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A Question of Chemistry: Controlling the Spread and Use of Chemical Weapons

Posted on: Thursday, 24 November 2005, 03:02 CST

By Litman, Leah

Opposite: Five hundred pound chemical bombs produced in Iraq await destruction by UN inspectors charged with disarming Iraq. Above: Chemical weapons experts examine one of "Chemical Ali's" former bases in Basra.

As the world was introduced to the destructiveness of total war with new technology in World War I, it also became acquainted with one of the most persistent, hidden threats of today-chemical weapons. World War I brought the destruction of almost an entire continent along with longstanding empires. One of the most powerful ejdiibits of this new devastating capacity was the introduction of chemical weapons in combat. Although there is some indication that arsenic gas was used during the Peloponnesian Wars from the recorded ailments of soldiers after battles, the first recorded use of a chemical weapon occurred at a battle in Ypres, Belgium in 191S. Over 6,000 cylinders of chlorine gas were released on Allied soldiers, who choked to death from the gas. Chlorine gas was not die only chemical agent used in WWI, as the Allies used phosgene later in 1915, and the Germans introduced mustard gas into battle in 1917.

The power of these new weapons prompted the initiation and signature of the Geneva Protocol ("Protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare") in 1925. Despite the prohibition on using such weapons, new and increasingly toxic ones were developed. Prior to and during World War II, Germany developed what are now known collectively as "nerve agents," including sarin, tabun, and soman. Decades later, Great Britain developed another nerve gas-"codename VX"-that is more commonly called VX gas. Another newly developed chemical weapon, Agent Orange, was used by the United States in the Vietnam War. Most recently, Iraq used chemical weapons, including mustard gas and tabun, against native Kurds in the 1980s, and the 1995 Tokyo subway attack by Auin Shinrikyo killed 11 people and injured over 5,000 with sarin gas. Prompted by these revolutions in chemical warfare, the Geneva Protocol branched into separate treaties, one of which, the Chemical Weapons Convention, entered into force in 1997.

What differentiates chemical weapons from the other known identified weapons of mass destruction in the various original forms of the Geneva Protocols-nuclear, biological, and radiological-is both the method by which they are developed and delivered. Neither Germany nor Great Britain intended on developing a chemical weapon when they each created the first novel weapon in their arsenal. Both were in the process of experimenting with insecticides and ended up with a "dual use" weapon-a weapon that serves an additional purpose other than military use (in this case, an insecticide). This is not uncommon for chemical weapons; many of their precursors, even immediate precursors, are commonly used materials in various industries-pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, academia, cosmetics, etc. This also makes delivery of chemical weapons unique; they do not require the immense maintenance or delivery mechanisms of nuclear weapons, nor do they require the stable, habitable conditions of biological agents. It is these unique qualities of chemical weapons that pose the greatest challenge when attempting to prevent their usage in either conventional or unconventional warfare.

Phases First

There are a multitude of known chemical weapons. In order to assist with enforcement, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) divided the weapons into three "Schedules." The schedules correspond to a measure of toxicity (with Schedule 1 being the most potent) and also the date on which the chemicals were to be monitored with export controls and banned from usage (Schedule 1 being the first). There are eight Schedule 1 chemicals, but three "precursors"- compounds needing only few minor modifications before becoming a chemical toxin-are also included as Schedule 1 chemicals. There are three Schedule 2 chemicals and 11 Schedule 2 precursors, and four Schedule 3 chemicals and 13 Schedule 3 precursors. In addition to the Schedule chemicals, there are also "Unscheduled Discrete Organic Chemicals" (UDOCs) that are to be reported and monitored by export controls under the CWC. UDOCs are all carbon compounds with the exception of common biological reservoirs and forms of carbon.

While the schedules may imply that Schedule 3 is not particularly threatening, one of the first and most deadly chemical weapons, phosgene, is a Schedule 3 chemical. But Schedule 3 agents, in addition to lethal chemical agents, include common chemicals that are not particularly harmful and are used in everyday industry, especially academia, including thionyl chloride and triethanolamine. How can Schedule 3 include both the innocuous and deadly? One of the most threatening attributes of chemical weapons is that they can be easily synthesized from common, everyday chemicals including those named above. For this reason, while these chemicals are monitored by the CWC, it can often be difficult to differentiate between a legitimate, civilian purpose and a potentially offensive, military one.

A Big Bug

While chemical weapons or their precursors have uses in several industries, the industry that uses the most, relatively and absolutely, of such compounds is the insecticide industry. In fact, when Great Britain and Germany developed their first novel chemical agents, they were actually aiming to improve upon existing pesticides and were not interested in a chemical weapons program. The shared origin is predicated on the fact that most of the compounds used as chemical weapons and insecticides are variants of nerve agents. These chemicals act to destroy an enzyme that degrades acetylcholine in the brain; with excess acetylcholine the nervous system becomes effectively jammed up, and the person dies. A third of the Schedule 3 chemicals and precursors are used by the insecticide industry alone (this does not include those chemicals used by the pesticide industry, which would raise the number to about half).

The chemical similarities between the pesticides and the final forms of the chemical weapons is but one of the stumbling blocks to enforcing the CWC. Unfortunately, the primary difference between the two groups is the substitution of one element, fluorine, for another, sulfur. No test that is usable in the field is known to make differentiation a simple task. The distinguishing features of both types of compounds are the sidechains. The chemically unique sidechains can be used to distinguish one type of pesticide from another, but not to distinguish between a pesticide with the same sidechain from a chemical weapon with the same sidechain.

It is not particularly easy to differentiate, when looking merely at quantity and location, between legitimate uses in the insecticide industry and potential military uses for Schedule 3 agents. Many areas in the United States, particularly rural or agricultural areas, use large-scale quantities of these chemicals in order to dispense large amounts of insecticides to protect future crops. Often insecticide control bureaus in insect-heavy areas including the southwest United States will contract out the purchase and dispersal of such agents to private firms in industry. Such firms will either purchase the chemical directly, or will purchase its precursors and then outsource the industrial modifications to a partner, which saves cost when purchasing in bulk. It is these precursors, which can be minutely altered into either an industrial pesticide or a military threat that pose the most significant barrier to reliable monitoring of chemical weapons and their precursors.

Opposite: Five hundred pound chemical bombs produced in Iraq await destruction by UN inspectors charged with disarming Iraq. Above: Chemical weapons experts examine one of "Chemical Ali's" former bases in Basra.

While the historical development of pesticides led to the formation of some of the most potent chemical weapons known to date, the relationship between the two industries has endured. In the process of developing a novel pesticide that entered the market under the name Amiton, the British Standards Institution actually ended up developing a new chemical weapon, that is included under Schedule 2 of the CWC.

In Industry

If the insecticide and pesticide industries were the only industries that employed dual use chemical technology, the task of enforcing the CWC would be more manageable. Unfortunately, dual use chemical weapons have legitimate uses in the cosmetic, pharmaceutical, biotechnology, rubber, and textile industries, as well as in organic synthesis and in the manufacture of gasoline, antiseptics, detergents, ceramics, and paper.

The pharmaceutical industry is perhaps the industry second to the pesticide industry for dual use. The toxicity of the chemicals makes them useful and interesting for research and possible treatment for diseases such as cancer and lymphomas, as the treatments for these diseases include targeting and removing affected cells. The toxicity of chemical weapons such as mustard agents has been studied with promising results to be used in future treatments.

CHEMICAL CHAOS

All of the Schedule 3 and Schedule 2 agents, chemical and precursors, have simultaneous uses in one or more of these industries. The precursors u\nder Schedule 1 are also dual use weapons. The varying nature of these industries makes it difficult to identify the end use of any of the agents. For large-scale industries such as the insecticide, pharmaceutical, or rubber industry, the quantities of the agents in question would easily parallel the quantities needed for the development of a full- fledged chemical arsenal and leave room for experimentation. But, on the other hand, smaller start-up biotechnology or pharmaceutical firms might purchase very small quantities. And ultimately, it would be difficult to differentiate these erratic, smaller-scale purchases from single, unconventional agents who could potentially pose a military threat as well.

Even if CWC monitoring agencies were able to distinguish every time between those chemicals destined for legitimate, industrial purposes and those for chemical weapons programs, there is the additional threat of theft that remains. Academic organic labs, industrial cosmetic factories, rubber plants, textile plants, paper manufacturing plants, and many other industrial sources are large storage outlets for the chemical agents and their precursors. All of these industries cannot be economically or logistically expected to adhere to the most stringent employee background or security checks. And even if they were, there is still the possibility of outsider theft, as the location and existence of chemical industrial stockpiles is quite easy to determine.

Powerless Protocol

With all of these concerns, it is difficult to feel much of a sense of safety or security from the CWC, especially given its additional hindrances of verification procedures that are limited by countries concerns' with patent and intellectual property protection. So what if anything can be done to secure chemical and precursor stockpiles? The existence of a multi-layered monitoring mechanism is essential; it is nearly impossible to expect one large national agency to have complete knowledge and authority over every biotechnology or pharmaceutical start-up that arises. Furthermore, local knowledge gathering and local enforcement are the only realistic ways that such small distinctions may be made regarding dual use chemical agents and precursors.

The increasingly innovative society that the CWC is now a part of demands that the treaty and its enforcement protocols adapt to meet changing circumstances. Without cooperation from signatories who are willing to go above and beyond the recommendations of the treaty, it will be difficult to sufficiently address the threat posed by chemical weapons.

editor-in-chief

LEAH LITMAN

Copyright Harvard International Relations Council Fall 2005

Source: Harvard International Review

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