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Future Roles of U.S. Nuclear Forces: Implications for U.S. Strategy

Posted on: Sunday, 2 April 2006, 06:00 CDT

By Klumper, Willem M

Future Roles of U.S. Nuclear Forces: Implications for U.S. Strategy by Glenn Buchan, David M. Matonick, Calvin Shipbaugh, and Richard Mesic. RAND (http://www.rand.org/publications/index. html), 1700 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, California 90407- 2138, 2003, 152 pages, $15.00 (softcover). Free download at http:// www.rand. org/pubs/monograph_reports/2005/ MR1231.pdf.

Future Roles is in fact a report of a study conducted by RAND in the context of Project Air Force that examines the possible roles of nuclear weapons in contemporary US national security policy. The book makes the point that the United States should indeed review its nuclear strategy, most of which still reflects post-Cold War policy. The authors move from the origins of US nuclear strategy to current roles for US nuclear weapons to implications for future US nuclear strategy. In the process, they present four case studies in order to illustrate one of their conclusions: the need for smaller nuclear weapons that might give US nuclear strategy exactly the flexibility it needs.

Considering the radical changes in international relations and security around the world, it is remarkable that US nuclear strategy has not already undergone a thorough review. For instance, the important role of US nuclear weapons during the Cold War in terms of deterring attack and maintaining a dangerous yet stable nuclear balance has changed dramatically. The world is no longer bipolar, and potential threats have emerged in various parts of the world. Former nuclear powers are falling apart, and their ability to control their weapons is crumbling; new nuclear powers are emerging; nonstate actors might gain access to nuclear weapons; and so forth. What effect does all of this have on nuclear deterrence? Who should be deterred by what and for what? Even more frightening, most of these new players do not know the "rules of the nuclear game."

In order to tackle such problems, the authors found that the United States has a much broader range of nuclear strategies and postures from which it can choose, including the abolition of nuclear weapons, substantial reductions and alterations, "business as usual" (only smaller), a more aggressive nuclear posture, and/or nuclear emphasis. The best variant might call for a much smaller nuclear force operated differently and used more aggressively if the situation so demanded. The best option in the current situation, therefore, is a nuclear force not obliged to retaliate immediately and as massively as in the Cold War but still capable of believable deterrence-in other words, a credible nuclear force with a command- and-control structure that need not have the ability to strike back immediately but can answer every nuclear attack on the United States with certainty.

To illustrate the possible use of nuclear weapons, the authors present four case studies that show the illogic of employing them in operational and tactical situations. For example, damage might prove out of proportion, and the chances of collateral damage too high, especially if one takes into consideration casualties as a result of fallout and radiation. As the best option, they suggest waiting for technological advances in the field of conventional weapons-because they promise the best overall results in future combat situations- and using tactical nuclear weapons only as a last resort.

After presenting extensive arguments that readers unfamiliar with military strategy in general and nuclear strategy in particular will find hard to follow, the authors come up with several options: restructuring US nuclear forces, creating a different kind of command-and-control system, maintaining a smaller number of nuclear weapons (but enough to pose robust deterrence), and increasing the number of these smaller weapons to back up eventual flaws in conventional capabilities and stimulate production of more technologically advanced conventional arms. (As an aside, it is strange that studies still depict Russia as the major nuclear opponent instead of China, another emerging world power with considerable nuclear capacities. Of course, readers could apply the case studies on military confrontation to China and come up with their own conclusions.)

Publishing on a subject so important to US national security can prove quite difficult because of the lengthy governmental clearance and review process. In this case, it took the authors almost three years to have this book published; even then, some of the references they used are not available to all readers. At any rate, reading a somewhat restricted version is better than reading nothing at all. Future Roles should prove interesting reading not only for the Air Force community but also for all military professionals and foreign- policy decision makers.

Lt Col Willem M. Klumper, Royal Netherlands Air Force

The Hague, Netherlands

Copyright U.S. Superintendent of Documents Spring 2006

Source: Aerospace Power Journal

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