Space Power in Joint Operations: Evolving Concepts

Editorial Abstract:

Space power is now an integral part of joint operations, without which our nation’s forces can conduct few operations. Colonel Fredriksson discusses how space can be better integrated into the joint fight using evolving and transformational constructs, including the space coordinating authority, director of space forces, and space air and space operations center (Space AOC).

OPERATION DESERT STORM, dubbed the “first space war,” witnessed an unprecedented integration of space into joint operations. An even greater dependence on space was demonstrated in the more recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Maj Gen Robert Dickman, USAF, retired, now deputy for military space in the Office of the Undersecretary of the Air Force noted, “We had very few weapon systems then [during Desert Storm] that could not have been used without space assets. It was very different in Operation Iraqi Freedom [OIF]. The way we planned our campaign-things like GPS [global positioning system]-were not a force enhancement but embedded in how we operate our forces. And that was a very fundamental difference.”1

With the ever-increasing importance of space, the need for an effective command and control (C2) construct to integrate space forces globally-across multiple areas of operations-is increasingly apparent. The secretary of the Air Force, as the Department of Defense’s executive agent for space, and the Air Force, as the lead service with the preponderance of space assets, need a comprehensive and fully integrated G2 methodology for space forces-a C2 system that takes into account the unique nature of space power and effectively integrates it into the joint warfighting environment.2 Quite simply, we need a C2 construct that optimizes and leverages the application of space power at the operational level of employment.

The Nature of Space Power

Space power is “the total strength of a nation’s capabilities to conduct and influence activities to, in, through, and from space to achieve its objectives.”3 For our joint forces, this means exercising the military instrument of national power more effectively through the control and exploitation of the medium of space. Space power’s contribution to the military instrument has grown dramatically. Nearly all our forces rely on the GPS for precise navigation and timing, and much of the global information grid uses the medium of space to link units around the world. In addition, blue force tracking and space surveillance and reconnaissance have become integral parts of the common operating picture.

Before examining how to integrate space forces in joint operations, one must understand the unique nature of space power. Doctrine for both the joint community and the Air Force recognizes the differences in the mediums.4 In changing the name of this journal to Air and Space Power Journal (from Aerospace Power Journal), Gen John Jumper, the Air Force chief of staff, noted that “we will respect the fact that space is its own culture, and that space has different operating principles.”5 This is not just to say that space is different than air, though indeed it is, as the laws of aerodynamics and orbital mechanics attest: the control and exploitation of these mediums also differ. The argument is not that air and space forces need be independent. To the contrary, in many respects they are complementary and synergistic. While Earth- imaging spy satellites can examine great swaths of terra firma, manned and unmanned air-breathing vehicles are arguably more responsive, can loiter at a specific location much longer, and can get much closer to the action.

But space power is indeed unique. Why else would we spend exorbitant sums to go there? The reason is that space power provides distinct advantages, which include global presence, perspective, persistence, responsiveness, and destructive potential.6 These attributes are a function of the unique character of space power. Understanding the nature of space power is the first step toward effectively integrating space into joint war fighting. So, then, what is unique about space power?

Space Power Is Inherently Global in Nature

First, space power’s inherently global nature provides for simultaneous, real-time effects in multiple theaters from numerous operating locations. Satellite constellations like the GPS can provide a pervasive, worldwide utility. Ground stations can downlink or uplink information collected on the other side of the globe nearly instantaneously. For example, a joint tactical ground station for the Defense Support Program can downlink missile warning information for a primary user in the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR) and share this information with users in other AORs. Moreover, space systems operate and can provide effects continuously-24 hours a day, 365 days a year-across the entire spectrum of conflict from peace to crisis to war. Unlike expeditionary forces, many space forces operate from “forward deployed” locations all of the time. Some, like navigation support and early warning, provide services even during periods of relative peacefulness.

Global Space Forces Produce Theater Effects

While it is useful to think about the global nature of space power, the application of this power in joint operations occurs at the theater level-these global forces create theater or local effects. Whether it is precision GPS guidance for aircraft and their bombs or imagery for targeting or battle damage assessment, the pointy end of the spear pierces the enemy at the tactical level. For example, although a Joint Direct Attack Munition is guided by a global GPS system, it produces a distinctly local effect. It is for this reason that space power must be integrated with air, land, and sea power at the operational level across the spectrum of conflict from peace to crisis to war.

Space Power Is Joint and Interagency

Space supports war fighters in all mediums-air, land, sea, and cyberspace. Each military service operates space forces of its own, although the Air Force is recognized as the lead service for military space.7 The Defense Satellite Communications System is an example of service cooperation; the Army operates the payload while the Air Force flies the satellite. In another example, the Navy operates its Fleet Satellite Communications and UHF Follow-On satellites utilizing the Air Force Satellite Control Network. Additionally, space missions are normally fragmented across many agencies-the National Reconnaissance Office, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, National Security Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (formerly NIMA), and Defense Information Systems Agency, to a name a few. These missions, therefore, are particularly dependent on joint and interagency cooperation and coordination. In fact, the military relies on commercial space systems for a majority of its wideband communications and garners much of its imagery through these agencies.8

The Rules of Engagement Are Different for Space

Ever since the Eisenhower administration declared that the use of space should be for peaceful purposes, the medium has developed as a global commons.9 International treaty and national policy have sought to preserve space as a sanctuary for the common use of all nations. Accordingly, there is a common perception that space is a peaceful place. Forces operating in space do so without constraint from political and geographic boundaries. Although treaty bans prohibit the deployment of weapons of mass destruction to space, they do not forbid other weapons or the militarization of space.10 With a few historical exceptions, space has not been weaponized- however, it has been militarized.11 Indeed, given the dependence of the American way of war on space, one cannot deny its strategic significance.

Requirements for the Command and Control of Space Forces

Current C2 constructs for air, land, or sea might suffice if space power were not different from other forms of military power. Just as airpower developed its own principles and methods for the application of its unique attributes, so must space power. Airpower evolved from an auxiliary air service under the province of the Army to a fully independent force. As it matured, so did its means to command and control the forces using that medium. From flags and radios to flying command posts and expansive air and space operations centers (AOC), the C2 of air forces has revolutionized its impact on war fighting.

An important step toward realizing space power’s potential in joint war fighting is to identify the requirements for C2-a necessary space-power evolution that mirrors that of airpower. Airpower and space power share many characteristics. With their ability to influence large areas and their limited force structure, both are most effective when centrally controlled.

Space power, even more than airpower, is inherently global in nature, and its limited force structure is in high demand. Therefore, unless capabilities exceed requirements, the effective application of space power first requires that a central authority prioritize, apportion, and allocate space forces. That commander sh\ould be able to balance global space responsibilities with theater requirements to properly prioritize space assets and provide positive theater effects. For example, during OIF, the USCENTCOM staff made six separate requests for support for Constant Vigilance, the capability to provide dedicated, space-based, infrared monitoring for a particular area of operations. Those requirements had to be prioritized and deconflicted with requests from other AORs and then balanced against the requirements for strategic early warning. However, execution can be centralized or decentralized, depending on the circumstances.

Second, integration of space forces must occur at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Although the distinction between strategic, operational, and tactical effects is often blurred-a single tactical attack, for example, can have strategic consequences- these rubrics remain useful for organizing, planning, commanding, and controlling military forces. A statement of a nation’s grand strategy reflects its national policies and objectives, which, in turn, dictate its military strategy. Or, in the words of Carl von Clausewitz, “War is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means.”12 Military strategies dictate operational campaigns, in which forces are mobilized, deployed, and engaged. In those engagements, tactical units employ specific assets to achieve specific objectives, which, in turn, contribute to accomplishment of campaign objectives. In planning terms, national strategy dictates military strategy, military strategy dictates operational objectives, and operational objectives determine tactical tasks. This, applied in a joint construct, is how the US military organizes, trains, plans, and fights. And we must integrate space power accordingly.

Third, space power must be integrated into the joint C2 structures. Joint forces are organized to fight in joint task forces (JTF) under the command of a joint force commander (JFC). Joint operations doctrine states that the JTF can be comprised of both service components (Army, Air Force, Marine, and Navy) and joint functional components for air, land, maritime, and special operations (joint force air component commander [JFACC], joint force land component commander [JFLCC], joint force maritime component commander [JFMCC], and joint force special operations component commander [JFSOCC]) (fig. 1).13 All Air Force air and space forces are organized under the authority of commander, Air Force forces (COMAFFOR). Air Force doctrine also recommends that the COMAFFOR serve as the JFACC in most cases.14

Finally, as stated earlier, the employment of military force occurs at the operational level. The Air Force supplies the preponderance of air and space power forces and the capability to exercise C2. Generally, the Air Force employs theater forces through air and space expeditionary task forces with an AOC as the C2 element.15 The Air Force relies on this construct for the integration of air, space, and information power. Integration of air, space, and information operations is certainly necessary. For too long, stovepiped organizations hampered effective integration of these different but synergistic functions.

Figure 1. A joint task force organization with functional and service component commanders, representing the Air Force’s preferred joint force organization. (Reprinted from Air Force Doctrine Document 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 17 November 2003, fig. 5.2, 65.)

Organizations for Space Forces

United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) is the organization responsible for global space operations. On 30 July 2002, President George W. Bush signed a new Unified Command Plan directing the merging of US Space Command with USSTRATCOM and designating it as the combatant command for space, effective 1 October 2002.16 As such, USSTRATCOM is responsible for executing space operations to provide effects to theater commanders worldwide and for conducting continuous space services that support global missions. USSTRATCOM can be both supporting, as in the case of support to a regional combatant commander, and supported, as in the case of the space- superiority mission.

Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) is the force provider and currently the operational component to USSTRATCOM for Air Force space forces. Fourteenth Air Force exercises operational C2 of Air Force and attached forces through the Fourteenth Air Force AOC on behalf of AFSPC and for USSTRATCOM. At the time of this writing, discussions were under way on how to combine all of the forces that the Air Force provides to USSTRATCOM-intercontinental ballistic missiles; space forces; information operations; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); and global strike-into a single component, which will be called Air Forces Strategic Command (AFSTRAT).17 The details of this arrangement are relevant to the employment of space forces; the general principles prescribed in this article are valid regardless.

Current Constructs for Integrating Space into Theater Operations

Based on the complexity and scope of operations, the JFC can either retain authority or designate a component commander to coordinate and integrate space operations. The JFC considers (among other things) the mission, nature, and duration of the operation; preponderance of space-force capabilities; and the C2 capabilities (including reachback) in selecting the appropriate option. Joint and Air Force doctrines provide guidance for how the JFC coordinates and integrates space forces.

Space Coordinating Authority

Joint Publication (JP) 3-14, Joint Doctrine for Space Operations, establishes the concept of a coordinating authority for space, stating that “a supported JFC normally designates a single authority to coordinate joint theater space operations and integrate space capabilities. The space authority will coordinate space operations, integrate space capabilities, and have primary responsibility for in- theater joint space operations planning.”18 This authority, dubbed the space coordinating authority (SCA), has been tested in practice. For the first time in OIF, the JFC designated the JFACC to function also as the joint space coordinating authority, and a senior space officer was deployed to assist the JFACC in that role.19 Table 1 provides a more complete list of that person’s responsibilities.

Table 1. Responsibilities of the space coordinating authority

Air Force doctrine provides specific guidance regarding the C2 of space forces. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-2 states that the JFACC should be the coordinating authority for space and that this officer “may require a space officer dedicated to carry out the detailed responsibilities associated with the coordination role.”20

Senior Space Officer

In recent operations, a senior space officer (SSO) has served as the space advisor to the COMAFFOR, JFACC, or other JFC. In Operation Enduring Freedom (OFF), for example, senior Air Force officers deployed to the theater to support the COMAFFOR and the JFACC.21 Typically, a senior colonel or brigadier general with current space experience serves as the SSO and becomes the senior space expert and advisor to the COMMAFFOR, combined force air component commander (CFACC), or JFACC. Responsibilities of the SSO are listed in table 2.

The “Space AOC”

The Fourteenth Air Force AOC, often referred to as the “Space AOC,” at Vandenberg AFB, California, is the central C2 node for Air Force and attached space forces. The Space AOC conducts space- strategy development and combat planning; it also directs space operations across the spectrum of conflict. In concert with the planning efforts of USSTRATCOM and service components, it provides theater AOCs reachback capability as it simultaneously allocates, prioritizes, and develops the Air Force space operations plans to exploit the full range of space-combat capabilities in multiple theaters. These capabilities include gaining and maintaining space superiority, enabling and enhancing terrestrial operations, providing assured access and operations in space, and, eventually, delivering conventional strike capabilities from and through space. It is also the primary node for collecting, integrating, and fusing numerous information streams into a single integrated space picture as part of the overall common operating picture. The Space AOC operates 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, planning, synchronizing, tasking, integrating, and assessing execution of assigned and attached space forces.

Table 2. Responsibilities of the senior space officer

The Space AOC provides and integrates theater space effects with Falconer AOCs through the air tasking order (ATO) process. The “Falconer AOC” designation is applied to those five AOCs that have fully integrated space into their operations centers. During this process, the JFACC determines the objectives, targets, timing, and tempo of effects for the JFC. Embedded space personnel in the Falconer AOC divisions ensure that space activities and effects are integrated into ATO development and execution. The ATO process, in turn, drives the development of the space tasking order (STO), which is developed in parallel at the Space AOC. The STO tasks the right combination of operational in-place and deployed space units to synchronize space operations and provide the effects that theater and global commanders require (fig. 2).22

Support Teams

Service components and supporting commands provide support teams to assist theater commanders with integrating space in-theater. USSTRATCOM has created SSTs that are prepared to support theater commanders with integrated space, information operations, computer network operations, missile defense, and global strike capabilities. Several SSTs have been formed, each with a distinct theater focus. When needed, the SSTs will d\eploy to the theater to support the JFC. The teams will include space personnel that will work closely with the SSOs, space operations officers assigned to the theater, and reachback organizations such as the Space AOC.

Figure 2. Integrating global and theater space effects

Looking Forward: Director of Space Forces

Space forces resemble mobility forces in that they have both global and theater responsibilities. Senior officers attending a recent doctrine summit recognized this similarity and recommended that a director of space forces (DIRSPACEFOR) concept, modeled after the director of mobility forces (DIRMOBFOR), be examined as a C2 option for in-theater space forces (fig. 3).23 This recommendation became a summit action item which led the Air Force Doctrine Center and AFSPC to convene a “red team” whose purpose would be to examine that concept. That team recommended adopting a DIRSPACEFOR construct based on a modified DIRMOBFOR model, which was subsequently approved at Corona South, the Air Force’s periodic senior-leadership conference.24

Essentially, the team recommended evolving the SSO construct to a more defined role as a DIRSPACEFOR. The DIRSPACEFOR would serve primarily as an advisor to the COMMAFFOR/JFACC as part of this commander’s special staff. The DIRSPACEFOR would coordinate and integrate space support for the Air Force under the COMMAFFOR or for the JFC under the JFACC. The DIRSPACEFOR’s responsibilities (table 3) would closely mirror those of the SSO, which he or she would replace. The DIRSPACEFOR concept builds on both the DIRMOBFOR and the SSO positions. This individual would serve as a senior advisor to the air component commander and help ensure space support’s unity of effort. It is a position with wide horizontal, vertical, and reachback responsibility but with only limited authority under the current proposal. The DIRSPACEFOR would have to rely on his or her moral authority and skills of coordination to get the job done. Unlike the DIRMOBFOR, the DIRSPACEFOR would not have a dedicated space division in the AOC but would rely on a small staff, personnel embedded in all AOC divisions, and reachback capabilities to execute his or her responsibilities. Whereas a DIRSPACEFOR would provide coordination at the JFACC and AOC levels, it is essential to address integration at the JFC level if SCA is retained, or to determine the coordination of joint space forces if the SCA is delegated to another joint force component commander-say, the JFMCG. Although neither optimal nor complete, the DIRSPACEFOR model for integrating space power into joint operations is a useful evolutionary step toward a more robust C2 construct for theater space forces. In fact, the construct was successfully employed during Austere Challenge 04, United States Air Forces in Europe’s annual exercise in March 2004.

Figure 3. Director of space forces concept. (Adapted from Headquarters Air Force Space Command, Directorate of Plans and Programs [HQ AFSPC/XPXS] briefing, subject: DIRSPACEFOR, 1 February 2004.)

Table 3. Responsibilities of the director of space forces

Recommendations for Transformation

The Air Force is on an evolutionary path toward developing a C2 mechanism that will most effectively integrate space into joint war fighting. The processes in place today are a vast improvement over those of the past. Still, we can do better. The following recommendations are offered to maximize space power’s contributions to joint war fighting.

The in-theater SSO or DIRSPACEFOR should be empowered with a robust reachback capability. The Space AOC function, under AFSTRAT or another component of USSTRATCOM, is that capability. The Space AOC must provide an automated, machine-to-machine-correlated, single, integrated space picture as part of the family of common operating pictures to commanders at all echelons. Regardless of the evolution of in-theater space C2, this decision-making capability will provide centralized and effective C2 of our space power.

An alternative C2 approach would empower the theater AOCs with an ability to plan, task, and execute inherently global space forces. That approach, however, has several drawbacks. First, although some space forces are deployable and could, in theory, be fully dedicated to a single JFC, breaking our space forces into penny packets is not an efficient way to allocate these scarce resources.25 Second, resource limitations prevent duplicating the planning and tasking functions for each AOR, especially in an era when the Air Force is seeking to reduce the forward footprint of its AOCs. Finally, with such a modus operandi, space units would field a multitude of requests for effects-sometimes conflicting-from multiple areas of operation. The lack of a central, operational-level adjudication and tasking authority would result in a splintered chain of command for these tactical units.

Rather, the Air Force should integrate joint space capabilities at the operational level of conflict. As the lead service for space and the one with the preponderance of its capabilities and the ability to command and control through the Space AOC, the Air Force is uniquely postured to assume this role. However, as long as the presentation of space effects remains fragmented across multiple agencies and services, the United States will fail to realize space power’s full effectiveness or achieve its full potential.

A small space coordinating element (SCE), with perhaps 10 personnel, would enhance the integration of space within in-theater Falconer AOCs. It would include specialists in the various space- combat capabilities: navigation, warfare, missile warning, space control, surveillance, and targeting. In addition to giving the DIRSPACEFOR or SSO a dedicated and robust staff, an SCE would also provide additional resources for horizontal and vertical coordination with the JFC and other components. In contrast, the first responsibility of space personnel who are embedded in the AOC’s other divisions is that division’s respective portion of die ATO process-strategy, combat plans, combat operations-rather than providing dedicated space oversight and expertise. The perception of stovepiping space is chief among the arguments against an SCE, as is the desire to limit the AOC’s footprint. However, a relatively small staff reliant on the reachback capability resident in the Space AOC would be a minimal addition to the AOC staffing and considerably less than that of the AOC’s mobility and ISR divisions. The SCE would not serve as a standalone planning and tasking organization- the Space AOC should do that-but would provide a staff with specialized space expertise for the DIRSPACEFOR or SSO.

Eventually, space forces will do more than transmit information in support of air, land, and sea forces. Countersatellite operations and kinetic-kill capabilities are under development. Additional capabilities that can be tasked on platforms like space-based radar, space-based infrared systems, and GPS will further exacerbate the need for C2 of space forces. As these capabilities mature, the need for a dedicated joint force component commander for space will increase.

A single joint force space component commander (JFSCC) could also serve as global space coordinating authority (GSCA) for USSTRATCOM, the global combatant commander. Accordingly, joint doctrine should designate a GSCA as an inherent responsibility of the commander of US Strategic Command (CDRUSSTRATCOM).26 As the combatant commander responsible for global space operations, the CDRUSSTRATCOM would delegate GSCA to USSTRATCOM’s functional component for space, be it AFSTRAT, Fourteenth Air Force, a JTF for space, or another organization. The JFSCC should exercise operational control over the resources of all the services and government agencies charged with providing space support to the war fighter.27 This will provide a single point of contact for JFCs and unity of command for space forces supporting them.28

Conclusion

The Air Force is the right organization to integrate space effects in joint war fighting. It provides the preponderance of military space capabilities and the ability to command and control them. JFCs should delegate SCA to the JFACC or COMAFFOR to provide air and space power to the joint fight. The JFACC, through the SSO or DIRSPACEFOR, would exercise SCA, coordinating space effects for all functional component commanders in the AOR. The Falconer AOC ensures that space effects are integrated and synchronized with the JFC’s campaign plan through the ATO process. This process, in turn, provides the guidance for the one global STO, which prioritizes and integrates all theaters’ requests for space support. The commander of USSTRATCOM and the combatant commander for space delegate the responsibility for providing space effects to his or her Air Force component, which exercises this responsibility through the Space AOC, which in turn provides the requisite centralized C2 function for global and theater space operations. This approach ensures that a single commander commands space forces at the operational level of war. Just as an Airman provides airpower to the joint fight, so should a space Airman provide space power.

Notes

1. Quoted in J. R. Wilson, “The Ultimate High Ground,” Armed Forces Journal, January 2004, 28.

2. DOD Directive (DODD) 5101.2, DOD Executive Agent for Space, 3 June 2003, http://www.dtic.mil/whs/ directives/corres/pdf/ d51012_060303/d51012p.pdf.

3. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001, updated through 23 March 2004, 489, http://www.dtic. mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/ jpl_02.pdf.

4. JP 3-14, Joint Doctrine for Space Operations, 9 August 2002, on page 1-2, identifies characteristics of space that include no geographical boundaries, motion not affected by the earth’s surface, and unique (physical) characteristics; other special characteri\stics include global access, persistence, predictive orbits, and unique legal considerations. Older Air Force doctrine documents (Air Force Doctrine Document [AFDD] 2-8, Command and Control, 16 February 2001, for example) still use the term aerospace and with it the implication of a seamless operating medium. However, the current doctrinal idiom refers to the terms air and space as separate and unique mediums.

5. Gen John P. Jumper, “A Word from the Chief: Why ‘Air and Space’?” Air and Space Power Journal 16, no. 3 (Fall 2002): 5, http:/ /www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/air chronicles/apj/apj02/fa102/ jumper.html.

6. Brian E. Fredriksson, “Globalness: Toward a Space Power Theory” (master’s thesis, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell AFB, AL, June 2003), 37-45. Other sources and authors that have also characterized the attributes of space and space power include SPACECAST 2020 Executive Summary (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University, June 1994); Christian C. Daehnick, “Blueprints for the Future: Comparing National Security Space Architectures,” in Beyond the Paths of Heaven: The Emergence of Space Power Thought, ed. Col Brace M. DeBlois (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, September 1999); Bob Preston et al., Space Weapons: Earth Wars, RAND Report MR01209 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002); Bruce M. DeBlois, “Ascendant Realms: Characteristics of Airpower and Space Power,” in The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory, ed. Col Phillip Meilinger (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, August 1997) ; Gregory Billman, “The Inherent Limitations of Space Power: Fact or Fiction?” in Beyond the Paths of Heaven; and Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

7. Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization, Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization, Pursuant to Public Law 106-65 (Washington, DC: The [Space] Commission, 11 January 2001), chap. 4, 56-57, http://www.space.gov/ docs/fullreport.pdf; and DODD 5101.2, DOD Executive Agent for Space.

8. Commercial systems provided approximately 60 percent of satellite communications in OEF and 80 percent in OIF. See “US Government Market Opportunity for Commercial Satellite Operators: For Today or Here to Stay?” Futron Corporation Report (Bethesda, MD: Futron Corporation, 29 April 2003), http://www.futron.com/pdf/ governmentwhitepaper.pdf; and Robert K. Ackerman, “Military Users Boost Commercial Imagery,” SIGNAL Magazine, December 2003, http:// www.us.net/signal/Archive/ Dec03/Archive-dec03.html.

9. Col David W. Ziegler provides a thorough review of the “sanctuary perspective” in “Safe Heavens: Military Strategy and Space Sanctuary,” in Beyond the Paths of Heaven.

10. See P. K. Menon, The United Nations’ Efforts to Outlaw the Arms Race in Outer Space: A Brief History with Key Documents (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Meilen Press, 1988); Peter L. Hays, United States Military Space: Into the Twenty-First Century (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, September 2002); and Everett C. Dolman, Astropolitik: Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age (London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 2002), 113-44, for excellent surveys of space-related arms-control treaties and regulations. The most prominent space treaty is the “Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,” 27 January 1967, and usually referenced as simply the “Outer Space Treaty” (OST). Contrary to popular perception, the treaty regime, to include the OST, does not prohibit weapons other than “weapons of mass destruction” in space. Article FV of the OST declares, “States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.” See http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/Space Law/outersptxt.htm. Two additional treaties include (1) the now defunct Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972, which limited the development, testing, or deployment of land, air, sea or space-based ABM systems or components (http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/abmt); and (2) the Agreement on Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (United Nations General Assembly Resolution 34/68, 1979), which declared that the moon be developed “exclusively for peaceful purposes,” and prohibits nuclear weapons, weapons of mass destruction, and military facilities or maneuvers on or in orbit around the moon. See http://www.unog.ch/frames/disarm/distreat/ moon.htm.

11. Although weapons do not orbit in space, capabilities exist that can threaten space assets. Examples of those capabilities include nuclear weapons launched by ballistic missiles; ground- based lasers; electronic countermeasures, like GPS jammers; ABM systems, like the Russian Galosh deployed around Moscow; the old SL- 11-launched coorbital ASAT, which may still be operational; as well as the American space shuttle. Paul B. Stares, Space and National Security (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 1987), 111-13, provides a dated but still relevant discussion.

12. Carl von Clausewitz, On “War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 87.

13. JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, 10 September 2001.

14. AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 17 November 2003, 78, https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Main.asp.

15. Ibid., 79.

16. Unified Command Plan, change I, 30 July 2002; and “US Strategic Command History,” USSTRATCOM Fact File, http:// www.stratcom.mil/factsheetshtml/history.htm.

17. Gen John P. Jumper, USAF chief of staff, to Adm James O. Ellis, Jr., letter, 23 February 2004, http://www. 55srwa.org/0403/ 04-03011454.html.

18. JP 3-14, Joint Doctrine for Space Operations, 9 August 2002, http://jdeis.cornerstoneindustry.com/servlet/ page?_dad=porta130&_schema=PORTAL30&7865629. 58.211_J7_DISBROWSEPUBS_CLS_7865629.next_page =browsePubs/ tblContents.jsp&_pageid=56&d=3&pubId =43&pubNum=null&bol=1&searchType=0&pubOne=0.

19. CFC FRAGORD 09-004, 180548Z Mar 03, as cited in Maj Mark Main, “An Examination of Space Coordinating Authority and Command Relationships for Space Forces” (unpublished paper, Fourteenth Air Force Weapons and Tactics Division, Vandenberg AFB, CA). On 19 March 2003, Gen Tommy Franks, commander, USCENTCOM, invoked his authority and issued an order that designated the combined force air component commander (CFACC) as the space coordinating authority for OIF with responsibility to “coordinate all joint theater space operations and integrate space capabilities.”

20. AFDD 2-2, Space Operations, 27 November 2001, 24.

21. Brig Gen Richard Webber served as the deputy JFACC for space at the combined air operations center at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar. Brig Gen William Shelton served as the chief, space and information operations element at Headquarters USCENTCOM at Tyndall AFB, FL.

22. “Doctrine Watch no. 21: Space Tasking Order,” 12 March 2004, https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Main.asp.

23. Doctrine Summit 4, Air Force Doctrine Center, Maxwell AFB, AL, 17-18 November 2003.

24. Maj Scott Patton, Headquarters Air Force Space Command, Directorate of Plans, point paper, subject: Director of Space Forces, 9 January 2004; and Headquarters Air Force Space Command, Directorate of Plans, briefing, subject: DIRSPACEFOR, 1 February 2004.

25. Similar arguments were made by early airpower advocates, including Mitchell and Trenchard, to justify separate air services- and subsequently in debates about close air support for the Army.

26. Maj Mark Main, deputy to the SSO during OIF, “An Examination of Space Coordinating Authority (SCA) and Command Relationships for Space Forces” (unpublished paper, Fourteenth Air Force Weapons and Tactics Division, n.d.).

27. Myron Hura et al., Integration of Air and Space: Focus on Command and Control, RAND Project Air Force Report MR-1521-AF (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), xiii. These authors observed that “only a fraction of space systems that support military operations are commanded and controlled by the military.”

28. Benjamin Lambeth, Mastering tlie Ultimate High Ground: Next Steps in the Military Uses of Space, RAND Project Air Force Report MR-1649-AF (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), 158.

LT COL BRIAN E. FREDRIKSSON, USAF

Copyright U.S. Superintendent of Documents Summer 2004