National Space Policy: Evolution By Stealth?

In recent years, Pentagon advocacy for pursuing a strategy of “space control” that includes war-fighting “in, from and through space”1 has reached a fever pitch. Top Pentagon and Air Force space officials have repeatedly testified to Congress and made public speeches about the need for the U.S. military to establish “space dominance” to counter enemies of the future. Some officials, such as General Lance Lord, chief of Air Force Space Command, have even declared that “war in space has begun.”2

What remains uncertain, however, is whether such a strategy actually has been politically endorsed at the White House level and is consistent with national space policy.

Officially, the National Space Policy promulgated by President Bill Clinton in 1996 still stands, a policy that had previously been interpreted as eschewing the deployment of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons and weapons in orbit, reflecting more than 40 years of informal restraint both by Republican and Democratic administrations.

National security adviser Condoleezza Rice in 2002 launched a review of space policy, but that review is still pending. Indeed, in the four years since the inauguration of President George W. Bush, no new public documents that explain overarching administration (or Department of Defense) policy toward space weapons have been released. The single new policy paper relating to the issue was approved at Pentagon level, “DoD Policy on Space Control,” signed by Defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld in January 2001. That policy, however, is classified as secret.

Meanwhile, there has been a steady trickle of lower-level military planning and doctrine documents that seem to codify U.S. intentions to develop, deploy, and eventually use space weapons. The most recent is the Air Force’s Aug. 2 “Counterspace Operations Doctrine.”3 This precedent-setting document outlines Air Force guidelines for conducting ASAT operations, possibly pre-emptively, against satellite systems being used by enemies, whether they be dedicated military satellites; those with primarily commercial functions; or those owned and/or operated by third parties, whether governments or commercial entities.

Another document published in August by the Joint Chiefs of Staff similarly sets out operational guidelines for coordinating space operations across the services, including those to destroy enemy satellites and space systems.4

The situation begs a number of questions: What exactly is U.S. policy on the weaponization of space? Is the United States now determined unilaterally to break the taboo against arming the heavens that has stood since the dawn of the space age? Has such a policy and strategy been blessed, either formally or informally with a wink and a nod, by the White House? Is the Pentagon or Air Force simply trying to take advantage of a policy vacuum by rushing to quietly implement a more aggressive approach to military space?

Commander of Air Force Space Command General Lance Lord (left), shown here at a congressional hearing, said that “war in space has begun.”

One possible conclusion from reading the tea leaves, however, is that the White House and Pentagon are engaged in a clever political effort to avoid a controversial public argument on space weapons by reinterpreting Clinton-era policy or practice behind closed doors, that is, to reorient U.S. space policy in secret.

True, the Clinton policy itself is less than clear on the issue of space weapons and is open to a number of interpretations. Although it stresses the peaceful uses of space and downplays military applications, it also leaves the door open for the employment of ASATs for national security reasons. For example, the policy states that U.S. national security space activities should assure “that hostile forces cannot prevent our own use of space” and should “[counter), if necessary, space systems and services used for hostile purposes." It later states that, "[consistent with treaty obligations, the United States will develop, operate and maintain space control capabilities to ensure freedom of action in space, and, if directed, deny such freedom of action to adversaries."5

Although vague, the 1996 policy was widely interpreted at the time as stressing a deterrent approach, while refraining from any first deployment of ASAT systems or space-based weapons for striking targets on earth. In other words, one could read the Clinton policy as based on a belief that space control could be achieved without weapons." It should be noted that this reading of the Clinton policy would also be consistent with the historical approach to military space first laid out by the Eisenhower administration, according to Air Force sources.

In fact, the Clinton administration was viewed as politically hostile even to the development of space weapons, particularly those that could be seen as having offensive attributes.7 Clinton canceled a number of research and development programs that would have crossed the line toward weaponizing space, including the space- based Global Protection Against Limited Strike program that evolved under President George H. W. Bush from President Ronald Reagan's more ambitious "Star Wars" project; the Air Force's planned military Spaceplane; NASA's Clementine II satellite experiment designed in part as a proof of concept for space-based missile defense; and the Army's Kinetic Energy Anti-Satellite Weapon. By contrast, the Bush administration has allowed a wide array of space weapons-related technology developments to go forward at the Pentagon (see sidebar). Meanwhile, the Air Force's most recent vision for its future force structure includes a number of ASAT and space strike weapons such as the Ground-Based Laser, the AirLaunched ASAT Missile, the Space- Based Radio Frequency Weapon, and Hypcrvelocity Rod Bundles.8

"There was a while in the 1990s when we couldn't say 'space control'-we couldn't talk about it," Gen. Ralph E. Eberhart, thencommander of the U.S. Space Command and U.S. Air Force Space Command, was quoted in May 2002 by /due's International Defence Review.''

Air Force and Space Command planning documents dating from the Clinton era, such as the Space Command's 1998 "Long Range Plan," are as equivocal as the National Space Policy itself, reflecting long- standing service efforts to press the edge of the envelope regarding space weapons. At the same time, they also can be read as reflecting the military's view that nothing from the Clinton administration authorized the development and deployment of offensive systems designed to "negate" enemy assets in space or of space-based weapons to hit terrestrial targets.

On negation, the Long Range Plan states that "|t]he United States will need to develop national policies supporting space warfare, weapons development and employment, and rules of engagement,”10 later adding as a recommendation that Space Command “advocate national policy and legislation to support negation.”11 This seems to indicate that Space Command (dominated by Air Force officials) did not believe it had such policy or legislative authorization.

On space-based weapons for global strike (i.e., aimed at terrestrial targets), the docuI ment is much more blunt. It states that, “|a|t present, the notion of weapons in space is not consistent with national policy.”12

Fast forward to today. The most recent Air Force planning document, the “Strategic Master Plan for FY 06 and Beyond” published in October 2003, maintains that national space policy actually requires the development and “deployment as needed” of “negation” capabilities to counter enemy space assets.l:i It goes on seemingly to move the goalposts on when a presidential decision would be required. Although the Clinton policy can be read as requiring a presidential approval for deployment, the Air Force now insists presidential approval is not required for deployment but only to approve actual use of ASAT systems.

Current Air Force officials argue that the “employment” threshold was also applicable during the Clinton era as well, but there are reasons to question the logic of this interpretation. For one thing, since the use of ASAT systems would be an act of war, it is obvious it would require a White House decision, thus making the concept of an employment threshold moot. Further, the Strategic Master Plan itself is seemingly contradictory on the issue. For example, the caveat regarding “deployment as needed” raises the question of at what level the determination of need is to be made.

With regard to space-based strike weapons, rather than repeat the Long Range Plan’s assertion that such systems are “not consistent with national policy,” the Strategic Master Plan states that such weapons are allowable under international law but that “our nation’s leadership will decide whether or not to pursue the development and deployment.”14

Fortunately, the shifting language on space warfare used by the Air Force and Pentagon leaders has not gone completely unnoticed. The Senate and House Armed Services Committees, concerned about the lack of clarity regarding military space policy, included a clause in their conference agreement on the fiscal year 2005 Defense Department budget bill to require the Pentagon to provide Congress with an “extensive” review of national space policy. This report will provide lawmakers w\ith a first opportunity for input on this critical national and international security issue. As a unilateral move by the United States to deploy space weapons would come fraught with a variety of risks to national and global security, it is about time there was a public debate.1

ENDNOTIiS

1. “Report of the Commission to Assess United States National security Space Management and Organisation,”January 11, 2001, p. xvl (Executive Summary).

2. “Lord: Space Command Focusing on Maintaining Space Superiority,” Inside the Air Force, January SO, 2004, p. 9.

3. “Counterspace Operations,” Air Force Doctrine Document 2-2.1, August 2, 2004, found at ht t p://w w w.dtic.mil/doct r inc/jcl/ servicc_ pubs7afdd2_2_l.pdf.

4. “Joint Doctrine for Space Operations,” Joint Publication 3- 14, August 9, 2004, found at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/ new_pubs/ jpS_14.pdf.

5. National Science and Technology Council, The White House, ‘Tact Sheet: National Space IOlicy,” .September 19, 1996.

6. John Ii. Hyten, “A Sea of Peace or a Theater of War? Dealing With the Inevitable Conflict in Space,” /Ifr & Space Power Journal In, no. 3 (Fall 2002).

7. Bill Sweetman, /one’s International Defence KfWfW (May 2002): 45.

8. “The U.S. Air Force Transformation Might Plan,” November 2003, p. D3.

9. Sweetman, “USAF Plots Return to Space.”

10. U.S. Space Command, “Long Range Plan Implementing USSPACECOM Vision for 2020,” April 1998, chap. 5, p. 10.

11. Ibid., chap. 5, p. 11.

12. Ibid., chap. 6, p. 2.

13. Air Force Space Command, “Strategic Master Plan FY06 and Beyond,” October 1, 2003, p. 3%.

14. Ibid.

Theresa Hitchens is vice president of the Center for Defense Information and served as the editor of Defense News from 1998 to 2000.

Copyright Arms Control Association Nov 2004