• E-mail
• Print
• Comment
• Font Size
• Digg
• del.icio.us
• Discuss article

The "Mouse That Roared": Agenda Setting in Canadian Pesticides Politics

Posted on: Friday, 9 June 2006, 06:00 CDT

By Pralle, Sarah

Issue redefinition and venue shopping have been identified as key strategies for enacting agenda and policy change, but much work remains to be done in elaborating these processes. I argue that an important aspect of issue redefinition involves shifting not only the image of an issue but also the bases for considering those issues-what I call policy principles. Policy principles are the core values, beliefs, or guidelines attached to policies that help direct decision making. The emergence and acceptance of new principles by the public and policymakers can be a vital source of policy change, at times having far greater consequences for policy than redefining an issue. Venue shopping is also a multifaceted undertaking involving efforts by policy entrepreneurs and advocacy groups to keep issues out of venues they would rather not participate in as well as move decision making to new arenas. Moreover, while the literature suggests that shifting venues is usually a sensible strategy, sometimes venue shopping can backfire. A case study of the municipal movement to restrict the nonessential use of lawn and garden pesticides in Canada illustrates these theoretical points and shows the applicability of agenda setting models to contexts outside the United States.

KEY WORDS: agenda setting, policy change, environmental policy, pesticides

On June 28, 2001, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the right of Hudson, Quebec to restrict the use of lawn and garden pesticides1 on public and private property. In its decision, the Court confirmed the authority of local governments to pass laws to "secure peace, order, good government, health and general welfare in the territory of the municipality." The Court also cited the "precautionary principle"-the idea that policymakers should act to protect human health and the environment even in the face of scientific uncertainty-as a legitimate basis for local action on pesticides.2 The decision was noteworthy in at least two respects. First, the Supreme Court's endorsement of the precautionary principle signified an important rhetorical and substantive victory for environmentalists, who had promoted the principle as an alternative to risk-based environmental regulation. second, the Court's decision encouraged the spread of pesticides bylaws to other municipalities by giving localities the green light to regulate in this area. After the Hudson decision, a flurry of towns and cities joined the bylaws bandwagon, bringing the total number of pesticides bylaws in Canada to over seventy by the spring of 2005.

The pesticides bylaw campaign in Canada suggests the importance of issue definition and venue shopping strategies in processes of agenda and policy change. Issue definition strategies are aimed at shifting the public and policymakers' understandings of an issue in order to encourage agenda and policy change (or prevent them, as the case may be). Venue shopping refers to policy entrepreneurs' search for alternative policy arenas and their efforts to move decision- making authority to new venues. While numerous agenda setting studies acknowledge the importance of these strategies, much work remains to be done in elaborating the processes and practices associated with them. I argue that an important aspect of the issue definition process involves shifting not only the image of an issue but the bases for considering those issues-what I call policy principles. Policy principles are the core values, beliefs, or guidelines attached to policies that help direct decision making. The emergence and acceptance of new decision principles by the public and policymakers can be a vital source of policy change, at times having far greater consequences for policy than recategorizing an issue.

Venue shopping also emerges as a multifaceted undertaking. It involves efforts by policy entrepreneurs and advocacy groups to keep issues out of venues they would rather not participate in as well as move decision making to new arenas. Successful policy entrepreneurs and interest groups may force their opponents to compete in arenas where opponents are at a disadvantage or to expend resources waging battles in multiple venues when they would prefer to concentrate on just one. Moreover, venue shopping is not always in the best interests of policy entrepreneurs and interest groups; while the literature suggests that shifting venues is usually a sensible strategy, sometimes venue shopping can backfire, as shown in the case of pesticides policy in Canada.

The article begins with an overview of issue definition and venue shopping strategies with an eye toward extending our understanding of these processes. Next, I provide background material on the issue of lawn care chemicals in Canada and the United States. Because pesticides regulation in Canada has historically followed that in the United States and because the two countries continue to shape one another's agendas in this policy area, it is reasonable to discuss pesticides policy in both countries. The article then examines the events and political dynamics surrounding the pesticides bylaw campaign in Canada. Particular attention is paid to how the issue emerged on local agendas, to the strategies used by antipesticides groups to achieve policy change, and to the reactions of the pesticides and lawn care industries. The data for this section come from a review of advocacy group literature, an examination of the media's coverage of the issue, analysis of relevant government documents, and interviews with representatives from national, provincial, and local antipesticides groups as well as with representatives from the pesticides and lawn care industries in Canada.

Issue Definition and Policy Principles

Models of agenda setting emphasize the importance of problem definition, framing, and issue images in shaping policy conflicts (Baumgarter & Jones, 1993; Kingdon, 1984; Leech et al., 2002; Cobb & Ross, 1997; Rochefort & Cobb, 1994; Schneider & Ingram, 1993; Stone, 1988). Shifting the image of an issue-the way an issue is discussed and understood-is a key way to mobilize the public and policymakers around a policy problem and proposed solution. Sometimes it is necessary to transform what is considered a "condition," or something one lives with, to a "problem" that one can and should do something about (Kingdon, 1984; Stone, 1988). In other cases, policy entrepreneurs will try to shift attention to different aspects of a complex issue to change how the public and policymakers think about and react to an existing issue (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Leech et al., 2002). Policy entrepreneurs and interest groups might also try to redefine an issue to move consideration of it into a new policy venue, where decision rules, norms, and procedures differ. Moving a seemingly "local" issue to international policy arenas, for example, requires redefining the issue to emphasize its global implications and importance.

In short, altering the image of an issue is a key strategy for political actors seeking policy change. Issue redefinition is often necessary to break down policy monopolies and to get movement on a policy that has generated little attention or has languished in the backwaters of some decision room. However, as Leech et al. (2002, p. 284) note, redefining an issue is not simple, easy, or swift: "Most issues change only incrementally and a commitment of resources over the long term is critical." The authors cite several impediments to change. First, there are few novel arguments, at least for policymakers and experts. This means that changing the definition of an issue often requires the mobilization of the previously uninterested, something which is difficult for small or resource- poor interest groups. Second, government officials can manipulate rules and procedures to keep certain definitions out of key decision- making venues. Finally, successful mobilization around a new understanding of an issue might trigger an effective counter mobilization, leading to policy stalemate and stability (Leech et al., 2002, pp. 286-7).

The case of agricultural pesticides illustrates the limits of issue definition strategies. After all, since at least the 1960s when Rachel Carson's Silent Spring was published and antipesticides advocacy took hold, a negative view of pesticides has existed and has even dominated discussions of pesticides (see Baumgartner & Jones, 1993). Public concern about pesticides inspired new federal regulations in both Canada and the United States aimed at limiting harm to humans and the environment. However, the "health and environment" frame did not wholly replace the earlier "agricultural and economic" frame; rather, these two images of pesticides exist side-by-side in sometimes uneasy company. At times, the health and environment frame dominates, as in the late 1980s when the agricultural chemical Alar raised widespread fears among the consumer public and was pulled off the shelf by manufacturers (see Harrison & Hoberg, 1994, pp. 55-76). However, pesticides are still widely used in both the United States and Canada, attesting to the survival of a more positive image of pesticides as necessary for agricultural production and protection of human health (because they get rid of disease-carrying i\nsects such as mosquitoes).3

The different images of pesticides are buttressed or threatened by conflicting and often confusing studies that attest to their hazards on the one hand and safety and effectiveness on the other. Interest group mobilization behind these different images adds to the cacophony of voices and to public uncertainty about whether pesticides are harmful or not (Bosso, 1987). How, under these conditions, can further policy change occur? I argue that significant policy change in the midst of conflicting policy images is more likely when advocacy groups and policy entrepreneurs successfully introduce new principles to guide policy decision making. A policy principle is the stated or unstated, formal or informal basis upon which policymakers deliberate and make decisions. Policy principles constitute an identifiable set of claims that, together with such things as causality and symbols, comprise the politics of problem definition (see Rochefort & Cobb, 1994; Stone, 1988). Stone (1988) argues that a rational decision model, one that portrays policy problems as choices facing individual political actors, dominates contemporary policy analysis. The bases for making choices, however, may be contested; policy actors will argue about what standards should guide policymakers, what weight should be given to different values, and how policymakers should approach an issue more generally.

Policy principles that often operate in the background are frequently unstated and are unlikely to be at the forefront of public discussion.4 The assumed nature of many policy principles makes it difficult to change them. For example, discussions of health care in the United States are largely guided by the assumption that health care is a privilege, not a right. Advocating for a "rights" principle to guide public policy around health care is a long-term, difficult process that requires people and policymakers to question unrecognized assumptions and entrenched ways of thinking. At times, however, new principles can take hold of the public and policymakers' imaginations and become a new guide to policymaking. Such shifts in principles can lead to dramatic policy changes that have broad impact; the introduction of the precautionary principle as a guide for environmental regulation, for example, could potentially revolutionize environmental policymaking.

Venue Shopping and Opponent Strategies

Problem definition strategies often go hand-in-hand with strategies of venue shopping. To move an issue into a new policy arena, it is sometimes necessary to reframe a problem or solution such that it fits an institution's discourse, norms, and jurisdiction. Policy entrepreneurs and interest groups might use venue-shopping strategies to overcome biases in policy institutions that make it difficult for them to participate in and have influence over decision making. If successful, venue shopping can lead to significant policy change, as new institutions with different rules, norms, preferences, and constituencies become involved in an issue and assert some jurisdiction over policy decision making.

Elsewhere, I have argued that venue shopping is not always as rational as it is often portrayed in the literature (Pralle, 2003). While interest groups on the "losing" side of policy have an incentive to search for alternative venues, a number of constraints might prevent them from doing so. Interest groups, particularly newly formed and inexperienced ones, do not always recognize opportunities for venue shopping. They may be constrained by internal organizational factors, which limit their ability to venue shop. Some groups will be ideologically resistant to using certain policy arenas. Moreover, venue shopping can be experimental and ad hoc rather than planned and deliberate, and it may be driven by policy learning as much as by purely instrumental strategic considerations. Finally, as shown in the pesticides bylaws campaign in Canada, venue shopping can backfire for those who fail to think through their strategy.

It is important to note that opportunities to venue shop vary in different political systems. In Canada, which has a mixed system of a Parliamentary government and a federal structure, opportunities to venue shop "horizontally"-across different branches of government- are diminished because of the dominance of the executive branch and a relatively weak judiciary.5 However, the Canadian federal system might provide policy entrepreneurs and interest groups with opportunities to "vertically" venue shop-that is, play different levels of government off one another. As Schattschneider (1960) remarked some time ago about the U.S. federal system, "One of the most remarkable developments in recent American politics is the extent to which the federal, state, and local governments have become involved in doing the same kinds of things in large areas of public policy, so that it is possible for contestants to move freely from one level of government to another in an attempt to find the level at which they might try most advantageously to get what they want" (p. 10).

Canadian political scientists have been somewhat skeptical about the possibilities for and allure of venue shopping in a federal system. While some echo Schattschneider's suggestion that federalism increases the opportunities for interest groups to influence public policy (referred to as the "multiple cracks" theory), others doubt whether all interest groups benefit from the fragmentation of power. Hugh Thorburn (1985, pp. 61-2), for example, lists a number of potential downsides: interest groups must incur higher costs to exert pressure at more than one level of government; increasing federalization of policy can lead to organizational strain, as interest groups must spend time and effort coordinating and orchestrating campaigns in different places at the same time; and while the richer and better led groups might benefit, the less well off, less organizationally savvy groups will suffer.

Thorbum's skepticism suggests an important feature of successful venue shopping strategies: Policy entrepreneurs and interest groups not only try to shift decision making to favorable policy arenas, but try to avoid competing in venues where they are at a disadvantage. Put differently, strategically savvy entrepreneurs and interest groups are able to both choose promising arenas and preclude competition elsewhere. Their skill in doing so, however, depends in part on the ability of their opponents to compel them to enter arenas they would rather avoid. As Meyer and Staggenborg (1996, p. 1648) observe in their discussion of social movements and counter movements, "[A]n opposing movement may force a movement to abandon its concentration on the arenas that are most favorable and engage in arenas in which the opposition is making progress, thereby diluting its resources."

More generally, one must pay attention to the interaction of competing interest groups and advocacy coalitions when analyzing the dynamics of policy conflicts.6 Policy actors, after all, do not act in a vacuum but are frequently confronted by opponents who counter mobilize to forestall or prevent the changes sought by reformers. These opponents affect the opportunities for agenda and policy change just like other external political factors. Put differently, competing interest groups, advocacy coalitions, and social movements shape one another's claims, choices of venue, and other tactics (see Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996). At times, opponent mobilization can act as a constraint; but opponents' missteps or lack of mobilization can also open new opportunities for action. As the case study here illustrates, the strategic mistakes of the pesticides and lawn care industry opened further opportunities for antipesticides activists.

The Problem of Lawn and Garden Chemicals in North America

Much of the history of pesticides policy and politics in Canada as well as the United States has involved the agricultural use of pesticides. This focus is both understandable and appropriate, because the majority of pesticides are sold for agricultural purposes. Only 9 percent of the pesticides sold in Canada in 2002 (out of a total of $1.27 billion in sales) were used for nonagricultural purposes, for example.7 The widespread agricultural use of pesticides raises concerns about their potentially harmful impacts on wildlife, water quality, and the sustainability of agriculture more generally. However, an even bigger fear around agricultural pesticides use is the potential for pesticides to compromise human health, including that of agricultural workers, pesticides applicators, and consumers. Indeed, consumer concern about pesticides residue on fruits, vegetables, and other food products has largely driven pesticides regulation in Canada and the United States (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Bosso, 1987).

Concern about the nonagricultural use of pesticides, while not as prominent in the history of antipesticides activism, emerged in the late 1950s. The United States' gypsy moth and fire ant eradication programs triggered widespread opposition by environmentalists, biologists, and even residents who supposedly benefited from the campaigns (Bosso, 1987, pp. 79-108). The eradication programs made visible what had been hidden to much of the population: People's back yards were being sprayed with seemingly dangerous chemicals. The issue of lawn and garden pesticides, however, would take another 20 to 30 years to reach a prominent place on the agenda in Canada and the United States.8 Suburbanization and the increasing popularity of large, manicured lawns, along with the growth of professional lawn care companies in the 1980s and 1990s no doubt set the stage for the issue to attract public attention (Robbins & Sharp, 2003; see also Jenkins, 1994).

Concern was triggered by a wealth of research and studies on various aspects of pes\ticides and children's health. In the United States, epidemiologic studies of farmers, farm workers, and pesticides applicators suggested a possible link between pesticides exposure and cancer. While the focus of this research was on agricultural pesticides, it nevertheless raised the issue of pesticides exposure through external physical contact. At the same time, research on the vulnerability of children to pesticides was highlighted by a 1993 U.S. National Academy of Sciences Report titled "Pesticides in the Diets of Infants and Children" and a 1996 study by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Environmental Health Threats to Children." Children's cancer rates were increasing in the United States by about 1 percent a year; studies suggested that the increase was due in part to the greater susceptibility of children to toxins in the environment. When surveys showed a high rate of pesticides use in schools (one 1993 survey indicated 87 percent of New York schools used pesticides), it did not take parents and other concerned citizens long to put two and two together. Children were being exposed to pesticides in schools, parks, day care centers, and their own backyards on a daily basis.

A second development also raised the visibility of nonagricultural uses of pesticides. In Canada, several provinces passed laws requiring residential lawn care companies and exterminators to post signs when pesticides had been used and to notify neighbors before spraying.9 The yellow warning flags at the edges of people's property became a familiar sight in urban and suburban neighborhoods, serving as reminders of the presence of pesticides in local communities.10 Antipesticides groups used the opportunity to point out that homeowners apply pesticides at greater rates than agricultural users. The Canadian Environmental Law Association (CELA), for example, estimated that residential users applied between two and three and a half times more pesticides per hectare than farmers (Pirn, Cooper, & Keenan, 2002).

The problem of nonagricultural uses of pesticides thus became more visible and salient. As shown in Figure 1, media attention to the issue of lawn and garden pesticides increased gradually in the early 1990s and then exploded after 1999. Kathleen Cooper, senior researcher for CELA, claims that she received numerous calls in the late 1980s and early 1990s from people who expressed concern about pesticides use in municipal parks and schools (phone interview, 2005). The first campaigns against the cosmetic use of pesticides were thus aimed at restricting use on public property, mainly in recreational park areas, on school property, and around day care centers. Then, in 1991, a small town in Quebec targeted the "nonessential" use of lawn and garden pesticides on private property. Few could have predicted that Hudson's action would lead to a cascade of regulations aimed at limiting lawn and garden pesticides use on private property, particularly because most of the activity on pesticides was taking place at the federal level.

The "Mouse that Roared": Hudson, Quebec, and the Courts

During the mid-1980s and early 1990s, provincial and national environmental organizations in Canada had their sights on the national government for movement on the pesticides issue. Their focus on the federal regulatory process was understandable; the national government retains primary authority for testing and registering all pest control products manufactured or sold in Canada.11 Provinces in Canada control the classification of pesticides for sale and use, and may be involved in training applicators, restricting the use of highly toxic chemicals, and requiring notification of pesticides applications by pest control operators, among other things. However, the federal government determines whether a chemical is deemed safe for use by conducting health and safety evaluations and environmental impact reviews. Municipal governments played little role in pesticides regulation until the 1980s. Municipal governments in Canada have no independent Constitutional authority; nevertheless, provincial laws typically delegate certain powers to local governments. For example, most provinces have legislation that allows town or city councils to pass bylaws that protect the health and safety of their inhabitants.

Figure 1. Coverage of Lawn Care Pesticides by News Desk, 1985- 2005.ab

a From Lexis-Nexis News Service. Search strategy: News Category = World News; News Source = North/ South American News Sources; Search terms = "Pesticides" in Headline, Lead paragraph, Terms; "Lawn" in Full Text. Articles ranged from short announcements about pesticides bylaws and gardening articles about natural pest controls to more in- depth articles about the issue of lawn and garden chemicals and the pesticides bylaws movement. Articles that were not primarily about the issue but that were captured by the search terms were excluded.

b Forty-eight news sources were included in the search, including national, provincial, and local Canadian newspapers and news magazines. Articles in U.S. news sources were not included.

In the late 1980s, developments at the federal level suggested that reform of the nation's pesticides law was on the political horizon. In 1987, a government commission recommended 23 different changes to the federal Pest Control Products Act (Hughes, 2000). Two years later, the Minister of Agriculture (who had authority over pesticides regulation at the time) convened a task force to study the matter further; the Pesticide Registration Review Team, as the task force was called, issued a "Blue Book" in 1990 recommending a complete revamping of the country's pesticides registration system. When the Liberal Party under Jean Chretien won the election in 1993, it issued a plan for implementing the Review Team's proposals (dubbed the "Purple Book") and later transferred authority over pesticides regulation from the Minister of Agriculture to the Minister of Health. Criticism of Canada's outdated pesticides law and calls for reform continued throughout the 1990s, eventually leading to significant legislative changes in 2002.12

Environmental and health advocates might have continued to target only the national government for pesticides regulatory reform had it not been for Hudson, Quebec's bylaw. In 1991, the town council passed Bylaw 270 prohibiting nonessential uses of lawn and garden pesticides on public and private property, except under specific circumstances and in certain locations. How did Hudson's bylaw- which applied, after all, to only 5,400 people-attract so much attention? A series of lawsuits by the lawn and garden care industry are partly responsible for raising the visibility of the town's bylaw. In 1992, Spraytech and Chemlawn, two landscaping companies charged with violating the Hudson bylaw, challenged the legislation in court, making two key legal arguments. First, they challenged the authority of Hudson to pass the bylaw, charging that municipalities in Canada did not have jurisdiction over the issue. Second, the litigants claimed that the bylaw conflicted with federal and provincial legislation which had already deemed the chemicals safe and legal for use.

In 1993, the Quebec Superior Court ruled in favor of Hudson, prompting several other municipalities in Quebec to consider their own pesticides bylaws.13 The lawn care companies appealed to the Quebec Court of Appeals and lost in August 1998. Despite a second legal defeat and the increasing jurisdictional clarity provided by the decisions, Spraytech appealed again, this time to the Supreme Court of Canada. In June 2001, 10 years after the passage of the Hudson bylaw, the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed the lower court's decision. While the Court recognized that municipalities have no inherent power to legislate, it cited provincial legislation that gave towns and cities the authority to regulate in the interest of a community's health and welfare. In addition, the Court disagreed with Spraytech's contention that a conflict existed among federal, provincial, and municipal laws, ruling that municipal bylaws were not inconsistent with federal laws permitting the use of the chemicals generally.

The Hudson controversy and the Supreme Court victory in particular was the "mouse that roared," a focal event that galvanized the public and policymakers to take action (Birkland, 1997; Kingdon, 1984). Figure 2 suggests that both the Quebec Superior Court decision and the Supreme Court ruling led to increased legislative activity around pesticides. After the Hudson decision, municipalities throughout Canada gained confidence in their right to make municipal bylaws restricting the use of cosmetic pesticides. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision, only one municipality outside Quebec had passed a bylaw; after the decision, municipalities in Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Ontario, and British Columbia enacted pesticides restrictions. Katrina Miller, a toxics campaigner for the Toronto Environmental Alliance, said that the Hudson decision was critical in getting larger cities like Toronto to consider bylaws (phone interview, 2005). Kathleen Cooper, of the Canadian Law Association, claims they were "bombarded" by phone calls in the spring of 2001 after the Supreme Court decision: "Everybody was waiting for that decision ... People all over the country were pushing [for bylaws] but were waiting because they were afraid of being sued" (phone interview, 2005). As of spring 2005, about 70 municipalities had passed various forms of municipal pesticides bylaws. According to one estimation, when these bylaws come into full effect, close to 36 percent of the Canadian population will be covered by the laws (Christie, 2005).

Figure 2. Annual Number of Canadian Private Property Pesticides Bylaws Enacted, with Key Court Decisions, 1991-2005.a

Explaining Local Action and the Diffusion of Pesticide\s Bylaws

While the court cases went a long way toward giving municipalities permission to pass antipesticides bylaws, the judicial decisions themselves cannot explain why municipalities considered adopting bylaws in the first place. What accounts for the emergence and successful passage of local antipesticides bylaws? One vein of scholarship in environmental politics and federalism predicts a dearth of progressive environmental policies at the local level. "Race-to-the-bottom" theories suggest that subnational jurisdictions will avoid policies that impose costs on businesses for fear that they will lose capital investment to competing municipalities and states. Destructive competition for capital thus puts a general downward pressure on environmental regulations that are construed as creating an "unfriendly" business environment (see, for example, Markusen, Morey, & Olewiler, 1993,1995). Baumgartner and Jones (1993, p. 221) argue along similar lines, suggesting that city governments will seek "investment" policies that generate more revenue than they cost while avoiding "consumption" policies that are net consumers of tax revenue.

Recent scholarship on Canadian environmental politics also doubts the ability of decentralized federal structures to lead to bottom- up policy innovation and reform. According to Barry Rabe (1999), Canada's three-decade experiment with decentralization in the field of environmental policy has led to "little sub-national innovation." Rabe echoes other theorists of environmental federalism by citing the imperative for economic development at the provincial level, and mentions "buck passing tendencies" wherein federal and provincial governments take popular and symbolic stands but do little that "might disturb established patterns or relationships" (Rabe, 1999, p. 291; see also Harrison, 1996). Rabe says little about municipal politics, however, following a pattern in Canadian studies of largely ignoring local politics (see Cameron & Simeon, 2002).

Canada's pesticides bylaws impose costs on both businesses and on city budgets. Lawn and garden care companies subject to the regulations must spend additional resources to reeducate their employees about natural lawn care methods. Moreover, they often have to hire additional workers because of the labor intensiveness of natural lawn care. (Pulling weeds requires multiple persons and hours of work compared with spraying pesticides.) The pesticides bylaws also impose costs on municipalities and therefore are net consumers of tax revenue. According to one shady, the average cost to implement a bylaw campaign is CAN $0.50-1.00 per person per year.14

While race-to-the-bottom theories are plentiful, both theoretical and empirical work raises questions about the extent to which it operates in practice. In a shady of provincial competition in Canada, researchers found "scant evidence of provinces spiraling downward in the proverbial race to the bottom" (Harrison, 2004, p. 2). The literature on subnational policy innovation and diffusion not only questions the inevitability of races to the bottom but suggests that substantial room exists for progressive policy reform at the local level. Subnational jurisdictions may face "upward" pressures to strengthen environmental regulation when constituents compare themselves to other jurisdictions. Moreover, policy elites often "pinch" ideas from other jurisdictions and become entrepreneurs for innovative policies in their jurisdictions (Schneider & Ingram, 1988; see also Rose, 1993). In short, a federal system can lead to significant policy innovation and reform. As Martin (2001, p. 472) writes in his study of living wage campaigns in the United States: "Because cities are free from strict central government supervision, they look to each other to define appropriate policies and models of governance.... [C]ities are sensitive not only to the movements of capital but also to political developments in other cities." Martin goes on to note that advocacy groups must form national networks to take advantage of the openness provided by federal structures; the sharing of information and campaign expertise among cities facilitates the diffusion of progressive policies. Baumgartner and Jones (1993, p. 233) also attest to the dynamism of federalism, arguing that "the complex mix of governments in the federal system creates as many opportunities as constraints ... [N]umerous linked venues provide many opportunities for policy entrepreneurs."

The antipesticides bylaw movement appears to fit these more optimistic accounts of the possibilities for local policy innovation. Like the living wage campaigns described by Martin, the bylaw movement was fueled by national networks of activists and policymakers. In 1996, Toronto Environmental Alliance, Sierra Club of Canada, World Wildlife Fund, Citizens for Alternatives to Pesticides, and the Canadian Labour Congress launched the Campaign for Pesticides Reduction (CPR). The original coalition of regional and national environmental or labor groups expanded to a network of 75 organizations within a year. Resources and information about successful pesticides campaigns were shared through the Internet, via email, and sometimes in person. Meryl Hammond, one of the leaders of the Hudson bylaw campaign, developed a guide for activists, "Pesticide Bylaws-Why We Need Them and How to Get Them" which became standard background reading for communities considering bylaws campaigns. Moreover, the Canadian Environmental Law Association offered free legal advice to local groups and city councils interested in enacting pesticides restrictions.

The Sierra Club of Canada played a central role in the network. One campaigner for the Sierra Club of Canada estimates that almost 30 percent of her time was spent on supporting local groups around their pesticides campaigns (phone interview, 2005).15 Christine Brown, a member of the Hamilton, Ontario Citizens for Alternatives to Pesticides (CAP), noted that they received help from a Sierra Club representative who spoke on CAP's behalf on a local television show (phone interview, 2005). Physical and health organizations also performed a critical role. Local antipesticides groups received help from organizations like the Canadian Cancer Society, the Lung Association, the Family College of Physicians, nurses associations, and other health organizations who provided important testimony before city councils about the risks of pesticides to children (Bob Diamond, phone interviews, 2005). Quite simply, physicians lent expertise and legitimacy to the campaign. As Kathleen Cooper of the Canadian Environmental Law Association noted, the testimony of bylaw supporters before city councils was "calm" and "reasonable": "We had doctors beside us ... and we did not come off as wild-eyed and crazy" in front of often very conservative city councilors (phone interview, 2005).

In sum, these networks were an important factor in the diffusion and success of the municipal bylaws campaign. Antipesticides activists suggested that without them, the movement would have remained fragmented, with small towns pursuing bylaws in isolation without the benefit of broader knowledge, experience, and expertise (Rickman, 2004). Networks also sprung up among municipal officials, creating the kind of subnational communication and innovation described by Martin in the above quote (see also Harrison, 2004). In October 2002, for example, 50 municipal politicians and staff from eastern Ontario attended a half-day workshop where they heard presentations and asked questions of officials and activists who had been involved in successful municipal campaigns. The "limited engagement of ideas and innovations" across boundaries that Rabe described in reference to Canadian environmental politics in the late 1990s was clearly challenged by the municipal pesticides campaigns.

Issue Redefinition and the Precautionary Principle

It was not just the networks and the messengers who made a difference. It was also the message. Antipesticides activists redefined the issue of lawn and garden chemicals in at least three ways. First, they challenged the ideal of an entirely weed-free, near-perfect lawn. Several stories about lawn care pesticides in the 1990s were in the "Lifestyle" or "Home" sections of Canadian newspapers (see Figure 1). These news stories often questioned the need for and desirability of the perfect suburban lawn, mirroring activists' message that "dandelions are your friend." A second strategy of issue redefinition was to focus on children's health. The antipesticides activists' arguments about the negative impact of lawn chemicals on children's health sparked a chord with the general public and were a key factor in gaining attention to the issue, according to Kathleen Cooper and other antipesticides activists.16 Focusing on children is a way to mobilize large segments of the population-parents-and because children are positively constructed target populations policymakers often feel pressure to direct policy to them (Schneider & Ingram, 1993).17

The trade-off between children's health and a weed-free lawn became a powerful frame for rallying the public behind the bylaws. Activists did not ignore the central claim of the industry-that pesticides can be useful-but turned this argument against the industry by focusing on nonessential or cosmetic uses of pesticides. (Even the word "cosmetic" suggested frivolity and egotism.) More generally, frames that imply trade-offs can be powerful tools in policy debates because they empower people by giving them choices. Framing issues in terms of trade-offs does not deny the everyday experiences of people-in this case, that pesticides can be useful tools for getting rid of weeds and pests around the home. Rather, it recognizes local knowledge and "common sense," but asks people to apply their common sense and make the "right\" choice. The trade- off frame is an alternative to what Baumgartner and Jones (1993) refer to as "non-contradictory argumentation" where advocacy groups shift attention to those aspects of an issue that favor them rather than craft elaborate responses to their opponent's arguments. Trade- off frames ask "is it worth it?" rather than ignore or deny the claims of opponents.

A third rhetorical strategy involved introducing the precautionary principle into the debate over lawn and garden pesticides. The precautionary principle asserts that policymakers should act to protect human health and the environment even in the face of scientific uncertainty. Advocates of a precautionary approach to environmental policymaking acknowledge and accept that uncertainty is inherent in managing natural resources and regulating for toxic substances. This uncertainty, however, should not prevent action: In fact, in the face of potentially irreversible and negative consequences, the burden of proof should be on those advocating for new technology or actions rather than on those advising restraint and protection. This orientation toward health and environmental regulation gained ground in Europe and in international forums in the 1980s and 1990s. For example, the precautionary principle was implemented in the 1987 Montreal Protocol, was reflected in the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (the so-called "Earth Summit"), and has recently been incorporated into the United Nations Biosafety Protocol controlling trade in genetically modified products. Canada itself has signed several international agreements citing the precautionary principle and has written the principle into select statutes. When the Supreme Court of Canada cited the precautionary principle in the Hudson decision, the first time any court in North America had done so, it lent further legitimacy to the concept.

At the local level, antipesticides campaigners in Canada admitted that uncertainty existed about the negative health effects of lawn and garden pesticides, but urged city councilors to act anyway. Somewhat surprisingly, a message of uncertainty and lack of knowledge about the health impacts of lawn care pesticides resonated with local city councilors. As Kathleen Cooper of CELA noted, "We were persuasive, reasonable, and used precautionary arguments. We didn't claim we had the science because we didn't... We accepted that we didn't have all the answers but said we have the ability to eliminate one of the uses [of pesticides] where it is unnecessary" (phone interview, 2005). In some ways, Cooper's analysis is puzzling: A lack of solid data and evidence would seem to present barriers to policy reform. Under conditions of uncertainty, policymakers can easily justify a lack of action by questioning whether and to what extent a "problem" exists (Kingdon, 1984; Rochefort & Cobb, 1994; Stone, 1988), or they can delay action until some future date when the evidence is more convincing. In the case of cosmetic pesticides use, city councilors could cite scientific uncertainty to advocate for voluntary measures and educational campaigns rather than outright bans or restrictions on pesticides use.

The public expression of uncertainty by antipesticides advocacy groups is also puzzling. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993, 1999) suggest that advocacy groups involved in heated conflicts adopt a "siege mentality" whereby they become more dogmatic and assertive in their claims rather than admit uncertainty or lack of knowledge. Why did a strategy of acknowledging scientific uncertainty around the health impacts of pesticides work? To answer this question, one must consider where these claims were being made-namely, in front of city and town councilors who had little to no expertise on the matter. These were not regulators in the federal Pest Management Regulatory Agency who assessed scientific data on pesticide ingredients to determine how much exposure to a chemical (usually in parts per million) a human could tolerate. Somewhat paradoxically, the scientific uncertainty gave city councilors permission to regulate in an area where they lacked experience. Councilors were not being asked to serve as the final judge on complex scientific issues nor did they have to weigh the costs and benefits of cosmetic pesticides in any precise way. Rather, they were being asked to exercise precaution in the face of troubling information about the link between pesticides and human health. Moreover, unlike the national government, local governments were not in the business of promoting pesticides. Their duty was to local constituents, many of whom were urging their representatives to take reasonable precautions to ensure the health and safety of the community. Restricting the unnecessary use of pesticides seemed like a sensible step in this regard.

Antipesticides activists throughout Canada thus successfully injected a new principle into pesticides policymaking at the local level, as evidenced by the fact that several municipalities formally accepted the central tenets of the precautionary principle. For example, the Association of Municipalities of Ontario, a nonprofit organization representing the Ontario municipalities, wrote the following in their "Pesticides Brief": "What seems apparent is that scientific knowledge regarding unnecessary exposure to residential pesticides and the potential health effects is a highly complex area of study and continued studies are needed. Nonetheless, many are recommending that when risks to human health are unnecessary or uncertain, the wisest course of action is to take precaution by reducing the use of pesticides in the urban environment."18

The Expansion of Conflict to Local Venues

When the town of Hudson, Quebec asserted its jurisdiction over the issue of lawn and garden pesticides, it sparked the imagination of antipesticides activists, most of whom were focusing on pesticides regulation at the federal level. As Katrina Miller of the Toronto Environmental Alliance said, "Hudson [Quebec] punched through a wall that no one had tried to take a whack at" (phone interview, 2005). The result was a massive expansion of the pesticides issue onto municipal agendas throughout Canada. However, antipesticides groups did not abandon their work in national venues; rather, they added the pesticides issue to local venues. It would be more accurate to call their strategy "venue adding" rather than "venue shopping." This strategy made sense, because environmental groups were not losing at the federal level: while policy reform was slow; pesticides were on the agenda; environmental groups were recognized stakeholders in debates over reform; and federal pesticides law was eventually revamped in ways that recognized the concerns of environmental and health organizations.19 The benefit of "going local" was that the local government could (or would) take additional regulatory steps that the other levels could not.

The emergence of pesticides issues on the agendas of local governments across Canada was not in the interest of the propesticides coalition, which consists of manufacturers and distributors of pesticides as well as lawn and garden care companies. Pesticide manufacturers, represented by industry trade associations like CropLife Canada, were ill prepared to fight battles in hundreds of city councils around the country. This relative lack of organization at the local level was a byproduct of the structure of the pesticides regulatory regime in Canada, one that was relatively centralized at the national level. CropLife Canada was organized and active in national venues, and according to one environmental activist, "was way more sophisticated at the federal level" than at the local level (Cooper, phone interview, 2005). One of the advantages provided to antipesticides activists, then, was that manufacturer's groups were fairly unprepared to do battle at the local level. As Debra Cordon of CropLife Canada admitted, "We were not organized at the local level and we are still not organized there. You have to be interacting with them [local communities] on a daily basis ... We focus on advocacy and spend a lot of time in Ottawa and at the provincial level." Another industry analyst admitted that "there is a tinge of regret from some LCOs [lawn care operators] who realize that had the industry been organized in the first place, they might be winning the battle" (qtd. in Stahl, 2004, p. 28). Not only was the industry late in responding to the local activism around pesticides, but according to Conlon, they had "zero clout" with city councils. "We had zero clout, zero energy [at the local level]. We would fly in where there was a problem, expect to give our say and that is it because traditionally this level was not regulated" (phone interview, 2005).20

The antipesticides coalition was structured in a more intergovernmental fashion. Of the 120 environmental groups in Canada in 2002 who reported that they worked on pesticides issues, 85 worked at the local or regional level, 28 at the provincial level, and 16 at the national or international level.21 As noted above, regional and national environmental groups played an important role in linking local bylaws groups such that information, experience, and expertise were shared. New grassroots-based groups sprung up around the pesticides issue, but the antipesticides coalition also relied on existing environmental organizations, some of whom shifted their attention from other local issues to the pesticides campaign. The Humber Environment Action Group in Newfoundland, for example, formed a subcommittee to address the pesticides issue; later, the Humber Group folded and renamed itself Community Free Pesticides (Diamond, phone interview, 2005). In short, the structure of the antipesticides coalition was much better suited to carry out campaigns in local communities throughout the country\, in addition to working at provincial and federal levels on reforming pesticides registration laws. They had an appropriate organizational structure, high energy at the local level, and substantial clout.

Antipesticides activists were not only situated to take advantage of the expansion of conflict to local venues, but found they had better access to policymakers at this level. In interviews with activists, several described local politics in terms that would make advocates of decentralized democracy proud: "It was easier to work at the local level; it was easier to mobilize . .. We had the respect of the city councilors," said Christine Brown of Citizens for Alternatives to Pesticides (phone interview, 2005). Katrina Miller of Toronto Environmental Alliance also sung the praises of local government, claiming it is the "closest form of government to the people ... Politics [at the provincial level] is not as transparent. It is party-based; you are no longer talking to individual politicians but to parties" (phone interview, 2005). Kathleen Cooper of the Canadian Environmental Law Association put it this way: "If you choose to go local, it is very accessible. We worked with Toronto Environmental Alliance-they knew the system, knew the councilors." Moreover, any resource constraints posed by the federalization of policy were overcome through the formation of alliances and coalitions. As a campaigner for the Sierra Club of Canada remarked, "It [the federalization of policy] has not been a strain. The locals have good energy ... and we have more resources and contacts" (phone interview, 2005).

The propesticides coalition responded to the success of the antipesticides movement by shifting conflict to the judicial arena, hoping that the courts would bar municipalities from asserting jurisdiction over the issue. This strategy was successful in that the court challenges raised uncertainties about whether cities had the right to regulate. The subsequent delays by city councils gave CropLife Canada and lawn and garden companies time to better organize at the local level. In Toronto, for example, CropLife Canada waged an extensive public relations campaign, spending millions of dollars trying to counter the bylaw movement (Debra Cordon, phone interview, 2005). Delays might also have killed some reform efforts simply because it was difficult for the less organized and resource-poor environmental groups to keep the pesticides issue on the agendas of local governments for long periods of time. Some of the locally based activists, for example, noted that energy at the local level "fizzled out" over time. Long campaigns and legislative delays-prompted in large part by the jurisdictional uncertainty caused by the lawsuits-strained the resources and energies of some of the smaller antipesticides groups. As Christine Brown of Citizens for Alternatives to Pesticides lamented, "Everyone was really energized at first. Now it is harder. It has gone on too long... People are swamped by other concerns." Bob Diamond of Community Free Pesticides echoed Brown's sentiments, adding that "burn out" is a danger when there are too few activists (phone interviews, 2005). Such statements suggest that the pesticides industry's legal strategy was at least partly successful in that it gave reluctant city councilors a reason to delay action. These delays, in turn, made it more difficult to keep the issue salient and on the agendas of local governments.

However, the venue shifting strategies of the propesticides coalition also backfired in important ways. The judicial decisions and conflict around them raised the visibility of the municipal bylaws campaigns and thus expanded the scope of the conflict. Ted DiGiovanni of Landscape Ontario claimed that "every time [a municipal bylaw] was taken to court, it caused a huge renewed effort [on the part of antipesticides activists]. It would have been better not to take it to court because it created too much publicity." (see Figure 2.) DiGiovanni disagreed with the decision of Spraytech and Chemlawn, both members of Landscape Ontario, to appeal the court rulings: "All the decisions have been based on jurisdiction ... If we had won the court decisions, legislators could have easily changed the jurisdiction [over lawn and garden pesticides regulation] and given cities authority over the issue ... Jurisdictions can change" (DiGiovanni, phone interview, 2005). Environmental activists agreed: as one noted, "Had the companies just dropped this issue, the pesticides movement in Canada would look very different today" (Rickman, 2004).

The courts' decisions clarified jurisdictional authority over pesticides. As the industry appealed negative decisions to higher courts, jurisdictional clarity increased and the decisions were broader in scope. One activist went so far as to say that "[i]f those two lawn care companies in the Hudson had not pushed their case all the way to the Supreme Court, none of the bylaws would exist today" (Rickman, 2004). It is possible that if Chemlawn and Spraytech had refrained from appealing the decision to the Supreme Court, enough uncertainty would have existed so as to prevent municipalities (especially those outside Quebec) from passing pesticides bylaws. The Supreme Court's decision not only granted municipalities the authority to regulate in this area, but endorsed the principle of preventive regulation. As several legal observers have noted, this decision opens the door to other types of municipal regulation designed to protect the health and welfare of people in a community.

Conclusion

The municipal bylaw campaign against pesticides in Canada marks perhaps the first time that environmental and health groups in the United States are looking to Canada for inspiration around and guidance on pesticides policy issues. In the past, Canada has been a good five to ten years behind the United States in terms of its pesticides regulation. But Canada has now gone where its neighbors in the south have yet to go: They are banning or restricting the nonessential use of lawn and garden pesticides on private property. While the municipal bylaws vary-some are more restrictive than others-they are the first of their kind in North America. And evidence suggests the bylaws are more than an exercise in symbolic politics. In a study prepared by the Canadian Centre for Pollution Prevention and Cullbridge Marketing and Communication, communities with municipal bylaws (combined with education programs) achieved a 51-90 percent reduction in pesticide use.22

The case study of Canadian pesticides has shown how antipesticides activists mobilized the apathetic by shifting the image of lawn and garden pesticides sprayed on public and private spaces for aesthetic reasons. Quite simply, they labeled some uses of pesticides as unnecessary, nonessential, and not worth the potential health risk. They changed the image of lawn and garden pesticides from useful and seemingly harmless to superfluous and dangerous. More importantly perhaps, they embraced a new principle to guide policy-that of precaution. Indeed, one of the most significant outcomes of the municipal bylaws campaign might be a new appreciation for the limits of risk-based regulation. The campaigns showed that it is both possible and popular to use the precautionary principle as a guide for environmental regulation.

The case study of pesticides in Canada makes several contributions to our understanding of policy processes. First, I have argued that policy principles are an important component of the politics of problem definition and must be taken into account in our analyses of agenda and policy change. Policy entrepreneurs and advocacy groups might be successful in recategorizing an issue but fail to change the underlying principles guiding policy. For example, pesticides might be recategorized as a "health" problem, but how much weight should policymakers give to health concerns and how should they resolve conflicts between the health and economic components of pesticides? Whether policymakers and regulators adopt the precautionary principle to guide their decision making around pesticides regulation or some other, less protective principle has a considerable impact on policy and its implementation.

Further research is needed to explore how interest groups and policy entrepreneurs advocate for policy principles and what accounts for their success in changing the underlying principles associated with a policy. In general, I surmise that it is difficult to change principles, as they are often deeply ingrained both institutionally and culturally. Institutional actors are trained and socialized to embrace certain guidelines for decision making, while institutional norms, rules, and procedures may be structured in such a way as to favor some principles over others. Moreover, public understandings of the proper bases for considering issues are often deepseated and therefore difficult to dislodge.

This case suggests that policy principles gain legitimacy as they are used and adopted by multiple institutions: The Supreme Court of Canada, for example, cited international law as providing a basis for Hudson's preventive action.23 The pesticides case also suggests that certain principles will match some venues better than others. To take rather obvious examples, rights principles are best suited to legal venues while cost-benefit principles are more commonly found in bureaucratic agencies. The relative fit between principles and venues is due in part to institutional norms, values, historical precedents, and the orientation of institutional actors. For example, economists are apt to embrace cost-benefit and efficiency principles; policy analysts are educated to think in terms of utilitarian principles; and judges and lawyers are prone to think in terms of rights. In addition, jurisdictional assignments and policy responsibi\lities play a role in matching principles to venues. If an agency is charged with both promoting and regulating a substance or industry then it will have difficulty implementing a precautionary approach. Politics, of course, also figures in: the relative influence of interest groups in different venues will constrain the ability of institutional actors to incorporate and implement certain policy principles into their decision making because some interests stand to lose by a change in underlying principles.

A second contribution of this case study is a closer understanding of venue shopping strategies. My suggestion elsewhere (Pralle, 2003) that venue shopping is sometimes less rational than portrayed in the literature is supported by this case study. Environmental and other antipesticides groups did not consciously search for an alternative venue for pesticides action in the early 1990s, but instead seized on the example of Hudson, Quebec and "ran with it" as one activist said. Without Hudson's example and the court cases following, antipesticides activists may have overlooked the potential for change in local venues. The pesticide industry's venue shopping strategies were also not entirely rational. Spraytech and Chemlawn's decision to continue to target the courts was, at least in retrospect, a questionable strategy. The Hudson cases raised the visibility of the conflict over lawn and garden pesticides and clarified jurisdiction over the issue, emboldening previously reluctant municipalities to pass their own bylaws. The antipesticides coalition, then, benefited from the mistakes of its opponents. Further research might examine more systematically how the actions and reactions of opposing advocacy coalitions shape the nature of policy conflicts, taking into account the possibility that success is partly a function of the mistakes of one advocacy group or another. As policy entrepreneurs and interest groups learn from their mistakes, one can assume that any strategic advantages are diminished or lost.

The third lesson from the case study concerns the possibilities for subnational environmental innovation and policy diffusion in federal systems. Many scholars of Canadian environmental politics have lamented the increased decentralization of authority over environmental policy in Canada, noting the reluctance of provinces to impose regulations on industries that dominate provincial economies, and pointing to decreased opportunities to enact national environmental standards (Paehlke, 2000; Rabe, 1999; VanNijnatten, 1999). While these concerns may be well founded, the explosion of local activism around the cosmetic use of lawn and garden pesticides suggests that decentralization can sometimes lead to more (and stronger) environmental regulation. Indeed, the municipal bylaws movement has been credited for putting additional pressure on the national government to revamp federal pesticides laws, because the extensive public support for pesticide bans indicated widespread skepticism that the chemicals deemed safe by the Pest Control Management Agency were in fact harmless. The spread of local antismoking laws in Canada and the United States, the diffusion of municipal "living wage" campaigns in the U.S., and the enactment of climate change-related policies by U.S. and Canadian cities suggest that municipal governments are increasingly engaged in a variety of policy areas and are capable of enacting progressive policies (see Martin, 2001; Rabe, 2004; Shipan & Volden, 2005).

Finally, the case study of pesticides politics in Canada illustrates that agenda setting models developed in the U.S. context are applicable in other political settings. However, more research is needed that systematically compares agenda setting dynamics in multiple countries in order to understand why and how these processes might differ. case studies are of limited value in making general claims of this sort but can be suggestive about directions for future research. One fruitful area for research will be to look at venue shifting in a comparative context, as different countries will provide different opportunities for using strategies of venue shopping. Moreover, because political systems structure how interest groups and advocacy coalitions are organized, the capacity of different interest groups to venue shop and to adjust to the venue shopping strategies of their opponents will vary in different political settings.

Notes

Thanks to Peter May, Bryan Jones, Frank Baumgartner, Heidi Swarts, Elizabeth Cohen; Hans Peter Schmitz, and an anonymous reviewer for their helpful comments and advice.

1. I use the term "pesticides" generically to refer to chemical compounds used to kill unwanted plants or animals. Pesticides include herbicides, insecticides, rodenticides, and fungicides.

2. Canada Ltee (Spraytech, Societe d'arrosage) v. Hudson (Town), 2001 SCC 40.

3. The total amount of pesticides (active ingredient) used in the United States has remained steady since the mid-1980s at around 1,200 million pounds. Pesticide use in the agricultural sector in the United States has decreased slightly from the early 1980s-from 1,011 million pounds of active ingredients in 1982 to 907 million pounds in 2001. Pesticide use in the home and garden sector, on the other hand, has increased since 1982, going from 148 million pounds of active ingredients in 1982 to 163 million pounds in 2001. see the EPA's website, accessed at http://www.epa.gov/oppbeadl/pestsales/ 01pestsales/historical_data2001_3.html#table5_5.

4. At times, though, policy principles are institutionalized in public policy. For example, the cost-benefit principle has been written into the U.S. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act. It directs the Environmental Protection Agency to consider the potential environmental, economic, and social costs of pesticides and weigh these against their expected benefits when making pesticide registration decisions.

5. Some scholars, however, point to an increasing "judicialization" of environmental policy in Canada (see Knopff & Glenn, 1996). Certa

Source: Policy Studies Journal

More News in this Category