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Theories of Communication, Human Nature, and the World: Associations and Implications

Posted on: Friday, 2 July 2004, 06:00 CDT

Although much scholarly attention has been devoted to conceptualizing communication, few attempts have been made to examine the practical consequences of individuals' beliefs about communication. This paper reports the results of an initial investigation into the relationships among personal theories of communication (or message design logics), privately held philosophies of human nature, and personal assumptions about the world. Results demonstrated significant differences in participants' philosophies of human nature and assumptions about the world as a function of message design logic. Implications and directions for future research are addressed.

KEY WORDS: message design logic, philosophies of human nature, assumptions about the world, metaphysical beliefs

The whole function of philosophy ought to be to find out what definite difference it will make to you and me, at definite instants of our life, if this world-formula or that world-formula be the one which is true.

-William James (1898/1977, p. 349)

Metaphysical beliefs, beliefs about the underlying nature of things, are pragmatic in nature. They are working theories that provide guides for action and shape outcomes with varying degrees of desirability. Among the metaphysical beliefs commonly considered to influence individuals are those about the nature of humans (e.g., are they generally good?) and the nature of the world (e.g., is it generally just?). Less typically considered to be metaphysical or powerfully determining are beliefs about communication (see Shepherd, 1993, for one explanation of the de-ontological status of communication). It seems reasonable to wonder, however, whether metaphysical beliefs, worldviews, and communication attitudes are intertwined, and so this study examines the relationships among personal theories of communication (i.e., message design logics), privately-held philosophies of human nature, and key assumptions about the world.

THEORIES OF COMMUNICATION: MESSAGE DESIGN LOGIC

Defining communication sometimes seems to be the chief business of communication scholars, and it has persisted since Aristotle's time. Conceptions of communication are central to inquiry, value- laden and fluid. As Redmond (1995) states, "each existing definition tends to reflect a particular theoretical approach to the concept, and as theories change, so do definitions" (p. 4). The debate about how best to conceptualize communication affects interpretations of the field and discipline of communication (see Craig, 1993; Shepherd, 1993).

Conceptualizations of communication are important not merely to scholars, but to everyday actors. O'Keefe (1988), in her account of message variation, has noted that individuals possess implicit theories of communication, or message design logics. These are working models of what it means to communicate which help guide the process of message production and interpretation. Through interaction, individuals progressively accumulate and integrate knowledge about what communication is and what it can be used to accomplish. According to O'Keefe (1991), message design logics are distinct ways of thinking about communication situations, selecting thoughts for expression, and modifying expression to meet goals. A design logic is a description of the way thoughts, transformed as messages, relate to desired message outcomes. The variation in goals and goal management strategies observed in various studies (e.g., O'Keefe and Shepherd, 1987; 1989) arises from "differences in the very definition of communication that individuals construct and employ" (O'Keefe, 1988, p. 84). That is, "the message design logic model offers a theory of communication theories, an analysis of the alternative ways in which individuals (or communities) might constitute communication processes" (1988, p. 98).

According to O'Keefe (1988), there exist three general types of message design logic: Expressive, Conventional, and Rhetorical. Each of these implicit theories of communication is associated with a constellation of related beliefs and operations and is based on an individual's level of cognitive complexity. The three design logics are characterized by different premises about communication, which are manifested in messages of varying organization, content, and effectiveness (O'Keefe, 1988).

Expressive Design Logic

The Expressive design logic is the simplest form of message production and is based on the premise that "language is a medium for expressing thoughts and feelings" (O'Keefe, 1988, p. 85). Since Expressive communicators make no distinction between thought and expression, they "dump" their current mental states and assume that others do the same (O'Keefe & McCornack, 1987, p. 71). They see communication as "a process in which persons express what they think or feel so others will know what they think or feel" and see expression as the only job that communication can accomplish (O'Keefe, 1988, p. 84). For the Expressive individual, communication is successful to the degree that it is clear, and is desirable to the extent that it involves full and open disclosure of current thoughts and feelings. This preference leads to a "concern for the fidelity of messages, and anxiety about deceptive communication" (O'Keefe, 1988, p. 85). In interpreting the messages of others, Expressive communicators are unlikely to find anything other than literal and direct meaning (O'Keefe, 1988). Expressive messages have internal coherence that is subjective and associative.

Conventional Design Logic

Those who view communication as "a game to be played cooperatively, according to socially conventional rules and procedures" can be characterized as employing a Conventional design logic (O'Keefe & McCornack, 1987, p. 71). Unlike the Expressive communicator, the Conventional communicator draws a distinction between thought and expression, in that expression is subordinated to and specified by the process of achieving desired social effects: "[T]he propositions one expresses are specified by the social effect one wants to achieve rather than the thoughts one happens to have" (O'Keefe, 1988, p. 86). Communication is viewed as useful and desirable to the extent that it falls within "conventionally defined means to achieve one's ends" (O'Keefe, 1988, p. 87). In this framework, successful communication involves situational appropriateness, control of resources, and cooperativeness.

Rhetorical Design Logic

Individuals employing the third, and most elaborate message design logic, view communication as "the creation and negotiation of social selves and situations" (O'Keefe, 1988, p. 85). Unlike Expressive and Conventional communicators, Rhetorical communicators discern selves and situations as mutable rather than fixed: "[M]eaning is treated as a matter of dramaturgical enactment and social negotiation" (O'Keefe, 1988, p. 87). Individuals employing the Rhetorical design logic use their understanding of the ways in which verbal behavior can convey character, attitudes, and features of a situation to enact a desired social reality when producing messages and to interpret incoming messages with depth. Unlike the Conventional communicator, who sees context as an anchor for meaning, the Rhetorical communicator conceives context as a resource that can be managed and exploited by creating selves and situations through speaking.

Differing message design logics are associated with differing degrees of communicative effectiveness. In complex tasks, such as those involving regulation, conflict management, comforting, persuasion, and the like, the Expressive, Conventional, and Rhetorical design logics represent a move from least to most effective communication (O'Keefe, 1997). O'Keefe and McCornack (1987) found message design logic to be associated with perceptions of message persuasiveness, perceptions of message ability to satisfy the message target and other recipients, perceptions of message ability to motivate, perceptions that message producer attends to "face" wants, and perceptions of message producer attractiveness. Furthermore, Peterson and Albrecht (1996) demonstrated that superior- subordinate relationships in which one member employed a Rhetorical design logic were rated as more supportive, and managers employing Rhetorical designs had employees with lower levels of stress and burnout. Rhetoricals, then, with their ability to navigate in dilemmatic situations may be considered more successful in highly complex or difficult interactions.

PHILOSOPHIES OF HUMAN NATURE

In addition to implicit theories of communication, most individuals develop theories about human nature. Wrightsman (1964, 1992) identifies a number of dimensions along which individuals may vary in terms of their philosophies of human nature. The first dimension, trustworthiness versus untrustworthiness, refers to whether one believes people to be generally trustworthy, moral, and responsible or the converse. The second dimension, termed strength of will and rationality versus externally controlled and irrationality, refers to the degree to which one believes that humans control their own lives and understand their motives for acting. Third, philosophies of human nature vary along the dimension of altruism versus sel\fishness. The fourth dimension, independence versus conformity to group pressures, refers to a person's belief about the extent to which people generally maintain their individual convictions. The fifth dimension is complexity versus simplicity, which refers to the degree to which a person believes humans to be complex and difficult to understand. Sixth, philosophies of human nature may vary according to level of perceived similarity versus variability.

There is evidence that indicates differential outcomes based in part on alternative philosophies of human nature. A distinction is often made between those philosophies of human nature that are relatively negative (characterized by a high degree of cynicism and lack of belief in the goodness of people) and relatively positive (characterized by a low degree of cynicism and a belief in the goodness of people) (Wrightsman, 1992). Negative philosophies have been linked to a high incidence of coronary disease (Williams, 1989). In the educational context, positive philosophies of human nature have been linked to positive nonverbal communication behavior (Hopkins, 1973), and higher teaching evaluations (Wrightsman, 1964). Wrightsman, Richard, and Noble (1966) found that counselors with more positive philosophies of human nature were rated by peers as most wanted as a counselor, most technically proficient, most intelligent, and best liked. Kennedy, Cook, and Brewer (1969) found that male experimenters with positive philosophies of human nature were more successful in verbally conditioning subjects than were males with less favorable views of human nature, despite the fact that the procedure was standardized. Futhermore, people with positive philosophies of human nature are more likely to grant requests for information to participate in studies (Wrightsman, 1992) and to make cooperative choices in mixed-motive games like the prisoner's dilemma (Wrightsman, O'Connor, and Baker, 1972). Thus, evidence is suggesting that a more positive view of human nature may bring with it everything from better health, to more fulfilling interpersonal interactions, to better evaluations from others.

ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE WORLD

In concert with a longstanding view, Janoff-Bulman (1989) posits that individuals have personal theories about the world in general. This "assumptive world" (Parkes, 1975) is analogous to Bowlby's (1969) "world models," Harris's (1975) "structures of meaning," Epstein's (1973, 1979, 1980) "theory of reality," and Kuhn's (1962) conception of "paradigm."

Janoff-Bulman (1989) further argues that there are three primary categories of assumptions in personal theories about the world. The first category, benevolence of the world, refers to the extent to which people view the world positively or negatively. Two basic assumptions comprise this category: the benevolence of the impersonal world (the belief that the world is a good place and misfortune is relatively uncommon) and the benevolence of people (the belief that people are good, kind, helpful, and caring). The second category, meaningfulness of the world, involves people's beliefs concerning the distribution of outcomes and includes the following three distributional principles: justice (the belief that personal deservingness/character determines which events affect which people), controllability (the belief that appropriate, precautionary behaviors best determine what happens to people), and chance (the belief that particular events happen to particular people randomly and there is no way of making sense of the distribution of outcomes). The third major category, worthiness of self, includes the assumptions of self-worth (the extent to which people believe themselves to be good individuals), self- controllability (the extent to which people see themselves as generally engaging in the "right" behaviors), and luck (the extent to which people perceive themselves as generally lucky or unlucky).

To reinforce the pragmatic and theoretical utility of the preceding perspectives, Janoff-Bulman (1989) cogently contends they "provide the basis for anticipating the future and guide what we notice and remember, as well as how we interpret new information" and provide us with the "necessary equilibrium to function in a complex, changing world" (p. 115).

Subsequently, it seems reasonable to suggest that beliefs about communication, human nature, and the world can influence understanding and behavior, as well as shape varying outcomes. Investigating how beliefs about human nature and the world relate to beliefs about communication and vice versa could aid our understanding of individual differences in communication behavior and interpersonal relations.

METHOD

Participants

Participants were 223 undergraduate students enrolled in lower- and upper-division courses at a large mid-western university. Six participants failed to complete the independent variable measure as directed and were thus excluded from analyses. Of the remaining 217 participants, 104 were male, 110 were female, and 3 did not indicate sex. Most (114) were 18 to 20 years old, followed by those 21 to 24 (89), 25 to 27 (8), and 28 to 30 (2). Four participants failed to indicate age. Seventy participants were seniors at the university, followed by 67 sophomores, 44 juniors, 29 first-year students, and 1 who selected "other."

Procedure

After participants read a consent statement, all were given an 8- page survey questionnaire consisting of 81 items concerning beliefs about communication, human nature, and the world. The questionnaire was composed of the following measures relevant to this report: 1) O'Keefe's (1988) Ron-Test (a measure of message design logic), 2) Wrightsman's (1992) Philosophies of Human Nature (PHN-Short Form), 3) Janoff-Bulman's (1989) World Assumptions Scale (WAS), and 4) a brief demographic survey.1

Instruments

O'Keefe's (1988) Ron scenario was designed to assess participants' message design logics. Participants were asked to imagine that they were in a class in which a group project counted heavily toward the final grade. In this scenario, one of the group members (Ron) has been causing some problems for the rest of the group. Participants were asked to respond to this hypothetical situation by writing what they would say to Ron. Using procedures detailed by O'Keefe (1988), messages were classified according to the kind of message design logic they embodied (Expressive, Conventional, Rhetorical). The first author and a second coder independently scored 50 (23%) randomly selected cases. The two coders agreed in 90% of the cases, which yielded a Kappa of .88 (Cohen, 1960). The remaining responses were divided equally between the coders.

The Philosophies of Human Nature scale (PHN-Short Form; Wrightsman, 1992) measures participants' attitudes about people in general-attitudes that emphasize interpersonal behavior. The short form PHN contains forty-five items, representing the following six dimensions of philosophy of human nature: cynicism (10 items), internal locus of control (5 items), beliefs that people are conventionally good (12 items), complexity (6 items), variability (7 items), and belief in accuracy of first impressions (5 items). Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with each statement using 6-point Eikert scales (l = agree strongly, 6 = disagree strongly).

To test the factor structure of the PHN, principal components analysis with Varimax rotation (Kaiser normalization) was performed. With the exception of 4 items, all loaded highest on the originally proposed factors.2 These four items were dropped from subsequent analyses. After deleting an item from the complexity subscale, the remaining items justified conceptualizing the dimension as "futility in understanding others," rather than a belief that humans are complex. The resulting subscales, containing 41 of the original 45 items, had the following internal reliabilities: belief that people are conventionally good, .76; cynicism, .74; internal locus of control, .75; variability, .64; futility in understanding others, .61; first impressions, .67. These reliability estimates are consistent with those observed in previous studies (e.g., Wrightsman, 1964; O'Connor, 1971). Means and standard deviations for each of the PHN subscales are reported in Table 1.

TABLE 1

MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR PHN AND WAS

The World Assumptions Scale (WAS; Janoff-Bulman, 1989) is intended to assess participants' general assumptions about the world. The WAS includes 32 items, reflecting eight four-item subscales, each of which represents a primary postulate in a person's conceptual system. The eight subscales are: benevolence of the world, benevolence of people, justice, controllability, randomness, self-worth, self-controllability, and luck. Participants were asked to indicate the degree to which they agreed or disagreed with each item on 6-point Likert scales (1 = strongly disagree; 6 = strongly agree).

Principal components analysis with Varimax rotation (Kaiser normalization) was performed to test the factor structure of the measure. In all, five items had to be dropped from analysis due to failure to load adequately on any factor. These included two reverse- scored items from the benevolence of people subscale, and one item each from the justice, self-control, and randomness subscales. all four benevolence of the world items and the two remaining benevolence of people items merged as a single benevolence of the world factor, a finding consistent with previous research (JanoffBulman, 1989). all four controllability of outcome items and the remaining three justice items also merged as a single factor. The luck and self-worth subscales were retained in their original manners. The remaining three self-control items loaded together on a separate factor, as did the remaining three randomness items. To summarize, the emergent \factor structure was comprised of the following six components, encompassing twenty-seven of the original thirty-two items: benevolence of people and the world (6 items; [alpha] = .79); justice and controllability (7 items; [alpha] = .75), luck (4 items; [alpha] = .75), self-worth (4 items; [alpha] = .71), self-control (8 items; [alpha] = .57), and randomness (3 items; [alpha] = .66). With the exception of the self-control dimension, internal reliabilities of the WAS subscales are consistent with a previous reliability estimate (.67 to .78; Janoff- Bulman, 1989). Table 1 reports the means and standard deviations for each dimension of the WAS.

TABLE 2

ANALYSES OF VARIANCE FOR MESSAGE DESIGN LOGIC BY PHN AND WAS

RESULTS

In all, 217 respondents completed the Ron Test as directed. all analyses were based on these 217 respondents. Seventy-nine participants (36.4%) produced messages classified as Expressive, followed by 76 (35%) classified as Conventional, and 62 (28.6%) classified as Rhetorical.

To address the relationship between level of message design logic and philosophies of human nature, a series of univariate analyses of variance were performed (see Table 2). Results showed that level of cynicism significantly differed as a function of message design logic, F(2, 212) = 3.293, p < .05, [gamma]^sup 2^ = .03. Post hoc tests using Fisher's LSD showed that participants who produced Expressive messages were significantly more cynical (M = 38.38, SD = 7.59) than were participants who produced Conventional (M = 36.04, SD = 6.67) or Rhetorical (M = 35.66, SD = 6.49) messages. Furthermore, results showed that level of futility in understanding others significantly differed as a function of message design logic, F(2, 213) = 3.112, p < .05, [gamma]^sup 2^ = .03. Specifically, Rhetoricals scored significantly lower (M = 18.03, SD - 3.98) in futility in understanding others than did Conventionals (M = 19.58, SD = 4.23) and Expressives (M= 19.71, SD = 4.56).

Concerning a potential link between message design logic and assumptions about the world, results showed a significant difference in the combined assumption of benevolence of people and the world as a function of message design logic, F(2, 210) = 5.108, p < .01, [gamma]^sup 2^ = .05 (see Table 2). Rhetoricals scored significantly higher (M = 29.92, SD = 6.15) in benevolence of people and the world than did Expressives (M = 26.71, SD = 5.59) and Conventionals (M = 27.38, SD = 6.54).

Significant Pearson Product-Moment correlation coefficients between dimensions of the PHN and WAS were low to moderate, ranging from .14 to .36 in magnitude.

DISCUSSION

In terms of the relationship between message design logic and philosophies of human nature, results showed that participants who produced Expressive messages were significantly more cynical that those who produced Conventional or Rhetorical messages and that Rhetoricals scored significantly lower in futility in understanding others than did Conventionals or Expressives. There are several possible explanations for the finding that Expressives are more cynical than others. First, Expressives may be more cynical than Conventionals and Rhetoricals because they are actually exposed to more negative behavior from others. Considering that Expressive messages are often redundant, threatening, inappropriate, offensive, and/or ill adapted to the needs of the listener, it is possible that others react to Expressive message producers more negatively than they do to Conventionals (who strive for appropriateness) and Rhetoricals (who strive for consensus and interpersonal harmony). As previously noted, O'Keefe and McCornack (1987) demonstrated that judges rated Expressive messages as less effective along a number of dimensions and the sources of Expressive messages as less attractive than Rhetorical or Conventional messages and message producers. Furthermore, Peterson and Albrecht (1996) demonstrated that individuals in working (superior-subordinate) relationships with Expressive message producers tended to feel less supported, more burned out, and more stressed than when they were involved in working relationships with Conventional or Rhetorical message producers. Others may find the communication of Expressives to be insensitive, inadequate, or annoying and respond with anger, indifference, or insensitivity in return. One can imagine how our fictional character, "Ron," might have responded to an Expressive message that was emotional, reactive, and threatening in tone. The consensus-seeking Rhetorical messages, often carefully crafted to avoid face-threatening content, and the Conventional messages, frequently referencing existing rights and obligations of the social structures might elicit more positive behavioral responses from the recipient (O'Keefe, 1988). In essence, one possible interpretation of this finding is that Expressives are exposed to undesirable behavior of others more often, or to a greater degree, than are Conventionals and Rhetoricals, and are, thus, understandably more cynical.

Another explanation of the observed relationship between the Expressive message design logic and cynicism is that Expressive communicators, primarily due to their beliefs about communication, interpret certain events in a more negative light than do Conventionals and Rhetoricals. O'Keefe (1988) notes that for Expressives, there are two relationships between expression and thought: either the message expresses thought openly and honestly, or the message is a lie. For Expressives, accuracy and honesty are fundamental standards for assessing the effectiveness of communication. all ten items comprising the cynicism subscale make mention of some aspect of the deceitfulness of others (e.g., sneaking, cheating, lying, pretending). The very definitions of cheating, lying, or pretending and the relative importance assigned to these acts may differ between people employing different message design logics. Due in part to the dichotomy between truth and lie, more things in the world may seem like deceit to an Expressive communicator than to a Rhetorical or Conventional one. In fact, Rhetoricals see selves and situations as mutable. As O'Keefe (1988) suggests, when confronted by multiple and conflicting goals, the preferred strategy of the Rhetorical communicator is to "be someone else" by redefining the situation and himself or herself. This strategy may seem "untruthful" to Expressives in ways that Rhetoricals would not consider.

The other significant finding in regards to PHN and MDL is that Rhetoricals scored significantly lower in a sense of futility in understanding others than did Expressives or Conventionals. This finding makes sense considering Rhetoricals' beliefs about communication and what it can be used to accomplish. O'Keefe (1988) argues that for Rhetoricals, communication is fundamentally a process of repeatedly solving a coordination problem:

The one thing Rhetorical message producers must accomplish in a social situation is the achievement of a consensus regarding the reality in which they are engaged, coming to employ a common descriptive vocabulary and finding a common drama in which to play (O'Keefe, 1988, p. 88).

Thus, Rhetoricals constantly have the possibility of negotiation before them. Rhetoricals have a tendency to view meaning as inter- subjective, unanchored by context, and to value psychoanalysis and deep listening (O'Keefe, 1988). Such beliefs should be related to a sense of hope in being able to understand others.

Expressives likely experience greater futility in understanding others since communication is considered a process of thought and feeling transmission, instead of a process of attaining consensus and inter-subjective understanding. Meaning is considered a psychological phenomenon by the Expressive communicator. Expressives must be constantly concerned with communication "breakdown," fidelity, and the like. As Shepherd (1999) has argued, believing that meaning resides in the heads of social actors necessarily implies the impossibility of shared understanding.

Explaining Expressives' sense of futility in understanding others is relatively straightforward; it is more somewhat more difficult to understand why Conventionals differ from Rhetoricals in this regard. After all, Conventionals believe that meaning is anchored in contexts, and so one might think that understanding should be a relatively straightforward matter of reading signs, interpreting symbols, and following rules. It is, though, this seemingly straightforward nature of the Conventional logic that presents the problem of misunderstanding: Conventionals still share with Expressives a sense that meaning is fixed rather than negotiated. Unfortunately, Conventionals must regularly encounter others who do not read context as they do-contexts must often apparently dictate different meanings to different interactants. To a Conventional, the most obvious cause of such misunderstandings must be an incompetent or uncooperative other, one who refuses to understand or to be understood.

The results also demonstrated a link between MDL and the assumption of benevolence of the personal and impersonal world. Rhetoricals rated the world as significantly more benevolent than did Conventionals or Expressives. One explanation of this finding is that Rhetoricals may have actually experienced more benevolence of the personal and impersonal world. As O'Keefe and McCornack (1987) have demonstrated, Rhetoricals are rated by others as more attractive and effective than are Conventionals and Expressives. seemingly, the producer of a message designed to promote harmony and consensus would bring about a more positive response from a message target than would a message designed through an Expressive or Conventional logic.

A second potential explanation of this relationship is that it is a function of the beliefs Rhetorical message producers posses\s about communication. Achieving coordination, consensus and harmony with others requires a certain faith or belief in the goodness of the other social actors and in the drama itself.

It is worth noting that although Rhetoricals scored significantly higher than Conventionals or Expressives in benevolence of the world, there was no significant difference as a function of MDL in beliefs that people are conventionally good. These measures seem to be quite similar at first glance. However, the beliefs that people are conventionally good subscale of the PHN taps more specific assessments of the degree to which others engage in desirable behavior, while the benevolence of the personal and impersonal world subscale of the WAS measures more general or global assessments of the goodness of others and the world. Consider the difference between the following statements: "Most people would stop and help a person whose car was disabled" and "Human nature is basically good." One reason that Rhetoricals scored higher than others on statements of the second type, but not on statements of the first type, may be related to their corresponding levels of cognitive complexity. Highly complex individuals tend to employ less evaluative consistency in their ratings of others because of an increased ability to reconcile seemingly contradictory information about others (Crockett, Mahood, & Press, 1975; O'Keefe, Delia, & O'Keefe, 1977). It is possible that Rhetoricals believe that in certain situations people may engage in undesirable or immoral behaviors, but are still basically good and kind. Conventionals and Expressives may be more likely to strive for consistency between these seemingly contradictory positions.

World assumptions centering on outcome distribution (randomness and controllability and justice) were unrelated to message design logic, as were the world assumptions dealing with worthiness of self (self-worth, luck, self-control). Apparently, message design logic is related to perceptions of the extent to which good versus bad outcomes occur in the world, but not to how outcomes are distributed, or whether the individual is personally deserving of good versus bad outcomes.

In sum, these results suggest that some beliefs about the world and people are related to the message design logics people employ. For all significant results, message design logic accounted for between three and five percent of the variance. The picture of the rhetorical communicator is of one who has relatively positive expectations of others and the world and who believes in the possibility of reaching understanding with people. The Expressive communicator, by contrast, tends to have relatively low expectations of others (they are untrustworthy and dishonest) and feel greater futility in trying to figure others out.

Implications

The current study has several implications for the concepts under investigation. First, the detailing of a link between theories of communication and beliefs about people and the world provides justification for O'Keefe's (1988) claim that message design logic is related to conceptions of the social world. The finding that Rhetoricals have more positive views of the world and other people and report less futility in trying to understand others than do Conventionals or Expressives may indicate that Rhetoricals conduct themselves differently; recalling that positive philosophies of human nature are related to a number of positive outcomes and desirable behaviors. As previously discussed, individuals with more positive views of human nature are less likely to suffer from coronary disease. They receive higher interpersonal evaluations, are more likely to volunteer to participate in studies, and are more likely to choose to trust others and cooperate with others in experimental tasks. It is possible that Rhetorical communicators may be more likely than their Conventional or Expressive counterparts to engage in pro-social behavior.

Second, the relationship here demonstrated between certain theories of communication and beliefs about people and the world (some of which are clearly more beneficial than others), suggest considerable responsibility for scholars and teachers of communication. The results of this study advise that we forward a Rhetorical conception of communication-that we urge adoption of a theory of communication as constitutive of selves and social worlds- as people who adhere to such a theory are more positive in their outlooks and, importantly, more hopeful about reaching understanding with others. Positive outlooks are associated with various desirable outcomes, and as Shepherd (2001a) has recently argued, there are also likely benefits (e.g., for community building) to holding faith in the real possibility of communication, just as there are costs that come with disbelieving the same (see also, Shepherd, 2001b).

Limitations and Directions for Future Research

First, some subscales of the WAS achieved lower than desired internal reliability coefficients (self-controllability, .57; randomness, .66). However, these results are likely due to the small number of items (3) comprising those subscales and are generally consistent with previously observed internal reliability estimates (see, e.g., Janoff-Bulman, 1989).

Second, because the sample is confined to college undergraduates, caution should be exercised in attempting to generalize the observed findings to other populations. Future research should attempt to validate the results by examining their application in broader and more diverse groups of participants. One current impediment to such work lies in the nature of O'Keefe's (1988) Ron-test, which is specific to the experience of college students. However, previous research has effectively adapted the scenario for application in non- academic contexts (see, e.g., Peterson & Albrecht, 1996).

As all of these theories hold that beliefs are built, modified, and reinforced through interaction, future research should also examine the role of interaction in their formation, preservation, and change. Furthermore, this study does not provide an exhaustive look into the relationships among philosophies of communication, human nature, and the world. The variables examined as part of this investigation are only some of those that could have been chosen. Future research could build from the findings of the current study to identify other potentially useful belief variables to examine in tandem with message design logic.

Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, this study does not link theories of communication, human nature, and the world, with actual behavior. While there is some evidence, and it seems reasonable to assume, that beliefs influence practice, there is much work to be done, especially in determining how theories of communication contribute to behavior. Researchers should strive to identify theories of communication that correspond to the prevention or solution of pressing social problems. For instance, important questions include whether individuals holding certain theories are better citizens, more likely to help others, to volunteer, or to be involved in community life than are individuals who maintain other theories. We are currently undertaking a project addressing such questions.

NOTES

1 The questionnaire also included McCroskey and Richmond's (1987) Willingness to Communicate scale and two open-ended questions addressing the meaning and purposes of communication, which were not used as part of the current project.

2 Factor loadings of the PHN and WAS dimensions may be obtained upon request from the first author.

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Direct correspondence to: Autumn Edwards, School of Communication Studies, Lasher Hall, Athens, OH 45701. (740) 593-9163. E-mail: edwardsautumn@hotmail.com.

Autumn Edwards (M. A., University of Kansas) is a doctoral student in Communication Studies at Ohio University. Gregory J. Shepherd (Ph. D., University of Illinois) is Professor and Director of the School of Communication Studies at Ohio University. This article is based on the first author's master's thesis, which was under the direction of the second author. The authors wish to thank Chad Edwards for his assistance in coding participant responses, as well as the editor and three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions.

Copyright Central States Speech Association Summer 2004

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