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Proposed Tenets of Space Power: Six Enduring Truths

Posted on: Thursday, 8 July 2004, 06:00 CDT

Editorial Abstract:

The Air Force has a policy of using space as the high ground and has funded programs for building responsive launch vehicles and applying force directly from space. At the same time, the service continues to improve its current space capabilities. However, the Air Force has no tenets about how best to employ space power. Major McNiel stipulates that without guiding, enduring truths about space power, there is no doctrinal foundation to build upon, and the Air Force risks building systems and developing tactics, techniques, and procedures that do not ensure the most efficient and effective use of space power. He proposes six such tenets for consideration.

But if we limit our efforts only to applying space technologies to existing modes of war fighting, we have undershot. . . . It is no different than all the ways our armed forces once found for airpower to support ground operations-and do no more.

-Hon. Peter B. Teets

Undersecretary of the Air Force

THE TENETS OF space power presented in this article address the necessity of developing doctrine for conducting military operations in space. Maj M. V. Smith's study Ten Propositions Regarding Spacepower concisely articulates the nature of space power by conclusively showing that it is a unique form of military power-not an extension of airpower.1 If, as Smith demonstrates, space power is unique, then enduring truths must exist regarding the employment of that power. This article proposes six such truths with the hope that the Air Force community will examine, discuss, and incorporate them into our service's doctrine.

Tenets Are Appropriate at This Time

We have heard legitimate discussion about the appropriateness of developing tenets of space power. Because many people believe that space power's primary mission today is force enhancement and further believe that it should integrate as closely as possible with air operations, they argue that the tenets of air-power provide sufficient guidance. However, since the Air Force now has policy and programs calling for space power to do much more than force enhancement, the service needs doctrine to guide the development and employment of space forces. Furthermore, we can now draw on experience in space matters and a wealth of research to form a basis for articulating the tenets of space power in doctrine.

Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, notes that "the application of air and space power is refined by several fundamental guiding truths ... known as tenets."2 This article builds upon Smith's propositions, focuses on truths about employment as we now understand them, and suggests their inclusion into doctrine. With these truths as a starting point, as space power matures the tenets of space power will also evolve-just as AFDD 1 says they should.3

The idea that we do not have enough experience in space flight to develop space doctrine does not stand up. Mankind's dream to reach into space is almost as old as the dream to fly.4 Only 13 years after the Wright brothers' first flight, Robert H. Goddard launched the first liquid-fueled rocket-the direct antecedent of modern space- launch vehicles.5 Dating from the launch of Sputnik in the 1950s, we now have over 46 years of operating experience in space.6 The National Reconnaissance Office was created in 1960.7 An Air Force major command has assumed responsibility for space forces for over 21 years.8 Furthermore, a unified command responsible for war fighting with space forces has existed for over 18 years.9 The nearly half century of experience includes major utilization of space power in the Vietnam war; the Cold War; Operations Desert Storm, Allied Force, and Enduring Freedom; and now the ongoing Iraqi Freedom. After hundreds of years of thinking about going to space and five decades of operating in space, we obviously have plenty of experience to write tenets about space power. In addition to experience that spans a time-frame longer than that between the Wright brothers' first flight until Chuck Yeager broke the sound barrier, we have witnessed a plethora of academic writing about space power and some doctrine development.10 Given the lengthy experience base, the extensive number of publications about space power, and the policy and programs for the application of force in, to, and from space, it is not only appropriate but also necessary to codify the tenets of space power in doctrine.

Current Air and Space Doctrine and Policy

National safety would be endangered by an Air Force whose doctrines and techniques are tied solely on the equipment and process of the moment. Present equipment is but a stop in progress, and any Air Force which does not keep its doctrine ahead of its equipment, and its vision far into the future, can only delude the nation into a false sense of security.

-Gen Henry H. "Hap" Arnold

Today's Air Force doctrine claims to articulate the tenets of space power, but this seems the result of an attempt to include space in air operations rather than an honest assessment of space- power doctrine in its own right. Such a situation is problematic because, as Lt Col Peter Hays observes, since few concepts of sea- power theory directly translate to airpower theory and since space is as unique as sea or air, there is no reason to assume that either sea-power or airpower theory should directly translate into space- power theory.11

The idea of an aerospace force still drives Air Force doctrine, even if the term has fallen out of favor. Colonel Hays and Dr. Karl Mueller point out that "Air Force chief of staff Gen Thomas D. White first used the word aerospacem 1958, and the concept that air and space form a seamless operational medium has been the foundational component of Air Force thinking about space ever since."12

AFDD 2-2, Space Operations, made significant steps towards formulating a mature space doctrine by pointing out that space is a "physical environment-like land, sea, and air."13 AFDD 1 continues this evolution of doctrine: "Air and space are separate domains requiring exploitation of different sets of physical laws to operate in, but are linked by the effects they can produce together."14

Even though current doctrine recognizes the differences between the air and space mediums, it does not explain how the linkage of effects between space and air forces is any greater than that between air and ground forces or space and naval forces. So the idea that space power operates as an extension of airpower seems an underlying assumption.

Also, current Air Force doctrine does not consider tenets of space power apart from the tenets of air and space power as articulated in AFDD 1.15 If interpreted very generally, those tenets may also have applicability to space power. However, to be useful in guiding future programs; tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP); and the development of combat theory, they should be restated with further specificity as they apply to space power-if not in AFDD 1, then in some subordinate doctrine document.

The latest revision of AFDD 2-2 not only draws some distinction between the mediums of air and space, but also distinguishes between air and space power: "Airmen, however, should not assume airpower and space power are interchangeable. Applying the operational art of war requires an understanding of the similarities and unique qualities of each."16 Representing a significant departure from previous Air Force doctrine, AFDD 2-2 goes so far as to rename the joint force air component commander (JFACC) the joint force air and space component commander (JFASCC): "A JFASCC may require a space officer dedicated to carry out the detailed responsibilities associated with the [space forces] coordination role."17 Central Air Forces used this concept of a senior space officer in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, successfully incorporating space into air operations.

AFDD 2-2 explains how to integrate space into air operations but not how to employ space forces as either a supporting or supported military power. It also does not address how synergy between air and space forces makes them suitable for remaining a single component. Synergy exists between all components of a joint force, yet we would not consider placing either land and air forces or sea and land forces under a single component commander. Given that the differences between space and air forces are just as great as-in many ways, even greater than-those between air and ground forces, it is no more appropriate to have space forces commanded by the air commander than to have air forces commanded by the ground commander.

Some people have argued against the push by space-power advocates to change the focus of the Air Force's space-power doctrine from force enhancement towards a more complete force package, including force application. Maj John Grenier comments that "the essence of [offensive counterspace] and [defensive counterspace] has less to do with force application and more to do with supporting, enabling, and enhancing other air and space operations."18 He, along with others, believes that until the fielding of technology that allows space to apply force, the Air Force should continue to focus on vising space power as a force enhancer.

If this same argument were applied to airpower prio\r to World War II, then the work of the Air Corps Tactical School's strategic- bombing advocates in developing the theory (what was, in effect, doctrine at the time) of high-altitude, precision daylight bombing before the advent of high-performance bombers was completely misguided.19 They should have waited until after the B-17 and B-24 bombers became operational to develop doctrine about how to use them.20 Had they done so, the United States might never have had a four-engine heavy bomber capable of bombing Germany or Japan. The fallacy of this "wait for the capability" argument is that without the development of doctrine, there is nothing to guide the requirements for new systems or their TTPs. Technology does not limit the development of space power today; the culprit is the lack of doctrine that results in ill-defined, incomplete space-power requirements.

Major Grenier points out that the high classification of many space systems and the lack of integration of counterspace plans represent substantial obstacles to helping the airbreathing part of the Air Force understand what space brings to the fight. However, he says that those factors are just excuses for the "inability of space operators, space weapons officers, and space experts to tell in- theater aviators what counterspace brings to the fight."21 Although counterspace is only one portion of space power, if his argument is correct, it is actually doctrine that has failed to articulate what space power contributes to the fight. That failing partially results from the lack of space-power tenets that could serve as building blocks for doctrine on applying space power. Although we have made some progress towards recognizing space power as the equal of airpower, current Air Force doctrine views space power as an extension of airpower, having a primary mission of force enhancement. Disappointingly, many people believe it should stay that way.

Space as the High Ground

In On Space Warfare: A Space Power Doctrine, David E. Lupton proposes four schools of thought-actually four doctrinal approaches- regarding military activity in space.22 Each of the four schools- sanctuary, survivability, control, and high ground-suggests a focus, employment strategy, wartime mission, and preferred organization for space forces.

The United States Air Force is now part of the "space as the high ground" school of thought. It is important to view space power through this frame of reference because then we can clearly see that space forces will become directly engaged in traditional combat- killing targets and receiving hostile fire-adapted for the unique environment of space, along with conducting space power's traditional role in command, control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. If that is true, then the need for a solid doctrinal basis for space power becomes imperative. This move to the high-ground school was a significant departure from historical practice, occurring as recently as Desert Storm, when the United States began moving from a sanctuary doctrine towards a survivability doctrine.23

The formal beginning of the move to space as the high ground began with publication of US Space Command's Long-Range Plan. The plan envisions a robust, fully integrated suite of space and terrestrial capabilities by 2020 that provides dominant battlespace awareness enabling on-demand targeting and engagement of all ballistic and cruise missiles. If so directed by the president and secretary of defense, these assets can also identify, track, and hold at risk designated high-value terrestrial targets.24

The report of the Space Commission sees space as the high ground as well:

Finally, space offers advantages for basing systems intended to affect air, land and sea operations. Many think of space only as a place for passive collection of images or signals or a switchboard that can quickly pass information back and forth over long distances. It is also possible to project power through and from space in response to events anywhere in the world. . . . Having this capability would give the U.S. a much stronger deterrent and, in a conflict, an extraordinary military advantage.25

The commission also warns of the need to deal with satellite vulnerability and to negate enemy spacecraft.26 The fact that the Department of Defense accepted the recommendations of the report indicates that military policy is clearly in line with the high- ground school of thought.

Realization of a high-ground policy continued with Air Force Space Command's applying financial resources to implement parts of a high-ground doctrine. On 1 March 2003, the command launched an $8 million Analysis of Alternatives for Operationally Responsive Spacelift program based on a mission-needs statement validated by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. Projected for initial operational capability in 2014, the program's payloads include the common aero vehicle, a munition that can be delivered from or through space, along with counterspace payloads.27 The command also recently launched the Counter Surveillance and Reconnaissance System (CSRS); Counter Communications System (CCS); and Rapid Attack, Identification, Detection, and Reporting System (RAIDRS)-all designed for space combat. Finally, AFDD 1 describes the counterspace function of air and space power: "Counterspace involves those kinetic and nonkinetic operations conducted to attain and maintain a desired degree of space superiority."28 Taken as a whole, these indicators show that the Air Force is responsible for a high- ground approach to space power, even if its current doctrine still treats space power as an extension of airpower.

Tenets of Space Power

Few concepts from sea power theory translate directly into airpower theory-why should we expect either sea power or airpower theory to apply directly to the distinct medium of space?

-Lt Col Peter Hays

United States Military Space: Into the Twenty-First Century

Although the Air Force has plans and programs for using space to do more than move large amounts of data over long distances and observe terrestrial activities, it has no guiding, fundamental truths about how to employ space power. The following proposed tenets of space power attempt to represent enduring truths about such employment. Although in some cases existent capabilities may be "lead-turning," without doctrine to help shape thinking and requirements, how will the Air Force see to it that programs and TTPs develop in ways that ensure the most efficient and effective use of space power?

Tenet One: Space Operators Should Understand the Advantages and Limitations of Operating in, to, and from Space

Space is a distinct medium, both physically and politically. As is the case with land, sea, and air, one finds both advantages and disadvantages associated with operating in, to, and from this medium. Understanding these benefits and limitations is critical to the proper employment of space forces.

Although some people consider space operations similar to air operations, space is no less unique than any of the other three mediums.29 Space's physical characteristics make it distinctive.30 Even though no universally accepted dividing line exists between air and space, we should consider the following: the highest altitude obtainable by an air-breathing aircraft is about 28 miles; somewhere around an altitude of 62 miles, the conditions for aerodynamic flight cease, even if we had some form of sustainable propulsion; and the lowest altitude of a sustainable satellite orbit is 93 miles.31 Therefore, in between the two mediums lies a region 65 miles wide which cannot sustain flight without tremendous expenditures of fuel.32

This boundary layer divides two dissimilar environments. Air is a medium of substance, and space is a vacuum. AFDD 2-2 quotes Gen Thomas White as saying, "There is no division . . . between air and space. Air and Space are an indivisible field of operations."33 As shown above, General White-as well as anyone else who believes that space power is an indivisible, natural extension of airpower-is wrong.

The existence of a synergy of effects between forces operating in different mediums does not suggest that one of those forces is an extension of the other. For example, one would certainly not claim that a C-17 delivering Army troops or a B-52 dropping bombs on enemy troop positions represents ground power; obviously, airpower operates in a different medium and can do more than support Army troops. Similarly, when space power delivers effects that benefit other forces, it does not act as an extension of those forces; space power operates in a different medium and can do more than perform force-enhancement missions.

The value of knowing the difference between air and space resides in understanding how the different mediums affect operations. Some of the differences concern the operation of vehicles-the dissipation of heat in space or the effect of a change in velocity on the ground trace of a spacecraft's orbit. Others have to do with the effect of phenomena in the medium, such as electromagnetic-energy storms in space.

The most important differences are what the physical distinctions permit. For example, spacecraft travel at very high speed (about 17,500 mph in low Earth orbit), allowing them to cover distances very quickly or have a tremendous amount of kinetic energy. However, there is much distance to traverse in the vastness of space. Changing direction at orbital speeds is very difficult or impossible given the very limited fuel supplies available. Also, orbiting at a very high altitude allows a wide field of view and, at a geosynchronous altitude, a continuous presence over an area. However, electromagnetic energy and physical objects are affected in many ways as they pass through the entire depth of the atmosphere. Clearly, one must have considerable operational expertise to understand how to use the pecu\liarities of operating in space for military advantage.

In addition to the physical differences, other differences exist. Unlike operations in any other medium, those in space observe no political boundaries. Much like a ship in international waters, spacecraft can go anywhere at any time, but space has no shores to impede travel. The unprotested orbits of the first Sputnik established the right of spacecraft to unimpeded orbits over any country.34

Related to the right of unrestricted orbits is the idea of vehicular sovereignty. That is, sovereignty resides with the vehicle- not its position, as is the case with ships operating in international waters. The disadvantage of vehicular sovereignty is that there are no safe sanctuaries in which to seek refuge for refitting or resupplying. Once hostilities towards a spacecraft commence, it cannot (with the exception of transatmospheric vehicles) seek protection by returning to friendly territory.35

As with other mediums, treaties limit some activities in space. In very broad terms, we have treaties against placing weapons of mass destruction in orbit or on the moon, establishing military bases on celestial bodies, or interfering with the verification of arms-control treaties from space. Causing long-lasting environmental effects is also prohibited.36 Most importantly, almost everything is legally permissible except for the few specific cases mentioned above.37 In this sense, space is like other mediums: some activities therein are subject to agreed-upon political limitations, but such restrictions are unique to space.38 Given its distinctive physical and political environments, we can reasonably conclude that space is a unique medium and that the need to understand the advantages and limitations of operating in, to, and from that environment is the first tenet of employing space forces.

Tenet Two: Space Power Should be Prioritized and Coordinated by a Space Professional with a Global Perspective

Because of their global impact, tremendous capabilities, very high cost, difficulties of operating in space, and extreme sensitivity to technology advances, space forces may be the ultimate low-density/high-demand asset, thus requiring prioritization by a commander with a global perspective. The speed and altitude of orbiting spacecraft almost always give space forces the potential to produce effects in multiple theaters, often simultaneously. For example, a communications satellite may provide support to European Command and Central Command at the same time, or an imaging satellite may image targets in multiple theaters within a few minutes of each other. Similarly, terrestrial forces executing space- control missions would almost always produce effects on systems used by an adversary in multiple theaters. The organization of US military forces allows combatant commanders to command all the forces in their theater for good reasons. In the current command plan, the commander of US Strategic Command provides the required global perspective.

The combatant commander with a global perspective should have command authority of all military space forces. Additionally, because the space forces selected to execute any major regional- contingency operations plan will require significant commercial and intelligence augmentation, the combatant commander should be able to obtain and coordinate additional forces from the civil, commercial, and intelligence space sectors.39

In this organizational scheme, tactical control and, sometimes, operational control of assets would be allocated to a theater. However, the theater commander would never have control over a satellite-only mission payloads. Either a deployment order or space tasking order would clearly define the time and scope of a theater's control of an asset. This could entail complete dedication of a satellite to a theater (e.g., a communications satellite supporting only that theater) or continuous dedication of a certain number of transponders on a communications satellite. In the case of satellites in low Earth orbit, it could involve certain windows of time for each mission payload, based on when resources would become useful to that theater.

The joint force space commander in a theater should have direct liaison authority with whatever organization controls the payload, and that organization would have a direct supporting relationship with the commander while its payload remained allocated to the theater. This arrangement allows the commander to coordinate as necessary to ensure that the operations crews fully understand what effects the theater needs during the time the resources are allocated. In effect, the satellite- and payload-operations crews would work under that theater commander for the duration of the direct-support relationship. The same arrangement should also hold for terrestrial space forces. Even though tactical control passes to the theater, combatant command should reside with a commander having a global perspective because of that person's ability to regularly create effects in multiple theaters.

The theater commander would have authority to "pull the trigger" on systems that affect only his or her theater. However, for missions that would create effects in multiple theaters, execution authority remains with the space combatant commander. Clearly defining the extent of this authority for each system allocated to a theater, based either in space or terrestrially, becomes extremely important to avoid confusion and maintain unity of both command and effort.

Space forces not allocated to a theater would remain under the operational and tactical control of the space combatant commander, even if they affect a theater. The commander must remain fully aware of theater commanders' needs and requirements to see that space forces respond to these supported commanders. A single space- tasking-order process would transmit orders from the theater commander and combatant commander to the executing forces.

Future systems will present greater challenges to this system but will make it even more important. For example, should a microsatellite "space-predator" constellation launched solely to support a single theater be under theater combatant command? In this scheme, the answer is no because, even though the constellation may be optimized to provide imagery coverage of specific gaps in one theater, it would still have value to other theaters. The same is true of theater missile defense from space. Those missiles may or may not impact in the theater from which they were launched, so a commander with a global perspective should pull the trigger for those systems. Processes such as training and exercising, which ensure close coordination between the theater's space staffs and the space combatant commander's staff, should be adopted to assure that space remains integrated with the theater's campaign plans.

Tenet Three: A Space Professional Should Centrally Control Space Power in a Theater

Being a good operator in any one environment is difficult. Becoming expert on how to employ military instruments at the operational or strategic level of war in any medium takes a career of learning.40 Space is no different; only professionals with a deep pool of experience in space operations should command space forces.

Because space power in a theater is a very limited resource, a space commander with a theaterwide perspective should control its allocation within that theater. Failing to do so runs the risk of repeating the mistakes made in the early years of airpower- specifically, forces spent inefficiently in "penny packets." A joint force space component commander (JFSCC) should fill this role.

During the research for this article, this tenet and the preceding one received the most criticism of all the tenets proposed; interestingly, they were also the most strongly defended. The most often voiced concern was that space power, for the most part, has done a good job of becoming relevant to the fight through force enhancement-especially force enhancement of the Air Force-and is well integrated into air and space operations centers (AOC). Many leaders who provided comments felt strongly that this situation should not be reversed, thereby avoiding the segregation and marginalization of space power. This tenet in no way suggests reversing any of those advancements in the utilization of space power.

It does not call for the removal of space weapons officers or other space operators from the AOC, although they may need renaming. Their primary function should remain the optimizing of space support for air operations and ensuring that the JFACC has experts who can see to it that airpower uses space to its fullest advantage. Sometimes they also help other services integrate space power into their operations. We should continue to use space power to enhance air, land, and sea power; however, it can do much more.

The JFSCC would have responsibility for planning the employment of all space forces allocated to the theater by the space combatant commander. he or she would do this coequally with the other component commanders and would answer to the joint force commander (JFC) for the employment of space power to accomplish effects for the campaign plan, either as the main effort or in support of that effort, as directed. Currently, no one is tasked to think about how to use joint space forces in this way. As long as the senior space operator remains part of the JFACC's staff, the focus for the employment of space forces will not likely shift away from providing support to air operations.

Today's situation resembles the one during the early days of airpower when Gen Carl Spaatz said in exasperation that soldiers and sailors talked about the years of experience that went into training a surface commander, which made it impossible for outsiders to understand their calling. Yet, they all felt capable of running an air for\ce.41 Today's equivalent to General Spaatz's comments would have pilots speaking in awe of the complexities of running eight- ship formations and designing strategic air campaigns, insisting that a person can master the required skills only after spending years in the cockpit and commanding air forces. Yet, the Air Force considers pilots almost instantly capable of mastering the intricacies of optimizing space power.42 That statement does not denigrate pilots; it merely emphasizes the idea that learning how to use space power in a fight-like using any other form of military power-is a complex, difficult process which requires years of learning.

Although it did not consider space power, Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, points out that "any dimension of combat power can be dominant-and even decisive-in certain aspects of an operation or phase of campaign and each force can support or be supported by other forces."43 True, space power would be hard pressed to demonstrate decisive effects today, but such capability is only about 10 years away (see tenet six).

Decisive or not, space forces in a theater should remain under the command of a JFSCC. Fully integrating space power's potential into the JFC's plan while simultaneously providing support to other forces can become a very complex task. It is a mission for a JFSCC- a commander with enough experience in space operations to make those judgments, the staff to employ space power to full advantage, and a coequal position on the JFC's staff.

Tenet Four: Space Power Is Flexible and Versatile

Space power, much like airpower, is flexible and versatile. Although these attributes are not unique to space power, they nevertheless constitute a valid tenet of space power. Flexibility allows space power to shift from one campaign objective to another very quickly.44 For example, a photoreconnaissance satellite may image targets on two different fronts of a campaign within a very short period of time. Today's legacy satellite systems are not easily reconfigured or maneuvered;45 however, they can shift between different objectives within the limits of the platform. In this respect, they resemble all weapon systems: they must operate within their limitations.

Future systems may provide much more flexibility in the form of responsive launch systems using common microsatellite buses. Addition of a "space predator"-a small, cheap, expendable satellite with limited life, launched for a single purpose-enhances flexibility, as do on-orbit refueling capabilities. The latter reduce the mission-limiting impact of deciding to maneuver a satellite.46 Some critics say that space systems will never become cheap enough to make short-lived satellites such as space predators practical. However, considering the fact that a Tomahawk cruise missile costs $600,000 and is completely expended in a single mission, it seems reasonable to spend $1.1 million on microsatellites (not including some of the one-time infrastructure costs) that are launched for a single mission but provide a few months of useful life.47

Space power is versatile in that it can prove equally effective at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war-sometimes simultaneously. For example, a Defense Support Program satellite has the ability to watch for strategic-missile launches at the same time it looks for much shorter-range theater missiles. The common aero vehicle or space-based lasers planned for the future will attack targets across the spectrum of war and do so nearly simultaneously. Furthermore, counterspace systems will attack space systems used by the enemy to achieve tactical and strategic effects.

Some critics may charge that this tenet dwells on future systems that may never develop into weapon systems. But that is precisely the point of writing tenets now: to help guide the development of those systems-which are actual programs, not just vaporware-and their TTPs. If we do not design flexibility and versatility into systems, they will not have it.

Tenet Five: Space Power Should Capitalize on Its Unique Advantages

As a unique operating environment, space provides advantages that we should capitalize on and limitations that we should minimize. Thus, the best use of space power requires choices about what mission to perform in, to, and from space. Just as it makes sense to conduct some missions from a tank rather than an airplane, it also makes sense to do some things from ships or airplanes instead of space. By the same token, we should use space rather than terrestrial forces for certain missions. As the often-repeated mantra of the space-integration school of thought goes, some air- power missions will migrate to space when it becomes reasonable; however, in addition to such migration, we can probably use space to execute entirely new sets of missions.48

What, then, are the most important characteristics of space power? First, the "global" nature of space power allows us to reach any place on Earth in much less time than with any other system. It also gives us access to all locations on Earth simultaneously with relatively few assets, unlike any other form of military power.49

Second, because of the persistence of space power, we can not only reach all spots on Earth with great speed and/or do so simultaneously, but also continue to provide access to those areas for as long as required. Together, global access and global presence are the essence of space power.50

Third, space power is unobtrusive. Its ability to create effects over an area is not always apparent. As launch systems become more responsive and as satellites require less on-orbit checkout prior to becoming operational, this characteristic will become increasingly prominent. One has to deal with fewer political and public-opinion considerations when deploying space-based forces rather than strike aircraft or unmanned aerial vehicles. As stated above, even when the presence of space power is well known, no laws prohibit it from conducting operations over any spot on Earth.

Finally, the vacuum of space allows some weapons to travel very long distances with no disruption by atmospheric conditions. Although this principle applies mostly to space-to-space engagements, it makes space-based missile defense and space-based counterspace missions practical.

These four attributes-global access, global presence, unobtrusiveness, and the vacuum of space-constitute unique advantages that space-power missions should capitalize on. If a mission does not require any of these attributes, using some other form of military power may be preferable. But if a mission does lend itself to any of these four, we would do well to consider conducting it in, to, or from space.

Space power will never replace airpower, and airpower will never do everything space power can do; the two are unique and complementary. As Maj M. V. Smith observes, "Airpower should continue to provide theater-focused forces; space power provides globally focused forces. The two complement each other as joint partners with land and sea forces."51

Tenet Six: Space Power Can Support, Be Supported, or Operate Independently

Like all other forms of military power, space power can support other forces, receive sup port from other forces, or act independently. Today, space assets are the first forces over a theater and remain there after the termination of conflict. For much of its history, space power has supported terrestrial forces. Both experience and books that forecast how space power will support forces in the future speak for themselves-they don't require repeating here.

One case, however, is worth mentioning. The Air Force's Global Strike Task Force (GSTF) and Global Response Task Force (GRTF) will rely on space for traditional support, but space power may also play a major role in helping "kick down the door" and rapidly striking fleeting targets with precision.52 With the fielding of the Force Application and Launch from the Continental United States (FALCON) program and other strike systems in the next 10-15 years, force application from space may soon become possible against targets very deep in enemy territory or against very well defended targets. Gen John P. Jumper, the Air Force chief of staff, did not present space- power force application as part of either the GSTF or GRTF, even though he addressed other capabilities not yet available. As soon as space forces demonstrate an attack capability, we should include them as force appliers in these task forces. Space assets can reach the theater faster, strike with greater impunity, and remain over the area longer than other forces. That is not to say they will ever replace the cost-effectiveness or mission flexibility of aircraft- only to point out the existence of some specialized missions the GSTF will execute that can take advantage of the unique characteristics of space forces.

Terrestrial forces can also support space power-most obviously when terrestrial forces strike ground segments of an adversary's space systems.53 Other less apparent support may include making efforts to mask the actual capabilities of some space forces, designating targets for munitions delivered from space, transporting space forces to forward locations, and providing security for terrestrially based space forces-to name just a few.

Additionally, space and terrestrial forces should be able to create synergistic effects. For example, terrestrial forces may cause an adversary to shift communications from a fiber-optic network to a space-based system. Space forces may then deny use of that system. The two forces working together would thus create an effect that neither could produce independently. Space power should never think of itself as operating in the vacuum of space; it should always be integrated into the JFC's plan to create effects in any way required. Space forces should stay flexible enough and suffici\ently integrated into joint war fighting to support other forces, even if doing so is not part of an ideal space mission. In turn, space forces may need assistance from other forces to cover their shortfalls.

Space power can also act independently of terrestrial forces. Only a very specific set of circumstances would allow space power to act decisively today, but as new systems become available, those circumstances will expand. That is not to say we should ever consider space power an answer to every problem or even useful in every circumstance. Like every other form of military power, in the right circumstances when an adversary has a critical vulnerability in a center of gravity that space power can affect, then it can be decisive. Major Smith points out that

force application from space will take many forms; but it seems likely space-based weapons will fill specific niches, ideal for a handful of missions during certain phases of operations. No claim is made that space power by itself can be decisive in conventional warfare, but it may help set the conditions for victory by friendly forces in certain circumstances. . . . There may be certain forms of limited warfare wherein information gleaned from space or strikes delivered from space may achieve the political and military aims of an operation.54

James Oberg argues that, at least for the next several decades, space power alone "is insufficient to control the outcome of terrestrial conflict or ensure the attainment of terrestrial political objectives."55 He fails to consider that some national centers of gravity might have a vulnerability that space power can affect. As Smith says, such weaknesses would probably occur in limited warfare with limited objectives and only in unique circumstances. The fact that they are uncommon, however, does not place them outside the realm of possibility. For example, space power may succeed in coercing some leaders by holding high-value, well-defended targets at risk from a space-based attack that neither puts a pilot in jeopardy nor requires overflight permissions from any other country.

Even if space power is not decisive, it may still take action independently of other forces-for example, by signaling US intent through temporarily denying some satellite-based services in a country or by striking a high-value, well-defended target. Many other attack options may remain independent of terrestrial forces, even if they produce synergistic effects with those forces to create a decisive outcome. Although we have not yet fielded some of these capabilities, they should become available during the careers of space operators on duty today.

Nothing here suggests that space power will ever prove decisive in all, or even many, situations or will ever replace airpower. However, a JFC's plan should always include space power and its ability to support other forces, be supported by other forces, or act independently to produce whatever effects the commander requires.

Conclusions

This article has depicted space as a unique medium with its own physical and political attributes. That uniqueness gives space its own operational characteristics-with the corresponding advantages and limitations. Therefore, one must concede the existence of enduring truths about how to employ space power.

The Air Force has policies that require space power to create effects in, to, and from space. Air Force Space Command has funded programs to enact that policy. However, Air Force doctrine includes no enduring truths about how to employ space power that could guide the development of space-power vision, operating concepts, programs, or TTPs. To remedy that deficiency, this article has proposed six tenets of space power and has demonstrated the validity of each.

Acceptance of these tenets by Air Force doctrine and, more importantly, by members across the services will put to rest discussion about whether space should be "weaponized." That argument is long since over: space is already being weaponized. The tenets will also help change the paradigm that many people use to view space by allowing them to see it as a coequal component of a joint force capable of supporting other forces, receiving support from other forces, or taking independent action.

To incorporate these tenets would require some organizational changes. Creation of a JFSCC will call for additional expertise in joint war fighting and a knowledge of how space can contribute directly to a JFC's plan. Deciding whether or not to collocate this staff with AOCs will require considerable thought and discussion. The processes, training, and exercising for these space staffs will become critical. We can apply all the lessons learned about incorporating space into air operations to making it part of the joint-force campaign plan, but the process will still take considerable time. The Space Division of the Air Force Weapons School may have to break into multiple sections-one focusing on support to air operations and another on creating direct effects.

Most importantly, adopting these tenets permits the presentation of space power to JFCs as a power in its own right-not just as a supporting function of airpower. Only a few people envisioned how applications of the global positioning system would eventually permeate society. It is just as difficult to predict the many ways space operators will use space power to create effects for the joint campaign plan.

Above all, this article has attempted to capture truths about space power yet to be codified. Regardless of a reader's stance on these specific tenets, few could argue that we do not need to articulate tenets. Space power has emerged as a force able to stand on its own. If the Air Force does not codify enduring truths about how to fight with this power effectively, its maturation will become a long and painful process. The next step requires us to discuss these tenets, modify them if necessary, capture them in doctrine, and apply them throughout the Air Force.

Notes

1. Maj M. V. Smith, Ten Propositions Regarding Spacepower, Fairchild Paper (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, October 2002).

2. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 17 November 2003, 27.

3. Ibid., 3.

4. According to legend, during the Ming Dynasty in ancient China, Wan Hoo attempted to reach space by mounting 47 large rockets on a wicker chair. "Wan Hoo and His Space Vehicle," http:// history.msfc.nasa.gov/ rocketry/06.html.

5. Goddard's first successful liquid-fueled flight occurred on 16 March 1926, in Auburn, Massachusetts.

6. Sputnik I-the first artificial, Earth-orbiting satellite-was launched on 4 October 1957.

7. Lt Col Peter L. Hays et al., "Space Power for a New Millennium: Examining Current U.S. Capabilities and Policies," in Spacepower for a New Millennium: Space and U.S. National Security, ed. Peter L. Hays et al. (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 2000), 8.

8. Air Force Space Command was created on 1 September 1982.

9. United States Space Command was formed in September 1985.

10. The Wright brothers first flew on 17 December 1903, and Chuck Yeager broke the sound barrier on 14 October 1947, almost 44 years apart.

11. Lt Col Peter L. Hays, United Sates Military Space into the Twenty-First Century, INSS Occasional Paper 42 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2002), pt. 1, 25-26.

12. Lt Col Peter Hays and Dr. Karl Mueller, "Going Boldly-Where? Aerospace Integration, the Space Commission, and the Air Force's Vision for Space," Aerospace Power Journal 15, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 36.

13. AFDD 2-2, Space Operations, 27 November 2001, 4.

14. AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 4.

15. Ibid., 27.

16. AFDD 2-2, Space Operations, 8.

17. Ibid., 31.

18. Maj John Grenier, "A New Construct for Air Force Counterspace Doctrine," Air and Space Power Journal 16, no. 3 (Fall 2002): 21.

19. Brig Gen Haywood S. Hansell, "The Development of the United States Concept of Bombardment Operations," in Airpower Studies: Academic Year 2003 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Command and Staff College, November 2002), 56.

20. Lt Col Michael R. Mantz, The New Sword: A Theory of Space Combat Power (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, May 1995), 60.

21. Grenier, "New Construct," 19.

22. David E. Lupton, On Space Warfare: A Space Power Doctrine (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, June 1988).

23. Smith, Ten Propositions, 22-25.

24. Long-Range Plan: Implementing USSPACKCOM Vision for 2020 (Peterson AFB, CO: US Space Command, Director of Plans, March 1998), 20.

25. Report of the Commission to Assess United States National security Space Management and Organization (Washington, DC: [Space] Commission, 11 January 2001), 33.

26. Ibid., 27.

27. William B. Scott, "Rapid Response," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 7 April 2003, 67.

28. AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 42.

29. Joint Publication (JP) 3-14, Joint Doctrine for Space Operations, 9 August 2002, 1-2.

30. It is possible that information is also a unique medium, but discussion of that topic is beyond both the scope of this article and the author's research and expertise.

31. Smith, Ten Propositions, 38.

32. Ibid.

33. AFDD 2-2, Space Operations, 1.

34. David N. Spires et al., eds., Beyond Horizons: A Half Century of Air Force Space Leadership, rev. ed. (Peterson AFB, CO: Air Force Space Command in association with Air University Press, 1998), 52.

35. Lupton, On Space Warfare, 15.

36. Smith, Ten Propositions, 43.

37. JP 3-14, Joint Doctrine for Space Operations, 1-4.

38. Brig Gen Simon P. Worden and Maj John E. Shaw, Whither Space Power? Forging a Strategy for the New Century, Fairchild Paper (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, September 2002), 130-32.

39. AFDD 2-2, Space Operations, 48. The document points out that augmentation using commercial assets began in the Vietnam War and has continued ever since. In Operation Allied Force, 60 percent of satellite communications occurred over commercial satellites; therequirements are increasing.

40. AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 19.

41. Col Phillip S. Meilinger, 10 Propositions Regarding Air Power (Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1995), 49- 50.

42. Report of the Commission, 43-44.

43. JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, 10 September 2001,111- 10.

44. AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 30.

45. AFDD 2-2, Space Operations, 9.

46. William B. Scott, "Space Shell Game," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 7 April 2003, 74-75.

47. "Tomahawk Cruise Missile," United States Navy Fact File, 11 August 2003, http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/ navpalib/factfile/missiles/ wep-toma.html. This amount is based upon a 10-meter-resolution microsatellite built and launched by Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd.-demonstrated with an actual on-orbit system using a 6.5 kg bus and Russian launch vehicles. The monetary figure includes the cost of a ground station. Another $2 million would add multispectral and two-meter monochromatic imaging. Maj Timothy Lawrence, USAF, researcher at Surrey, interview by the author, Maxwell AFB, AL, February 2003.

48. Smith, Ten Propositions, 104-5.

49. Ibid., 92.

50. Ibid., 48.

51. Ibid., 97.

52. Gen John P. Jumper, "Global Strike Task Force: A Transforming Concept, Forged by Experience," Aerospace Power Journal 15, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 29-32.

53. AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 42-43.

54. Smith, Ten Propositions, 106.

55. James E. Oberg, Space Power Theory (Colorado Springs, CO: US Air Force Academy, Department of Astronautics, March 1999), 127.

MAJ SAMUEL L McNIEL, USAF

Copyright U.S. Superintendent of Documents Summer 2004

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