic Bulletin

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